مجلة البحوث التاريخية
Volume 3, Numéro 1, Pages 112-126
2019-05-28
الكاتب : تيتة ليلى .
يتناول هذا المقال بالدراسة واقع منطقة الأوراس خلال الفترة 01 نوفمبر إلى 31 ديسمبر 1954 من خلال نظرة نقدية في ثلاث تقارير أعدها الجنرال بول شاريير القائد العام للقوات المسلحة في الناحية العسكرية العاشرة (الجزائر) عن تطور الأوضاع بالمنطقة بعد العمليات العسكرية الأولى المعلنة عن تفجير الثورة التحريرية. This article is interested in studing the général situation in the Aurès region from November 1st to December 31st, 1954 from a critical study of three reports written by General Paul CHERRIERE Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the 10th Military Region (Algeria) drawing on his information from the leaders of the three military regions of Algeria, Constantine and Oran, as well as police and gendarmerie interests. In fact, these reports are published in a huge volume prepared by John Charles Jaufferet, a Professor at the Montpellier 3 University with a number of researchers collected from documents kept by the historical land army (S.H.A.T) in Vincenne from 1946 to 1954. Through the critical reading of these documents we reached a number of results: The first is that it spoke on armed hand attacks and subversive operations in the region using a variety of means, which would represent the truth if these operations were not seen as criminal and subversive. Second,these operations were attributed to Muslims, the infidels, the outlaws, the terms often circulated by the French colonial authorities in describing the revolutionaries during this period and were also attributed to the "gangs" old was active in the region in a clear reference to the Grine Belgacem and his group, which was a source of disturbance to the colonial authorities prior to the revolution. Third,the reports limited the revolutionaries to people from the PPA and avoided talking about the FLN In the early days, Cherriere saw that he need only limited forces to deter rebel tribes. As the events unfolded, it became apparent that a large number of douars had joined it as of November 11, 1954, and this was evidenced by the support, funding, observation and empathy shown by the people of the region towards it In his assessment of the results of the French policy in the region, General Cherriere saw that the operations have not been very successful as the "rebels" continue to move back to other areas. On this basis, some historians believe that it is possible that, in a meeting with the local authorities on January 21, 1955, it was General Cherriere's reports that the liquidation of the region and the final elimination of the rebellion took several months because of the wide and varied difficulties of the field and the ocean. Some French military leaders also say that the delay in the arrival of military supplies to General Cherriere of Metropole is the main reason for the failure of the latter's policy in this period in the region. Finally,What was important is that the military supplies began to arrive and that General cherriere started from 22 January 1955 in the development of a huge methods of new military operations in the region.
الأوراس ; الثورة التحريرية ; شاريير ; التقارير ; الأوضاع
ليلى تيتة
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ص 165-180.
سعاد يمينة شبوط
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ص 153-167.
بوبكر حفظالله
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ص 1-18.
رضوان شافو
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ص 59-72.
عبدالله مقلاتي
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ص 409-429.