

U.S. Interests in the Middle East: The Roots

مصالح الولايات الامريكية في الشرق الاوسط: الجذور

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Abstract

This article explores the American interests in the Middle Eastern region starting from the cold war period up to the present day. It aims basically to discover the roots of the U.S. involvement therefore its interests in the region and its different genres to understand the intriguing relationship between "the greatest country in the world" and the Middle East that embodies the distinctive US interests in the region.

ملخص

يسعى هذا المقال لدراسة المصالح الأمريكية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط بدءًا من فترة الحرب الباردة وحتى يومنا هذا. يهدف بشكل أساسي إلى اكتشاف جذور التدخل الأمريكي في المنطقة وبالتالي كشف مصالحهم الجيوسياسية وأنواعها المختلفة لفهم العلاقة المثيرة للاهتمام بين "أعظم دولة في العالم" والشرق الأوسط التي تجسد المصالح الأمريكية المميزة في المنطقة.

1. Introduction

Being the greatest country in the world is not always linked to how much power a country could get, however, it is undoubtedly interrelated to how clever a power could have the ability to manipulate even by tiny hands, either on battlefields or outside. The United States of America –The greatest country in the world- acquired its nickname after the accomplishment of goals and interests it made and still making in the world, particularly in the Middle East. After the failure of its counter-allies, Britain and France, to occupy the lands seized previously in the 18th century by Napoleon until the rise of the British imperialism in the 19th century, America is the new bogeyman in the area with no serious rivals. The American geopolitical intelligence helped Washington to strengthen its power all over the world by settling in the utopic Middle East before the destruction. Therefore, it is worthy to mention that the US interests and its involvement in the area have never been an up-to-the-minute issue, but a fixed principle in the American modern foreign policy. It was over time that Washington updated its interests and goals in the area to suit its political greed and economic fulfilment, from one presidential administration to another, whether to invade, to act as a broker, or just to be the uncovered permanent enemy.

2. Washington in the Middle East: The Opening

Before the opening of the American melodrama in the Middle East, another drama has fallen from the wall of fame to put its curtains down, the British one. It was not the Shakespearian dramas, yet, more notorious pieces, the imperial tragedies. At the time of those tragedies, U.S. interests in the Middle East were almost missionary, educational, and commercial. Remarkably, Thomas Jefferson's administration tried to secure trade routes from the Ottoman pirates in North Africa to reach the high seas (Lesch and Haas 1), whereby, relations were established by exchanging the Caribbean rum for the Turkish opium (Rodenbeck 1).

By the time, The United States' interests were born in the 1930s by the emergence of two strategic elements in the Middle East. Evidently, the discovery of Oil in Saudi Arabia and the creation of Zionism as an activist Jewish movement in Palestine. As these two factors grew, the US ties with the Middle East also have grown even more (Abo-Sak 1).

Nevertheless, the turning point marked the post-World War II era, by the start of the so-called "Cold War", as a new power has arisen to change the dimensions and the factual significance of the world domination. The first US intentions to dominate the Middle East are rooted back in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations through which the Office of Near East and African Affairs was founded in 1944 overtly to introduce the first American Middle Eastern relations¹. Roosevelt believed that America's future progress would be absolutely related to Middle East stability. He wrote to James Landis, Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East: "The Middle East is an area in which the United

¹ See Margolies, Daniel S., ed. *A companion to Harry S. Truman*.

States has vital interest” and its countries should push their economic systems to the next level. He added that it would be an area in America that would profit commercially and politically to cope with its rivals, the British and the soviets (Rubin 3).

It is noticed that the American control meant the abolishment of the British imperialism in the Middle East and the rise of “anti-imperialist preoccupation” (kedourie 5). Accordingly, Roosevelt’s plans to build an American political and economic laboratory stood without factual realization until the pre-cold war period. Britain and France have left the Arabic zone behind, without a power to hold in since they lost their bouncing interests after being shell-shocked from World War II to create the perfect chance for the Americans to seize. In an explicit manner, Barry Rubin revealed how the state department declared the British called the American aid in the Middle East after losing the needed energy to hold along with the intensifying difficulty:

“The British publicly and officially that they are no longer able to keep the Middle East in order without our help. We are inclined to believe that a policy of inactivity or ‘drift’ on our parts will result in a progressive deterioration of the influence of democratic civilization in the Near East.” (5)

Responding to the call of duty, the United States, and its rival the Soviet Union decided upon turning the Middle East into a new arena for a much more distinctive war. According to Hani M. Dorgham (1), The United States and the Soviet Union both had interests in the area, however, “each with different sets of values, therefore different sets of policies and interests, were trying to secure their interests in a highly complicated region". From this point, the first US

interest has been created for the sake of abolishing the soviet communist expansion and starting the new age of American supremacy in the world.

3. Anti-Communist Strategies:

By its analytical significance, the Cold War is “a conflict of national interests – two giants countries faced each other and battled it out for world supremacy by most means short of all- out war” (Westad 1). The cold war in the Middle east was focused on the borders near the Soviet Union as a threatening weapon ready at a time in a area called “Northern tier¹” or the Near East² which according to Yapp, this term has been used to describe the Ottoman empire and its territories, while the Middle East appeared later on to indicate the territories extended from Iran to Tibet (1).

To be a primary objective for Washington in the post World War II period, anti-communism designed the policy took place to gather more allies and to contain the soviet expansion in the East subsequently forcing the American

¹ According to Cohen, the Middle East comprises « along the two mountain ranges that guarded its northern approaches: the Taurus, which divided Turkey from Syria and the Zagros which divide Iran from Iraq. The states along whose borders these mountains ran- Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey- became known as the Northern Tier »

While Silverburg and Reich assume that « the Middle East and North Africa are defined as the region bounded by Turkey, Iran in the North and East, South Yemen in the South and Morocco in the West. This includes: The non-Arab states of Israel, Turkey, and Iran and the Arab states of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. Geographically peripheral states such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Greece, Cyprus, Mauritania, Somalia and Djibouti are not included except where the work refers to other relationships between the United States and the states »

supremacy. Anti-communism by its explanation is based on two fundamental data: the first is that "communism" depicted as a "supreme and unqualified evil" while the second labelled "an evil" a symbol to the Soviet that targeted the blowout all over the world (Miliband and Liebman 1). Marx and Engels had stressed in the *Communist Manifesto* in 1848, "spectre is haunting Europe-the spectre of Communism". Out of the spectre terror, Anti-communism, intended to abolish, the "Soviet imperialism combined with traditional Russian imperialism; of relentless totalitarian expansionism, of Communist aggression, and of an implacable will to achieve world domination" (Miliband and Liebman 12).

To prevent the communist bloc from damaging the American ambitions, one of the most effective anti-communist strategies was the Truman doctrine in 1947 and its breakthrough, the efficient "Marshal Plan" that could cope with the anti-communism notion, with clever steps and visions: to gain allies, exclude the Soviet Union from the region and build a better image for the United States as a stretching exercise for more extending influences. This doctrine represented the first step toward the overall control landing the Middle East.

3.1. The Truman Doctrine:

On March 12, 1947, The Truman policy of containment was first broadcasted as a reaction to the anonymous contribution "X-Article," to the journal *Foreign Affairs* made by George Kennan, to shape the Soviet Union's expansion plans towards Eastern Europe and central Europe¹ (Gerber 16). The initiation was alongside Stalin's plan in 1946 to set up an Azerbaijani satellite state in northern Iran and the communist tensions over Turkey to grant its alliance

¹ See Wright, C. Ben. "Mr. "X" and containment." (1976): 1-31.

(Jabber 73). To ruin Stalin's tactics, The American president Harry Truman addressed his congress in a speech demanding authorization for military deployments and economic aid for vulnerable European countries and near eastern ones facing "subversive elements" (Capaccio 9). In his speech, Truman explained his program designed to offer financial aid and military help to Greece and Turkey that cost 400 million dollars of American Military and economic aid (LaFeber 44).

According to Jones (36), "the Truman doctrine signalled the administration's willingness to engage in the struggle against communism on all fronts, social, political, and economic, as well as military". This doctrine served the American strategic interests to invest in the Near East as well as in the Middle East under Truman's saying, "helping free peoples". George Keenan assured that the State Department Russian expert, sustaining the Greek and Turkish crisis was a step that helped in relieving the tensions in the Middle East, Asia, and North Africa (LaFeber 44). However, the American intentions by legislating the Truman doctrine were not clear to the public at that time until the US secretary of state Dean Acheson "swung into the argument the treat was Russian communism, its aim the control of the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa" (LaFeber 44-45). Henceforth, the Americans assumed the fact that the communist evolution in the Middle East would be an unquestionable consequence if their police makers stood without reaction to Stalin's plans. Hence, the recognition of Stalin's tactics to control the strategic Dardanelles (the key link between the black Sea and the Mediterranean) in his sharp note to turkey would the effective motive for Washington to make some action (Spalding 328). Subsequently, Acheson, to justify the American foreign policy towards those specific non-neighbouring countries, has rather interpreted this note trickily, according to James Warren, Acheson stated, "if the Russians then pressed forward to take the Dardanelles,

such a move would have As Acheson put it “the clearest implications” for the Middle east” (40). Building upon this premise, Acheson defended Truman doctrine affirming, “If Greece and turkey were allowed to fall communist influence would “infect Iran and all the East” (Moser 155-156). Technically, it means oil reserves would be undeniably affected, the same interest for both the US and the Soviets. Finally, Truman doctrine was determined to secure the United States’ path regarding planting feet in the Middle East.

In Greece, the Truman doctrine aimed to find end to the guerrilla warfare that was initiated in 1944 by the communist gained party in the war over the resistance party eventually “with a veiled Russian support” (Price 34). In addition to communism abolition process, this doctrine contributed to marking the US roots in the Middle East in the history of its interventions. Truman identified his goal in the Greek foreign policy as “the beginning of a policy of the intervention that would require “the greatest selling job ever faced a president” (Jones 43). After justifying the reasons behind making the European Aid program, the American mission in Greece started action to assure the Greek alliance, which was quiet substantial. The reconstruction program was summarized by jones:

“In addition to the \$300 million for Greece, that country received \$50 million as its proportion of the post-UNRRA¹ relief program provided by separate legislation. Of the \$350 million for Greek assistance, the department of the Army through its military advisory group (assigned to the American mission) of perhaps forty members, would provide the Greek

¹ The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was created on November 9, 1943 by the United Nations to face and find valid solutions to global reconstruction issue during and after World War II.

See *The story of U.N.R.R.A.* by United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

National Army (of about 150,000 men) with advice on the use of \$150 million of war material.” (48)

Years passing by, the Truman doctrine was highly criticised and certainly not comprehended, not only by the Greek the concerned ones, but also by Americans. George McGhee, the coordinator of the Greek-Turkish aid program was one person of many to question the real goal behind helping Greece, he said “what good was economic reconstruction when the bandits simply blew up bridges and railroads as fast as the Americans built them?” (Jones 47). Yet, the reason was so clear in an era full of global rivalry over strategic alliances and seizing opportunities beneath the help alibi.

Truman needed more time, lands, and disguised operations to reach the real Middle East. “Greece’s neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention¹”, those words belong to Truman’s statement in his speech about the aid offered to Turkey. Contrasting to the Greek emergency, his speech has marginalized Turkey which falls in the second place after Greece. Still, the common interests in the area made Truman and turkey determine the need to be on one side. Evidently, The Greek guerrillas threatened the Turkish borders and its defeat meant granting stability to the Turkish territories (Hasanli 286). Up to these measures, Bostdorff detailed the United States military aid that covered “the training of thousands of officers and enlisted men and the reorganization of the entire Turkish military” to defend its lands as a weapon against the Soviets (143).

For this purpose, Truman’s secretary of state George Marshall made his project of recovery as a support plan to his president’s doctrine. This move

¹ See Harry S. Truman full speech. Truman Doctrine (1947).

marked the eligibility of the US interests in the Middle East, for the first time, in Greece and Turkey.

3.2. The Marshal Plan:

The Marshall Plan as a cold war policy is an American program designed by Secretary of State George Marshall that involved a program European economic Recovery called the European Recovery Programme (ERP) during the post-world war era, "to prevent the spread of communism beyond the "iron curtain"¹. (Tarnoff 1). It was first publicly announced at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. It is inevitable to say that the Marshall Plan lies by its essence in Truman Doctrine from the time when, Marshall "merely" revealed in his speech the American ambitions to cooperate in the Near East countries and the European damaged ones (Tarnoff 2).

In Turkey, the Marshall Plan made regulations concerning the doctrine implementation and it started to realise the cooperation aimed ambition in the country. The plan structure constituted founding the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1948 to offer relevant financial aid and development programs for cooperation participants, whose afterward turkey and Greece became members (Koça and Bedriye 86). Although the Marshall Plan did not achieve its aimed results since it failed to offer a remedy to the whole European countries, it reached the real objective that is blocking European countries' paths to fall in the Soviet communism and acting as "a beacon to show Middle eastern

¹ Iron Curtain is a specific term that describes the Soviet Union and the danger of its communist expansion in Europe. It was first used by Winston Churchill in May 1946, in his famous speech at Westminster College in Missouri. Churchill said: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent."

countries the way to western norms and orientation” that denotes the real focuses behind the aid (Constitutional Rights Foundation 4; Aydın and Erhan 68). On the geostrategic level, the American anti-communist strategy sought to contain the soviet spread through military alliances. One of The Marshall plan’s intentions was to include Turkey and Greece in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), gradually, this intention did finally realize in 1952 through their joining (Satterthwaite 81).

3.3. Eisenhower Doctrine:

Every story has an end, but in the American anti-communist saga there is always a new beginning with special incidents. Whether it is about luck or fate, the new episode opened with the thirty-fourth president of the United States in a region full of suspense, constant upheavals, and rising action. In the Middle East, the Eisenhower administration’s fundamental objectives were the same as Truman’s administration to seize the Soviet communist specter. However, his administration saw to be more operational and military than Truman’s economic orthodoxy. Meanwhile, Eisenhower has been elected a president of the US in 1953, and another leader has already joined the battlefield in the Middle East. In 1952, Jamal Abdel Nasser was neither considered a communist nor a US ally, though his nationalist movement worsened the situation for the Great Powers. At the outset, grounds for war settled in Egypt over Abdel Nasser’s attempt to nationalize the Suez Canal occupied by the British defending their nationalism to remove the British forces from Egypt (Nichols 5). It is undoubtedly that Abdel Nasser had a strong in Twain’s words saying that “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to the government when it deserves it”. Abdel Nasser was one of the “free officers” who force the abdication of King Farouk claiming for the British withdrawal from the country (Yaqub, Containing Arab nationalism 26). Those

nationalists were against the British manipulation of Egypt, thus, their loyalty to the government was no longer an absolute obligation.

Expectedly, following this cataclysm menacing the British being in the Middle East, Winston Churchill alerted the situation by demanding the American intervention to resolve the Crisis. The unexpected reply was Eisenhower's viewpoint publicized in his "waging peace" memories that "it would be undesirable and impracticable for the British to retain sizable forces permanently in the territory of a jealous and resentful government amid an openly hostile population" (Nichols 5). Nichols stated that Eisenhower was "knowledgeable" about the geostrategic importance of the Arab world, specifically the Suez Canal that bridges Asia with Africa by connecting the Mediterranean with the Red Seas forming adequate oil exportation roots to Europe as well to the American continent. Consequently, his standpoint would be substantial pertaining to the fact that the Middle East is the world's largest petroleum supply while he noted that the Suez Canal was "the most important waterway in the world" (5). To preserve the American need for the Arab oil, Eisenhower joined the negotiations over the Suez Canal. Yet, Following the negotiations' failure, due to the outbreaks of animosity against the West run by the Nasserism, Britain, Israel, and France invaded Egypt in late 1956. At the time when the Anglo-French Armada advanced towards Egypt and Israel deployed its forces in the Sinai, Eisenhower, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles thought it might be the time to intervene on the battlefield that is calling for the Soviets and Arab nationalists to join. The intervention sought to be a UN resolution aimed to call for the three forces' withdrawal and to establish a ceasefire (Nichols 217). The resolution has planned to sanction Israel, excluding Britain and France, that took control over the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip following the British and French troops stand down (Nichols 227). Apparently, Eisenhower's modus operandi was distinctive from the rest of the American policymakers to favor Israel in any circumstance. Spiegel noted that his administration focused only on the American interests, in this case,

the Arab states were much more important than Israel that remains “a strategic liability” (Spiegel, cited in Halabi 44)

The resolution move sought to contain communism from filling the British vacuum on one hand and Nasser nationalism from outbreaking on the other hand. Eisenhower’s administration believed Britain had left “a power vacuum” in the region that needed to be filled either through economic, military aid, or establishing political relations. (Yaqub, Contesting Arabism 111). Eisenhower took Truman as a paragon in deciding upon his anti-communist doctrine in the Middle East. In November 1956, proposed to the congress his doctrine waiting for the approval happened in 1957. In a joint session of the congress on January 5th, 1956, delivered his speech to delineate his policy of economic and military aid for the Middle East to keep up the momentum, with the US armed forces’ interference against any nation controlled by international communism (Michaels 472). Eisenhower thought by opposing Britain, France, and Israel, it would demonstrate the United States as anti-imperialist less menacing power than the Soviets (Yaqub, Contesting Arabism 112). Pragmatically, US officials offered for Egypt to finance the construction of Aswan High Dam to assure full control over the Nile opposed to the soviet offer (Neff 123). Halabi stated that the offer was annulled in June 1956 once Washington discovered that the Egyptian media faked the soviet offer (36). Notwithstanding the actual events, Jamal Abdel Nasser accomplished the Suez Canal nationalization in upcoming July supported by the Soviet Union (Halabi 37). Moreover, the American pragmatism progressed to create neutrality embodied in a strategy to pacify the Egyptian Israeli dispute by awarding the two parties economic and political support Besides, Eisenhower managed to convince the Israelis to leave the Sinai Desert under the warning of cutting off the American support (Nichols 278).

In the case of operations, Eisenhower's doctrine was highly criticized for being out of order in alarming circumstances. Nonetheless, pointing out the Jordan Crisis of April 1957, when the US helped King Hussein against the revolutionaries aided by Syria and Egypt by sending the Navy's Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean (Michaels 478). Furthermore, Eisenhower's doctrine acted more anti-communist during the Turkish attempt to take over Syria as it plunged the situation. Yaqub has drawn attention that Eisenhower urged Turkey to withdraw from the Syrian lands while the Soviet Union pressured the crisis by threatening to set missiles against Turkey if Syria got attacked (115). Dwight Eisenhower had avoided serious confrontation during his administration, for one essential reason to assure peace in the Middle East, as his doctrine sought to be the most eligible way to end up the hostilities in the Suez.

4. Securing Israel:

US-Arab interactions remained stabilized to some extent even after the American involvement to constrain the Soviet expansionism, thenceforth, the birth of new securities, or rather a new "special relationship" was the watershed in the epic history of the Trio. George Ball, the American diplomat, agreed with the general awareness of the Israeli importance to the United States once he stated "First of all one of our interests in the Middle East is the carrying out of a rather emotional commitment to the Israeli people to permit them to achieve their objective of a national home (Reich, 3). Evidently, this emotional bond between the Americans and the Jewish signified US-policy makers' doctrines, for instance, Truman, the first American president to bless the Jewish state after its formation.

Continuing accurately to his path toward success in the Middle East, Truman again made a step forward remaking the history of the region. Contrasting to Franklin D Roosevelt and his disinclination to endorse Zionism thinking that such an attempt would shake the American-British diplomatic relations, especially during World War II, an intensive period that needed allies more than securing ambitions (Hahn 18), President Truman had an undisputable standpoint towards the Jewish state. Michael Benson perceived that “Truman’s evangelical Christian upbringing- namely his appreciation for bible prophecies about the restoration of a Jewish state, his sympathy for Jews as the chosen people for the Old Testament” in addition to the Nazi Holocaust that worsened the situation, he has definitively endorsed Zionism and give his full recognition to the Jewish state under the Balfour declaration (Benson, cited in Hahn 27). Eventually, in October 4th, 1946, the eve of the Jewish Yom Kippur holy day, he announced, indirectly his Zionist support, “Partition would command the support of public opinion in the United States, to such solution our Government could give its support” (Hahn 35). The Jews have welcomed this statement on their holy day; conversely, this day was not holy for Britain or for the Arab countries especially Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt, that blew up to break the US-Arab relations, Whereas Britain took this declaration as a violation to their goals in Palestine and the Middle East entirely (Hahn 36). Behind the description of historical events lies the necessity for understanding; Truman’s statement was a signal that required full understanding intended the American recognition of the Jewish state in Palestine. Correspondingly, his real recognition of Israel as a Jewish state on 15th May 1948, just after a few minutes of its formation characterizes the start of a new chapter in the American foreign policy history book, Israel, as a vital chapter in the whole book (Little 77).

4.1. Partition 1950:

Since 1948, the United States has been caught between the two parties in a clash, whether to support Zionism or to rescue harmony that existed with the Arabs. The rescue plan happened to be a truce for the trio, though, done by a different trio. On May 25th, 1950, the United States, France, and Britain issued the Tripartite Declaration as a ceasefire agreement to stop the increasing hostility in the Middle East (Slonim 135). The declaration document declared, “The three governments recognize that the Arab states and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and legitimate self-defense¹”. They also made the decision to intervene in case one of the two parties violated any line of the agreement, as follows, “The three governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation”.

Accomplishing its mission, the Tripartite Declaration has softened the conflicted sphere in the area. Fundamentally, It showed how Truman’s administration could be loyal to its endorsement regarding the Jewish state in Israel as to his relations in the Middle East (Slonim 145). Nonetheless, the intervention lines of the declaration paved the way for the US to upgrade its situation to a frank broker in Middle Eastern issues.

4.2. US policy and the Arab- Israeli conflict:

¹ Tripartite Declaration Regarding the Armistice Borders: Statement by the Governments of the United States, The United Kingdom, and France, May 25, 1950

At the outset, I would just clear out a point behind saying “the Arab Israeli conflict”. It was never a political conflict but a clear invasion of Palestine a free land with its population that has been outcasted from their homes. The question of Palestine is no longer a conflict but a question of freedom. It is an invasion, definite colonialism, and needless to say that they are violating the International law by taking others’ lands without their consent. Without counting the innocent people that have died starting from 1948 until the present day, the crimes, women have been abused in many forms, children have been killed and there has been no safe life to live for. The conflict here is related to the Arab relations with the invaders not to the Palestinians. What is happening in Palestine is not a conflict but a genocide.

The American newly established chapter remained stagnant until 1967 during the Arab Israeli conflict, deep-rooted by the Arab nationalist’s defence against Zionism aspirations. Steven Spiegel stressed that the reason behind rising tensions in the area was owed to Washington, under the Johnson administration, “preoccupation” with Vietnam, unconscious of the split settled between the Arab states; Increasingly, the rise of Jamal Abdel Nasser as a political Arab leader, tied with the Soviet Union with Iraq and Syria while Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya endured their alliance with the US (119). The Arab nationalist took their decision to battle against Israel in 1967, marking the first real American involvement in the Arab Israeli conflict acting under the Tripartite agreement of 1950. During The “six days war” of June 5-11, 1967, Israel won the battle against the Arab nationalists headed by Jamal Abdel Nasser, which progressively, ended in its occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, the West Bank of Jordan River and the Golan Heights of Syria, growing the Israeli territories pre-1967 (Modigs 4).

During this conflict, the United States was administrated by President Johnson to mark again a new signature in the Middle East. There was a marked difference between Johnson's reaction to Israel's behavior in 1967 and that of Eisenhower in 1956. Whereas Eisenhower had forced Israel to withdraw from Egypt, Johnson merely called for, and achieved, a "cease-fire in place." This allowed Israel to remain indefinitely in possession of the territories it had seized. In response to the war, Johnson was clever enough to secure the Israeli authorities once he called, but not insisted, the Israeli forces to withdraw; be that as it may, peace in the Arabian zone would never return to its early state before the six days war (Burroughs and Joseph 27). To this end, Neutrality seemed to be the United States' most effective method to preserve friendship and common objectives with Israel as with its Arab friends. However, this move could neither prevent Oil flow from being halted nor trade or the security of American workers in the Middle East from ceaseless tension and jeopardy (Fernandez 43). Responsively to the actualities, the Unites states attempted to bring about either *de jure* or *de facto* settlement for the Israeli existence in Palestine by embracing UN Security Council Resolution 242. The resolution called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories of recent conflict" and "a just settlement of the refugee problem". The resolution admitted Arab states' right to defend and to recapture their territories, unluckily, it could not precise which territories the declaration is directed to. Visibly, the withdrawal section calls for "withdrawal of Israeli armed troops from territories" without mentioning the definitive article "the" or "all" before the word "territories" which created obscurity resulted in conflicting

interpretations of the resolution (Fernandez 43) and so forth a difficulty to fulfil its commandments.

To serve its double standards in the Middle East, the United States, according to William Quandt, has interpreted the 242 Resolution at its inception that Israel should not cross “the 1967 lines once peace was established” (47). For the moment, the United States was scared that the tensions that followed the resolution would magnetize the Soviets to the Middle East (Fernandez 43) regarding the fact that “Israel now exercised a de facto veto on U.S. diplomatic policy in the region” which may turn the Arab states towards fetching another ally in the region (Kolko, cited in Fernandez 44).

The situation worsened once Israel refused to withdraw from the territories. In 1964, The Arab reaction came to life to enhance the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) foundation 1964 with the support of the Arab states aiming to establish a Palestinian state (Fernandez 43). Nightmares may not happen in the real sphere, yet America’s nightmare occurred On October 6, 1973, Egypt, and Syria, aided by the Soviets, attacked Israel during the Israeli celebration of the holy day “Yom Kippur”. In 1973, Sadat fostered a military alliance with Hafiz al-Assad, the president of Syria. They calculated the attack with Egypt attacking Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula while Syria in the Golan Heights. (Yaqub, Dunton, and Reay 59). Closely as the Arab forces could defeat Israel, “the US in airlifting ammunition and supplies, managed to turn the situation around and surround the Egyptian army” (Modigs 4). In this vein, the United States marked its first military involvement in the Middle East showing the side it

belongs with, and so forth, Israel was openly echeloned as indispensable to the American policy. In this episode, reference should be made to the Algerian president Houari Boumedienne who directly affirmed that; “Israel played a secondary role in the 1967 war. The Battle was American and only the performance was Israeli”, compatibly, Jamal Abdel Nasser said that the United States is the decision-maker concerning the Arab territories – not Israel (Gerges 180).

As it is said an eye for an eye, Arab states tended to avenge the US in a sensitive play to raise oil prices by sending a clear warning: “Unless Israel returned to the 1967 lines and the United States stopped its arms supply to Israel, an embargo would be placed on all oil shipments to the United States”. To this end, Arab have turned the tables against the United States, which risen the need for a peace process between the *hate* Triangle “Israel, the US, and the Arabs”, and publicly admitted the need for a Palestinian homeland (Modigs 5).

4.3. Carter, the Peacemaker:

Unlike Eisenhower’s anti-Israel administration, on the other face of the coin, Jimmy Carter guaranteed the American commitment to the Israeli state in the Middle East. Thus, On May 12, 1977, President Jimmy Carter described American Jewish relations as “a special relationship”. In a Press conference, he exposed the truth saying “Its absolutely crucial that no one in our country or around the world ever doubt that our N.1 commitment in the Middle East protects the right of Israel to exist, to exist permanently, and to exist in peace. It’s a special relationship” (Reich 12). This special relationship with Israel as well as the coalition with the Arab States urged Washington to find mutual solutions for the two sides, likewise, for its double-standard approach in the Middle East.

Although the US had no problem with Israel thanks to the support offered by the Jewish lobby¹, the Carter administration assumed to vary its approaches concerning Jerusalem to avoid oil embargos and price escalation (Spiegel 316). Responsively, in September 1978, Carter hosted a trilateral summit in his presidential retreat in Maryland "Camp David" addressing the Egyptian Israeli dispute and solving the Palestinian issue. Following days of negotiations being held by Carter, on September 17, Anwar Al-Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister signed a document entitled "Framework for peace in the Middle East" (Bregman and El-Tahri 124). This framework pledged the Israeli military withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza to grant their inhabitants self-governing for a transitional period of five years (Fraser 120). With another framework into the bargain, the Camp David accords set out the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace between Egypt and Israel" as the founding basis for the "normal" Egyptian Israeli relations starting with the Israeli full departure from the Sinai Peninsula. Critically, the agreement may not seem perfect to end the dispute though it marked Carter's policy achievement to assemble two clashed sides into one agreement, even with the harsh belief Begin had that the Israeli should never leave the Palestinian lands (Pressman 1118). This statement fits with Dumbrell's notation over the accords as "vague transitional agreements for the government of Gaza and the West Bank" but he settled his critique on the fact that it was "an extraordinary achievement for the carter personal diplomacy" (Dumbrell, cited in Pressman 1119). To this end, the Carter administration was distinctive in its methodology, evidently, the American mediation prior to 1977 was less "intensive

¹ Formerly called the Zinoist lobby which embodied the coalition of several American groups and individuals in support of Israel led by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

and dramatic” than Carter’s personal participation in the Negotiations (Touval 314) which traced his strong commitment toward securing Israel.

Notwithstanding Carter’s achievement, the Arab consensus revealed total opposition to the accords including Jordan, the PLO, and even Saudi Arabia. President Anwar Al Sadat was openly condemned for assuring peace in Egypt at the cost of Gaza and Jerusalem by the PLO chief, Yasser Arafat who accused Sadat of selling “Jerusalem, Palestine and the rights of the right of the Palestinian people for a handful of Sinai sand” (Deming et al., cited in Pressman 1121). During these intense circumstances, the US tactic stood in action to accomplish Carter’s approach, but with the Arab recognition. Cyrus Vance, U.S. Secretary of State, traveled to Jordan and Saudi Arabia immediately after the summit to convince them as to gain their support for the Accords (Pressman 1121). King Hussein of Jordan voiced his opposition in a striking word, he said to Vance, “What has come out of the general framework is a *fig leaf* for the Begin plan. Pure *sugarcoating*. Look at all of Begin's statements: Israeli troops to stay for an indefinite period. Settlements, too. What's transitional about that?” (De Borchgrave, cited in Pressman 1121). As a result, to the rising antagonistic sentiments, for the Camp David accords particularly for Al Sadat, the Egyptian president was assassinated by a group of disaffected soldiers on October 6th, 1981 (Fraser 122). Up to this point, the Arab opposition to the agreements was obvious still, on the other way around; it initiated a *calm war* between the Arab countries and Israel for the next decades. Israel turns out to be a strategic arm in the American hands. Its contributions in the Middle East created support for the American ambitions. Israel’s impact in the Egyptian Sinai and along with the Suez Canal crisis helped with holding back the Soviets from profiting from the canal, besides the military aid it provided during the Jordanian civil war in 1970 (Reich 4).

From one administration to another, US presidents strongly bonded their ties with the Israelis. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan showed how Israel strengthens the United States' position in the Middle East; he said, "Our own position would be weaker without the political and military assets Israel provides...the fall of Iran has increased Israel's value as perhaps the only remaining strategic assets in the region on which the united states can truly rely", Reagan added that Israel "has the democratic will, national cohesion, technological capacity, and military fiber to stand forth as America's trusted ally" (Reich 4)

4.4. Post-cold war:

Following carter's peace efforts, the American president Barak Obama centered his concern on the need to establish a pacific Israeli-Palestinian relationship. One of his first calls in the oval office was to the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, to whom he promised peace settlement between the two conflicted sides and more necessary to help the establishment of an independent Palestinian state (Gerges 313). Nevertheless, Obama stood loyal to the Jewish state as any other American president therefore, he said, "America's commitment to Israel's security is unshakeable. Our friendship with Israel is deep and enduring. And so, we believe that any lasting peace must acknowledge the very real security concerns that Israel faces every single day" (Gerges 314).

This loyalty extended to the next President Donald Trump who pledged "the deal of the century" on his campaign trail to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Trump's open favouritism towards Israel was evident in December 2017 after his recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital and moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem as part of the deal's initiative (Black 23). As a reaction, the Palestinians boycotted a visit by the US vice president, Mike Pence, a symbol of the US Christian Zionist lobby while the answer was very quick,

Trump's cut for the US aid to UNRWA dated back in 1948 (Black 23). In 2020, the deal of the century was undoubtedly the deal of the century but solely for the Israelis. After three years of the initial plan, the new deal was the annexation of other Palestinian lands including the West Bank and other occupied lands in the Jordanian borders (specia para 5). Even if the deal also assured the foundation of a Palestinian state, it was not convenient either for the Palestinians or for the Arabic public opinion.

5. Economic Interests: Oil

As eternal as its loyalty to Israel, America's oil interests are much greater. The United States' key interest in the Middle East precisely in the Persian Gulf is "oil". In fact, the Middle East holds 63% of the world's oil reserves with 25% representing 261 billion barrels belonging to Saudi Arabia alone (Fouskas 17). Moreover, gas and oil production exist in other countries such as Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, and Iran. In view of this, the strategic goals concerned with stabilizing petroleum flow for the industrial world with practical prices, more profoundly, controlling the oil market instead of being controlled. Initially, US oil companies gain entrance to the Middle Eastern oil spot through the Red Line Agreement. This Agreement was signed on July 31, 1928, as the first "international consortium" to manipulate the Middle Eastern oil supplies. This agreement granted the American oil company Standard Oil of New Jersey almost 24% share, equally with the rest of the companies including, the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), the Royal Dutch Oil Company, and the "Compagnie Française des Pétroles" (CFP). Progressively, the US oil companies upgraded their ambitions toward Middle Eastern oil through another company. Definitively, Standard Oil Company of California (Socal) inaugurated the real control story in the 1930s after establishing of a Bahrain petroleum company. In 1933, it comes

the turn for Saudi Arabia to sign a concession pointed to grant Socal free access to the Arabian oil in Dahna in the west of the kingdom, with free production and exportation processes besides high marketing facilities under the naming "California Arabian Standard Oil Company" (CASOC) but the name changed in 1944 after the association of Texaco, Exxon and Mobile to be partners in the present-day title: "the Arabian American Oil Company" (Aramco) (Handbook, A. R. A. M. C. O 112; Halabi 29). Despite the fact that Socal was the last company to come preceded by the British companies, Anglo-Iranian Company, and Shell, the United States now controls over 42% of the Middle Eastern oil stocks (Mikesell et al. 27). The American interest in Middle Eastern oil requires some interpretations. At first, the search for more oil supplies was a post-world War issue over oil unavailability; intensely, this issue swayed Roosevelt's administration's quest for oil independence. The Persian Gulf crude oil would be the appropriate solution; it could power the United States Army and navy as well as its Allies in addition to providing huge finance to the Marshall recovery plan. Hence, President Truman's administration in 1947 announced that the United States would no longer rely on the Texas or Venezuela oil, preferably, the 300.000 barrels of Saudi Crude would pumped each day by Aramco through the trans-Arabian Pipeline (Little 53). The TAPLINE road designed the US interests and decided its friends. As stated by Little (53), Truman approved the topographical path of the TAPLINE that ran "from west-northwest Dhahran across the Saudi desert through Jordan's panhandle and Syria's Golan Heights to the Lebanese coast". Ironically, all the TAPLINE zones have been a matter of American interests whether to promote local peace or to insure political stability. Factually, Oil has been a permanent US promoter involved in the Middle East even the containing the Soviet Union was partial cause to protecting energy production and sole Middle Eastern US dependence. To all appearances, US policymakers did their utmost to secure US oil reserves in the Middle East with

the enormous importance it carries for the American economy as well as its international sovereignty. Remarkably, during the Suez Crisis, the Six-Day War, Washington worked intensely with Wall Street to “shield” the US oil concessions from being attacked by the Arab nationalists as well as protecting the international of crude petroleum (Little 44).

Viewing the constant flux in the Arabian zone, Washington accustomed its oil interests from just flow issues to Price concerns precisely after the foundation of OPEC “The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries including Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Venezuela on 14 September 1960 in Baghdad, Iraq to institute oil prices and exert its sovereignty over the international flow. Eventually, during the 1973 Arab Israeli crisis, the United States faced a problematic question after the rise of crude prices. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 attempted by the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) managed to quadruple oil prices (Halabi 64). This situation proved the American unconditional need for Middle Eastern oil. Through the eyes of Henry Kissinger, US secretary of state, “the oil price shock caused a deadly combination of severe recession and high inflation which, in the Unites States, reached 14 per cent a year at its height” (Halabi 63). Increasingly, Gal Luft (1) declared his testimony that America has increased its dependence on foreign oil after the OPEC oil embargo 1973, from 30% to 60% in 2005, which is estimated to rise to 70% in 2025.

As for Carter view, he explicitly pointed out that the American “national strength is dangerously dependent on a thin line of oil tankers stretching halfway around the earth, originating in the Middle East and around the Persian Gulf” (Halabi 64). Carter’s view would the truthful fact about the US foreign policy towards the Middle East even after the end of the bipolarity during the cold war.

By the beginning of 1990s, Washington reacted hastily to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, as it was a direct invasion to the US oil interests in the Persian Gulf. President George Bush allied with several Arab states created an international coalition to release Kuwait from the hands of the Iraqis (Hudson 334)

The post cold war period, America have been crowned the only great power, however, the coronation ceremony did not last so long. The rise of China and India as new contesting industrial nations, likewise the US, they have a continuous demand for the Middle Eastern oil. In 2005, china was the second world consumer of oil and by 2030, it is predicted that china would be importing oil as much as the US consumes (Luft 3). This expectation would sooner be a certain fact to create a real battle over the Persian oil.

6. Nuclear Arms control:

In post cold war time, an additional interest was added to the three core ones (oil, Israel and counterterrorism) as spectre of bipolarity vanished. Preventing and reducing the threats posed by rogue states those with weapons of mass destruction programs, particularly, "hostile" states like Iran with rigid regimes. Today the absolute nuclear danger is Iran though it is not the only Nuclear Power in the Middle East, with the existence of Israel. Unsurprisingly, the US never considers Israel nuclear program started in the 1960s as a threat since it is an ally (Byman and Moller 13). However, Iran was certainly a threat based on its antagonism raised after the Iranian revolution in 1979. The nuclear horror story has begun in 2002, the time when the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) released a series of reports accusing Iran of Nuclear related activities that violate its treaty obligations to accommodate the IAEA instruct (Haugen et al. 136). In 2006, reports continue to be issued to shake the American interests that Iran

nearly produced 85 tons of hexafluoride uranium (UF6) that would be enough for the construction of nearly 12 nuclear bombs (Haugen et al. 136). Therefore, The Iranian suspected activities of its nuclear program pressed the U.S. Intelligence Committee to calculate that by 2015 Iran would certainly have a nuclear weapon (Haugen et al. 138). Tehran extended its enmity with Washington behind its extensive nuclear program that enriched uranium to twenty percent (Byman and Moller 14). Up to this point, the United States preferred sanctioning Iran as a US modern eligible weapon towards preventing any future extensive nuclear proliferation. In 2015, the resolution finalized to be an agreement between Iran and the six powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany; collectively known as the P5+1) so-called a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (Kerr and Katzman 1). JCPOA was designed to dissolve Iran's nuclear weapons program in exchange for sanctions relief. Tehran's Nuclear threat became more intensely aggressive as it sponsors Islamist radicals, consequently, it would mean powerful terrorism and a high risk of subversion (Byman and Moller 14). The Iranian nuclear threat grew bigger in 2017 resulting from the construction of a nuclear reactor moderated by heavy water at Arak. Relying on Kerr and Katzman's insights (4), though Tehran has asserted that the reactor is intended to produce radioisotopes for medical use and to replace the Tehran Research Reactor, The US was not relieved. In fact, sensing the peril was convenient following the JCPOA scientific estimations that "the Arak reactor, if it had been completed, could have produced enough plutonium for between one and two nuclear weapons per year" (Kerr and Katzman 4). Despite the JCPOA's efforts during Obama's administration to contain the Iranian nuclear aspirations, the Trump administration questioned its effectiveness. Evidently, in 2018, Donald Trump decided to cease the US participation in the JCPOA, and to remise the economic sanctions under the justification the agreement did not address Iran's

ballistic missile program or its regional behavior, the JCPOA accords are limited to a 10–15-year period, after which Iran could resume its enrichment and other covered activities (Joyner Para 10).

7. Alibi Interests: War on Terror and Democratization

Democracy has been fundamentally a fixed principle in American politics. Since 1776, Thomas Jefferson immortalized the phrase “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” to grant the American population freedom and protection. Progressively, Truman’s anti-communism policy, Eisenhower’s non-military confrontation, Johnson’s honest commitment to Israel, Carter’s peace mediation, and with the start of the third millennium, the George W Bush administration in America commenced its new approaches toward the Middle East by ensuring his democracy approach but much different than Jefferson’s and more distinctive than Reagan’s and Clinton’s. President Roland Reagan was the first to adopt the democratic principle in the American foreign policy agenda, “in the belief that “freedom” could defeat “evil empire” of the Soviet Union”, whereas Clinton believed in the necessity of “market democracy” in an attempt to liberate economic markets and their governments (Markakis 12-13).

In his cold war struggle, Reagan’s first concern was ending the Soviet Union in one hand and erasing the Arabic autocracy and theocracy on the other. Regardless, this fact was not an American concern until first the Iranian revolution in 1979, in which Washington alarmed itself with the danger behind the rise of Islamist government after the fall of the American friend Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and the instalment of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic. Those events were turbulent to the American foreign agenda that would unquestionably threaten their interests in the Middle East

from jeopardizing oil reserves to absolutely being a menacing weapon towards Israel (Sharp 3).

At the Reagan times, the Islamism issue was not as much critical as the rise of dictatorship in Iraq led by Saddam Hussein in a form of absolute anti-Americanism. Regardless, the US-Iraqi relations remained stabilized until the Iraq invasion of Kuwait aiming for the annexation in August 1990 (Markakis 141). Knowing that Kuwait is an oil export country, it means one way or another, Washington would interfere to protect its eternal oil interests. President G.H.W Bush immediately called for the Iraqi withdrawal, and then following months of diplomatic negotiations, in January 1991, the US-led a coalition including Saudi Arabia and Britain to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait (Markakis 142). Fighting autocracy and theocracy was not an explicit principle under the democracy aura until president G.W Bush came to the office to announce his new plan.

7.1. The Bush Doctrine:

The incidents of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, embodied the *realpolitik* approach towards the Middle East, as an unsurprising result, they initiated the democracy promotion efforts, "War on Terror" on the Arabic theocratic groups. Shadowing the attacks, the US updated its objectives in the Middle East under the democratic peace justification. In his State of the Union Message in January 2002, president G.W Bush announced his doctrine against terrorism that was threatening the American security, he said, " I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer... our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun ... history has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight"(Aruri 168). Washington assumed that the ultimate solution towards ending terrorists' threats was to

democratize the Islamist movements into more peaceful, moderate political parties so far from extremism (Dalacoura 61). By evidence, Islamist groups are groups sought to govern through Islamic rules (Sharia). These groups vary from “moderate Islamist” which find equilibrium between the need to create political and social government centred on Islamic laws, to radicals Islamist that may seek to power positions through elections to in order to generate a severe rule under the name of Islam (Sharp 2), for instance, the Palestinian Hamas or the Lebanese Hezbollah sponsored by the Iranian authorities. Along with these Islamist groups, America concerned its war on terror on more aggressive groups. In Afghanistan, the Unites states started the war against Taliban in attempt to change the local regime as well as abolishing al Qaeda jihadist group by killing its leader Osama ben Laden (Farsoun 140)

Pragmatically, Bush criticised the previous administrations by speaking of “decades of failed policy in the Middle East” into making peace in the area, yet the method was promoting violence (Neep 75) which he paved the way to guarantee that democracy is the accurate resolution to the Middle Eastern issue. In his speech in 2003, Bush expressed the way his administration would approach the Middle East,

“Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe – because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export.

And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo.”¹

While searching the roots behind the attempts to democratize the Middle East, the western consensus agreed upon the incompatibility of Islam norms and Democracy principles. Following the fall of communism, “Civil Society” notion developed among the scholars, discreetly, as an alibi for establishing a democratic liberal market in the Middle East (Neep 77). Deeper in his analysis, Neep mentioned that “Political scientists frequently note that democracy cannot be installed from the top down; the push for a political system in which genuine participation is possible must begin at the grass-roots level”. Nonetheless, Bush has challenged the political theory regarding democratization. In fact, the democracy and counterterrorism card assured Bush open access to the Middle East. He invaded Iraq in 2003 in an attempt to secure oil on one hand and on the other to end up Saddam Hussein’s alleged dictatorship over the Iraqi population. With over 130.000 US troops occupying Iraq, paradoxically, Washington is asserting “a generational commitment to helping people of the Middle East transform their region” (Rice cited in Hudson 336). It was obvious that the United States had a plan toward erasing terrorism and planting real feet in the precious Middle East, however it was under the Alibi of democratization. As its application was purely military, Hudson (337) tells it, the new American approach under the Bush administration shaped the new US manifest destiny, As for Robert kagan, this approach was driven by two dynamics; the first was to maintain security post 9/11 while the second was more “an ideological sense in the moral mission”

¹ President Bush’s speech at the Twentieth Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington DC, November 6, 2003.

(Kagan cited in Hudson 337). Whatever the case may be Washington achieved the desired scores in the Iraqi game in the execution (by hanging) of Saddam Hussein on Saturday, 30 December 2006 after being convicted of crimes against humanity. The Iraqi Special Tribunal was privileged to run the execution even with the fact that Iraq was still invaded by the US. This late was part of Bush democracy promotion plan. Saddam was killed for the murder of 148 Iraqi Shi'ites in the town of Dujail in 1982 after a try to kill him besides his accusation of being charged of several crimes against humanity including his invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Sceats and House 2).

In the process of fighting terrorism in the Middle East, the US policymakers deployed its intelligence agencies to hunt the radical Islamists all around the world and construct special prisons in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and elsewhere. Correspondingly, seeking remedy for the Middle East *democratic deficit*, the Bush administration founded the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) in December 2002 alongside the Broader Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiative (BMENA) in June 2004, including Pakistan and Afghanistan to gain more allies in boosting democratization policy (Dalacoura 63). The MEPI and BMENA are thought to have a huge impact on the democracy booting process through supporting the foundation of several human rights organizations, economic, educational and women empowerment. Profoundly, in 2005, MEPI helped in training election monitors for the presidential and parliamentary elections (Sharp 9). Additionally, as freedom of speech is part of democracy organism, the US established the "Al-Hurrah" the Arabic language speaking television station besides "Al-Sawa" Radio station (Markakis 97).

The whole project of anti American terrorism and promoting democratic sense of governing amongst the Middle Eastern region was totally a failure as

Hudson described it to be “an impossible project” (337). Luckily, the following president was conscious about this fact. President Barak Obama took office in January 2009 to face what Bush had encouraged before, “the Arab Spring”, taking the shape of the cataclysm to settle down people’s democratic rights.

7.2. Obama Administration:

The Democratic President, Obama joined the oval office to reconcile what Bush has already damaged. Vice President Joe Biden provides a clear sense of the Obama reconciliation approach to the Middle East, especially fixing the democratization issue. He declared, “Our administration has set an ambitious goal...to advance democracy not through the imposition of force from the outside, but by working with moderates in government and civil society to build those institutions that will protect that freedom.”¹ In 2009, during his speech at Cairo University, Obama announced his reconciliation policy toward Islam and the Middle Eastern hemisphere. Obama described his doctrine towards the area as *a new beginning*. He said,

“I've come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles—principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.”²

In its essence, Obama did neither address terrorism nor Islamism as an extremist movement; he addressed Islam as the religion for the Middle Eastern

¹ Joseph Biden, “Remarks at the 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy,” February 7, 2009.

² President Obama speech in Cairo, « A new begining » June 4, 2009

nations seeking a US-ME harmony and peace for the humanity (Gerges 303). In 2011, the Arab Spring fought against the autocratic regimes starting with Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Libya. The political awakening for sure shook Washington though Obama decided upon a non-interventionist approach democracy issue in the region (Gerges 306). Unlike Bush, Obama with his peaceful approach coast America the loss of a Middle Eastern Ally, Hosni Mubarak, more profoundly, he did not invade Syria like Bush invaded Iraq to step down Al Assad. Relying on Fawaz Gerges's analysis of Obama's peaceful approach, the American president refused to sponsor the Syrian rebellion neither with arms nor with trained fighters (309). Instead, his national security team has been very vigilant in the peace process for the Syrians as well as for the US interests. Precisely, White House press secretary Jay Carney said, "we don't want any weapons to fall into the wrong hands and potentially further endanger the Syrian people, our ally Israel or the United States" (Gerges 310).

Obama kept his promise to preserve the Middle East and its democracy via the complete withdrawal of all American troops from Iraq creating a new form of democratization based on freedom (Williams 87). Regarding human rights, closing the Guantanamo Bay was Obama's solution by condemning all the torture forms used inside the American special prisons (Dalacoura 69). However, Obama failed in making democracy in Syria through his non-interventionism policy while Al-Assad was using chemical weapons on his own people (Mazza-Hilway 20). Consequently, he is often blamed for the Syrian rebellion eruption, and the rise of the Islamic State ISIS that led to the Russian settlement in Syria. This end marked the replay of the whole story moving back to the start point.

7.3. Trump Doctrine:

As if the Middle East is fated to be the ultimate arena for conflicts and interests but never peace. Obama's successor, Donald Trump seemed to be another Bush for the region. Like Obama's anti Bush approach, Trump was anti Obama's. In a redesigning for G.W Bush counterterrorism policy, the new American president showed more hostile tactics towards jihadist Islamist groups than President Obama especially ISIS whom he targeted to eradicate as a primary objective (Mazza-Hilway 24). His approach contrasted his "America first" policy, yet, he did not engage in the democracy fundamentalism as "the Bushes" has done for the Middle East. Notably, besides ISIS, Trump concerned its administration with Al-Assad chemical weapons violations that put the human lives in danger (Mazza-Hilway 24). In 2017 and 2018, the US sent airstrikes alongside France and the United Kingdom to punish Al-Assad's non-humanitarian attitude through using chemical weapons and particularly to stop their production (Mazza-Hilway 25). To do so, the Trump policy planned to maintain a "semi-permanent" military presence in Syria though the purpose was not to step down the Assad regime but to limit Iranian and Turkish influence in the area (Barron and Barnes 3). Based upon this premise, the Trump policy towards the Middle East was far from being a reconstructive aimed relationship but rather putting literary America first and its interests for sure.

8. Conclusion:

The long history of the American interventions in the Middle East delineated its principles and foreign goals. Whether to defeat the Soviet Union, secure Israel, or punish the autocratic rogue states that threaten Oil

supplies, the US is updating its tactics and policies to find the correct fitting tool for each political and economic quagmire. Eventually, it has been proved right through the Iraqi experience that military intervention is of bi-destructive nature while truces and talks are out of reach of success. Besides, it is illogical to stand opposed to the forging nuclear aspirations that threaten world peace by starting a war that may damage more than it heals. To do so, and to secure its efforts and lives, the US modern policy has chosen to attack peacefully through economic sanctions that trigger extreme damage on the target but less if none to the American sanctioning authorities.

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