

**Volume: 08, N°:01 (2024), p 26 - 36****The Italo-Turkish War 1911-1912 (The Tripolitan War)** **Salmi Aicha \***

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**Abstract:**

The attainment of Italian unification necessitated the engagement in four distinct wars of different magnitudes, ultimately fulfilling the aspirations of both liberal and conservative proponents. Consequently, the Kingdom of Italy emerged as a prominent European power, in which in the wake of its failed attempt to seize possession of Tunisia and its eventual defeat at the Battle of Adwa, the new nation sought out alternative available strategies to realize its colonial ambitions. That made Italy declare war on the Ottoman Empire in 1911-1912, During it, Italy, sought to drive the Turks from Libya, This led to Artillery being fired in the Mediterranean, and the Red sea, the Dardanelles.

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## The Italo-Turkish War 1911-1912 (The Tripolitan War)

### Introduction

At the beginning of the 20th century, many Western European powers were seeking to create and consolidate empires, particularly in Africa., Italy, was no interloper to this, to her she was about to be in the process of founding a dominion, Just south of and across the Mediterranean Sea, Decidedly in Libya in 1911. Tripolitania and Cyrenaica provided a compelling possibility to extend Italy's interests and it would relieve the pressure of a resurgent nationalist movement.

Particularly With the attention of the wider Europe fixated on the events in Morocco, was the conquest of vulnerable Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in the far corners of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire simply too promising an opportunity to pass up?

Hence, to provide a definite answer to the research. In our article, we attempted to explore various aspects of the subject, during its various phases of hostilities on multiple belligerent fronts, in contemplation of the required conclusion; we pursued the historical method as a strategy for the research, in conjunction with the descriptive method. Added to that, we defined the study's Destinations as such:

- ♦ Emphasize the historical significance of conflict during a pivotal period in history for Italy and the Ottoman Empire, Libya.
- ♦ Understanding the fundamental dimensions of the Italo-Turkish War 1911-1912 thorough investigation as well as an examination of the available sources.
- ♦ Indicating and notifying the devastating effects of the conflict in Libya, and the Ottoman Empire, and how Italy exploited this warfare to its advantage.

### 1. The Motives for the Italian Penetration into Libya:

Italy wanted to become an empire not only because it considered this its historical right and saw itself as a noble nation worthy of equal greatness and equality with other great powers, but also because of some thorny domestic issues. Partly because they wanted to avoid resolution. Moreover, the Italian politicians knew this well. (Simon, 1987, p.47) and it was gradually constrained into seizing Libya through the occasions of a few 30 years. Tunisia is admittedly the point of North Africa nearest to Sicily, in more than absolutely geological terms, but trusts of making an Italian North African realm there were dashed by the acknowledgment of the French protectorate in 1881 (Wright, 1981, p.25).

France's occupation of Tunisia enraged Italy more than others, because after establishing its union, Italy shifted its sights onto Tunisia, which was geographically extremely near to Italy and residence to approximately 20,000 Italians, but France moved ahead of it and occupied it, resulting in relations between France and Italy to decline (Uçarol, 1995, p. 292).

Indeed, after it became apparent that French forces were advancing towards the frontiers of Tripoli immediately following the Tunisian invasion, and from there, both Italy and the Ottoman Empire turned their attention to this direction. Italy proceeded with preparing an occupation of Tripoli, while the Ottoman Empire transferred soldiers, supplies, and equipment to Tripoli and undertook repairs and maintenance on the port (ALTUNSOY, 2022, p.32) .

Thereafter Without a doubt, it is barely an exaggeration to say that it got to be aphoristic to any Italian government, no matter what its political complexion, that Tripoli was a 'promised land' that would sometime in the not so distant future be akin to Italy ( Stephenson,2014,p.58).

Since 1884, there has been a fear among the Ottoman Empire that Italy would attack Tripoli. Thenceforth, rumors have spread that soldiers are gathering in Sicily to land in Tripoli. However, by 1911, circumstances were ripe for Italy to take measures against Tripoli, as Giolitti became Prime Minister again on March 1, 1911, and in the new government, San Giuliano was Minister of Foreign Affairs. While presenting the program of the new government to Parliament, Giolitti focused on three important issues, The Tripoli issue, was included this in the government's program, nevertheless Giolitti did not explain it to Parliament (Uçarol, 1995, p. 635-636).

The Italian Prime Minister Giolitti merely justified his country's aspirations by saying that: "the existing state of things could not last; given the attitude of the Young Turks, if we had not gone to Libya, some other power would have done so either for political or economic reasons"(Giolitti,1923, 254).

Indeterminately, within the late-nineteenth-century 'scramble' by European powers for African belonging Italy went after unclaimed Libya for vital security within the Mediterranean and compensation for imperialist designs frustrated elsewhere (Wright, 1981, p.25), Italy was motivated by several crucial factors to actively pursue Libya. They are as follows:

- **The population increase dilemma:** In the late 1800s, many Italian liberals made a link between colonialism and population growth. This immediate link was a response to the difficult conditions in which Italy found itself (Choate, 2003, p.65), often challenges related to land insecurity and high unemployment rates within its own national territory (Iavasile, 2012, p.45).
- **Financial constraints and the deterioration of conditions in Italy:** Contrary to France and Britain, the newly formed Kingdom of Italy confronted financial restraints that hindered them from promoting and founding plantation colonies for economic exploitation (Choate, 2003, p.65).

The political elite saw colonial enlargement as a practical remedy to domestic problems. After the unification of Italy, the population increased dramatically and surpassed the capacity of the national economy to maintain it. This resulted in employment and food scarcity, particularly in the poorer countryside of the South and Sicily, leading to rampant misery and social discontent among the less privileged. As a result, from 1870 to 1910, an estimated 9 million Italians chose to migrate to the United States and South America. The government anticipated that the colonization of a colony located just 300 miles to the south would allow these immigrant farmers to turn the Libyan coast into a thriving Italian enclave, thus relieving internal pressures and contributing to the overall improvement of the country (Esposito, 2020, p.6).

- **The natural resources:** the colonial authorities were also keen on the country's natural wealth (Iavasile, 2012, p. 47).

## 2. The Italian military operations to invade Libya (Tripoli and Cyrenaica): title

The Italian occupation of Libya pursued a long but eventually successful diplomatic campaign to gain the consent of the Great European Powers for the project, and France was the only power that could put up serious resistance to the Italian plan, but it was surmounted by Italian support for its stance in the crises of 1905 and 1911. (Askew, 1942, pp.269-369) .

On September 19, 1911, the Italian Army was officially called up and began gathering an expeditionary force. Late on September 26, the Italian ambassador in Constantinople issued an invasive ultimatum to the Ottoman government, ordering the surrender of Libya to the Kingdom of Italy in just 24 hours. Although the Ottomans were open to a compromise that would preserve their

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dignity, similar to their agreement with Britain over Egypt, Rome sought a confrontation and as a result hostility erupted on September 29 (Esposito, 2020, p.6).

According to this ultimatum, firstly, Italy was worried about the safety of Italians living in Tripolitania and Benghazi, which were deemed unsafe, and thus some Italian families started to leave the province. Secondly, Italy stated that the ships transporting arms and soldiers to Tripolitania were disturbing Italy, but the Ottoman Empire declared on September 26 that there was no such issue for the Italians. It also said that there was sufficient protection in the region to ensure security and that they should not worry (BERCİ, 2020, p.40).

The Ottoman Empire affirmed that it had always given priority to good relations with Italy and that it was still willing to discuss with Italy as long as it did not jeopardize the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but that Italy would not be able to impose the order it wanted in Tripolitania and Benghazi (Armaoğlu, 1997, p.639).

Upon Porte's rejection of Giolitti's ultimatum (Del Boca, 2010, p.19), the Italian army organized a special army division known as the Corpo d'Armata Speciale, consisting of two divisions with a total of 34,000 soldiers, to invade Libya (Esposito, 2020, p.7).

At around this time, the Ottoman Empire had nearly 3,500 troops in the province and the local inhabitants played an important role in providing support to the troops and in the resistance against Italian domination. With the help of the local residents, the Ottoman Empire attempted to prevent the advance of Italian forces into the region (ÜSTÜN, 2020, p.34).

On September 29, 1911, the Tripolitan War erupted between the Ottoman Empire and Italy. Throughout the Tripoli War, Italy committed illegal acts that did not conform to the rules of the International Law of War (BERCİ, 2020, p.1). Thus; Italy's attack on Tripolitania led to great outrage and tension among the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire from the very first day. As stated before, the government's lack of using the necessary harsh language for a long time contributed to the escalation of this conflict. From the outset of the war, the atrocities perpetrated by the Italians in Tripolitania raised a pro-Ottoman sentiment in Europe and some demonstrations were organized. However, the hypocritical policy pursued by European powers against all political attempts showed that it would be "**naïve**" to assume that the matter would be resolved in support of the Ottomans (Şeber, 2011, p.249).

Italy, after declaring war on various global platforms, commenced the long-awaited operation it had envisioned. Deploying its armed forces, armed with state-of-the-art weaponry and military equipment, Italy displayed the pinnacle of technological advancements during that era (Üstün, 2020, p.36).

On October 3, 1911, at 3:30 p.m., the Italian fleet initiated an attack on the outdated cannons of the Tripoli fortresses. The Italian artillery, with its superior range, quickly overwhelmed the fortresses, including the Sultaniya and Hamidie forts, as well as the Lighthouse and Quay batteries. Despite the absence of the main expeditionary force from Naples, which consisted of 34,000 men and 72 cannons, the responsibility of occupying the deserted Tripoli fell upon Commander Umberto Cagni and his 1,732 sailors (Del Boca, 2010, p.19).

They bombarded the limited number of urban centers situated along the coastline, with Tripoli being the most prominent among them. Just two days later, Ship-of-the-line Captain Umberto Cagni, leading a force of 1,700 marines, addressed the remaining inhabitants of the city who had

not sought refuge inland during the initial bombardment. He proclaimed, "You are now our children and hold the same rights as all other Italians, from which you are inseparable and undistinguishable by law. Therefore, raise your voices alongside your Italian brothers: Long Live the King, long live Italy!" (Tjønn, 2019, p.13).

At the onset of the war, the deployment of fresh forces became impracticable due to the Italian navy's control over the Aegean Sea. Additionally, the transportation of supplies and troops via land was hindered. Due to the fact England wanted to avoid complicating matters for Italy and strengthening its ties with the Triple Alliance, declared the neutrality of the Egyptian territories owned by the Ottoman Empire. Essentially, England prohibited the Ottoman Empire from traversing its own territory, thereby closing off the main route. Consequently, all European nations had also declared their neutrality towards the Italian "**aggression**". As a result, only a limited amount of arms and supplies could be clandestinely smuggled and sent to Tripolitania from Tunisia and Egypt (Armaoğlu, 1997, p.640).

The landing commenced at 3:00 PM on October 5th and concluded, without any untoward events. (Del Boca, 2010, p.19) However, upon the arrival of Italian armies, they were met with an unexpected and bitter surprise. Despite the initial ease of occupying the main coastal towns of the vilayets, thanks to their proximity to Italian naval artillery, the invasion soon encountered obstacles (Gerwarth & Rose, 2014, p.37) However, the Ottoman Empire did not have any military ammunition to respond to these shelling. Therefore, Turkish forces fiercely resisted the Italian advance. However, in the end the troops began to strategically retreat further and further inland (Üstün, 2020, p.35).

In addition To make matters worse, the local population, seemingly unaware of the centuries of Ottoman rule, joined forces with the Turkish resistance. This resistance quickly demonstrated its horrifying consequences. Just two weeks after the Italian landing, they managed to expand their control beyond Tripoli, establishing a semi-circular perimeter spanning 25 kilometers. (Gerwarth & Rose, 2014, p.37), on 17 October, the Italians successfully occupied Homs and Tripolitania. Following this, on 18-19 October, Italian troops managed to seize Benghazi; the capital of Cyrenaica, (Esposito, 2020, p.10) Nevertheless, The Italians encountered significant challenges during the operation, as they faced difficulties in establishing control over the inland areas. While they managed to secure the coastal towns without much trouble, their advancements inland were obstructed by a formidable alliance of Ottoman troops and indigenous guerrilla forces (Bridge & Bullen, 2004, p.310).

On the morning of 23 October, Ottoman forces mounted a vigorous counter-attack and broke through at Sciara Sciat. (Gerwarth and Rose, 2014, p.37), when a force consisting of 10,000 Ottomans and Libyan tribesmen launched a major assault on Italian positions in the Sciara Sciat oasis near Tripoli. This attack proved to be successful as they gained ground and inflicted serious casualties on the Italian troops. (Esposito, 2020, p.10).

The first major fight between the Italian and Turk-arab forces, the Italians had come off second best. Kepi assessed that at a maximum the Turkish constrain was composed of 2,400 Turks and fair beneath 5,000 Arabs. Perhaps indeed less. The Italians were about 50,000 strong.' John Q.

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Wood, the American consul in Tripoli amid the war, stated that 50,000 troopers were accessible to the Italian commander within the city of Tripoli. In the same alacrity, he expressed that a furious engagement took put on 26 October in which numerous Italians were slaughtered and wounded and it is additionally assessed that a few 2,000 Arabs were moreover slaughtered (Lyon, 1971, p.38).

Following This attack, The Italians, who only a few days before had been jocosely wondering how soon their African holiday would end, panicked and turned on the Arab ‘traitors’ with ferocity. Under the eyes of an appalled foreign press, days of savagery followed. The streets of the Libyan capital were filled with corpses and gallows, dispelling any illusion that Italy was going to make Tripoli a ‘land of love’. (Gerwarth & Rose, 2014, p.37), Moreover, the response was, the Italian forces launched a counterattack and were able to secure their positions, which was to profoundly change the course and nature of the war (Stephenson, 2014, p.112).

nevertheless, it was soon proven to be a difficult operation for the Italians, who, despite easily establishing a foothold in the coastal towns, moved infuriatingly slowly inland against a combination of Ottoman troops and local forces of resistance (the last of which were not completely suppressed until 1926)( Bridge & Bullen,2004,p.310).

### 3. The extension of military operations beyond the confines of Tripoli:

#### 3.1 The military operations in the Asiatic coast, the Mediterranean, and the Dardanelles.

On 1 November Lt Gavotti of the Aeroplane Flotilla made history’s first aerial bombing attack, at Ain Zara oasis 8km (5 miles) south of Tripoli. Barring Despite Italy’s powerful navy and the thousands of troops it landed on the coasts, it could only penetrate a few kilometers inland and stayed there, and when Italy realized that the war would be prolonged, it resorted to a number of means of pressure on the Ottoman Empire. The first of these ways was (Armaoğlu, 1997, p.640), on 5 November, when the Italian parliament formally annexed Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the Kingdom of Italy (Esposito, 2020, p.10), which the Italians resorted to as an instrument of pressure on the Ottoman Empire. Notably, the declaration led to progressive triumphs for the predominant Italian forces that made Turkey’s resistance incapable, to force the Ottoman Empire to call for peace and reconciliation. Yet The Ottoman Empire dissented against this “annexation” and announced that this annexation was contrary to international law. (Armaoğlu, 1997, p.640)

Conjointly Italy’s formal declaration of the annexation of Tripoli in full sovereignty on 5 November devastated any plausibility that the powers could be able to intervene in a compromise arrangement. In this circumstance, with the war aims of the bellicose parties too distant and separated to confess to compromise, but with either one possessing the military prevalence to inflict its will on the other, the powers had a foretaste of the calamity that was to torment the European states system for next four years after 1914. (Bridge & Bullen, 2004, p.310) Italy's second attempt to exert pressure was to ask for the mediation of the great powers. These states had already supported the Italian quest for Tripolitania. The intervention of the Great Powers lasted from November 1911 to April 1912. The Ottoman Empire's response to these intermediary attempts was that Italy should declare that it renounced the annexation of Tripolitania and withdraw its troops from these territories. (Armaoğlu, 1997, p.640)

The situation in Tripoli, which proceeded to become progressively strained, has led to Italian acceleration, which has driven to the extension of its maritime operations to the Asiatic coast (Lyon,

1971, p.41), where Italy resorted to the third means of pressure. On April 18, 1912, the Italian navy tried to force the Dardanelles and head towards Marmara or Istanbul. However, when the Ottoman Empire blocked the entrance to the Dardanelles with torpedoes, the Italian fleet did not dare to enter the Strait. Nevertheless, Italy's forcing of the Straits led to a new escalation in the problem of the Straits. Unable to do anything in the Straits, Italy resorted to its fourth attempt on the Ottoman Empire. In April and May 1912, it occupied the Dodecanese Islands. During this occupation, the Greek population of the islands helped the Italian navy a lot. They thought that the Italians would save them, but they would soon realize that they were deceived (Armaoğlu, 1997, p.640).

In the news compiled from foreign news agencies, it was evaluated that the Italians could not foresee that they would go so far as to organize an operation on the Dardanelles. It was stated that such an attack could affect the trade of European states and threaten the order in the Balkans. Analyzing this news, İkdam commented that relations with the Balkan neighbors did not deteriorate. In the article titled "**What Will the Italian Navy Do?**" published in Yeni İkdam dated November 14, 1911, it was stated that the Italians were in search of a point where they could put pressure on the Ottoman Empire in order to compensate for their difficulties in advancing in Tripolitania and their financial losses. As mentioned before, the sighting of the Italian navy off the coast of Rhodes, Izmir and Beirut showed that Italy was thinking of spreading the war to wider areas. Actually, in the news article titled "**Italy's New Attack**" in İkdam, it was reported that (ŞAHİN,2022,p.65) the Italian Navy blockaded some ports in the Red Sea, bombarded the Port of Beirut on February 24, 1912 and sank the torpedo Ankara and the corvette Avnillah On April 18, 1912, it attacked the Dardanelles( HAYTA,1994,p.132).

Although Italy's bombardment of the Dardanelles resulted in its failure to cross the Strait, Rhodes came under Italian control on May 16, 1912 and all the Dodecanese islands by May 20. The primary reason for Italy's focus on the islands was to prevent military aid to be sent to Tripolitania and Benghazi (TAĞMAT, 2018, p.142).

In July, the Italian naval force dispatched torpedo boats into the Dardanelles. At last, the Italians played the Balkan card. Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria had entered into unions against their previous Ottoman suzerain. Each had regional aspirations within the remaining Ottoman domain in the Balkans—in Albania, Macedonia, and Thrace. The Italian Crown was related by marriage to King Nicholas I of Montenegro, and the Italians empowered the Montenegrins to announce war on the Hassock Domain on 8 October 1912. It was, as it were a matter of time, sometime recently the other Balkan states taken after suit (Rogan, 2015, p17).

This development mobilized other states and diplomatic negotiations with the Ottoman Empire began. In foreign agency sources, it was reported that European states were mobilizing in order to put an end to the Italo-Ottoman war and that if the conditions of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not accepted, these negotiations would be in vain and Italy would even launch greater attacks (ŞAHİN, 2022, p.64).

### 3.2 The military operations in the Red sea

The Italians, who were prevented from carrying out activities in the Balkans and were obliged to temporarily delay their intervention efforts in the Aegean, shifted their activities to the Red Sea and the Arabian Peninsula. (Geppert et al., 2015, p.35).

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In January 1912 with four modern destroyers. These vessels were dispatched in response to intelligence reports that the Ottoman navy was endeavoring to transfer a number of its ships from the Persian Gulf to the area. The Italians evidently were concerned that these vessels could be utilized to carry Ottoman troops across the Persian Gulf, as the Ottoman ships consisted mostly of small cannon boats. Several Ottoman ports were firebombed by the navy, but there were no notable battles. (Stephenson, 2014, p.234).

In February 1912, the Italian navy proceeded with its operations in the Red Sea, seemingly to force the Porte to give in. Asim Bey protested furiously against these acts and urged his diplomats to warn the neutral powers that the Empire still had not exercised all its belligerent rights and that there was no reason to prolong the expelling of all Italians from the Empire. Virtually all the neutral powers recommended that the Empire abstain from carrying out the expulsion, though they acknowledged to various degrees that the Empire had the right to do so. Ottoman diplomats broadly agreed that expulsion of the Italian community at this time would be imprudent and could prompt Italian retaliation in the wider, more sensitized Aegean Sea. It appears that Asim Bey was swayed by the almost unanimous counsels of his diplomats against taking any measures against the Italian community at this stage, for indeed nothing was done against them until weeks later when the Italian defiance became even greater and the Porte was more or less forced to fulfill its threats (Childs, 1990, p.120-121).

On May 20, the Ottoman authorities imposed the banishment of all Italians from the Ottoman territories; this amounts to around 50,000 people, 12,000 of whom resided in Constantinople. The decree excluded clerics, widows, cripples, and workers (around 2,000 men) and required all the rest to comply and leave within 14 days (Beehler, 1913, p.76).

The Italians blockaded the Yamen coast, taking Massowa as a naval base. This siege gravely impacted the British, who controlled much of the Red Sea commerce with the Arabian coast, but did little damage to the Turks, who, except Sheikh Said, had no naval protection on the coast and only withdrew their forces inland when it seemed that the Italians were about to attack. Sheikh Said, a hamlet, and fortress opposite Perim, more than held its own as the Turks had a few heavy modern guns there, set up in well-observed gun pits near the summit of a high hill (Bury, 1915, p.17).

Italy was fully conscious of the fact that Ottoman rule there had been threatened in recent years by rebellions sponsored by local notables such as Imam Yahya of Yemen and Sheikh Idris of Assyria. In a further indication of his increased interest in foreign policy after the breakout of the Libyan conflict, Giolitti ordered Italian commanders in late October to contact Yahya and Idris and induce them to revolt. If they responded favorably, Italy was willing to provide them with weapons and ammunition, sending them funds, and offer military assistance from the coast. Giolitti assured them that Italian military operations were consistent with the religious sentiments of the Muslims and the national aspirations of the Arabs. 'The war we are waging against Turkey is not a religious war,' he noted, 'but a war to defend our honor, to protect our compatriots and their interests. Nothing else' (Geppert et al., 2015, p.35).

Still, this situation distressed Yamen far more than the blockade, since Idrisi seized the Farsan Islands and his movements in Asir posed a continual menace. Turkey has now reclaimed the Farsan Islands and there appears to be a certain prospect of a deal with Idrisi because a Turkish Governor



has been assigned to Asir; we will see if he can manage to handle the situation. Although the Arabs do not trust the Imam, recalling their previous history, but they favor him out of patriotic motives, although they admit that the Turks are in Yamen to some extent by invitation, and they loathe Turkish rule. Meanwhile, The Turks realized that the province for them was formidable, but they were hesitant to withdraw lest their prestige in other parts of Arabia be undermined (Bury, 1915, p.17).

Nor was this the only Italian action On October 2, Italian naval vessels fired 21 shells at Hodeidah, which was blockaded along with Jeddah, During these strikes, a British motorboat was sunk in Hodeidah. In another offensive, a Turkish ship suffered a similar fate at Luhaiyeh. Mokha and Sheikh Sa'id were bombarded at the end of November, while Khokhah was destroyed on December 1. Two days later, Yukhtul and Dhubab were also hit. Further Italian intervention in Yemen took place in 1912 when the Italians approached the Sultan of Lahaj and requested him to persuade to dissuade Imam Yahya from attacking Idrisi: The Imam responded that the Italian Government was leading astray "**one whose name God had erased from the list of Believers**"(Baldry, 1976, p.160).

While the destruction of Ottoman fleet assets in the Red Sea was unquestionably a beneficial combat operation in its own right, it obviously did little to exert pressure on the Ottoman government in regard to a wider conflict. Ottoman grievances about Italy's conduct were relentless (Stephenson, 2014, p.234).

Logically, during these evasive escapades, at least one of the Powers ought to have been alienated enough to interfere in the conflict between the Turks and the Italians. However, even these vagaries could not sway the Powers from their ultra-neutral stand. The Porte's punitive measures did not alter their position either. No Great Power was yet willing to open the Pandora's Box that could spark a full-scale European war. (Lyon, 1971, p.47) On June 18, 1912, the British, Russian and French Ambassadors in Istanbul and Rome offered mediation to the Italian and Ottoman Foreign Ministers (TAĞMAT, 2018, p.143).still, the real resolution to the war between Italy and Turkey, once considered to be quickly attainable by all the Powers, was eventually achieved by the belligerents respectively. After Count Aehrenthal's fear of an uprising in the Balkans had come true. The outbreak of the Balkan threat compelled the Turkish Government to conclude peace by statutory decree outside the approval of Parliament, and in a sense, the Turks terminated the Tripolitan War as hastily as the Italians had initiated it (Lyon, 1971, p.68).

In July 1912, negotiations to end the war began in Lausanne. During the peace talks, Italian Prime Minister Giolitti argued that the evacuation of Tripolitania by Ottoman forces should take place before the evacuation of the Dodecanese Islands from Italy. While the Ottoman-Italian negotiations were ongoing, the situation in the Balkans deteriorated significantly in August 1912 and the hostilities that ignited the Balkan Wars started on the Ottoman-Montenegrin border in early August. Montenegro officially declared war on the Ottoman Empire on October 8, 1912 (TAĞMAT, 2018, p.143).

The treaty ratified at Lausanne on October 15 left the Ottoman Empire with some apparent concessions. The Sultan was permitted to refrain from acknowledging Italian sovereignty by promulgating an edict or decree recognizing autonomy for Libya. In addition, the reason for this was that the Ottoman Empire, in order to avoid the reaction of the Libyan people and not to be seen

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as abandoning a Muslim land, by another edict, Mehmet V authorized the assignment of a special representative charged with the defense of Ottoman interests in the ex-provinces (DEMİR, 2020, p.155).

Additionally, the Sultan's Firman explicitly outlined that a new government would be responsible for the administration of affairs in Libya, with a commitment to upholding the religious and cultural traditions of the people. Mr. Shamseddin Bey, the Sultan's Naib es-Sultan, was appointed to oversee all Ottoman interests in Libya. The existing Sharia laws would remain in effect, and the Sultan would appoint a Qadi, or chief judge, as necessary. On October 17, the King of Italy issued a decree granting complete amnesty to all individuals in Libya who had participated in hostilities. Furthermore, the decree affirmed that the general population would retain their freedom to practice the Islamic faith, as they had done previously (Beehlkr, 1913, p.99).

In addition, the Italians pledged financial compensation and a proclamation on the protection of the status quo in the European and Mediterranean areas of the Ottoman Empire - which in fact was rather insipid and instantly became anachronistic with the military advances in the Balkans. Nevertheless, the Italians' success was obvious. Giolitti, San Giuliano and the entire liberal ruling group had secured Italian ascendancy over Libya, as proven by the recognition of Italian domination by the Great Powers. Moreover, Italy took benefit of the conditions and delayed the restoration of the Dodecanese Islands to Constantinople until an uncertain date (Geppert et al., 2015, p.39).

### CONCLUSION

Italy emerged as a major power interested in Libya, which dates back to 1881. Up until that ominous day of invasion in October 1911. The assiduously worked to gain the consent and approval of the Powers to fulfill that dream. Assiduously worked to gain the consent and approval of the Powers to fulfill that dream. Still, its stay in Libya was certainly never easy. Nevertheless, the Italians spent the first two-thirds of their time fighting indigenous rebellions by a population that was not prepared to accept Italian domination, Due to the necessity of Italian colonization to secure a sufficient provision of fertile agricultural land, and opting to establish a colonial territory in Libya, specifically in the "**cultivable**" steppe, to accommodate Italian settlers. While providing them with job opportunities

However, The Tripolitan War with Turkey erupted on September 29, 1911, and expanded to involve the seas around Tripolitania, the Aegean, and the Red Sea, as well as the Mediterranean. All the constraints imposed on Turkey by Italy, all the coercion Italy could exert on Turkey from land and sea did utterly nothing to bring Turkey to its knees .

Eventually, the Ottoman Empire yielded to the pressure exerted by Italy on it and Peace negotiations between Italy and Turkey began in July 1912. There were three separate negotiations, formal negotiations between Italy and Turkey at Lausanne; informal mediated in Constantinople conducted by an Italian agent named Badana through the German Government; and the settlement of the war between Italy and Turkey, once thought to be quickly attainable by all the Powers, finally found by the belligerent states themselves. After the eruption of war in the Balkans had taken place. The suppression of the Balkan danger prompted the Turkish Government to seek peace by decree without the approval of Parliament. Consequently, they signed the Treaty of Ouchy in 1912.

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