The Local Turn in Peace Studies:
Toward a Review of Liberal Peacebuilding.

التجاوب المحلي في دراسات السلام : نحو إعادة مراجعة لنموذج بناء السلام الليبرالي.

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Abstract :

For a long time, the Liberal peace model dominated discourse and practice in peacebuilding, but the result was far from the idealism advocated by this model. In many regions, when peacebuilding was linked to state-building on a conditional basis, the real factors behind these areas' conflicts remained far from being treated. Even when institutions were formed in them, they were still powerless and often distorted. This issue established the emergence of critical current in Peace studies, known as the local turn, whose basic premise is that the more local powers and actors are involved in peacebuilding efforts, the greater the chances of its success.

Keywords: Peace studies, the local turn, peacebuilding, Liberal peace.

ملخص :

سيطر ولفترة طويلة نموذج السلام الليبرالي على الخطاب والممارسة في بناء السلام، ولكن النتيجة كانت بعيدة عن المثالية التي يرسمها دعاة هذا النموذج، ففي كثير من المناطق، حينما رُبط بناء السلم ببناء الدولة بشكل شرطي، ظلت العوامل الحقيقية الواقفة خلف النزاعات في هذه المناطق بعيدة عن المعالجة، وحتى وإن تشكلت فيها مؤسسات فقد ظلت عاجزة ومشوهة في كثير من الأحيان. وقد أسس ذلك لبروز تيار نقدي في دراسات السلام، عرف بالتجاوب المحلي، تنطلق فرضيته الأساسية، من أنه كلما انخرطت القوى والفواعل المحلية في جهود بناء السلام كلما زادت فرص نجاحه .

الكلمات المفتاحية: دراسات السلام، التجاوب المحلي، بناء السلام، السلام الليبرالي.

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INTRODUCTION:

In the 1990s, there was a fundamental shift from top-down peacebuilding, where outside interventions played the role of expert by applying their concepts of conflict resolution, and ignoring local and national cultures and capacities. This shift took place in favour of a set of practices and principles commonly referred to as "Peacebuilding from Below," which emphasises a return to the local environment of conflict in peacebuilding structuration.

Giving importance to local actors has become a widely agreed principle in peacebuilding, both in research and practice."The transformative" peacebuilding theory, which was developed by John Paul Lederach in the early 1990s, had a significant influence in guiding the shift from "international" to "local" peacebuilding paradigms. Lederach's thought has also influenced a whole generation of peacebuilding practitioners. Local turn reflects a move away from linear concepts in peacebuilding, which assume that peace can be imposed within Western visions without including local contexts and dynamics in which conflict arises. These nonlinear concepts emphasise that peacebuilding, which is a hybrid process, involves the community and local practices and pathways, and they emphasise the importance of 'hidden' agencies and resistance to all global solutions to local problems imposed from above. Many of those who are interested in Peace Studies see that peacebuilding initiatives are not neutral in their normative tendencies, raising essential questions about the role of international organisations in their attempts to end conflicts by promoting a political and economic model based on Liberal peace assumptions.

With the increasing number of actors operating in post-conflict areas and the operational and technical cooperation among governments, inter-governmental organisations, and the local community, the main question that arises in this context and could be problematic for this research is: Can a comprehensive peacebuilding approach, whose development is based on the idea of local turn, be adopted?
From this central question of the study, several questions can arise including:
Is the local turn representing a critical current in the field of Peace Studies?
Is the local turn considered as an emancipatory attempt out of normative frameworks and mechanisms that have adopted by the Liberal peacebuilding model?

This paper seeks to answer these questions through the following two axes:

2 .A New Research Agenda About the Emergence of Local Turn in Peace Studies:

2.1. Local Turn in Peace Studies Literature:

The sought of including local contexts, communities, or local agencies within the process of conflict transformation and peacebuilding, during the last two decades, has been at the heart of the discussions in the field of Peace Studies, where the literature of Peace Studies in the mid-1990s has seen a tendency towards the need to include local structures in peacebuilding processes within what is known as (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015, p.825):

Refering to the local dimension of peacebuilding as a tool for measuring the effectiveness of the peacebuilding process by decentralising peacebuilding processes as well as leveraging local governance patterns, capacities, and ownership[1].

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[1] Local ownership refers to the degree of control exerted by local actors over national political processes in post-conflict contexts, and it is now widely recognized that local ownership is a guiding principle for peacebuilding. However, there remain questions about how it should be achieved. However, the two main determinants that local ownership and national capacity for

Focusing on the local in peacebuilding as a means of emancipation and inclusion of local agency, expressed partly through the emphasis on voices from below and partly within the critical approaches to how the local has been interpreted in peacebuilding so far, arguing for peacebuilding that is essentially local.

Profound changes drove the shift towards the local environment in peacebuilding research at the cognitive and practical levels. At the cognitive level, it was through the intense debate that prevailed during the late 1980s within the Humanities and Social Sciences, in particular Anthropology, Ethnographic Studies, and Sociology. These debates are driven by scathing criticism by proponents of poststructural and postcolonial theories to mainstream epistemologies and ontologies (Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 763), that considered culture to be a constant and immutable value, while the new approaches advocated the idea that culture is a structure that is not characterised by unity and stability, and it is subject to internal and external influences, and negotiation about what it is within the perceptions of individuals and society as a whole (Bräuchler, 2018, pp. 18-19). The inclusion of culture as a searchable variable, followed a reconsideration of qualitative research in the fields of the Humanities and Social Sciences, that had been neglected in favour of quantitative studies, arguing that it was not quantifiable. Thus, the data such as culture and societal perceptions of concepts like peace, reconciliation, and justice, where they are interpreted at local conflict trone communities, have been included in the research agenda of Peace Studies. These debates on culture have reconsidered ''difference'' and ''context'' in the research agenda in the field, by considering culture and values as an analytical tool for understanding the cultural structures that stimulate conflict, or the value system prevailing in societies in a situation of violence, which allows parties from within or outside the conflict to engage in the peace processes and incorporate such local structures and factors as local civil society, traditional local justice, as well as values of local reconciliation. (Bräuchler, 2018, p.p 20-21).

The discourse of local agencies in Peace Studies emerged in the writings of Johan Galtung (1969) and Adam Curle (1971), but it took on a more intense form in the 1990s in the works of John Paul Lederach (1997),   Edward Azar (1990), and Robert Fisher and Herbert C. Kelman (2003), whose writings were the first generation of local turn in Peace Studies. These writings were a reaction to the failure of peace operations, which were after the UN peace agenda document (1992) in Rwanda, Somalia, and The Balkans. These critics emphasise the empowerment of local structures within peace processes as a condition for their success.

The authors of the first generation argue that international-Liberal peacebuilding efforts are essential and indispensable to achieve peace. However, they are marred by over-reliance on international support and a misunderstanding of the roles of local structures, and therefore they have to include local actors in their structuration. (Paffenholz, 2015, p. 860), or what Lederach calls the middle level of society (NGOs, civil society organisations, local leaders), Lederach mentioned that great attention is paid to material sources and external factors in many processes of conflict transformation and peacebuilding, while the correct idea is the opposite. The greatest resources for sustainable peace are rooted in the local environment. So the efforts to achieve sustainable peace must consider individuals, communities, and their cultural

peace should generate are the extent to which civil society influences and the restoration of government functions, (see Donais, 2009, pp. 3-26; Donais, 2012 for mor detail).

particularities as peacebuilding resources rather than as recipients, or parts marginalised from those processes (Lederach,1997, pp.7-8.).

The second generation of local turn came as a response to the neo-Liberal approach to peacebuilding, which shifted from issues of peace to issues of security and Liberal state-building, which emerged after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The writings of Roger Mac Ginty, Oliver Richmond, and David Chandler were the most prominent of these contributions that established a critical school of peacebuilding which sought to expose the relationships of forces that control the contents of neo-Liberal Peacebuilding Architecture and the exclusion that those forces exert on the local structures of communities that have experienced conflict (Paffenholz, 2015, pp. 858-859).

The shift towards the local in Peace Studies, according to Michael Pugh, is to restore the critical (foundational) paradigm of the field of Peace Studies in general and the issue of peacebuilding in particular, and to rid it of the dominance of the mainstream that adopts an epistemologically problem-solving paradigm, which has received tremendous support from Policymakers and research institutions associated with governments, international organisations, or international donor institutions. The critical paradigm also presents questions about the assumptions associated with the practices of peacebuilding and its cognitive frameworks, and transcends the interpretive limits of the Liberal peacebuilding (Pugh, 2013, pp. 11-12), which is an extension of the value system, which is related to the prevailing power relations in favour of the West in the international community. and which seeks to make these trends more compact in its cognitive aspect in order to justify the hegemony of these forces (Cox, 1981, pp. 128-129).

The critical orientation of Peace Studies has given more space to a different understanding of peace policies, the state, the rights, the needs, and law in the context of peace as a scientific concept, and also as a practical path beyond the dominance of the Liberal model and its ontological and epistemological assumptions, in which it presents an incompatible solution to conflicts, with ideological objectives that neglect the structural factors of conflict that are often rooted in the daily dynamics of the local environment of conflict (Ginty & Richmond, 2013, pp. 767-768).

2.2. Local Turn from International Agenda:

Post-Cold-War era, which witnessed interest in internal conflicts that, according to Lederach, were existed before this period in third-world countries, and were covered by the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those conflicts were not motivated by the nature of the ideological conflict that prevailed during the Cold-War era, but by the identity whis was shaped by the nature of the exclusionary state in the third world. They also took place at local levels, and involved many non-state actors (Lederach, 1997, pp. 7-8).

The United Nations and other international actors in peacebuilding processes talk about the concepts of "local governance" and "local capacity" associated with local ownership. However, reviews of peacebuilding experiences, following internal conflicts after the Cold War, show that they adopted superficial peace agendas, and were of a central nature that excluded the specific context of the local environment. These models also employed the concept of "local" as a rhetorical rather than a practical concept within peacebuilding and conflict transformation processes (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015, p. 825).

As the international body that formulates and oversees peacebuilding initiatives, The United Nations adopts centralised action plans that are not compatible with "local

ownership" from the groups of experts who formulate peacebuilding action plans located at the headquarters of United Nations organs to the peace teams deployed to conflict zones, where the formulation of peacebuilding operations is often a bureaucratic- institutional process, which completely lacks accountability in terms of the content of peacebuilding plans, as well as in terms of the practical management of the organs and personnel involved in peace operations; therefore, the reconsideration of accountability coming from below , and the abandonment of the vision of superiority towards all what is local, which is adopted by the international actors when facing the task of peacebuilding after conflict, are considred as a basic condition for formulating peacebuilding models that are capable of achieving sustainable peace (Pugh, 2013, p. 15).

   International actors in peacebuilding also adopt strategies to promote democracy and the free market as a 'cure' for the situation of violence. In fact, according to Ronald Paris, many of these organisations have become active and influential advocates of the democratic Liberalism, or the market economy, or both.

   At the end of the Cold War, this ideological orientation prevailed only within the peacebuilding initiatives in which the United Nations intervenes,then it became an ideology adoped by all the actors involved in international peacebuilding structuration, including specialised United Nations agencies such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), or outside as the European Union, NATO, the Organization of American States (OAS), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and many NGOs working in relief and development tasks. They are, in brief, who are called the pancipal peacebuilding practitioners (Paris, 2004, p. 22) because they go beyond the limits of their role of supporting peacebuilding as an objective to try to impose themselves as normative powers that define the contents of peacebuilding processes and state-building and the development models that accompany them (Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 769).

   The major peacebuilding operations supervised by the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies in Cambodia, Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, East Timor, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, are formulated according to a stereotypical model that focuses on achieving security rather than achieving peace (Newman, 2013, p. 312). The problems involved in this international peacebuilding structration have considered the achievement of peace as a materialistic goal that can be measured through indicators of democracy, human rights, and the integration of a post-conflict economy into the global economic system. One of the most significant challenges faced by these processes, according to E. Newman, were represented by the ability to create coordination between international peace agencies and local actors that are characterised by the ability to make peacebuilding processes adaptable according to the specificities of local communities that are in conflict. Thus, the practical dimension of the local turn in peacebuilding was the reconsideration of the kinds of goals that must be achieved, and the actors that must be included in the peacebuilding structuration. These goals are the achievement of the capacity of the state and society that live in conflict, or during the post-conflict period to maintain and enhance peace in a subjective way with the assistance of the local actors, represented by civil society structures, local government agencies, and local non-governement organisation. Indeed, peacebuilding task forces or a large part of them must be local (Newman, 2013, pp. 314-316).

   According to Roger Mac Ginty, there is danger in describing everything which is

'traditional' or 'indigenous' as romantic, while these levels include all the original, natural, and valuable dynamics that ensure sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. In contrast, the dichotomy of "international" and "modernist" lacks all the characteristics that characterise local structures (Mac Ginty, 2011, pp. 51-52). Hence, peace is considered as a concept that can be reformulated at the level of values and pactices, but practitioners of international peacebuilding consider it as a universal concept that can be exported to all societies with different contexts, and this is what led to a collision between the external actors of peace and daily dynamics of conflict within local communities that show resistence to these unilateral practices. Richmond argues that a process of 'hybridisation' of peacebuilding should start on the ground to make a shared process between international and local actors within what he calls "everyday peace", which does not just refer to the perceived problems and real obstacles that individuals or groups face in their daily lives in post-conflict periods, but also to all the interactions and dynamics that make the terms of peace within a particular community unique with having specific contexts that are discovered through local structures far from any prepared upper moulds (Richmond & Mitchell, 2012, pp. 1-2).

Local Turn as a Critique of the Liberal Peacebuilding Paradigm:
3.1. Liberal Peacebuilding Ideology:

With the absence of the discussion about peace as a concept, and with the consequence that comes from it as being an epistemological problem that cannot be solved from the cognitive side, in addition to the victory of the Liberal West over Communism, the world witnessed, after the Cold War, the emergence of what Richmond calls "Victor's Peace." The model and concept of international peace were associated to what is determined by the victor's standards and values embodied by the Liberal norms. It has been generally assumed that Liberal peace is the most acceptable model among all peace-related proposals, and it prevailed in most international policy documents related to peace and security issues after the Cold War period. Moreover, It has also been assumed that there is no discussion about its structure and legitimacy in post-conflict environments. However, the basic components that formulate liberal peace including democratisation processes, the sovereinty of law, human rights, the globalised market economy, and neo-Liberal development, have increasingly faced criticism in many respects. These critics have focused on the links between certain levels of intensive democratisation and economic reform, espoused by the neo-Liberal agenda, on the one hand, and local ownership and fragile development projects on the other hand (Richmond, 2006, pp. 292-298).

Proponents of liberal peace[2] argue that Liberal systems suppress violence options in society. Thus, according to them, third world countries, where violent conflict is

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[2] The liberal peacebuilding Orthodoxy descends from Immanuel Kant's thoughts of *Perpetual Peace* (1795) where he argued that the chaotic state of the world could be overcome, through the synthesis of republican governments responsible to their citizens, international law, to regulate the conduct of the state, and economic interdependence to create interests in the maintenance of peace, by avoiding the costs of war. This model developed by Kant and his followers evolved into the theory of "democratic peace", these theses were included during the founding of the league of nations and then the United Nations and were embodied in the international peacebuilding processes put forward by the *Peace Agenda* document (1992), (see Doyle, 2012; Cavalcante, 2019 for mor detail).

prevalent , lack three main pillars (Doyle, 2005, pp. 464-465):

1.Liberal institutions that guarantee democracy (the separation of powers and activation of representative institutions).

2.Human rights as irreplaceable universal values.

3.The development dependent on the integration of the local economy into the system of a globalised capitalist economy.

Based on these basiscs, the Liberal peacebuilding was put and has prevailed in peacebuilding initiatives since the end of the Cold War, and has got tatal accepentence among international institutions and practitioners as the model that can bring peace to societies in conflict (Finkenbusch, 2016, p. 253).

This Liberal peacebuilding model was built according to the context that includes four components (Jackson, 2018, p. 2):

1.Security sector reform which includes disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of armed parties (DDR Programs), the focus on the professionalism of the army, and the adherence to law and system.

2.Economic reform which includes market Liberalisation that is based on the Liberal economy.

3.Political reform which includes a political system that ensures political participation and competition, fair national elections, and constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. In some cases, social reconciliation efforts take the form of commissions of truth, purges, amnesty, and other transitional justice mechanisms, which often do not take into account historical and cultural contexts and the role of local actors.

Liberal Peacebuilding as a State-building:

   The Liberal peacebuilding model has not been able to change its ''idolatry perception,'' in Richard Jackson's words, based on relating the idea of peace to the building of institution and state, which has ties to external parties that support peace, and which adopt superstructure models that face strong resistance from local structures. So Liberal peacebuilding is considered as a Liberal state-building project and more then being than a peacebuilding project. This vision seems to be the reflection of the Hobbesian Perspective, which deals with peace as an incidental case in human relations that is dominated by a tendency to conflict. Therefore, the Liberal peacebuilding perspective has emphasised the idea of nation-building to srround what is considered as a security dilemma for identity groups, rather than looking for opportunities to create coexistence (Jackson,2018, p3). Michael Pugh sgguests a critical dismantling of the Liberal peacebuilding concept, and he describes it as the followoing:

   "overarching neoliberal ideology that merges security and development; 'romanticises the local' as victims or illiberal; builds hollow institutions; designs economic life to reproduce assertive capitalism; equates peace with state-building, and assumes that interveners have privileged knowledge about peace issues. The paradigm is mobilised with a package of transformation policies – an assemblage construed by academics as the 'liberal peace'" (Pugh,2013, p. 14).

   One of the substantial projects of Liberal peacebuilding is economy-building. International economic institutions tend to empose neoliberal structural adjustment on countries after a situation of widespread violence, without having a realistic view of the effects of the conflict. Donors have pushed these countries to become a mirror image of themselves as if the war had no consequences. They made capitalism, as an economic system, the goal to be achieved to build new societies showing dedication to the Liberal Orthodoxy that is the only one that is capable of achieving and maintaining

peace and economic development (Gaynor, 2016, p. 783).

One of the biggest problems, posed by the approaches of international economic bodies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, is the interventions included in their stereotyped projects to rebuild national economies in post-conflict countries, and to emphasise on starting working on the privatisation, market Liberalisation and the ill-considered withdrawal of the state in controlling economic imbalances. This means that the aim is more then concentrating on saving the state from economic collapse; it is to undermine the economic roles of the state and turn it into a minimalist state. Reducing the state capacity and relying on external resources have led to the migration of competencies rather than their re-absorption into the private sector. The role of the state is to provide the institutions and legal frameworks required for the normal functioning of the economy. The interventions of international economic bodies hamper the building of local capacities in terms of Structural Adjustment Programme Design which is included in the specificity of a post-conflict economy as a result of the reduction in the government spending.They also scale down the salaries of employees, and the purchasing power of employees of the government sector, who shapes the majority of the workforce. This leads to a deepening of inequality within society, which may contribute to a renewed cycle of conflict (Abrahamsson, 2003, pp. 66-67).

All reports issued by the international financial institutions consider inequality as an incentive factor for conflict within society. However, we note that inequality is a structural feature rooted in the international capitalist system in which these institutions attempt to integrate the economies of post-conflict countries. These practices by the institutions of capitalism represent a new type of economic trusteeship, in the absence of global economic stracturation that allows the equitable distribution of wealth. Thus, the international efforts to support peacebuilding and state reconstruction are based on certain moral and structural contradictions in the geopolitics of economic aid (Richmond, 2017, pp. 300-301).

For his part, Chandler sees that the barriers that have hindered the success of the Liberal peacebuilding model are embodied in two fundamental factors (Chandler, 2017, pp. 144-148):

The absence of the true will of the West to provide the resources and coordination necessary to achieve a societal transition from conflict to peace, focusing instead on accelerating formal Liberal institutional transformations that are supposed to operate with no contact societal dynamics.

Illegal attempts by these forces to curb the process of enabling local elites to attain power and control their national resources, which creates a stark contrast to the Liberal model which emphasises the construction of representative bodies that displace the elites who monopolise power that existed before the conflict or was produced by the conflict.

From Peace to Security:

Peacebuilding operations have formulated as part of the international security agenda, which deals with intra-state conflicts as a security threat that needs to be addressed with security approaches through military intervention to resolve crises of an inherently non-security nature. However, what requires security is the embodiment of social transformation and justice, as well as emancipation from all structures that are conflict-causing (Newman, 2010, pp. 306-307). Liberal peacebuilding paradigm sought to securitising peacebuilding initiatives (not by passing the state of negative peace) focusing on the militarisation of peace processes, especially in light of the

conditions that prevailed in the world order after the ''global war on terror'' led by the United States and its allies. Moreover, these illiberal politics of the most extreme external actors in support of the Liberal peacebuilding model pose problems about its ability to achieve the essence of what it calls for (Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015, pp. 176-177).

The major powers that support the efforts of the United Nations have taken the peacekeeping operations adopted by the organisation as a cover to legitimise the presence of their forces under the pretext of achieving stability and confronting terrorism. Hence, the Liberal peacebuilding models, according to J. Karlesrud, transformed from a quest to achieve peace towards coalitions against terrorism and extremism influenced by major powers that do not matter with the considerations related to the legitimacy of the regimes in the countries of conflict. Thus, the alliance with these regimes that lack legitimacy under the pretext of combating terrorism and making stabilisation[3] becomes a priority at the expense of achieving peace (Karlsrud, 2019, pp. 10-11). These security perceptions of the peacebuilding come from the widespread belief among the major powers in the international system that weak and failed states generate security threat.This led to include pacebuilding in the international security agenda, and created selectivity in the international community approach by the major powers that take advantages of conflicts in the countries of the South under the pretext of security threats, regardless of the extent of the human rights violations they cause (Hehir, 2007, pp. 309-311).

Local Versus International Transitional Justice:

Many traditional societies have developed and maintained sophisticated mechanisms for non-violent conflict resolution and have constructed their notions of peace. These perceptions of peace have been marginalised away from the versions of peace offered by colonial powers, or sponsored by elements of the modern-day international community. It is not surprising that traditional societies found, and find, Western perceptions of peace, something extraneous to their values. This misunderstanding between cultures, or attempts to impose one culture on another, may explain - in certain respects - why many peace agreements in contemporary ethnic-local conflicts find it difficult to achieve sustainable peace (Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 149). While international transitional justice is one of the components of a Liberal peace model that seeks to create strong global accountability for crimes occurred during the conflict by convicting and holding perpetrators accountable under the pretexts that local institutions are dishonest, or as a deterrent to avoid the recurrence of conflict-period crimes, it fails to establish a course of local norms that can achieve public satisfaction. Local cultures with their values and practices may stimulate conflicts or escalate their dynamics. However, they include, simultaneously, values and practices

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[3]   Stabilisation has been a progressively recurring concept in UN circles since the begining of the 2000s. The concept was first employed by NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1996 to 2004 and the UN Security Council introduced the term 'stabilisation' in the latter year in the name of the UN mission to Haiti. Since 2009, three more missions have had stabilisation included in their mission names – MONUSCO in the DRC (2010), MINUSMA in Mali (2013) and the UN Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA, 2014). In the same period, there has been an exponential growth in the use of the concept of stabilisation in Security Council meetings and documents, driven mainly by the three penholders, France, the UK and the US, who have 'uploaded' 'their conceptualisations of stabilisation into UN intervention 'frameworks', (see Curran & Holtom, 2015 for mor detail).

that build reconciliation. Conflict transformation and peacebuilding based on transitional justice that incorporates the values of local culture have come to be seen as an alternative to superior "retaliatory" transitional justice often imposed by international institutions or even by states involved in the conflict, which leave no opportunities for societal forgiveness or political reconciliation (Wanis-St. John, 2013, pp. 361-362).

From this perspective, the model is a continuation of the historical processes of imperialism that produced neo-colonialism and alienation, where Liberal peace has come to be seen as synonymous with Liberal imperialism operating within a moral system that claims cognitive superiority, justice, and freedom (Jackson, 2018, p. 4). Thus, the local turn emerged from sharp critics of the Liberal Orthodoxy on peace, which deals with crises outside the geography of the West with the logic of "terra nullius"[4] or the natural right of the West to intervene in the issues of the South. According to Mac Ginty and Richmond, the Liberal perspective is a continuation of the colonial anthropology centred on the idea of the civilised Western mission to the uncivilised people, and the dedication of the inability of the local agency to confront the structural forces exercised by the colonialist or the elites associated with it, where the collusion of local elites at present with the former coloniser is an inevitable path for third world countries in order to justify links to Liberal peace and state-building (Ginty & Richmond, 2013, pp. 765-766).

Conclusion:
The failure of Liberal peacebuilding models since their inception in the early 1990s has led to a review of the values and mechanisms by which peace is achieved. These reviews have reconsidered local structures as independent agencies that have effective practices in the path of peace rather than portraying them as obstacles to peace. Local agencies have become resistant to the Liberal model of peace which sees the realisation of Liberal standards as the determinant of peace, and the construction of neoliberal democracies as a mechanism to realise these standards. Moreover, the tendency to combine peace with Liberal state-building, without including local contexts and realities in a way that ensures true empowerment, has led to the construction of distorted states whose institutions have no societal extention.

In Peace Studies in general and in peacebuilding issues in particular, the local turn has reflected a re-examination of international peacebuilding efforts, and it has pushed for greater inclusion of local factors. In addition, it has called for greater attention to the local system of values and traditional heritage, including elements of the identity which forms society, especially in divided societies, where all societal components must be included in post-conflict state institutions with strengthening the territorial sovereignty of the state and its national identity outside the control of international actors engaged in multilateral peacebuilding.

Advocates of local turn argue that it represents an approach in the peacebuilding to achieve the human security of post-conflict societies instead of employing it as a form of new interventionism, and to strengthen the economic protection of the states that are ripped by conflicts rather than hasty integration into the global economy, and to

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[4] Mac Ginty and Richmond argue that the Liberal perspective of peace is rooted in the Roman Orthodoxy terra nullius, which refers to Rome's right to control the territories settled by the 'Barbarians' as primitive nations unable to manage their affairs, which, in their view, reflects the marginalization of the local context within the Liberal peacebuilding agenda as patterns and actions are useless for peace.

improve public services to ensure the removal of the hidden dynamics of conflicts.

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