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Irregular naval warfare in early modern age: the case of Algerian privateering in the 16th and 17th century.

الحرب البحرية غير النظامية في العصر الحديث المبكر: حالة الغزو البحري الجزائري في القرنين 16 و17 الميلاديين.

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Abstract:
This paper discusses Algerian privateering as an early manifestation of naval irregular warfare. By excluding social and economic aspects of privateering, the study will exclusively deal with the military aspect of privateering through discussing types of ships and engagement tactics of 16th and 17th century Algiers. It will demonstrate that although Algiers adopted the changes and developments in shipbuilding and gunnery that occurred in Europe, the regency maintained its irregular way of conducting naval warfare embodied in privateering.

Keywords: Algeria; Irregular warfare; Privateering; Guerre de course; naval warfare.

ملخص:
يتناول المقال حرب الغزو البحري الجزائري باعتباره نوع مبكر للحروب البحرية غير النظامية في العصر الحديث. على عكس كثير من الدراسات السابقة، تتغاضى هذه الورقة البحثية عن الجوانب الاقتصادية والاجتماعية للغزو البحري، وتركز على الجانب العسكري كتكتيكات الاشتباك وأنواع السفن الحربية التي اعتمدتها الجزائر في القرنين 16 و17 الميلاديين، مع المقارنة بين الفترتين. يُظهر المقال أنّه رغم تبني الإيالة للتطورات التي ظهرت في أوروبا في مجال صناعة السفن والتسليح، حافظت الجزائر على الأسلوب غير النظامي في الحرب البحرية المتجسد في القرصنة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الجزائر، الحرب غير النظامية، حرب القرصنة، الحرب البحرية، التكتيكات البحرية.

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The sixteenth century: the heydays of galley warfare

One should distinguish between maritime warfare of the sixteenth century and that of the following periods. The sixteenth century was characterized by a clash between two superpowers (the Ottoman Empire and the Spanish Empire) on land and sea. Large armadas consisting of hundreds of ships were deployed by both sides and clashed in many decisive battles.

In their quest for hegemony in the Mediterranean, The ottomans relied not only on their formidable regular fleet, but also on the experienced Muslim privateers of North Africa officially sanctioned by Istanbul. This proved crucial, because the combination of well-disciplined navy and initiative corsairs played a major role in the maritime battles of the Ottomans[1].

While the Ottomans won in the battle of Preveza in 1538, the Christian coalition regained the upper hand in the Mediterranean after the battle of Lepanto in 1571. Early sixteenth century sea battles were generally decided in hand-to-hand combat.[2] Bow guns and early swivel guns were also often used in galley battles.[3] Muslims on their side depended more on archers carrying short composite bows effective in the crowded confines of sea combat[4]. It was not before the introduction of modern warships in the 17th century that new techniques in naval warfare came to the fore.

Ship Types:

Up until the sixteenth century, the galley had been dominating maritime warfare in the Mediterranean. Characteristics of the galley, from the narrow and long body, lateen-rigged mast, shallow draft, and low-lying hull… to a large number of rowers enabled it to perform well in shallow waters and to bring more soldiers into battles faster than round ships. The ship's narrow body had specifically allowed swift movement and high maneuverability, thus rendering the galley a formidable weapon in sixteenth century maritime warfare.[5]

Other ships, such as galliots and fustas, are mere derivatives of the galley. Aside from their smaller size, armament, and carriage capacity, galliots and fustas are similar to galleys in terms of design and rigging.

Ascertaining the exact types and numbers of Algerian ships entails speculation Due to a lack of archival data. A look into Albert Devoulx's survey of the Algerian navy offers some details about ships commonly used in the sixteenth century. Although early models of so-called round ships were adopted by Algerians, albeit scarcely, narrow-bodied ships, mainly galleys and galliots dominated the list. It is also worth noting that the size of the Algerian fleet kept

fluctuating and was contingent on gains and losses in battles, the amount of newly built pieces, and the support of the Sublime Porte. For instance, in 1530, the Algerian navy consisted of 60 vessels. In 1553, Salah pasha beat a Portuguese flotilla with his 40-vessel strong squadron. Three years later, his fleet's strength increased thanks to the arrival of 30 galleys and galliots from Istanbul.[6]

In the second half of the 16th century, Devoulx's list demonstrates consistency in the numbers and types of ships used by the regency. In the battle of Lepanto, for example, the regency contributed with a fleet of 60 galleys, galliots, and brigantines. Ten years later (1581), Algiers' Uldj Ali had under his command 35 galliots of different sizes and 25 small "frigates"[7] amounting to 60 vessels.[8] In 1588, though the size of the fleet shrunk to 35 ships, the types were the same, i.e. galleys, brigantines, and frigates[9].

The widespread use of long ships highlights an important aspect of the Algerian navy, its fighting doctrine, and the type of war Algerians used against their enemies.

Situated on the borderland at the edge of the Muslim world, the newly founded Regency of Algiers found itself in dire position amidst an intense geopolitical rivalry between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. Repetitive naval campaigns from much-stronger Spain and its allies, and the consequent resistance of Algiers rendered the latter a war-like city and an advanced fortress defending the western flank of the abode of Islam. Furthermore, Ottoman corsairs who considered themselves "sea ghazis"[10], along with their janissary counterparts adherent to the military traditions of "Frontier Ghazis"[11] contributed greatly as well in the consolidation of the image of Algiers as the nemesis of Christendom, and also influenced the foreign behavior of Algiers for the next 300 years. However, due to the inherent incapability of matching Christian naval power, the Regency resorted to "Corso" (commerce raiding) as a form of irregular naval warfare,[12] or "Guerilla activities" as labeled by Salvatore Bono[13], to tackle the challenge of carrying the war to the enemy.

It is noteworthy that Corso was a European practice from classical times. The term per se was not coined until the middle ages. *Cursarius* (corsair) is a Latin noun coming from verbal expressions referring to maritime "**course**" (Cursum) conducted by vessels in the Mediterranean.[14] In modern times, many European nations practiced Corso or "La Guerre de course"[15] against their enemies. England, the Netherlands, and France were the major naval powers that saw it beneficial to raid commerce capabilities of their foes through privateering. In

fact, it was a practice well theorized among European scholars both in terms of its legality and military feasibility.[16]

Similarly, many coastal cities, especially Bejaia in the "Central Maghreb" (the geographical space that correspond approximatively to the Eyalet of Algiers) adopted Corso as a means to avenge the aggressions of Christian pirates and corsairs of various nationalities[17]. It was only later on after the advent of Ottoman corsairs that the practice was semi-officially adopted as a doctrine of the Algerian navy. While admitting the equal practice of Corso by both Christians and Muslims, Moulay Belhamissi distinguishes between the factors that stimulated it, at least for Algerians. *"*The corso practiced by Algerians, he argues, was the war of the poor engaged against the wealthy. The struggle of those who are barred from trading against those who pretend that they are the only who can generate profit from maritime traffic*"*.[18]

Naval irregular warfare tactics:

Weaker maritime states usually use "Corso" as a means to inflict maximum damage on the enemy's maritime trade without risking direct confrontation with their stronger war navies. Corso as an irregular form of naval warfare depends chiefly on hit-and-run tactics, i.e. raids on enemy coastal towns and commercial ships. Rias (Plural of Rais or ship captain), capitalizing on the shallow drafts of their vessels, would hide in rocky shores situated near strategic maritime lanes with the purpose of ambushing the enemy. When an opportunity looms, they attack swiftly to surprise their prey. When closing in on enemy ships, they use their numeral superiority to overwhelm and deter any possible resistance.

Speed and maneuverability played a major role in attacks and retreats. When the prey is more difficult to subdue than first assumed, corsairs exploit the smoothness of their galleys thanks to Oars, triangular sails, and shallow drafts to retreat as fast as they attacked to shallow waters where heavier enemy ships could not pursue. Pierre Dan points out to this detail by singling out the difference between Christian and Barbary galleys. Christians generally prefer bigger and stronger galleys with two masts, a big piece of ordnance mounted on the "**coursier**" [19] (gangway), 3 or 4 medium size ordnance placed on the prow, and banks up to 28 on each galley. Barbary corsairs on the other hand usually opted for smaller galleys with one mast, one gun on the coursier, and only 23 to 24 banks, which made their galleys lighter and faster.[20] A document from the Ottoman archives confirms Dan's views on the centrality of speed and smoothness to the Algerian navy. After the ottoman campaign in Cyprus in 1571, Algiers's Beyler Bey Alj Ali asked the sublime Porte to substitute four of his

heavy galleys (or kadırga in Ottoman Turkish) with lighter galleys more appropriate to Corso activities. His request was later granted by a decree from the Grand Vizir in July 1571.[21]

Nonetheless, long-narrow ships are not entirely compatible with maritime warfare. In contradistinction to round ships, the main shortcoming of narrow ship design is that the bulwarks do not offer protection in battles and they render the ship unseaworthy[22]. This is exactly why the galley is said not to be designed for blue water seafaring but rather for enclosed basins such as the Mediterranean where violent weather is less common. To tackle this shortcoming, the sortie season of the galley was confined to a limited period between May and September of each year.[23]

This irregular strategy persisted throughout the time of the Regency. The difference between "La guerre de course" of the sixteenth century and that of the seventeenth is the adoption of new ships and weaponry, new engagement tactics had emerged.

The 17th century: the dominance of round ships

It is widely accepted that the emergence of new ship designs and the improvements applied to others in the 1600s ushered in a new era in the history of maritime warfare. These technological breakthroughs were subsequently introduced to Algiers through many exogenous factors that consequently enabled Algerian flotillas to operate in the Atlantic Ocean, thus prompting a surge in corsairing activities.[24] According to some sources, Moriscos who either immigrated to North Africa over the course of the sixteenth century or banished from Spain after 1609 were key to the technological leap witnessed in seventeenth century Algiers.[25] In other words, the newcomers not only solidified local antipathy towards the Spaniards, but also contributed in the long process of technology transfer from Europe to the Regency, particularly in the fields of shipbuilding and weaponry[26] that were pivotal to successfully operating in previously unknown waters.

The seventeenth century historian Pierre Dan offers more insight in this regard. He ascribes the expansion of Barbary activities into the Atlantic to the incorporation of round ships into their fleets, which facilitated cruising the seas in all seasons after the corsairs activities were limited to only a few months a year.[27] This was a milestone in the history of North Africa. According to Dan, North European renegades, especially Dutchmen who became jobless after the 1609 truce with Spain[28] were the main engine behind it. He singles out the Flemish

Renegade Simon Danser as the first to introduce round ships to Algerians around the year 1606.[29] Danser was just the first in a long chain of North European renegades to join the fleets of *Garb-Ocakları*. In the next decades, their presence in North Africa will increase dramatically to the point where renegades from maritime powers such as France, England, and the Netherlands would represent a significant portion of all Renegades based in the Maghreb. This trend will continue until renegades from Christendom would make up two-thirds of all North African corsairs in the seventeenth century.[30]

The clear surge in numbers of North European renegades comes in contradistinction to the previous century wherein renegades of Mediterranean origin in general, and Italians in particular were dominant.[31] Arguably, the shift of balance from southern to Northern Europe in terms of renegade origin suggest a drastic shift in the type of ships used by the Regency in the 1600s. Meaning thenceforth, the reliance on round ships will come to prominence at the expense of narrow ships. Yet, a total rift between the corsairs and their battle tested narrow ships will never take place.

In addition to renegades, skilled European captives also contributed to naval technology transfer to Algiers. Many European coastal towns, which were known for their naval industries, were among the favorite targets of Algerian Razzias. These resulted in the desired capture of skilled carpenters, sailmakers, and gunsmiths. According to Meredith Martin and Gillian Weiss, France's shipbuilding hub La Ciotat suffered a disproportionate number of Algerian incursions that led to many workers being captured. A 1670s French nobleman and an erstwhile captive exaggeratedly estimates that there would have been no Algerian fleet without the assistance of Christian shipwrights.[32] Interestingly, the transfer of technology went both ways, as the case of Gunnar Olofsson Roth demonstrates. The Scandinavian shipwright had his shipbuilding skills sharpened during his captivity in Algiers. As a result, upon his return to Sweden he used his expertise to build no fewer than 12 major ships and several smaller ones between 1668 -88. The latter were patterned after North African designs reputed for their swiftness and privateering-worthiness.[33]

Regardless of the factors behind the technological advancement of the Algerian navy, it is a historical fact that seventeenth century's Algiers had become a regional maritime power. It is believed to have possessed the most technologically advanced fleet in the entire Islamic world,[34] and the largest war fleet that even outclassed Europe's best war fleets in the 1620s.[35] The blue water flotilla that the regency had built was able to operate in high seas as far as

Iceland, North America and the Faroe Islands to the North, and the Canary Islands to the south. The maps of the approximate locations in which ransomed Spaniards from Algiers were captured[36] highlight the newly adopted pivoting-to-the-Atlantic strategy of the Regency's navy. When compared to the 16th century, the activities of the Algerian flotillas are no longer concentrated solely in the Mediterranean (See **Figure 1.**).



Figure 1. The location of capture of ransomed Spaniards in 25-year bins. Larger circles and thicker lines denote more captives in a place/route.[37]

Ship numbers and types:

Despite the presence of galleys and galliots and other types of narrow ships in the arsenal of the Regency, historical accounts indicate that round ships, mainly galleons, pollacres, and barques, constituted the bulk of the fleet in the seventeenth century. Galleons were more seaworthy vessels embedded with capacious hulls, which allow more burden carriage and provisions for transatlantic voyages.[38] Square sails and higher bulwarks also shaped the seaworthiness of the galleons, and the latter feature specifically consolidated the defensiveness of round ships by way of minimizing aggressor-boarding possibilities and providing an adequate structure capable of supporting more ordnance.

As to the number of ships of the Algerian fleet, historical sources cover this issue to some extent. The Venetian envoy Giovanni Battista Salvago who visited Algiers in 1624 states that the fleet of the regency includes a hundred round ships. 60 of them armed with 24 to 30 guns while the rest are smaller tartans and polacres. If we add the six galliots of 25 banks that he observed, the total number of ships rises to 106.[39] Ten years later, Pierre Dan asserts that Algiers had 70 ships, polacres, and barques. Some gunned with 35 to 40 canons, others with 25 canons.[40] As to narrow ships, Dan states that the city possessed galleys (two of 24 benches, and two of 23 benches), one brigantine of 15 benches and eight frigates of 5 to 6 benches.[41] He also asserts that in August of the same year, a squadron of 28 vessels *"the finest and the best armed that one can possibly behold"* had sailed westward to intercept English, Norman, and Breton ships bound for Spain. Some days later, a flotilla of eight more ships sailed to the Levant, while the remaining of the Algerian fleet was already cruising the seas.[42] Dan's remarks are an indication of the magnitude the Algerian Navy had reached. The 28-ship-squadron that sailed westward must have been a round-ship-only squadron, while the other could have consisted of narrow ships that usually operated in the Mediterranean.

In late 1674 and early 1675, Le Chevalier d'Arvieux observed 3 galleys and around 30 warships of different sizes in the arsenal of Algiers, chief among them the one equipped with 50 guns. The rest of the fleet, according to him, varied in

size and the number of mounted guns. Local sources that Devoulx worked on seem to back d'Arvieux's figures. They mention that in 1674 Algiers had 26 vessels of different types, including two oared-frigates, and two chitia (saettia).[43]

Some 20 years later (1693), we find a report in the Tachrifat about a squadron of ten ships designated to sail eastward. Although the report does not specify the types of ships nor the number of cannons mounted on each, it details the exact number of sailors and gunners. The flagship of the squadron had 128 sailors and 80 gunners, the others carried between 48 and 36 gunners[44]. Judging by the number of gunners, it is safe to say that these ships possibly had between 20 and 40 guns.

That said, empirical evidence demonstrates that the last quarter of the seventeenth century marked the beginning of the decline in Algerian corsairing activities[45]. This claim is consistent with historical accounts (the emergence of full-fledged ship-of-the-line in Europe superior to anything Algerians could muster,[46] French naval attacks on Algiers, and the destruction of Algerian fleets by the British and the Dutch). These attacks affected Algerian naval capabilities negatively, causing the diminishing of the fleet in size and power and, subsequently, prompting a shift in planning to focus more on softer targets such as fishing vessels.[47]

Engagement Tactics:

Although engagement tactics from the seventeenth century forth became increasingly reliant on broadsides exchanges, boarding and grappling had also kept their places in naval battles.[48] Larger English galleons from as early as the 1630s, for instance, were practically ship-of-the-line that will become the norm in the eighteenth century. However, the tactics of engagement employed by English captains were still compliant with boarding and entering rather than adopting the line-ahead tactics that broadsides entail. It was not before the first Anglo-Dutch war (1652-54) that the line-ahead was formally adopted by first the English, and then the Dutch.[49]

For corsairs, it was usually all about boarding to secure engagements. The advantage in sheer numbers of soldiers came to the detriment of armament. Algerian Corsairs do not usually favor ships armed with heavy ordnance for they lack speed and maneuverability crucial to privateering.[50] Furthermore, the value of an intact ship and cargo is much higher than a damaged one. This makes depending on ordnance to subdue the prey is somewhat economically counterproductive, hence the emphasis on the superiority in manpower in engagements rather than cannons. Additionally, large crews onboard meant

enough manpower to crew the prizes. Nevertheless, Rias never disregarded cannons altogether. Small caliber guns such as pierriers (swivel guns) and handguns were the indispensable weapons of choice for corsairs. Their role was instrumental in neutralizing defenders on the deck to facilitate boarding.[51]

Historical accounts highlight the importance of mass advantage for Algerians not only in reference to the crew superiority in numbers, but also in reference to the number of ships sailing together. The term "wolf packs" that is accepted as a connotation for German U-boats collective attacks on Allied convoys in the Second World War could validly apply to Barbary corsairs engagement tactics. British lawyer J. E. G. de Montmorency tried to equate German submarines' warfare in the First World War with the activities of North African corsairs. He argues: "*The German methods have been modelled with pleasing historical accuracy on Barbary States*".[52] Although De Montmorency's comparison is clearly intended to smear and delegitimize U-boat warfare that devastated British mercantile fleets in WWI, the fact that submarine tactics in both World Wars were similar in many aspects to corsairs' raids of early modern times is self-evident. Barbary corsair raids on merchant ships in the seventeenth century were quite often undertaken in squadrons (or wolf packs) to overwhelm their targets and overpower their ships.[53]

Algerian Rias did not muster round ships, such as galleons, for their sea-worthiness exclusively. The other advantage that round ships conferred to North African corsairs is their indistinguishability while sailing owing to their similarity to European designs. The resemblance made it even harder for targeted ships to identify friend from foe, let alone establish the nationality and intent of the approaching ship. Algerian Admiralty was therefore keen to procure European experts in vessel ornamentation with the aim of disguising their ships by means of decorating them according to European standards. It was a well-known stratagem among corsairs and pirates to make one's ship look like a friendly design in order to deceive the enemy and approach them safely.[54]

Barbary corsairs also mastered the infamous technique known as "false flag". It consists of usually flying a banner of a European nation to lure the prey to lower its guard. It is an effective way to pacifically neutralize the menace of the prey's ordnance if it exists, and to avoid a lengthy chase should the identity of the corsair be compromised.

When the ruse works, the Rias then approach their target safely and once they are within firing range, they replace the false flag with their real banner and

quickly initiate the engagement. Many accounts mention incidents involving Algerian corsairs using false flags. A French magistrate reports that his Algerian captors were flying the Dutch banner when they captured him in 1642. It was only when they closed in within cannon range that they swapped the Dutch colors for Algerian ones.[55] Another report from 1706 demonstrates how the Rais Hamet Touil, by means of flying the Dutch banner, deceived a French corsair into giving up his Dutch booty and consequently fleeing the scene.[56]

Naval battles in general and privateering in particular involve many other tactics. The use of disguise in naval warfare, for instance, has long been one of the most valuable tactics the commander could resolve to in order to increase the element of surprise.[57] "Les bateaux-pièges" or decoy ships, for example, are camouflaged men-of-war characterized by their non-combatant appearance with the aim of attracting the enemy. When the latter attacks, the decoy ship quickly deploys her housed weapons to surprise the attacker and overwhelm them. Rear admiral Campbell cites an incident from 1672 where a captain by the name of Knevet commanding the "Argier" (Algiers) deceived a Dutch corsair by means of concealing his ordnance and colors, and maneuvering his ship carelessly to give the impression of an unexperienced merchant captain.[58]

Conclusion:

Irregular warfare embodied in privateering was to Algerians the adequate response to European maritime hegemony. In the 16th century, Algerian activities were largely confined to the Mediterranean due to several factors that range from technological (dependency on narrow ships) to political ones (a strong 16th century Iberia). However, as the time marched on the Regency gained accessibility to transatlantic maritime lanes, which meant a surge in privateering. The main reason of this is the incorporation of round ships into the Algerian arsenal in the beginning of the seventeenth century. This marked a milestone in the history of the Algerian navy as the shift constituted a major difference between Algerian privateering in the sixteenth century and that of the seventeenth century.

Notes :

[1] R. G. Grant, Battle at Sea. 3000 years of naval warfare, 2nd edition, Dorling Kindersley Limited, London, 2010, p.86.

[2] John F. Guilmartin, Jr., Galleons and Galleys, Cassell & Co, London, 2020, p.106. Jean Rougé, La marine dans l'antiquité, Presses Universitaires de France, 1975, p.106. Henry A. Ormerod, Piracy in the ancient world an essay in Mediterranean history, the university press of Liverpool, Liverpool, 1924, p.170. Salvatore Bono, les corsaires en Méditerranée, Edition la porte, Rabat, 1998, p.137. Among hand weapons commonly used by Algerians, Pierre Dan specifies scimitars and muskets. See : Pierre Dan, Histoire de Barbarie et de ses Corsaires, Seconde Edition, 1646, Paris, p.310.

[3] Grant, op. cit, pp.84-85.

[4] Iain D. Martin et al, Fighting techniques of naval warfare 1190 BC-present: Strategy, Weapons, Commenders. And Ships, Thomas Dunne Books, New York, p.102.

[5] Dan, op. cit. p.106.

[6]Albert Devoulx, "La marine de la régence d'Alger", in : Revue Africaine, N° 13, 1869. pp.8-9.

[7] By frigate Devoulx probably means its precursor the Galleon which was dominant in the 16th century. According to björn landström, the Galleon of the sixteenth century evolved into frigate, and the frigate evolved later to become ship-of-the-line. However, no satisfactory explanation has yet been given as to how this evolution came into fruition. See: Björn Landström, The royal warship Vasa, interpublishing, Stockholm, 1988, p.15.

[8] Devoulx, op. cit. P.10. Bono, op. cit. p.102-107.

[9] Dan, op. cit. p.311.

[10] Murad reis, Piri reis, Barbaros Brothers are some of many early Ottoman corsairs who operated in the western Mediterranean and considered themselves "sea Ghazis". Refer to: Christine Isom-Verhaaren, "Was there Room in Rum for Corsairs?: Who Was an Ottoman in the Naval Forces of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th Centuries?", Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies, XLIV (2014).

[11] The notion of frontier ghazi is symbolized in a sense of obligation to subjugate the infidels. Refer to: MARSHALL G. S. HODGSON, The Venture of Islam; Conscience and History in a World Civilization, VOLUME THREE, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 1974, p.100.

[12] Sam J. Tangredi, "Sea power: Theory and Practice", in: Strategy in the Contemporary World, edited by: John Baylis et all, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.118. Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE, "Guerres irrégulières : de quoi parle-t-on ?'', Stratégique, N° 93-94-95-96, 2009/1, p.20. Ajey Lele, « Asymmetric Warfare: A State vs Non-State Conflict », oasis, N° 20, july-december, 2014, p.98. Le Baron Lescallier, Bases de l'administration maritime, ou Projet pour l'amélioration de cette partie, Firmin Didiot, Paris, 1819, p. 81.

[13] Bono, op. cit. p 49.

[14] Daniel Heller-Roazen, The enemy of all piracy and the law of nations, Zone Books, New York, 2009, p.79.

[15] It is worth mentioning that Michel Fontenay helpfully differentiates between (A) privateering/la guerre de course, which he defines as a form of war between states and limited to certain periods. (B) corso /la course which is corsairs activities practiced by both Christians and Muslims in the Mediterranean. However, while admitting the usefulness of such distinction, both terms will be conflated as said distinction does not serve our purposes in this paper. Refer to : Bono, op. cit. p.17. Alejandro Colas, Barbary Coast in the Expansion of International Society: Piracy and Corsairing as Primary Institutions, paper presented at the ISA annual conference, San Francisco, CA 3-6 April 2013, pp.5-6

[16] See for example: Lescallier, op. cit., pp 81, 83-84. C. B. Norman, the corsairs of France, SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE, & RIVINGTOX, London, 1887. JAMES R. THURSFIELD, NAVAL WARFARE, University press of Cambridge, 1913, pp. 93-99. L.-B.

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[17] Bono, op. cit. p.16-17.

[18] Belhamissi Moulay, Marine et marins d'Alger (1518-1830), T 2, Bibliotheque Nationale d'Algerie, 1996, p.152. For more discussions on this topic; see : Nabil Matar, "THE MAGHARIBA AND THE SEA Maritime Decline in North Africa in the Early Modern Period", in: TRADE AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE IN THE EARLY MODERN MEDITERRANEAN BRAUDEL'S MARITIME LEGACY, edited by: MARIA FUSARO, COLIN HEYWOOD and MOHAMED-SALAH OMRI, I.B.Tauris Publishers, LONDON-NEW YORK, 2010, pp.118-120. DANIEL PANZAC, BARBARY CORSAIRS The End of a Legend 1800-1820, BRILL, LEIDEN-BOSTON, 2005, p.21.

[19] A term proper to the Galley that designates the passage between the fore and the aft between the banks of a row-galley. The ordnance is usually placed in the fore part of the passage. See: Lescallier, op. cit. p.47.

[20] Dan, op. cit. pp.309-310.

[21] فاضل البيات، **البلاد العربية في الوثائق العثمانية: ولاية الجزائر في القرن العاشر الهجري/السادس عشر الميلادي**، مركز الأبحاث للتاريخ والفنون والثقافة الإسلامية باستنبول، المجلد 8، استنبول، 2019، ص ص. 184-185.

[22] Guilmartin, op. cit. p.106.

[23] Dan, op. cit. p.309.

[24] Empirical evidence confirms that North African corsairs significantly leveled up their activities in the Atlantic at the outset of the 1600s. See: Eric Chaney, "Measuring the Military Decline of the Western Islamic World: Evidence from Barbary Ransoms", Explorations in Economic History, 58, 2015, p.114.

[25] Devoulx, op. cit. pp.9-10.

[26] عبد القادر الميلق، **تأثير ثورات الموريسكيين الأندلسيين على العلاقات الجزائرية الاسبانية "897-1017هـ/1492-1609م"**، ماجستير في التاريخ الحديث، قسم التاريخ، جامعة غرداية، 2012-2013، ص ص 110-116.

[27] Dan, op. cit. p.313.

[28] Guilmartin, op. cit. P.192.

[29] Dan, op. cit. p.313.

[30] Chaney, op. cit. p.121. Devoulx, op.cit. pp.8-9.

[31] See Pierre Dan's list of captains of Algerian galleys in late 1580s : Dan, op. cit. p.310.

[32] Meredith Martin and Gillian Weiss, "A tale of two guns Maritime Weaponry Between France and Algiers", in: The Mobility of People and Things in the Early Modern Mediterranean : The Art of Travel, edited by Elisabeth A. Fraser, Routledge, 2019, p.32.

[33] Jan Glete, Swedish Naval Administration 1521–1721: Resource Flows and Organisational Capabilities, Brill, Leiden, 2010, p.341.

[34] Chaney, op. cit. P.110.

[35] Guilmartin, op. cit. P.162.

[36] The empirical analysis on the data collected by Eric Chaney from 22 missions of Catholic religious orders to Algiers between 1575 and 1692 demonstrates that around 80% of ransomed Spanish captives were captured at sea against 11% at land, and only 7% in military confrontations between Spaniards and North Africans. The data denotes that the overwhelming majority were captured at sea, meaning from ship-on-ship attacks, which could be perceived as an indication of the efficiency of Algerian irregular naval warfare against its archenemy Spain. Moreover, 41% of captives who were caught at sea were apprehended in the Atlantic, highly likely by privateers sailing on round ships.

This empirical analysis is consistent with historical literature that suggest that the 17th century was the era wherein North African corsairs conquered the Atlantic. Refer to: Chaney, op. cit. pp.112-114.

[37] Ibid, p.116.

[38] Guilmartin, op. cit. P.38.

[39] Bono, op. cit. p.102-103.

[40] Dan, op. cit. p.317.

[41] Ibid, p.309.

[42] Ibid, p.317.

[43] Devoulx, op. cit. pp.10-11.

[44] A. Devoulx, Tachrifat, Imprimerie du gouvernement, Alger, 1852, pp.38-39.

[45] Chaney, op. cit. p.116.

[46] Ibid, p.121.

[47] Ibid, P.110.

[48] Grant, op. cit. p.104.

[49] Ibid, p.210.

[50] See for example the story of the captivity of Chastelet des Boys that substantiate this aspect of Algerian tactics in : Louis Piesse, "L'Odyssée ou diversité d'aventures, rencontres et voyages en Europe, Asie et Afrique par le Sieur du Chastelet des Boys [1665]," Revue africaine, année 10, N 55, 1866, p.98.

[51] DE CHAPMAN, op. cit. pp. 83-84.

[52] J. E. G. De Montmorency, "The Barbary States in International Law", In: *Transactions of the Grotius Society*, vol. 4, 1918, p.93.

[53] Chastelet des Boys' story of cavtivity by Algerins, for instance, seems to support this thesis. See: Piesse, op. cit. p.96.

[54] Martin and Weiss, op. cit. p.32.

[55] Piesse, op. cit. 1866, p.95.

[56] Devoulx, "La marine de la régence d'Alger", op. cit. p.13.

[57] Mary T. Hall, "False Colors and Dummy Ships: The Use of Ruse in Naval Warfare", Naval War College Review, Vol. 42, No. 3 (SUMMER 1989), p.52.

[58] REAR-ADMIRAL GORDON CAMPBELL, MY MYSTERY SHIPS, DOUBLEDAY, DORAN & COMPANY, INC., GARDEN CITY, NEW YORK, 1929, pp.8-9. Bruneau, op. cit. pp.60-61.