

## About the Mimetism and the Acclimatization of Television's Industry in the Arab Media

Dr. Daoud DJEFAFLA  
UFR of Communication – Paris XIII University (France)  
LabSIC MSH Paris – Nord (France)

### Abstract :

Today, the Arab space contains a lot of the news channels, which sits on the throne stations, *Al Jazeera* and *Al Arabiya*. If the concept of the first to occupy this position in view of the many factors, it is difficult to see the arrival of the second to the rank of the first day of her birthday. This study is an attempt to make sense of this case and according to the hypothesis that the research process of conditioning has been studied starts by Channel Qatar, Channel Saudi Arabia. The format of Mimetisme manner in which the actors Saudi journalists in the television industry based on the idea of Acclimatization the system news reporting for *Al Jazeera* is the *Al Arabiya* channel, which produced the form in which it is today.

### ملخص :

يحوي الفضاء العربي اليوم الكثير من القنوات الإخبارية التي تربع على عرشها محطتان، الجزيرة والعربية. إذا كان مفهومنا أن تتبوأ الأولى هذه المكانة بالنظر إلى العديد من العوامل، فإنه من الصعب معرفة وصول الثانية إلى هذه المرتبة من يومها الأول لميلادها. هذه الدراسة هي محاولة لفهم كُنه هذه القضية والتي تتعلق حسب الفرضية البحثية بعملية تكيف خضعت لها القناة القطرية فأعطت القناة السعودية. إن نسق المحاكاة الذي انتهجه الفاعلون الإعلاميون السعوديون في صناعة التلفزيون بالاعتماد على فكرة أفلمة المنظومة الخبرية لقناة الجزيرة هو الذي أنتج قناة العربية بالشكل الذي هي عليه اليوم.

### **Introduction**

In the industry of television by satellite in Arab space, two channels, *Al Jazeera* and *Al Arabiya*, share the theme of news continuously with the presence of accessory few other actors. If the Qatari television has long remained alone on the top of the hierarchy of the Arab production news, today hardly the monopoly because it competes with its neighbor Saudi channel. If it is somehow logical that *Al Jazeera* gets this place among all the protagonists in the pan-Arab broadcasting content, namely its launch last fifteen years, innovation, aesthetics, opening novel of political debate, tone new production of the message, etc. It is unusual that his rival comes to the Saudi compete in the first days of birth. It is true of *Al Arabiya* belongs to the Saudi MBC media group, which is the first and largest investor in the information content industry in the Middle East, the Saudi actors have extensive experience in developing media services and that this chain has managed to recruit the great talents of the Qatari television and through them had flown into power, but is it enough for her to clinch second place behind *Al Jazeera*? In other words, what is the reason why Saudi Actors have won their bet on that TV?

To answer this question, a hypothesis can be developed as follows: the Saudi channel is a duplicate of television *Al Jazeera*. In other words, *Al Arabiya* is considered a station that imitates *Al Jazeera*, which mimics its ways and appropriates its television products. In short, *Al Arabiya* starts in the skin of *Al Jazeera*. From this assumption, we must try to find the logic that such "cloning" is achieved. We believe that this is a process of imitation that which *Al Arabiya* and *Al Jazeera* are regarded as social phenomena. The advantage of this approach lies in the fact that we understand how this process of imitation and therefore identify ways from which *Al Arabiya* will fight against *Al Jazeera* in that it came mainly to rival that. It serves to review the terms and tools used by *Al Arabiya* in its fight against *Al-Jazeera* is to say, try to identify the power of this medium and these instruments. Therefore, the question is: what is that "a media power"? The advantage of this approach is that it offers the opportunity to understand how *Al Arabiya* built its power on a logic of mimicry which is to deal with *Al Jazeera*. Therefore, it is attempting to highlight the process of mimicry of *Al Arabiya*, that by which she built her speech and uses his power struggle against *Al-Jazeera*. Also, it is about understanding how the Saudi channel *Al Jazeera* mimics the register of the composition of its program schedule, how it copies its emissions, etc.. In short, we find the origins of a specific element of *Al*

*Arabiya* television products in those of *Al Jazeera*. This approach carries an interest that lies in the fact that she can understand how *Al Arabiya*, materialized by the mimicry by programming tailored, through programs and copied by *une manière de faire* "how to" imitated, *Al Jazeera* fight its offering worldview and constructing his reality television.

### **1. *Al Arabiya*: the acclimatization of a television**

Between the Qatari channel *Al Jazeera* and the Saudi channel *Al Arabiya*, there is a close relationship that has left several authors say that "*Al Arabiya came to fight against the influence of Al Jazeera and media to reduce its impact on Arab societies*" (Wannas, 2006, p.35). In this sense, the two televisions appear as twin sisters. This qualification is the fact that the similarity between pairs of channels is noticeable on several stages. Since the Qatari is the first that has emerged in November 1996 and that the Saudi channel was born seven years later, in March 2003, it is obvious to say that *Al Arabiya* who was born under the sign *Al Jazeera*. In other words, the Saudi channel has taken the same characteristics of the Qatari and therefore it qualifies as a duplicate thereof. From there, if *Al Arabiya* is considered a string "clown" of *Al Jazeera*, a query can be asked the following formulation: how logic fits the cloning of *Al Jazeera* who gave *Al Arabiya*? Or, in other words, why Saudi actors who started their chain took the Qatari television as a reference? The explanation for this cloning is a process of imitation, understood as "*a report that involves a model and copy*" (Tarde, 1999, p. 116) and which consists of *Al Arabiya*, an imitation of *Al Jazeera*. So the choice of taking *Al Jazeera* as part of the model seems logical to follow, what Pierre Bourdieu calls "*the existing tastes*" imposed by *Al Jazeera* (1979, p. 256). These tastes may be that these "*hot air*" (Czuba, 2007) or these and other presenters who wear western style clothing, this graphic and modern trends, this dramatic music, etc. In short, the likes of *Al Jazeera* may be just what Miles (2005) describes as a way that gives it the character of a "*Western television information*". In other words, the imitation of the Qatari lies in its "*effect of symbolic imposition*" it has on offer television in the Arab (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 256).

Therefore, it seems that Saudi actors were taken in their action, by the logic of competition with other producers, namely *Al Jazeera*, "*and the specific interests related to their position in the field of production*" TV deals (Bourdieu 1979, p. 257). In other words, the use of Saudi Arabia, Qatar to the model, is part of the defense of Saudi interests in the Arab region,

damaged by the representation made on *Al Jazeera* Saudi Arabia (Fandy, 2007). Therefore, *Al Arabiya* is coming mainly to fight against the influence of *Al Jazeera*. The advantage of this is to defend a Saudi of things, because it is under the influence of actors who have organic relationship with the royal family. The strategy then is to create a copy of *Al Jazeera* (which is *Al Arabiya*) that simply contradict itself (that is to say *Al Jazeera*). Reproduction of the Saudi channel as a copy of *Al Jazeera* becomes part of a logic of imitation of the Qatari channel. From there, *Al Arabiya* becomes second *Al Jazeera* acclimated for political and ideological. Through this logic of imitation of *Al Jazeera*, *Al Arabiya* began a process of repetition, which comes in many forms by which it (the Saudi channel) appropriates elements of the Qatari channel. As part of this imitation, the chain Challenge acclimatized products and elements of *Al Jazeera* to give his signature. The theme of the television channel as continuous news, public choice (the Arab and Arab-speaking viewers), the choice of satellites and frequencies, the choice of operators of cable distribution, the choice of the extension on Internet: [www.aljazeera.net](http://www.aljazeera.net) and [www.alarabiya.net](http://www.alarabiya.net), etc. are all factors that militate in favor of this idea. This repetition is not limited to these records but it takes a different magnitude when it involves other stages, particularly that of television. Indeed, *Al Arabiya* has repeated much of the programming schedule of the Qatari channel. The repetition on the development of emissions, their titles, their gender, their duration, etc. To register, we record many elements of *Al Arabiya*, which are taken from the Qatari channel. However, that the Saudi channel is a television "clown", evokes a legitimate question regarding its existence and thus arises: how to duplicate this becomes a fully fledged chain fight against the original?

To answer this question, we must understand the process of imitation has led to *Al Arabiya* television. Indeed, the Saudi channel, which is the product of this process of imitation, has the skills that make "*the only large television that has the means necessary to win Al Jazeera*" (2006, Wannas, p.35). These means and expertise to offer *Al Arabiya* can acclimate to its objective and the issues that surround it. Therefore, it is considered a television acclimated for political purposes, and to achieve, she will fight against *Al Jazeera*. And since there is struggle, there is necessarily a question of power and means that *Al Arabiya* has, as a medium to conduct its struggle in The North Africa and The Middle East.

## 2. The Media Power of *Al Arabiya*

The question of the power of *Al Arabiya* is extremely important in understanding his discourse. Therefore, it is important to understand the concept of “power” and then locate it in the context of *Al Arabiya*. The advantage of this approach is that it helps to understand the strategies of the Saudi channel in its “media war” against *Al Jazeera*. To try to understand “power” of the Saudi channel TV, answer the question: how the copy of *Al Jazeera* (which is *Al Arabiya*) is contradicting itself (that is to say *Al Jazeera*) and with what means? To do so, it seems that *Al Arabiya* has a “power” that allows him to construct a discourse on its own and therefore requires the determination of a specific device that supports the realization of that power. And since it is about power, it seems appropriate to first identify those concepts in their theoretical framework. To do so, we use the work of Michel Foucault in which these two concepts are, among others, the pillars of his philosophical works. Why the use of concepts in Foucault's work on the issue of “power” of media, namely television channel *Al Arabiya*? Because Foucault does not see the power nor as a coherent, unitary, stable, nor as a substance shared by a limited number of privileged over others. However, he sees as power relations. In this sense, Foucault emphasizes that power does not exist because it is “*reality of relations, a beam more or less organized, more or less pyramidalization*” (1994, p. 302). It is this aspect of power that concerns us as a media, a television channel in this case is not an institution that has the means which enable it to win and submit with “force” the public. And also, because the Foucauldian concept approved its relevance to be applied in media contexts (Esquinazi, 1996). In this perspective, power is seen as a cross arrangement in which the practices, knowledge and institutions. In this sense, power is not something in someone's hands, but the element that circulates in the social fabric and passes them all, to combine them and remove them at once. It “*does not apply, simply as an obligation or prohibition, to those who 'have not' it invests, through them and through them, it builds on them, as themselves, in their fight against him, bearing in turn it has taken on them*” (Foucault, 2003, p.31-32). Thus, the power not possessed but exercised since it is considered an act or as Foucault describes a mode of action (Foucault, 1994, p. 313). It is this aspect of power that concerns us is to say, as a mode of action we are trying to use in a media context to examine the “power” television channel *Al Arabiya*.

To do so, our inspiration is the work of J.P. Esquenazi: *The power of media: TF1 and his discourse* in which he stresses that a theory of the power of television can not be defined using the binomial power / dominance and says that “*media can 't impose his interlocutor (...) he did not lock, no requirement to nothing*” (1996, p. 21). However, he finds that the French channel TF1 exercises its power by all its “*actions*” to which the partners commit themselves, in this case the speakers, to become the viewers (Esquenazi, 1996, p. 25-26). From there, it seems that the power of *Al Arabiya* manifests itself in fact establish a rapport with his interlocutors and sign a contract with them moral is to watch his television product. In this contract, the media is satisfied with mere presence of individuals before the television set connected to its programs and its power is already built. For the other part of the contract, potential viewers made their connection, as stated Esquenazi, “*in the name of the contents of its programs*” (1996, p. 27). From this, the power of media, conceived as relations with its stakeholders and its action towards them, is determined by its audio-visual and television practice. Therefore, we can say that “*power*” of the *Al Arabiya* can be articulated on two axes. First, *Al Arabiya* tries to win viewers with the aim of having a place alongside *Al Jazeera* in the Arab region. Secondly, *Al Arabiya* has, by its power, the function to be the vector of a pan-Arab Saudi Politic in Arab Region. From there, we can retain the power Foucauldian two features of great importance: the relationship and the act constituting the authority. This helps to evoke the manner of exercise of power. From there, it is necessary to highlight the discourse of *Al Arabiya* as a media that is to say, a television practice complex and therefore determine its instruments, the / the field (s) where it occurs and the network that emerges. This question is about the next point.

### **3. The Discourse Operator**

Before looking at the speech channel *Al Arabiya*, it is pertinent to ask: what is a discourse? Always remain on our Foucauldian approach. The philosopher does not see the discourse as all things said and how they are said, or as reports of duels between a dominant discourse and another dominated them with the class barrier. Foucault observes the discourse as the set of statements as they belong to the same *discursive formation* (1969, p. 153). It is the field “*strategic, where the elements, tactics, weapons are constantly moving from one camp to another, exchanging between the opponents and turn against the very people who use them*” (Foucault, 1994,

p. 123). So the speech is first “*training*” which has its own “*rules*” that give it its function as a creator of the reports, between the parties, and its strength as the origin of power. That said, we must observe the speech as “*a field*” (Bourdieu, 2002 p.114) that is to say, as a place of confrontation. It is the place, because the position occupied by each actor (and its media partners), determines the nature of struggle and defines how the exchange control elements are. It is also an instrument because the weapons used by each player, the tactics taken by them define the issue and contradiction.

In this perspective, how to identify these “*rules*” that control the field is built and its components are used in the discourse of *Al Arabiya*? To do so, observe the television discourse not as a language text, but as a social fact that has two dimensions: an informative, that concerning its objects (JT talking about the tsunami, a report on refugees from Darfur, etc.) and indicative that focuses on the speech itself because it determines the power relations produced by this discourse (the hierarchy of the tsunami compared with other information, the very choice to make a documentary on Darfur, etc.). Therefore the understanding of discourse necessarily entails the seizure of the indicative scale. In fact it is this that builds “*the link between discourse and the hearer: it brings together what the speech says as its assumptions, and understanding of them by their listeners can access the sense of what is said about the objects*” (Esquenazi, 1996, p. 30). In this sense we are trying to identify the function “*indicative*” of the discourse of *Al Arabiya*, as rules and practices of television, and therefore enter the media report that his interlocutor with a purpose: to reveal the power. For this, we must emphasize the rules of audiovisual discourse chain in Saudi Arabia. In other words, we must determine the *rules* of proper communication with *Al Arabiya*. For example, we must look for rules that explain the status of the subjects of discourse as the consecration of the issue *Sinaat El Mut* (the industry of death) on “terrorism” or those who forge the relationships between subjects such as restricting the issue of reform in Saudi on the on the social aspect (of cars driving by women) and restricting the issue of Saudi opposition to “Fundamentalist”, or those which determine the actors who can to have the floor such as the strong presence of actors observed in the emission *Idaat Liberals* (lighting) and those for objects of discourse that is to say the user chose to give information and not information about them such as the dissemination of information on “wage increases in Arabia” in a flash of economic information and the corresponding chain in Saudi stock market. In this sense and from those rules, the discourse of *Al Arabiya*

television may operate on the world, which “*selects what he speaks, he chose certain aspects, assigning positions, and assign links between objects*” (Esquenazi, 1996, p.32). Roughly from his worldview, media discourse constructs its own world. Here we are at it, the media discourse of *Al Arabiya*, as media action, such as television practice, and as a social fact, prepares reports and by those he exercises his power. This is manifested in the selection of statements, the choice of certain aspects, the allocation of positions and relationships between objects.

Therefore, it is pertinent to ask: how the chain creates a place of confrontation and how it retrieves the tools to fight? Alternatively, and because the speech is the weapon of power “*qualification and disqualification*” (Foucault, 1994, p. 124), it is also important to ask the question: what qualifies (or disqualifies) *Al Arabiya* in his discourse, how and why it does? Also, it must bring out the strength of the *Al Arabiya* discourse by highlighting the words of another (*Al Jazeera* viewers, actors, etc.) Used in his discourse: how are they retrieved, how Are they employees? In a word, we must show the discourse of *Al Arabiya* as a mode operator. To do this, an examination of the grid for programming the Saudi channel is the way that leads to the answer

#### **4. The Construction of The Programming of *Al Arabiya***

To bring out the discourse of the Saudi channel as a mode operator must demonstrate three elements. The first focuses on the segmentation of media time for *Al Arabiya* television about how this divides its transmission time, how it moved its production and how it articulates the programming flow and emissions. The second element concerns highlighted by the flow of the chain as it comes to identifying different types of news programs, their locations on the grid, etc. The last element of this relates to the identification of the construction of the grid emission from *Al Arabiya* interesting to examine how these products are made according to the logic of imitation with which the reference is made to *Al Jazeera*.

##### **a. The Segmentation of Media Time**

Programming the grid channel *Al Arabiya* is based, like that of the Qatari *Al Jazeera* on two rationales: the slices of schedules and time zones. These two logics of Anglo-Saxon origins, aims to have an alchemy “*that leads to a strategy of permanent peak time*” (Semprini, 1996). This segment of the broadcast day into four peak times and fragmentation in turn to sub-



programs, hinged together, more or less by specific characteristics. To learn how to fight against *Al Arabiya Al-Jazeera* programming, an observation of different peak times is necessary for the discernment in their joints as “tools of power” and that leads to the following:

- The peak time of the morning (5 h/10h GMT - 8 pm H/13 KSA), which is divided into two segments:
  - The first of 5 pm to 7 pm GMT (8 h/10 h KSA) is devoted entirely to the issue *Sabah Al Arabiya* (morning TV). For two hours, the channel offers viewers a diverse product: news flash, press reviews, etc. This show is a true copy of *Al Jazeera Hadha As-Sabah* (Al Jazeera this morning), which aired on *Al Jazeera* because both products are made using the same design, programmed at the same time slot and presented in the same way: a duet journalists in a room that moves throughout the show and receive columnists successively. The point of demarcation of the Saudi channel from the Qatar-based channel lies in the fact that *Al Arabiya* has brought a "big dose" of news items in this issue. During the pregnancy of one of its telespeakers, the chain has devoted an entire section on the subject.
  - The second from 7 pm to 10 pm GMT (10 am/1 pm KSA) is a thematic slice reserved for the economy. It offers a loop for three hours of programs devoted entirely to scholarship. Live from the main studio in Dubai and duplex with stock exchanges in six countries of the Gulf, the channel puts its audience in the heart of the financial activity with emissions which follow: *Aswaq Saoudiya* (the Saudi stock market), *Aswaq Al Arabiya* (Al Arabiya's purse), *Akhbar As-Souq* (market news), *Aswaq Khalidjiyae* (the fellowship of the Gulf) and *Saat El Iglak* (closing time). The Saudi channel feedback again a loop of production that exists in the programming schedule of *CNN* (Semprini, 2000) where the U.S. television network broadcasts *Business Asia*, *Business Day*, *Business Morning*, *World Business Today* and *Money Line*. The programming loop is one of the few exceptions where the Saudi channel does not refer to the Qatari channel. There are two reasons. First, because *Al Jazeera* is boycotted the rest of the Gulf countries and consequently has no access to local exchanges. Then, because *Al Arabiya* enjoys this situation, but also because it works “at it” since the biggest economic market in the Saudi peninsula. Therefore, the loop is the only economic moment, when the Saudi channel *Al-Jazeera* than by a relatively exclusive offers.

- Slice of the day (10 am/4 pm GMT – 1 pm/7 pm KSA), which is rather long, is characterized by the concentration of reruns. In a sense of alternation, it offers two types of offers: the flow between flashes and JT, and products between reruns of shows from yesterday, and documentaries.
- The edge of night, prime time (16 h/21 h GMT - 19 h/00 h KSA) is an extremely rich segment flows and emissions. The contents of this slice blend both genres and formats. It contains three newspapers “classic” 30-minute broadcast at the beginning of each hour: 16 pm, 17 pm, 18 pm GMT (19 h, 20 h, 21 h KSA) whose palette ranges from hard news to soft news via news items, politics, etc.. A sports program and a press review, *Assolta Ar Rabi* (the fourth power), are scheduled daily, respectively, 16 and 17 h 30 h 30 GMT (19 and 20 h 30 h 30 KSA). At the same time slot, the Qatari channel also broadcasts similar to those of *Al Arabiya*. It is, for the stream, two news flashes to 17 pm and 19 pm GMT (20 pm and 22 pm local Doha) and two leading newspapers to 16 pm and 20 pm Universal Time (19 and 23 h Doha h). The time span of 19 H/20 pm GMT (22 M/23 h KSA) is the main time for all programming channel *Al Arabiya*. It is dedicated to the dissemination of this unique television programming. Alternately, the channel airs every evening throughout the week, *Noktat Nidham* (Objection), *Panorama*, *Idaat* (lighting), etc. In that same time period, *Al Jazeera* broadcasts its “famous” emissions: *Akthar min raye* (more than an opinion), *Bila Houdoud* (without borders), etc. The competition between the two channels increases mainly during this time. Each channel uses a different strategy to win viewers. At 20 pm GMT (23 am KSA), *Al Arabiya* broadcasts the program *Akher Saa* (last hour). This product is a newscast longer lasting one hour and which combines the flow of information with “analysis” of the news commentary from journalists, academics, politicians, etc.. This show is a copy of *Hassad El Youm* (harvest the day) by *Al Jazeera*, which has the same design, which is broadcast simultaneously. This confirms what we have previously explained; *Al Arabiya* is a copy of *Al Jazeera*. Consequently, and in general, and regarding the segmentation of time slots of the broadcast of programs of *Al Arabiya*, a finding can be established: the Saudi channel adopts the same slots as *Al Jazeera* and the same dissemination methods (new and reissued)

#### **b. News and Reality**

The register of the review process of imitation of *Al Arabiya* made on *Al Jazeera* and after crumb highlight similarities that occur at the stage of

dissemination, it is now time to examine the Saudi production chain to capture any similarities with the Qatari television. There are two kinds of product: the flow and emissions. For News and 24 hours, *Al Arabiya* suggest to his audience, some thirty television news in three formats: the flashes of 3 to 5 minutes, the newscast of 30 minutes and hours of information. The flashes are presented alternately on two periods as: night, with JT and within the day and documentaries. The JT this chain, which last between 25 and 30 minutes are like a classic JT a television channel as it provides the news of politics, sports, economy, news items, etc. (Mœglin and Tremblay, 2005). From the point of view of TV consumption and the records of the presentation and format, this element is no different, or the JT Pan-Arab news channels (*Al Jazeera*, for example) and foreign (such as *BBC World*) nor the national terrestrial televisions JT. The difference observed in the programming and selection information.

Speaking of *Al Arabiya* television news is to evoke the JT as a television product that purports to say what happened in the world. The staging and decor are responsible for saying this (Jost, 1999, p. 76). The generic newscast from *Al Arabiya* seeks to combine two types of generic that this TV appears as a window on the world and as a mediator. The first image is the earth that turns on itself with the name of the chain that makes up the middle of the screen. This type of opening is most common in different generic TV: GPs as *TF1*, *France 2*, *Canal Algerie*, etc. or themes such as *Al Jazeera*, etc.. Apart from the generic studio *Al Arabiya* reflects this staged opening to the world. In the news of the Saudi channel information, the presenter is framed in close-up on a background of television, that either he took his image in an indefinite setting abyss, or it opens to the world, always ready to spring into its monitors. Through this chain emphasizes its ability to enter the world with viewers via technology (Djefafla, 2008). Using this technical device, *Al Arabiya* tries to showcase its range of flow that is not limited to this technical process. The Saudi channel information continuously conducts an utterance that recovery hinges on the opening mode of JT.

The newscast of *Al Arabiya* opens with Summary mode. In this configuration, the news in this chain takes the style of writing because the securities are closer to the "hat" of a newspaper or the dispatch of an agency. In this model the opening of the television news, information is the subject of a mediation which focuses on three dimensions: visual (image), oral (the presenter's voice) and writing (titles that scroll on screen) (Djefafla, 2008).

The meaning of this opening summary is close to a teaching method. In other words, this practice, which attempts to simplify the presentation of the new and present through various modes of utterance (written, oral, visual) is a certain pedagogy. That's what Francois Jost considered a mobilization of the expression to put "*in the service of clarity*" (1999, p. 79). While *Al Jazeera* played on the multiplication of points of view (the slogan), *Al Arabiya* plays on the clarity of the information is one of the pillars of the Saudi channel is still highlighted in the news as the value Basic mediation. In conclusion, it is important to note that the presentation of expository device, generic, studio, etc. is similar to that of *Al Jazeera* which confirms again the idea of imitation of *Al Arabiya* to it.

### **c. Mimetism as a Form of Fight Media**

The subject of this review is the program schedule channel *Al Arabiya*. The purpose of this is to see the source of emissions that form it and therefore find an answer to the question of emissions of the Saudi channel are they, like other elements (News for example), duplicate the production of *Al Jazeera*? To answer this question, we must examine the program schedule of *Al Arabiya* to highlight all the elements that make up the emissions: the title, genre, duration, frequency, etc. That can help determine whether or not there is an imitation. The starting point of this review is a hypothesis which is that *Al Arabiya*, as a media product, is a "duplicate" of *Al Jazeera* because it is part of a logic of imitation and therefore the same logic, it seems that broadcasts of *Al Jazeera* are the origins of those of *Al Arabiya*. Audit Through a detailed look at the schedules of the latter, he shows a link between the original elements, which are those of *Al Jazeera*, and acclimated elements, which are those of *Al Arabiya*. The advantage of this approach is to identify these issues as tools of power television channel *Al Arabiya*. In other words, understanding such issues as the instruments, which are in the hands of *Al Arabiya*, which enable it to build relationships with viewers and to fight against *Al Jazeera* (Foucault, 1994), because the program a string Television is the medium of discourse and the essence of its existence. To highlight the issues of *Al Arabiya* compared to those of *Al Jazeera*, a comparison chart that includes much of the schedules of the two channels was achieved. This table shows a blatant imitation of the Saudi channel *Al Jazeera*. The composition of the schedules of *Al Arabiya* is practically, at least at the formal level, the same as *Al Jazeera*. The observation of the kind

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of television product, its duration and periodicity we found that emissions from *Al Arabiya* are duplicates of those of *Al Jazeera*.

<i>Al Arabiya</i>	<i>Al Jazeera</i>	<i>Périodici té</i>	<i>Genre</i>	<i>Descriptif</i>
<i>Mouhima khasa (Spécial mission)</i>	<i>Ziyara khasa (Special visit)</i>	B	Interview	Visit to a personality
<i>Dhayfe wa hiwar (Guest ans et interview)</i>	<i>Dhayfe wa kadiya (Invited and case)</i>	W	Interview	
<i>Likaa el yaoum (Meeting day)</i>	<i>Dhayfe el yaoum (Guest of the day)</i>	D	Interview	Meeting with a political actor on a current issue
<i>Moukabala khasa (Special meeting)</i>	<i>Likaa khas (Special meeting)</i>	W	Interview	
<i>Noktate nidham (objection)</i>	<i>Bila houdoud (Borderless)</i>	W	Interview	
<i>Mina el Irak (Of Iraq)</i>	<i>El mach'had el iraki (View Iraq)</i>	W	Debate	
<i>Mahattate (stations)</i>	<i>Mourassilou Al Jazeera (Correspondant Al Jazeera)</i>	W	Reports	News magazine produced by the correspondin g chain

The device emissions of the two channels *Al Arabiya* and *Al Jazeera*

B : Bimonthly, W : Weekly, D : Daily

The observation of this table highlights the major elements *Al Arabiya* as a dedicated channel *Al Jazeera* impersonator. These elements show that the first string weaves its program schedule in a spirit of imitation which makes him a “naturalized Jazeera” *Al Jazeera* “original”. This practice of mimicry occurs as follows:

- In a striking way, the program titles of the two channels are “almost” identical. The pair *Moukabala khassa* (special meeting) / *Lika Khass* (special meeting) shows that even if the statement “Special meeting” in English appeared in two occasions, it is identical in two forms in Arabic language but significantly different synonyms. The other pairs follow the same logic. *Al Arabiya* emissions are the same as *Al Jazeera* like *Mina el Iraq* (From Iraq) / *El mach'had al Iraq* (Iraqi view) *Mouhim khassa* (special mission) / *Ziyara khassa* (special visit) *Dhayfe wa Hiwar* (Guest and interview) / *Dhayfe wa Kadiya* (invited and question) and *Lika el Yaoum* (the meeting of the day) / *Dhayfe el Yaoum* (the guest of the day), etc. All these proposals illustrate the linguistic mimicry blatant *Al Arabiya* issue securities of the Qatari channel. This is explained Gabriel Tarde, saying that “whatever effect in the number of ideas or actions that a theory or a machine synthesizes, there has never been only two elements that are both combined, adapted to each other” (1999, p. 122). By this process of mimicry, *Al Arabiya* has clearly recovered the program titles of *Al Jazeera* to appropriate them. The objective of this seems to lie in the fact that these elements, program titles may be viewed as tools for “power” in which *Al Jazeera Al Arabiya* disarms its own. Therefore, we can consider that the manufacture of the grid emission is thus a way to struggle on the part of *Al Arabiya*, *Al Jazeera*.

- The type of emissions is also a strong point in the process of mimicry led by *Al Arabiya* in building its program schedule. The facts above pairs are almost identical in terms of their manufacture. Take for example the issue of debate *Noktate Nidham* (objection) channel *Al Arabiya*, which is a true copy of the broadcast *Bila Hudood* (borderless) channel *Al Jazeera*. Roughly speaking, both products are characterized by the attention given to issues of timeliness often designed with a logic that is based on the controversy and an approach to provocation by the presenters. Wannas believes that the goal of this method, adopted by *Al Arabiya* and *Al Jazeera* is that it “brings out the deals, inflame the confrontation of ideas” (2006, p. 39). It is this characteristic that makes the news and not the substance of the debate itself. The same logic leads to the production of emissions, respectively, for *Al Arabiya* / *Al Jazeera*, *Mina el Iraq* (From Iraq) / *El mach'had al Iraq* (The

Iraqi view) that address the issue of Iraq, Baghdad and released animated by Iraqi logged on site *Mouhim khassa* (Special mission) / *Ziyara khassa* (Special visit) that offer interviews made at political figures, historical, etc. ; *Dhayfe wa Hiwar* (Guest and interview) / *Dhayfe wa Kadiya* (Invited and questions) and *Lika el Yaoum* (Meeting day) / *Dhayfe el Yaoum* (Guest of the day) that are extensions of current affairs with a meeting with a political player on the day or week.

▪ The mimicry in the production of emissions from *Al Arabiya* can be understood as a logic that aims to disrupt the supply of *Al Jazeera* television. Explanations. By programming each day at 19 h 30 (GMT) issuing *Esolta Ar Rabi* (the fourth power), a magazine devoted to decoding the news and its representation in the press, with assistance from multiple guests, *Al Arabiya* seems to offer viewers a similar or even identical to the *Ma Wara Al Khabar* (which is behind the new) *Al Jazeera* broadcast on the same days and same times. From there, we can say evoke the same subjects, address the same aspects of the news is not necessarily say the same thing. The opposition may lie in the similarity. Watch *Esolta Ar-Rabi Al Arabiya* (the fourth power) or follow *Ma Wara Al Khabar Al Jazeera* (which is behind the new one) is not under any circumstances the same practice. Therefore, we believe that by producing emissions mimicked those of *Al Jazeera* and by programming them into the same slots that the Qatari channel *Al Arabiya* can disrupt the supply programs of original programming which are those of *Al Jazeera*. In this process of disruption, it seems that *Al Arabiya* led the fight against *Al Jazeera* and so we can feel the power of the Saudi channel television. In this sense, we share the view of H. Brusini and J. Francis stressed that power television “*is played, is won and lost*” (1982, p.28) and we can say that the power of the Saudi channel is reflected in its programming and the use of those silent and anonymous it (Brusini, Francis, 1982, p.28). This leads us to consider that the production of *Al Arabiya* mimed may be one of the weapons to fight against media in this channel *Al Jazeera*.

## **Conclusion**

Acclimatization of the news channel *Al Jazeera* continuously by the Saudi players to give birth to *Al Arabiya* is peculiar phenomenon in the Arab region, because it is not a mere copying of an operating mechanism or just a tactic to develop a television program but it is indeed a depth that mimicry is not limited to simple competition of the Qatari but his inconsistency is his major goal. What is important to remember in this process is not the creation of the Saudi television, but rather the idea which has conveyed its inception and design which led to the development of its informational order. In this experiment, there is an appropriation, pure and simple communicative tools and instruments suitable for a protagonist with another and accommodation strategies and mechanics of how television *Al Jazeera Al Arabiya* which explains why the media power has a hybrid nature, elusive and is "close friend" of any media and today but tomorrow you will be your competitor. This reality shows several elements that may be useful for different actors in the Arab among them, the television industry by satellite and particularly that of the continuous information is not yet reached the stage of saturation, because the scope of this topic has largely seats to be occupied by new players. Having said that Algeria has good chance to succeed to gain a presence on the register and must grasp if not oblige to do so because all the factors militating for her to go in that direction. Its geopolitical role and its strategic position on regional issues, challenges common with other Arab countries (violence, democracy). Then there are the consequences of its absence on this stage in particular that should be rectified as soon as possible. The Algerian experience with the involvement of foreigners in Algeria and the thing slips committed by them and other domestic issues in the country (*Al Jazeera* and terrorism for example) requires a new look by the actors involved (political power , ENTV, etc..) in the subject in Algeria because it must act positively in this direction. Algeria has launched its International Radio in 2006 that is to say, twenty years after the birth of the Moroccan radio Medi 1. It is unacceptable that the same scenario repeats itself with Medi Sat launched two years ago. In other words, the arrival of Algerian television news in 2030!



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