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مجلة

# الاقتصاد الحديث والتنمية

## المستدامة

مجلة علمية دولية محكمة سداسية ومتخصصة

تصدر عن

مخبر الاقتصاد الحديث والتنمية المستدامة

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تصدر عن

مخبر الاقتصاد الحديث والتنمية المستدامة

جامعة أحمد بن يحيى الونشريسي - تيسمسيلت

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## أولاً: التعريف بالمجلة.

مجلة " الاقتصاد الحديث والتنمية المستدامة " مجلة أكاديمية علمية دولية محكمة سداسية ومتخصصة، تصدر عن مخبر الاقتصاد الحديث والتنمية المستدامة لكلية العلوم الاقتصادية والتجارية وعلوم التسيير بجامعة أحمد بن يحيى الونشريسي تسمييت، وتتناول القضايا والموضوعات بمجال علوم التسيير والتجارية والدراسات الاقتصادية. ويأتي إطلاق المجلة في إطار الاهتمام المتزايد بالبحث العلمي والتعليم الجامعي بجامعة تيسمييت، عن طريق نشر الدراسات الجادة والتميز ذات الطابع الاستراتيجي في مجال إدارة الأعمال والتسويق والدراسات الاستراتيجية بالإضافة إلى الدراسات الاقتصادية الكمية والمتخصصة، على أن تستند الدراسات المنشورة إلى معايير نشر علمية دقيقة وذلك بمشاركة أبرز الأكاديميين والباحثين في الجزائر والعالم العربي وباقي دول العالم.

## ثانياً: أهداف المجلة.

- تسليط الضوء بشكل علمي على المواضيع والقضايا ذات الطابع الاقتصادي البحت الخاص بالجزائر وباقي دول العالم.
- تشجيع البحث العلمي في الجامعات الجزائرية وباقي الجامعات في دول العالم، وإتاحة الفرصة للباحثين لنشر بحوثهم وإنتاجهم العلمي.
- الإسهام في إثراء البحث العلمي في مجالات علوم التسيير والعلوم التجارية والاقتصادية، من خلال نشر البحوث والدراسات النظرية، الكمية والميدانية.
- استشراف القضايا المستقبلية المرتبطة بالجزائر، والدول العربية، وبقية دول العالم.
- التركيز على الدراسات الاستراتيجية الآنية، والمواضيع الحديثة المحتملة في مختلف اهتمامات الباحثين المنتهين للمجلة وغيرهم من الباحثين عبر مختلف أنحاء الوطن والعالم.
- الإسهام في نهضة التعليم الجامعي وتطويره في الجزائر والعالم العربي.
- إطلاق طاقات الإبداع والتنافس العلمي، وفتح المجال أمام البحوث الأكاديمية الحقيقية.
- دعم المكانة العلمية والأكاديمية لجامعة تيسمييت وتوسيع آفاق البث العلمي.

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## Ukraine - Poland A common history in the development of international relations

### اوكرانيا - بولندا تاريخ مشترك في تطور العلاقات الدولية □

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#### Abstract:

Poland and Ukraine are the two biggest and most populated countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Because of their size, neighborhood and position in the region the two countries have often been compared to France and Germany. Both countries are deeply interested in their mutual cooperation. Such situation steams from five factors: direct neighborhood, common (albeit difficult) history, attractiveness of the Polish lab our market for the Ukrainians, membership of Poland in the Western structures, The aim of the given research is to consider Polish-Ukrainian relations as an example of strategic partnership or at least its most probable model as it is which, in contrast to other declared strategic partnerships, largely meets this definition. Scientific novelty of the work lies in the fact that we aim to apply theoretical indications of strategic partnership to the practical dimension of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

Keywords: Strategic partnership, political relations, foreign trade, Poland, Ukraine.

JEL Classification Codes: F5, F50, A12

#### المخلص:

بولندا وأوكرانيا هما أكبر دولتين من حيث عدد السكان في وسط وشرق أوروبا. نظرًا لحجمها وجوارها وموقعها في المنطقة ، غالبًا ما تم مقارنة البلدين بفرنسا وألمانيا. يهتم كلا البلدين بشدة بالتعاون المتبادل. تتبع مثل هذه الحالة من خمسة عوامل: الجوار المباشر ، والتاريخ المشترك (وإن كان صعبًا) ، وجاذبية المختبر البولندي ، وسوقنا للأوكرانيين ، وعضوية بولندا في الهياكل الغربية ، والهدف من البحث المحدد هو اعتبار العلاقات البولندية الأوكرانية على أنها مثال على الشراكة الاستراتيجية أو على الأقل نموذجها الأكثر احتمالية كما هو والذي ، على عكس الشراكات الاستراتيجية المعلنة الأخرى ، يلي هذا التعريف إلى حد كبير. تكمن الحدائة العلمية للعمل في حقيقة أننا نهدف إلى تطبيق المؤشرات النظرية للشراكة الاستراتيجية على البعد العملي للعلاقات البولندية الأوكرانية.

**كلمات مفتاحية:** شراكة استراتيجية ، علاقات سياسية ، تجارة خارجية ، بولندا ، أوكرانيا.

**تصنيفات JEL:** F5, F50, A12, :

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## **1. INTRODUCTION**

Bilateral Polish-Ukrainian relations fully reflect geopolitical complexities, social interconnection, and cultural context of the recent century in the history of Eastern Europe. Driven by security considerations and mutual desire for closer partnership – or even alliance – these relations haven't escaped series of conflicts and misunderstandings. A neighborhood with a tremendous potential remains vulnerable, because of modified regional context and internal political developments. Poland was the first state to recognize Ukraine's independence in 1991. Both states perceive each other as strategic partners, and such a perception survived almost thirty years of upsand-downs in international environment and internal political transformations in both countries. The stance of bilateral relations between them continues to be one of the key factors to overall regional stability.

### **The problem research**

What steps should Ukraine take to become one of Poland's top partners?

### **The aim research**

The aim of the given research is to consider Polish-Ukrainian relations as an example of strategic partnership or at least its most probable model as it is which, in contrast to other declared strategic partnerships, largely meets this definition. Scientific novelty of the work lies in the fact that we aim to apply theoretical indications of strategic partnership to the practical dimension of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

### **Materials and results of research**

#### **1.Strategic partnerships, international politics(Analytical theoretical framework).**

##### **1.1The rise of strategic partnerships in world politics**

Strategic partnerships (SPs) constitute a novel form and feature of the evolving international relations system and represent a new principle for organizing international life. Seen broadly, strategic partnerships represent a type of special relationship and thus are not unique or new at all. However, should one take a closer look into the internal mechanics of the partnership phenomenon and explore its distinctive foreign-political functions from its changing geostrategic context, it becomes clear that with the reconfiguration of the international relations system since the early 1990s, strategic partnerships have become the necessary key to cope with systemic and issue-specific international challenges. It is difficult to trace the path back to the first strategic partnership formed post-1990. The problem is of both an empirical and analytical nature as there is still no consensus in the literature as to what elements constitute the idea of a strategic partnership and whether labelling a relationship as such is sufficient to regard bilateralism as a strategic partnership. Most authors who searched for the roots of the phenomenon contend that the agreement between US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1994, which set forth 'a new stage of mature strategic partnership based on equality, mutual advantage, and recognition of each other's national interests' (Moscow Declaration, 1994), encompasses the first of its kind (cf. e.g. Envall and Hall, 2016, p. 89; Michalski and Pan, 2017b, p. 13; Nadkarni, 2010, p. 46). However, the long abandoned strategic partnership between the US and Turkey, which was re-invigorated in early 2018, was in fact established in 1992. Brazil and China forged their strategic partnership in 1993. Thus, at least two other partnerships of this kind were in place before the 1994 US–Russian deal was struck. Since 1993, when



China made its first strategic partnership with Brazil, and by 2014 China had forged close to 70 strategic partnerships of different types (FMPRC, 2015), thereby creating a web of truly differentiated strategic links with both major and emerging powers as well as with international organizations worldwide. Among international organizations, China's strategic partners are the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Arab League (AL) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). India has cultivated 20 strategic partnerships, including with the European Union. Japan has forged about half as many, but 'is quickly adding to the list' (Envall and Hall, 2016, p. 90). As one of the first international organizations, NATO began launching partnerships with non-member countries in the early 1990s in its efforts to foster peace and development. The Alliance's comprehensive Partnership for Peace PfP policy framework embraces now as many as 21 NATO partners across the globe. The EU has ten official global strategic partnerships (with the US, Canada, Mexico, South Korea, South Africa, Japan, Brazil, India, China and Russia) and a number of policy frameworks or issue-specific strategic partners, such as the Eastern Partnership (Eap) and associated countries. Furthermore, the EU has forged four institutional partnerships with other regional organizations namely NATO, ASEAN, AU and CELAC. The Andean Community (CAN) also pursues development and regional economic integration partnerships, including the 'associated membership' format. With the extension of interest and presence of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community (EAEU) to the Latin American region (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2017), the Andean Community also forged an economic development partnership with EAEU for the purpose of 'fostering the bonds of mutual cooperation with [other] organizations of regional integration', thus confirming 'the opening' of CAN for inter-regional partnerships (SGCAN, 2017), which is a rising trend today. ASEAN's partnership policy was first conceived as early as 1974, when it granted Dialogue Partner status to Australia, thus predating the systemic proliferation of strategic partnerships as we know them in a polycentric international context. In its current form, ASEAN's network of strategic partnerships lists eight more countries (the US, China, Canada, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, New Zealand) and one international organization – the European Union. ASEAN's partnership network evolved not only in terms of expanding its partnership web but also in terms of further diversification of partner-engagement formats: 'In conducting ASEAN's external relations, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting may confer on an external party the formal status of Dialogue Partner, Sectoral Dialogue Partner, Development Partner, Special Observer, Guest, or other status' (ASEAN, 2018). Clearly, the evolving international strategic environment stimulates the development of new flexible forms of international association and engagement among acting partners. It would be a daunting task to establish the precise number of SPs across the globe today – among other reasons, not all states' and international organizations' foreign policy bureaucracies keep a systematic and tidy record in this regard. Renard (2013, p. 302) goes even further to claim that '[most] governments probably do not even realize how many they have signed'. For some, this is a consequence of bureaucratic negligence or underperformance; for other actors, the issue of keeping a record might be of lesser to no relevance (which also shows their understanding of strategic partnerships). For another group of actors, such as China for instance, the matter is about political sensitivity – and thus an unwillingness to make multiple hierarchies of 'strategic', 'comprehensive', 'constructive', 'privileged', 'development' and other partnerships broadly visible (Bang, 2017; Oviedo, 2006). On the empirical side, the existence of both formal and informal strategic partnerships and the ways of labelling them (which does not



necessarily include markers of being either 'strategic' or a 'partnership') complicates the task even further. For instance, the 'American way of partnership' has prompted the US to forge over 60 formal strategic partnerships with other states and over 40 informal partnerships and so-called strategic dialogues, which furthermore do partially overlap (Hamilton, 2014). By 2000, Ukraine had allegedly established strategic partnerships with 19 countries (Saprykin, 2001), including one in 1997 with what is now openly hostile Russia. From 1995–2001, Ukraine proclaimed its partner relations with such states as: Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Turkey, the US and Uzbekistan as all being 'strategic'. Remarkably, only six out of the declared 19 strategic partnerships – i.e. Ukraine's relations with Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, the US and Uzbekistan – have been formed bilaterally as such; the remaining 13 partners have merely been unilaterally proclaimed by Ukraine as strategic. This perfectly illustrates in practice the imperfect situation that exists with strategic partnerships. Strategic partnerships, understood as a bilaterally established form of relationship, do not necessarily coincide in number and substance with the lists of strategic partners understood as strategically important that actors may unilaterally cultivate, contend or plan to have among their strategic partners. The surge of the idea of strategic partnerships is impressive. Its intensive proliferation in international relations appears phenomenal also because the term is not a domain-innate idea.

## **1.2 The promise of strategic partnerships in international relations**

However, perhaps less straightforward remain the reasons why strategic partnerships have emerged and proliferated – and why now? According to (Nadkarni 2010, p. 45), 'structural, regional, and civilizational modifiers' could help explain why, since the end of the Cold War, international actors have departed from the alliance paradigm and instead embraced partner-ships. Along with global power shifts and the diffusion of power that demand more flexible forms of international cooperation than alliances' frameworks can offer, the civilizational and structural factors are said to be less conducive to alliances at the regional level as well. Furthermore, three other contemporary factors – economic globalization, non-state security threats, and nuclear weapons – account for the decision of emerging global powers and middle powers 'to steer clear of formal alliances' (Nadkarni, 2010, p. 45). Paul (2018) posits that greater incentives to cooperate – for both small and large powers alike – arise 'when balance of power meets globalization', a permeating feature of twenty-first century politics. In new times and realities actors seek new forms of cooperation and problem-solving. Laipson (2015) argues that 'for 21st-century problems, states seek partnerships, not alliances'. Menon (2007) also points to the 'end of alliances' not least because of their rigid, limiting and exclusionist nature. In many regards, the twilight of the alliances era is seeing the dawn of the partnerships age – and many (though, not all) of the functions that alliances have performed are now substituted (sometimes also duplicated) by SPs and the international relations system has adapted the practices of strategic partnerships. Like alliances, strategic partnerships are inherently related to security issues. Renard (2016a, p. 33) notes that it 'is hardly imaginable that a strategic partnership worth the name could afford not to put security issues at the center of its agenda; [t]here is, after all, a very large overlap between strategic and security issues'. A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, the EU's first security strategy and the first foreign policy manifesto which explicitly introduced strategic partner-ships as a foreign policy principle, emphasizes the relevance of SPs for the EU's security: 'there are few if any problems



we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors' (European Council, 2003). Whereas the security component, be it explicit or implicit, narrow or broadly conceived – can be identified perhaps in every strategic partnership, not all SPs are security-driven and security-based. SPs cover a broad range and may be issue-specific or all-encompassing. For instance, the EU has environmental SPs with Brazil, India, China and South Africa (Grevi and Renard, 2012). With its ten official strategic partners, the EU has also developed cyber partnerships (Renard, 2014, 2018). India, on the other hand, has made efforts to expand its own web of strategic partnerships for economic development (Nath, 2014), including with the European Union (Sachdeva, 2015, pp. 14–19). Broader partnerships that either encompass a number of interaction areas or gradually build upon actors' strategic convergence (in goals, roles, worldviews) have proliferated as well. Examples include the EU–Japan 'normative partnership' which is still in the making (Hosoya, 2012) or the recent, all-encompassing EU–Brazil SP, which covers 'more than meets the eye' (Ferreira-Pereira, 2016, p. 55). The practice shows that strategic partnerships go well beyond security and only by way of exception draw on a single area of interaction. Conventional wisdom suggests that broad partnerships should be the more enduring. Strategic partnerships have both a form (format) and a process, whereas their purpose (function) may and does actually vary from context to context. For small and middle-sized powers, achieving the privileged status of a strategic partner with more powerful international actors serves as a tool for an indirect assertion of their strategic relevance in international affairs, therefore transcending the benefits of a merely bilateral goal-oriented strategic cooperation. For regional and global powers, the size and density of their strategic partnership webs enable actors to be active stakeholders in regional affairs both near and far, thus transcending the image-related benefits of widely recognized strategic relevance. Thus, in principle, strategic partnerships can be formed between 'emerging and established powers' alike (Kliman et al., 2014). Actors' motivations behind forging strategic partnerships are as various as their motivations to engage in any other form of international strategic interaction, whether it be of a cooperative or competitive character. For instance, Australia's interest in deepening strategic ties with ASEAN lies in gaining an additional 'strategic hedge' against the growing uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific region (WPR, 2018). For China, strategic partnerships have 'a clearer purpose in sight, namely, to shape an international environment that is propitious to its rise as a global power' (Michalski and Pan, 2017b, p. 14). In particular, the China–Russia strategic partnership may be regarded as both a platform that enables an additional strategic hedge for the rising powers under the Western hegemony, and as 'an axis of (tactical) convenience', driven by 'instrumentalism and opportunism' (Lo, 2008, p. 53; cf. also Brzezinski, 1997, pp. 116–17, 170). Alongside the international challenges and opportunities, strategic partnerships may equally be enabled or constrained by salient domestic factors of the partners in question (Trinidad, 2017). Without doubt, cultures of strategic and security, as well as political or socio-economic type regimes with a leadership personality may, too, generate the will to cooperate and forge a strategic partnership relationship or contrariwise, fail to deliver such. However, this is not the analysis level which this book project embraces. It must be made explicitly clear that strategic partnerships are neither bound to emerge from friendly relations or among friendly powers, nor are they bound to necessarily turn rivaling powers into allies. They provide an incentivized form of engagement and cooperation-while-at-competition. Following Blanco



(2015), strategic partnerships are used to 'define relationships as complex, like the one between India and the EU, and straightforward commodity-based ones as exist between Argentina and China' (p.53). Strategic partnerships have become the new wild card of international relations for they enable interaction and engagement between both friendly and rival, or competing powers as well as between those who are neither allies nor competitors. By virtue of this flexibility, strategic partnerships appear indispensable for strategic interaction in the twenty-first century. Obviously, strategic partnerships have become 'a central feature of the early twenty-first century diplomatic discourse', which speaks of their rhetorical significance but also bears nasty consequences for the assessment of their policy-related significance. The term's inflated rhetorical use leads to an equivocal situation where strategic partnerships 'mean everything – and thus mean little or nothing' (Renard, 2013, p. 302). The New York Times Chronicle reveals that 82 per cent of the articles the outlet published in 2012, in one way or another referred to the topic of strategic partnerships (NYT Chronicle, 2015). This trend can be interpreted in two ways – that is, signifying the rise of this phenomenon and its policy importance, as well as fixating the inflated use of the discursive frame thus devaluing the significance of its policy. Regrettably, and rather confusingly, both interpretations can be held valid, and oftentimes the empty rhetorical shelling overshadows the perception of the real political significance of strategic partnerships practice. (Envall and Hall 2016, p. 88) maintain that in Asia, strategic partnerships are 'a fundamental component of regional security dynamics'. (Grevi (2012, 2013)) disentangles why EU strategic partnerships matter for the Union's efforts to assert the EU as a global player, advance its economic and development goals, as well as channel its preferences for structuring the global governance processes. In 2009, then US Secretary of Political Affairs, William J. Burns explained the impetus behind the American strategy of partnerships in his Cyril Foster Lecture at the University of Oxford, where he asserted that the coming age of 'the partnership imperative' is 'a neat bumper-sticker and a handy slogan' but also 'an exceedingly difficult task to carry out in practice'; nonetheless there is evidently a crucial need to 'develop new tools of leadership and cooperation' and use those 'to build a new architecture of cooperation' (Burns, 2009). Given that such 'partnership imperative' informs the foreign policy of the current lonely superpower, one should not wonder why middle range or regional powers, as well as smaller powers, make commitments to the promise of partnership. Indeed, in an increasingly interdependent and complex international system, strategic partnerships represent a flexible and a multi-purpose foreign policy instrument in the toolbox of both the world's leading, rising and smaller powers as well as non-state actors – and first and foremost, international organizations of a greater scope of authority and inter-national engagement caliber.

## **2. Ukraine of strategic relations (Ukrainian-Polish).**

Ukraine's declaration of strategic relations with some countries in the first ten years of its independence has become certain cult event for the Ukrainian political establishment. It is significant that, as a rule, strategic partnership was proclaimed by the Ukrainian party only. It obviously proves Ukraine's striving for a certain level of relations. Real cooperation was not maintained by keeping to the basics of strategic relations, though. As a political scientist O. Dergachov states, Ukraine does not possess enough power to become a strategic partner (avoiding the depreciation of the essence of the strategy). For the USA and the UN Ukraine is a secondary object of influence. Russia is also far from considering Ukraine as a partner in solving its strategic foreign tasks (Dergachov O, 2000). The aim of the given research is to consider Polish-Ukrainian relations as an example of strategic partnership or at





least its most probable model as it is which, in contrast to other declared strategic partnerships, largely meets this definition. Scientific novelty of the work lies in the fact that we aim to apply theoretical indications of strategic partnership to the practical dimension of Polish-Ukrainian relations. It is necessary to note that the course of Polish-Ukrainian relations has been thoroughly studied by Ukrainian and Polish scientists. Research conducted by Ukrainian V. Budkin, G. Zelenko, T. Zaretska, Ya. Matychyk, S. Stoyetsky, S. Pavlenko, as well as Polish specialists, such as Ye. Orlof, V. Balyuk, T. Olshansky, V. Osadchy is meant. Therefore, we are interested in Ukraine's relations with Poland, first of all, as a practical model to research theoretical conception of strategic partnership. With the view to this, the structure of the article has been built: the characteristics of strategic partnership researched by S. Kononenko in particular (Kononenko S.,1999) have been analysed on the example of realization of Ukrainian-Polish relations. Science distinguishes several basics of strategic partnership.

## **2.1 The development of historical relations between Ukraine and Poland**

### **2.1.1 Community of strategic objectives.**

In their foreign policy Poland and Ukraine have defined the entrance to the European Union as their priority. Poland has implemented the strategy and in 2004 became a member of the EU. Ukraine declares its aspiration to join the European Union. Poland joined the NATO in 1999; in Ukraine entry to NATO is President Yushchenko's objective, this course is supported by the vast majority of Ukrainian experts (Mistse Ukrayiny v Nato,2006). Poland and Ukraine are developing co-operation in the sphere of safety. To our opinion, one of Poland's strategic goals is assertion of its own national interests, in this connection it is sometimes reproached from the side of its European allies, France in particular. French political leaders consider that Poland cares about American interests more than about all-European ones. Meanwhile Polish nation is more homogenous and consolidated than modern population in western countries. Moreover, it can be an example to follow for Ukraine in the persistent defence of its national interests and national identity itself under the conditions of powerful influence of big states and such superstate as the USA. Many Ukrainian scientists stress the coincidence of Ukraine and Poland's strategic goals. Thus, to V. Madisson and V. Shakhov's opinion, both countries strive for European integration and support good neighbour relations with Russia (Madisson V.V., Shakhov V.A.,2003). S. Pavlenko stresses the political dimension of strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine which, as he thinks, consists in prevention of appearance of a Europe's new dividing line on Ukrainian-Polish border, favouring relations strengthening between west, east, north and south of Europe(Pavlenko S.M.,2002). Ya. Matychyk pays attention to such factor as safety guarantee according to which Ukraine and Poland's goals are common in "ensuring national safety within the creation of all-European system"(Vlasyuk O.S.,2002). In general Poland is interested in the existence of independent Ukraine, moreover, if it is stable and foreseeable. It is proved, in particular, by the fact that during the Orange Revolution Poland, did not remain indifferent to Ukrainian events. President of that time A. Kwaśniewski noted on 23 November, 2004 that "Poland claimed from the very beginning that presidential elections are going to be an examination for Ukrainian democracy. Unfortunately, the result of the examination cannot be acknowledged as satisfactory. Our country is deeply convinced that for the future and for Ukraine's position in the world not only the election of a certain candidate is important but keeping to international standards and the way in which the President will be elected has a key meaning". A. Kwaśniewski started active mediatory and international activity. He conducted telephone conversations with US President George W. Bush,



President of France J. Chirac, EU Chairman and Prime Minister of the Netherlands J.P. Balkenende, Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schröder, EU Foreign Policy Chief J. Solana, Lithuania's President V. Adamkus, President of the Czech Republic V. Klaus, President of Ukraine L. Kuchma and presidential candidate V. Yushchenko. As a result of these consultations it was agreed that a group of mediators would come to Ukraine on 1 and 6 December, 2004, the group consisted of A. Kwaśniewski together with V. Adamkus, J. Solana and the representative of the Council of Europe V. Tymosevic. Polish deputies in the European Parliament showed significant activity during the discussion of the flow of events in Ukraine and defence of Ukrainian opposition. It is natural that unstable Ukraine will weaken Poland's safety, thus, our western neighbour is interested in the Ukrainian safety enhancement. Meanwhile, we agree with S. Pavlenko concerning the factor of danger to the success of strategic partnership which lies in the competition for the status of the regional leader. S. Pavlenko believes that Poland aims to play the role of a sole leader among the countries of the former socialist camp and is not interested in transforming Ukraine into a powerful centre of influence in Central Eastern Europe (Pavlenko S.M., 2002). In this connection, we can recall that strategic goals of other strategic partners proclaimed by Ukraine (the USA, Russia, the EU) cannot coincide with the Ukrainian because these countries determine their position from the point of view of their activity in much more significant geographical regions.

#### **2.1.2 Strategic consensus.**

Legitimacy of strategic partnership. Strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine was fixed on the highest level on 21 May, 1997 in Kyiv, in Joint statement of presidents L. Kuchma and A. Kwaśniewski. According to S. Stoyetski, "from the end of 1997 the formula of "strategic partnership" in the relations with Ukraine has become absolute in the official political discourse of the Republic of Poland and is shared by the decision-makers of Polish foreign policy irrelevant from their ideological and political belonging" (Stoyetski S., 2002). It is significant that according to the document "The Strategy of the Safety of the Republic of Poland" passed in 2000, the relations with Ukraine are outlined as those with a strategic partner. Thus, Poland is a country which has chosen a format of "strategic partnership" in relation to Ukraine, as well as Ukraine has done the same in relation to Poland. (Ilchenko A., 2000). Ukrainian-Polish strategic partnership is based on the ideology of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In European organizations Polish officials constantly remind about the necessity to give Ukraine a perspective of European membership. Poland supports Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic course and is ready to share its experience in this sphere.

#### **2.1.3 Formed and developed social mechanism.**

After Ukraine proclaimed its independence the activity of Polish-Ukrainian organizations and structures of state and public level which practically implement the objectives of strategic partnership has increased. The contacts made by scientists, teachers, youth, public organizations representatives are developed enough.

#### **2.1.4 Predominantly two-sided character.**

Polish-Ukrainian strategic partnership is developing within bilateral relations. According to Ukrainian scientists, "in the second half of 1990s Ukrainian-Polish interaction became an important stabilizing factor for Europe. Ukrainian-Polish alliance can be conventionally compared, by its significance for Central Eastern Europe, to German-French, which determined post-war history of Western Europe" (Perepelytsya G.M., Subtelnyi O.M., 2005). Bilateral cooperation between Poland and Ukraine attracts certain attention of the USA. This country



takes part in joint projects funding, first of all, in the sphere of small business, reformation of local self-government and macroeconomic policy through Polish-American-Ukrainian initiative on cooperation (PAUCI). It is clear that the USA are interested in stable Ukraine independent from Russia especially on conditions of its entry to European and Euro-Atlantic organizations and its assertion of the conception of transatlantic solidarity in these organizations. On the modern stage Polish-Ukrainian cooperation remains bilateral and mutually beneficial according to many parameters. Despite the reproaches from Europe’s side about the breach of all-European interests in favour of implementation of American international conceptions Poland follows, first of all, its national interests.

**2.1.5 Equality, non-hierarchical relations.**

At present there are all grounds to believe that Ukrainian-Polish relations correspond to this criterion. There is no significant difference in classification of our countries in the global strategic space. Both Poland and Ukraine strive for self-assertion on the international arena as middle-sized states, tending to claim regional leadership in certain areas. Ukrainian ambassador Yu. Shcherbak notes that our states belong to “middle power” (or rather, to regional leaders) (Sivets M.,2001).In the political sphere Ukrainian-Polish dialogue on the highest level has become traditional – presidents of both countries meet regularly. Poland is able to attract attention of Brussels European officials to Ukrainian problems. In the military dimension Poland’s power has strengthened after its entry to such organization of collective safety as NATO. Meanwhile Ukraine is one of leaders on the global arms trade market. The situation in Poland’s economy is more optimistic than in Ukraine, not to be able, though, to influence Ukrainian economy as much as, for example, the USA or the EU which give significant financial aid, or Russia which can cause pressure on Ukraine, regulating prices on energy sources.

**2.2 Ukraine’s And Poland Trading**

International trade was equal to 65% of Ukraine’s GDP in 2020, totalling to \$102.9 billion of goods exchanged with countries around the world. Poland is a key economic partner of Ukraine and already ranks second among all countries in terms of bilateral trade and as of 2020 the volume of bilateral trade in goods amounted to 7.36 billion US dollars.

**Table 1** Ukraine’s And Poland Trading

Country	Trade with Ukraine (2020)	Exports from Ukraine (%)	Imports to Ukraine (%)
Poland	\$7.4B	45%	55%

**Source:** IMF

In 2020, Poland exported \$5.68B to Ukraine. The main products that Poland exported to Ukraine are Cars (\$327M), Packaged Medicaments (\$110M), and Vehicle Parts (\$106M). During the last 25 years the exports of Poland to Ukraine have increased at an annualized rate of 8.66%, from \$712M in 1995 to \$5.68B in 2020. Ukraine exported \$3.26B to Poland . The main products that Ukraine exported to Poland were Iron Ore (\$373M), Insulated Wire (\$298M), and Seats (\$171M). During the last 25 years the exports of Ukraine to Poland have increased at an annualized rate of 10.8%, from \$251M in 1995 to \$3.26B in 2020.

**2.3 Disadvantages of Polish-Ukrainian Relations.**



It is necessary to note that old Polish-Ukrainian conflicts remind of themselves. Historical events, the fact of the fight for freedom of the Ukrainian people against Polish rule in 17th century, Polish-Ukrainian fights in western Ukraine and Eastern Poland are the factors that remind of considerable antagonism in the past. This component can weaken strategic partnership to some measure. However, considered and balanced politics conducted by both governments is able to form non-antagonistic relations on condition of mutual interest in stability and development. Certain steps in this direction have already been taken. In particular, on 21 March, 1994, Intergovernmental Agreement on Protection of Memorial Places and Burial Places of Victims of War and Political Repressions was signed. On 21 May, 1997, Joint Declaration of the President of the Republic of Poland and Ukraine "Towards Accord and Unity" was decreed. In the document it was fixed that "concealment or one-sided presentation ... of the facts (of the common Polish-Ukrainian history) will not cure the pain of those who were hurt and their relatives, will not favour the deepening and mutual understanding between our peoples. The way to true friendship lies, first if all, in truth and mutual understanding. We admit that no goal can justify crime, violence and application of the principle of collective responsibility".

### **Conclusions**

We consider that Polish-Ukrainian relations meet this criterion, since partners' mutual perception is reasonable. The cooperation is based on practicable plans. Poland understands difficulties of transformations in Ukraine much better than western countries. Slavic mentality of Poles is correspondingly more understandable for Ukraine than the world outlook of the citizens of other European countries. Conclusions. For Ukraine's foreign policy of the first decade of independence is characterized by declaring a large number of strategic partners, which did not correspond the reality of the relations. Moreover, foreign political rhetoric ignored theoretical achievements and characteristic parameters of strategic partnership. Declaration and implementation of ideas of strategic partnership are gaining significance on condition of their correspondence to the criteria. Having applied theoretical conception to practical dimension of the relations between Poland and Ukraine, we can conclude that the relations correspond to most fundamentals of strategic partnership. Under favourable conditions the tendency towards strategic cooperation will strengthen, especially if Ukraine's declared goal to enter European Union and Euro-Atlantic structures will acquire real features. Then, new factors will favour the enhancement and appearance of new forms of strategic cooperation. It is necessary to ascertain that there are possible dangers for successful scenario of the development of the relations. For instance, having entered the EU, Poland had to introduce visa system for Ukrainians. Thus, in the practical dimension western community fences itself off Ukraine with firm borders (although Poland, strengthening the borders to meet the demands set by the EU, makes visas free of charge for Ukrainians within strategic cooperation with Ukraine). A variant of the development of the syndrome of inappropriateness of European choice and Euro-pessimism on the background of the lack of clear European perspective for our country from the side of official Brussels is probable. Therefore, a strategic partnership dysfunction between Poland and Ukraine is possible. The constituent parts of Poland and Ukraine's national power can complement each other. It concerns, first of all, Ukraine's natural resources and its scientific potential, as well as Poland's economic achievements in the sphere of reforms and market economy development. we aim to apply theoretical indications of strategic partnership to the practical dimension of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

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