

Commerce and warfare: a Brief Note on the Activities of Ottoman and Portuguese Pirates and Privateers in the Eastern Mediterranean (second half of the 15th century and early 16th century)

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ملخص:

التجارة و الحرب: مذكرة موجزة عن أنشطة اللصوص و القراصنة العثمانيين و البرتغاليين في شرق البحر الأبيض المتوسط (النصف الثاني من القرن الخامس عشر و أوائل القرن السادس عشر)

تركز هذه المذكرة على الأنشطة المتشابهة للصوص و القراصنة العثمانيين والبرتغاليين في شرق البحر الأبيض المتوسط في النصف الثاني من القرن الخامس عشر وأوائل القرن السادس عشر. وكان لتصرفاتهم آثار على الصراع البرتغالي المملوكي الذي اتسع نطاقه في البحر الأحمر وغرب المحيط الهندي في أوائل القرن السادس عشر. ارتبط نمو هذه القراصنة البرتغالية بطموحات البرتغال السياسية والعسكرية في وسط وشرق البحر الأبيض المتوسط في بداية القرن السادس عشر. ولتحقيق هذه الاستراتيجية، كان لهم تأثير هائل داخل فرقة القديس يوحنا الأورشليمي. يتناول هذا المقال اثنين من القراصنة البرتغاليين البارزين والنبلاء: أندريه دو أمارال، مستشار فرقة القديس يوحنا القدس (في رودس)، الذي هزم أسطولاً للسلطان المملوكي قانصوه الغوري في خليج أياز (1510). وساهمت هذه الهزيمة بقوة في زيادة اعتماد السلطنة على العثمانيين، مما مهد لفتح مصر على يد سليم الأول عام 1517. وفيما

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يتعلق بديوغو فرنانديز دي ألميدا، تجدر الإشارة إلى أنه كان شقيق نائب الملك الأول لمقاطعة الهند (أي الإمبراطورية البرتغالية في آسيا).

الكلمات المفتاحية :

شرق البحر الأبيض المتوسط؛ الصراع البرتغالي المملوكي؛ اللصوص و القراصنة؛ وسام القديس يوحنا القدس؛ أندريه دو أمارال؛ ديوغو دي ألميدا.

Abstract:

This note focuses on the intertwined activities of Ottoman and Portuguese pirates and privateers in the Eastern Mediterranean in the second half of the 15th century and early 16th century. Their actions had impacts on the Portuguese-Mamluk conflict, which expanded in the Red Sea and the western Indian Ocean in the early 16th century. The growth of this Portuguese piracy was linked up with Portugal's political and military ambitions in the central and eastern Mediterranean at the beginning of the 16th century. To achieve this strategy, they wielded enormous influence within the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. This article deals with two prominent Portuguese privateers and nobleman : André do Amaral, Chancellor of the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem (in Rhodes), who defeated the fleet of the Mamluk sultan Ḳānṣawḥ al-Ghawī's in the Gulf of Ayāz (1510). This defeat strongly contributed to increasing the dependence of the sultanate on the Ottomans, thus preparing the conquest of Egypt by Selim I in 1517. With regard to Diogo Fernandes de Almeida, it is worth clarifying that he was the brother of the first Vice-roy of the *Estado da Índia* (i.e. the Portuguese Empire in Asia).

Keywords:

Eastern Mediterranean; Portuguese-Mamluk conflict; Pirates and privateers; Order of Saint John of Jerusalem; André do Amaral; Diogo de Almeida.

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This note focuses on the intertwined activities of Ottoman and Portuguese pirates and privateers in the eastern Mediterranean in the second half of the 15th century and early 16th century. As shown in greater detail in an extensive article⁶², these activities weighted in the fierce Portuguese-Mamluk conflict. They also indirectly played a significant role in the progressive military and political weakness of the Mamluks against the Ottomans⁶³.

At the beginning of the 16th century, Portugal sought a more prominent role in the Western and Central Mediterranean through King Manuel, who tried to challenge the political and economic influence of his powerful in-laws, Queen Isabel of Castile and King Ferdinand of Aragon⁶⁴. King Manuel attempted a maneuver to establish *de facto* a Portuguese zone of influence East of Melilla and around Oran⁶⁵. To better achieve this goal, he invested in the anti-Ottoman crusade. And, as with a previous crusade, this one also served a political and military agenda aside from an anti-Muslim one. In 1458, king Afonso V of Portugal had diverted the troops assembled to fight against Mehmet II, and instead had conquered the Moroccan port of Qasr el-Sghîr in the Strait of Gibraltar⁶⁶.

⁶²**COUTO (D.)**: « “The affairs of the Turks are growing Strongly”: The Portuguese, the Mamluks, the Ottomans, and the Indian Ocean Issues (1505-1517) », in *1516: The Year that changed the Middle East* (ed. by Abdul Rahim Husayn), Beirut, American University of Beirut, 2021, p. 304-349.

⁶³For a detailed discussion see **COUTO (D.)**: *op. cit.*

⁶⁴Hereafter referred to as the Catholic Kings. See **BRAGA (I. M. R. M. D.)**: *Cooperação e conflito. Portugal, Castela e Aragão (séculos XV–XVII)*, Lisbon, Universitária editora, 2002. By a treaty with King Louis XII of France, Ferdinand the Catholic, King of Aragon, also became King of Naples in October 10, 1500. The possession was ratified by the Pope on June 25, 1501.

⁶⁵See *carta de quitação* of Rui Fernandes de Almada, February 4, 1502. Robert Ricard republished in 1955 the list of products traded in Oran (the list had already been published by Freire, cf. **FREIRE (A. B.)**: « Cartas de quitação Del-rei D. Manuel », *Arquivo histórico Portuguez*, v. 5, 1907, p. 324-325, with a short comment underlining the connection of the factory with the Sudanese trade). See **RICARD (R.)**: « La factorerie portugaise d’Oran (1483–1487) », in *Études sur l’histoire des Portugais au Maroc*, Coimbra, Por ordem da Universidade, 1955, p. 193-201. On the Portuguese factory in Oran see *infra*.

⁶⁶**ROSENBERGER (B.)**: *Le Maroc au XVI^e siècle. Au seuil de la modernité*, Séville, Fondation des Trois Cultures, 2008, p. 52.

Therefore, in 1500, despite little assistance from the Catholic Kings, from whom he had asked for diplomatic support to carry out his project, King Manuel joined the anti-Ottoman coalition against sultan Bāyezīd II. According to the papal disposition of Alexander VI, the coalition was supposed to bring together the naval forces of Venice, France, and the Catholic Kings under the naval command of the Grand Master of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem (in Rhodes) and the land forces of the Habsburgs, Poland, and Hungary. The kings of Scotland, Denmark, Portugal, and England, as well as the duke of Florence and the government of Siena, had agreed to contribute financially⁶⁷.

After intricate negotiations, King Manuel finally dispatched the fleet of João de Menezes⁶⁸, thereby overstepping the role to which the Pope had relegated him. According to the chronicler Marino Sanuto, the participation of Portugal in the 1501 coalition was taken into consideration in Venice⁶⁹, despite Portugal's minor military contribution - just 8000 men, which still exceeded Poland's (1000) and Denmark's (6000)⁷⁰.

This initiative was taken during the restart of the war between the Porte and Venice following the delivery of the body of *Şehzade Cem* to Bāyezīd II⁷¹. The sultan took over Lepanto in August 1499, and Coron, Modon, and Navarin fell in 1500. For his part, the corsair Kemal Reīs carried out raids in the western Mediterranean,

⁶⁷About the political negotiations related to the crusade, see **AUBIN (J.)** : *Le latin et l'astrolabe. Etudes inédites sur le règne de D. Manuel 1495-1521*, v. III (ed. by Maria da Conceição Flores, Luís Filipe F. R. Thomaz, and Françoise Aubin), Paris, Centre culturel Calouste Gulbenkian, Délégation en France, 2006, p. 130-137. The Pope's disposition was issued on October of 1500.

⁶⁸**AUBIN (J.)** : *op. cit.*, p. 135.

⁶⁹**AUBIN (J.)** : *op. cit.*, p. 135, and **SANUTO (M.)**: *I Diarii di Marino Sanuto*, 58 vols., v. IV (ed. by Rinaldo Fulin, Frederico Stefani, Nicolò Barozzi, Guglielmo Berchet, and Marco Allegri), Venice, Marco Visentini, 1880, 4, 21.

⁷⁰**AUBIN (J.)** : *op. cit.*, p. 131.

⁷¹On this question, see **VATIN (N.)**: *Sultan Djem. Un prince ottoman dans l'Europe du XVI^e siècle d'après deux sources contemporaines : Vâkı' ât-ı Sultân Cem, Œuvres de Guillaume Caoursin*, Ankara, Imprimerie de la société turque d'histoire, 1997. On the Ottoman-Venetian war, see, among many others, **GOFFMANN (D.)**: *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 138-145.

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including in the waters of the Catholic Kings, venturing all the way to Valencia, a main port in Andalusia⁷².

Although the goals of Ferdinand and Isabel seeking to reunite the Portuguese fleet with that of Don Gonzalo Fernandéz de Cordoba - to prevent the movement of Bāyezīd II forces, who reportedly had prepared to come in support of the King of Naples- were essentially defensive, João de Menezes also carried secret instructions to occupy Mers el-Kébir and Oran⁷³. However, the Portuguese expedition, with thirty sails and 3500 men⁷⁴, failed⁷⁵; its attempt to disembark at Mers el-Kébir was stopped by contrary winds which forced the fleet to postpone the landing for three days, thus allowing the arrival of Maghrebian forces from the neighboring mountains.

The Portuguese did join the Venetian fleet in Corfu, but uneasiness between the two navies led to quarrels among crews while on land, resulting in fifty dead, after which the Portuguese returned home. The ultimate objective of joining the western fleets in Rhodes did not take place⁷⁶.

The Christian coalition's results were meager, having succeeded only in seizing Cephalonia (1500) and Santa Maura (1502), but not Durazzo. The project of greater Portuguese influence in the western and central Mediterranean, as King Manuel had originally conceived it, also failed, partly due to Mers el-Kébir's disaster and partly due to Manuel's parallel military investments in Morocco, where the Portuguese had maintained four coastal fortresses since the 15th century (Ceuta, Qasr el-Sghīr, Tangier, and Asilah), opposing the interests of Ferdinand and Isabel over the Wattāsid kingdom of Fez⁷⁷.

⁷²**COOK (W. F. Jr.):** *Hundred Years War for Morocco. Gunpowder and the Military Revolution in the Early Modern Muslim World. History and Warfare*, Boulder, Colorado, The Westview Press, 1994, p. 144-145. Due to its many inconsistencies, **HESS (A.):** *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier*, Chicago and London, Chicago University Press, 1978, is not recommended as a reliable source.

⁷³**AUBIN (J.)** : *op. cit.*, p. 135.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*

⁷⁵**AUBIN (J.)** : *op. cit.*, p. 143-144.

⁷⁶**AUBIN (J.)** : *op. cit.*, p. 135 **COUTO (D.)** : *op.cit.*, p.306.

⁷⁷See **LAROUÏ (Abdallah)** : *L'histoire du Maghreb. Un essai de synthèse*, Casablanca, Centre culturel arabe, 1995, p. 222-223; **YAHYA (D.)** : *Morocco in*

While the Portuguese increased their conquests and consolidated their rule along the Atlantic coast of the Maghreb⁷⁸, King Ferdinand of Aragon- after the death of his wife Isabel in November 1504, and with the advice of the influential Franciscan Cardinal Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros- occupied several ports along the Moroccan Mediterranean coast: Mers el-Kébir in September 1505, Melilla in April 1506, Piñon de Velez in 1508, and Oran on May 18, 1509⁷⁹. Consequently, the Portuguese were not able to keep their factory in Oran (which existed between 1483 and 1487), but they kept their outpost in Chios, where they used to come to sell the sugar from Madeira island and probably, after 1500, some spices⁸⁰.

The Portuguese military threat to the Mamluk sultanate: The Order of St. John of Jerusalem (in Rhodes) and the Levantine corsairs

Beyond his ambition to hold positions in the Western and Central Mediterranean, king Manuel also sought to reinforce his military

the Sixteenth Century. Problems and Patterns in African Foreign Policy, N. J., Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press, 1981, p. 1-2.

⁷⁸The conquest of Santa Cruz do Cabo de Guer (Agadir) took place in 1505. Agouz was conquered in 1507 and Safi in 1508. See **ROSENBERGER (B.)**: «Retour sur la conquête de Safi par le Portugal en 1508», in *Portugal e o Magrebe. Actas do 4º colóquio de história luso-marroquina*, Lisbon and Braga, CHAM / CITCEM, 2011, p. 83-97.

⁷⁹**CARVAJAL (L. G. de)**: *Anales breves del reinado de los Reyes Católicos D. Fernando y Doña Isabel de gloriosa memoria, que dejó manuscritos el Dr. D. Lorenzo Galíndes Carvajal*, Appendix 2 of *Crónica de los muy altos y muy poderosos don Fernando y doña Isabel*, in *Crónica de los reys de Castilla*, t. 70, v. 3 (ed. by Cayetano Rosell), Madrid, Real Academia Española, 1953, p. 533-565; **COSTA (J. P. O. e)**: *D.Manuel I*, Lisbon, Círculo de Leitores, 2005, p. 193.

⁸⁰The Portuguese held a factory in Oran in the 15th century, administered by Rui Fernandes de Almada. Its existence is attested between 1483 and 1487 (see the abovementioned *carta de quitação* of Rui Fernandes de Almada, February 4, 1502). In 1499, king Manuel of Portugal sent two officers (Diogo Machado and Lançarote Alvarez) to Chios. Gaspar Pereira and António do Porto were also sent to Chios. Regarding details concerning the Portuguese sugar trade (and other types of commerce) in the factory of Chios, see **COUTO (D.)**: «Portugal e a fronteira mediterrânica nos séculos XV e XVI: políticas reais e mapeamento do mundo insular levantino», in *Portugal e a Europa: Olhares, relações e identidades*, (ed.by Paulo Catarino Lopes), Lisbon, CHAM - Centro de Humanidades, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2019, p. 353-354 (an ill-defined amount of sugar was sent to the Ottoman lands).

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influence to East Mediterranean. The main reason was to put pressure on the Mamluk sultanate which represented a threat for the Portuguese, as they administered the Holy Places in Palestine and dominated the Red Sea, a key area for the delivery of Indian Ocean spices to the Mediterranean. Besides, the Mamluks had launched an expedition to India to fight the Portuguese in 1507-1508. Even if the Mamluk admiral ‘Āmir Husayn al-Kurdī was defeated by the Portuguese in 1509 in Diu (Gujarat), one could expect the restart of the attempts. In order to set foot on the East Mediterranean and to fight the Mamluks, King Manuel relied on the action of two powerful instruments: the Portuguese corsairs and privateers and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem⁸¹.

To counteract the actions of Ottoman privateers and corsairs in the service of the Porte⁸², the Order began recruiting crews and arming ships in the ports of the Catholic King (mainly in the kingdom of Aragon) resorting to hiring adventurers from various regions of the Iberian peninsula in 1495-1496⁸³. While active in the 15th century⁸⁴, these corsairs increased their raids significantly at the beginning of the 16th century thanks to the important positions of Portuguese knights in the Order of St. John of Jerusalem (in Rhodes)⁸⁵, whose members were devoted, since the creation of the Order in Portugal, to fighting Muslims in the Mediterranean⁸⁶.

⁸¹**AUBIN (J.)** : *op. cit.*, p. 445-466.

⁸²For an overview (dealing with Ottoman corsairs in western and eastern Mediterranean waters) see **GÜRKAN (E. S.)**: *Ottoman Corsairs in the Western Mediterranean and their Place in the Ottoman-Habsbourg Rivalry (1505-1535)*, Ankara, Bilkent University, (MA dissertation), 2006; **GÜRKAN (E. S.)**: *Sultanın Korsanları: Osmanlı Akdenizi’nde Gazâ, Yağma ve Esaret, 1500-1700*, İstanbul, Kronik, 2018.

⁸³**AUBIN (J.)** : *op. cit.*, p. 466.

⁸⁴**LIMÃO (P.)** : *Portugal e o Império turco na área do Mediterrâneo: século XV*, v. 1, Lisbon, Universidade de Lisboa, 1994 p. 204-219 ((MA dissertation). See also the tables in pages 217-219 with reference to seized “Ottoman” ships in 1498 (p. 219).

⁸⁵Settled in Portugal between 1122 and 1128, the Order of St. John of Jerusalem was protected by the Portuguese medieval monarchs, and mainly by king Sancho II, who granted it many assets and privileges: **COSTA (P. P.)**: « A Ordem militar do Hospital em Portugal: dos finais da Idade Média à modernidade », in *Militarium Ordinum Analecta*, v. ¾, 2000, p. 5-605; **COSTA (P. P.)**: « O Mediterrâneo e a Ordem de S. João », in *Portogallo Mediterraneo*, (ed. by Luís Adão da Fonseca and Maria Eugenia Cadeddu), Istituto sui Rapporti Itali-Iberici,

It should be reminded that one of the most important personalities within the Order in Rhodes was the Chancellor, the Portuguese André do Amaral, elected in 1503 registrar of the convent (*conservator generalis communis thesauri*), and Great Chancellor in 1511, a position generally provided in the *Langue de Castile*⁸⁷. Amaral owned a galleon, and, in 1507, he was permitted to arm a galleon and a galley to loot the sector between Kastellórizzo and the channel of Kos.

The Portuguese privateers activities were closely linked to the maritime trade of sugar, cloth and spices, and they developed on behalf of the Order. They covered a large area from the Aegean to the Egyptian coast, quickly confronting the Ottoman corsairs in their own waters. For example, in May 1498, Kemal Re'īs captured two Portuguese vessels, a small *barge* and a galleon with 180 men, and seized their nautical charts and artillery off the Egyptian coast⁸⁸. In 1502, according to *Şehzade* Korkut, the Portuguese seized an Ottoman *nave* in the same area⁸⁹.

Cagliari, 2001, p. 75-97. About Rhodes, see VATIN (N.): *Rhodes et l'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, Paris, CNRS éditions, 2000.

⁸⁶VATIN (N.): *op. cit.*, p. 34-39; LUTTRELL (A.): « The Earliest Documents on the Hospitaller Corso at Rhodes: 1413 and 1416 », *Mediterranean Historical Review*, v. 10, 1995 (v. 1-2), p. 177-188 and 178-179 in particular.

⁸⁷BARROS (M. F. L. de): « Muslims in the Portuguese Kingdom : between Permanence and Diaspora », *In the Iberia Peninsula and Beyond. A History of Jews and Muslims (15th-17th Centuries)*, (ed. by José Alberto Rodrigues da Silva Tavim, Maria Filomena Lopes de Barros, Lúcia Liba Mucznick), Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015, p. 66. Barros gives the date of 1501 for his appointment.

⁸⁸As I wrote elsewhere (COUTO (D.): « Portugal e a fronteira... », art. cit., p. 350), it is more likely that Kemal Re'īs captured Portuguese nautical charts on board of these ships that off Valencia as traditionally penned by some authors. According to Marino Sanuto, the encounter took place near Abukir (close to Alexandria) and one of the ships was commanded by the Portuguese privateer Saturnino. See COUTO (D.): « Portugal e a fronteira... », art. cit. p. 350 and note 45.

⁸⁹Korkud became one of the primary imperial backers of *ğazwa* [غزوة, *ğazawāt* or *ghazawāt* for غزوات in the plural). A person who practices *ghazwa* is a *ghāzī*, [غازي] activities through the eastern Mediterranean: see AL-TIKRITI (N.): « Ties that bind: An Ottoman Maritime Patron from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean », in *Seapower, Technology and Trade: Studies in Turkish Maritime History* (ed. by Dejanirah Couto, Feza Günergün, Maria Pia Pedani), Istanbul,

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Between 1500 and 1517, another prominent personality who stood out in the service of the Portuguese Crown in the eastern Mediterranean was Diogo Fernandes de Almeida, prior of Crato. As a knight of the Order, he participated in the siege of Rhodes in 1480⁹⁰. The Venetian Leonardo Ca' Masser, who visited Portugal, noted that Almeida had “spent a long time as a privateer in Rhodes and [sailed] everywhere in the Levant”. Almeida began plundering the Mediterranean coasts after his nomination as captain of the “Galleys of the Religion” in 1502; he roamed the area between Negroponte (Euboea), Salonika, Cyprus and the Egyptian coast, defeating in 1503 Kurtoğlu (Cortigoli), Muslihiddin Reis, later *Sanjakkbey* of Rhodes after the Ottoman conquest of 1522. The naval battle between these two corsairs was described in a letter sent by the viceroy of Sicily to the Catholic Kings, who in turn reported the news to King Manuel of Portugal⁹¹.

Piri Reis University Publications, Denizler Kitabevi, 2014, p.18; **AUBIN (J.)** : *op. cit.*, p. 469.

⁹⁰ The date of his departure to Rhodes was registered in Portugal: **PINA (R. de)**: *Chronica do Senhor Rey D. Affonso V* (ed. by M. Lopes de Almeida), Porto, Lello & Irmão, 1977, chapter 208, p. 874.

⁹¹[Palermo, January 25, 1504, in *Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo*, Lisbon (hereafter AN/TT, *Corpo Cronologico* (hereafter CC) part I, folder 4, doc. 74, fol. 1]. This document was transcribed in **LÁZARO (A. M.)**: *O grande lagarto: o Mar Vermelho nos primórdios da presença portuguesa no Oceano Índico (1487-1521)*, Braga, Universidade do Minho, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, (Ph.D. thesis), 2006, p. 497 (doc. 9), following the edition of *Documentos referentes a las relaciones con Portugal durante el reinado de los Reyes Católicos*, 3 vols. (ed. by Antonio de la Torre y del Cerro and Luis Suárez Fernández), Valladolid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Graficas A. Martin, 1958–1963, p. 113-114: Isabel, the Catholic Queen, sent the news to King Manuel (from Medina del Campo, April 17, 1504 [AN/TT, CC I, 4, 74]). About Kurtoğlu, see **TENENTI (A.)**: « I corsari in Mediterraneo all'inizio del Cinquecento », *Rivista storica italiana*, v. 72- 2, 1960, p. 284-285. Kara Durmuş also participated in the naval battle. Bosio calls him “Caradromis”, and relates that he was born at Sivrihisar. See **AUBIN (J.)** : *op. cit.*, p. 468, note 17. About Kara Durmuş, see also **AL-TIKRITI (N.)**: *art. cit.*, p. 18-19. **BRUMMETT (P.)**: *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery*, New York, State University of New York Press, 1994, p. 94, says that Kara Durmuş sailed off apparently “under the patronage of the *beylerbey* of Manisa, Celal Beg” (but truly under the patronage of Korkud).

Almeida's activity competed with the pirates from Rhodes (among them Nicolas Santurini)⁹². Upon returning to Portugal in 1504, having had the opportunity to study the weaknesses of the Egyptian coastal defenses, he advised King Manuel to attack Alexandria.

It is important to note that Diogo Fernandes de Almeida was one of the brothers of Francisco de Almeida, the first viceroy of the *Estado da Índia*, the Portuguese empire in Asia⁹³. As it is well known, the Portuguese 16th century nobility operated within a strongly supportive clan system based on the *ethos* of the family and its clientelist networks⁹⁴. Thanks to the coordinated actions of the two brothers, both in terms of military and intelligence planning, King Manuel was able to weaken the Mamluk sultanate on two fronts. Thus, attacks on one front had repercussions on the other: while Diogo Fernandes de Almeida fought the Mamluks in the Mediterranean by mobilizing other members of the Order as well as some pirates and corsairs, his brother Francisco attacked the Mamluks with his fleets in the Indian Ocean.

In fact, King Manuel's goal was to have the Order of Rhodes "carry on in the eastern Mediterranean the counterpart of those operations that were led in the Arabian Sea"⁹⁵. However, the Portuguese monarch could not achieve this ambitious design during his life time (he died in 1521): the conquest of Rhodes by *Yavuz Selim* in 1522 made it impossible. Anyway, the project of making the Order an instrument of his external policy⁹⁶ led King Manuel to

⁹²On Nicola Santurini see **BOSIO (G.)**: *Dell'Istoria della sacra religione et ill.ma militia di San Giovanni Gierosolimitano*, v. II, Rome, Guglielmo Facciotto, 1594-1602, p. 603; **MIZZI (J.)**: *Catalogue of the Record of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in the Royal Malta Archives*, 13 vols., v.1-8., Malta, Malta University Press, 1964-1970, p. 113 (1506), p. 125 (1509), p. 142 (1513).

⁹³**COSTA (P. P.)**: « O poder régio e os Hospitalários na época de D. Manuel », *Revista camoniana*, v. 15, 2004, p. 257. The third brother, Pedro de Almeida, became commander (*comendador*) of the Order of Avis (i.e., the powerful Order of the Portuguese Discoveries).

⁹⁴**RESENDE (V.)**: *A sociedade e a expansão no reinado de D. Manuel*, Lagos, Câmara Municipal de Lagos, 2006, p. 115-147. See also the contributions published by **COSTA (J. P. O. e)** and **RODRIGUES (V. L. G.)**: *A alta nobreza e a fundação do Estado da Índia*, Lisbon, Centro de História de Além-Mar, 2004.

⁹⁵**AUBIN (J.)**: *op. cit.*, p. 465.

⁹⁶**COSTA (P. P.)**: p. 262-263.

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organize a Levantine spy network within the Order with agents in Egypt, Syria, and the Dodecanese Islands whose mission was to gather intelligence on the internal situation in Egypt and on Ottoman-Mamluk diplomatic relations.

To conclude this brief note, one of the most relevant aspects to be underlined concerns the role played by this double Portuguese piracy in the defeat of the Mamluk sultan *Ḳānṣawḥ al-Ghawrī*'s by André do Amaral's fleet, at the Ayās Gulf (1510), an outcome which had enormous consequences in the geopolitical balance of the Middle East in the 16th century, as it paved the way for the 1517 Ottoman conquest of Egypt⁹⁷.

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⁹⁷See detailed discussion in **COUTO (D.)**: « “The affairs of the Turks...” », art. cit., 324-325.

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