A Stateless Nation: why the Kurds still do not have a State?

Hocine Laarid[1]*

[1] Constantine 03 University (Algeria) Laboratory of discourse analysis and comparative lexical and literary studies

Abstract:

This study is discussing the Kurds' question as to the most important and complex issue after the Arab-Israeli conflict and the most complicated one in contemporary times, particularly, in the failure of these people to make their own country in the New Middle East. Also, it is discussing some various difficulties faced by Kurdish nationalism, due to the fact that the Kurds are geographically distributed in four countries in the Middle East such as; Iran; Iraq; Syria, and Turkey. Therefore, this study attempts to explore the causes and objectives of the Kurds in establishing a sovereign state, and why they face obstacles in achieving this, especially in light of the escalation of their resonance in the political agendas of the countries of the region and international actors.

Keywords: The Kurds, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Turkey.

1. INTRODUCTION:

Strongly, the Kurdish question emerged in the nineteenth century during the weakness period of the Ottoman Empire. This latter led to radical and decisive shifts in the political map of the region. At that time, the major powers redrew their borders and identities, and easily, they paved the way for new geopolitical circumstances, which widely opened the region for international conflicts particularly the super-power's conflicts. The Kurds in this region were distinguished by a great deal of political and military activity and effectiveness, wishing to emphasize their national identity and the fulfillment of their national demands, which constituted a major threat to the national security of many countries in the region, according to the perspective of the countries in which they are present.

For decades, the debate over the status of the various Kurdish-majorities has been going on in the international community. In reality, however, this issue is not at the front pages, so it is not surprising that no clear response to the issue has been reached. While some suggest the establishment of an independent state, others will choose more autonomy within their own countries, or, conversely, they suggest that the Kurdish minorities be fully absorbed.

In fact, the Kurds have been almost ignored by leaders in International and Middle Eastern politics, and have been suffering from the marginalization in the region.

2. Who are the Kurds?

Genealogically, the Kurds are belonging to the Indo-Ari race, and the term Kurds are generally used to refer to the Kurdish people. Who often see themselves as the original people of a region called Kurdistan or Kurds-land,

---

* Hocine Laarid.

this mountainous region is located in the North of the Middle East; it includes parts of northwestern Iran, Northern Iraq, southeastern Turkey, and northeastern Syria. In addition, to these parts, the Kurds are distributed in small numbers in some regions of Azerbaijan as well as southeast of Armenia and Lebanon, and they are considering among the largest nationalities that do not have a national homeland or a unified internationally recognized political party. (Gunes, 2019)

Although, the Kurds have many tribes, nearly they are all Sunni Muslims, with a minority in both Iran and Iraq following Shia Islam. The main Kurdish languages are Kurmanji and Sorani. Then, Kurmanji has spoken in Turkey and Syria, and some regions in Iraq and Iran.
The Sorani language is mainly spoken in Iran and Iran and is considered as the education's language in Kurdistan Iraq in Iraq. (Chyet, 2019)

The Ottoman Kurdish scholar Abdullah Cevdet in 1913 in the Kurdish journal has written: "we are in a decade in which most identities are identified and recognized. (Walfgang Taucher, 2015) A century later, Kurds still proclaim that their identity has not been recognized yet. During the last century, the most of works about the Kurds have been addressed the Kurdish identity, whether these works focus on affirming, denying, or suppressing "Kurdish Identity", or on exploring the various aspects and dynamics of this conflict. (Walfgang Taucher, 2015) They are sharing a religious belief particularly with Arabs, and Turks as Sunni Muslims.

3. **Kurdish question and the Turkish humiliation**

Unlike many countries, Turkey has taken serious steps in containing the Kurds. However, it faces the threats of Kurdish terrorist groups called (PKK and YPG). The assimilation processes by Justice and development party and the PKK revolt cost more than 30.000 people.
The Arab Uprising has been revived the desire of an independent State in the Kurdish population. The Arab Spring of 2011 brought new dynamics to Kurdish separatism as the revolutions weakened the Iraqi and Syrian governments, but they were also painful. Kurdish groups began opposing the demand for an independent and sovereign state. With the rise of ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), the group was able to gain control of the oil-rich regions of Syria and Iraq. YPG / J is allied with the Turkish Armed Forces to fight against ISIS and expel them from the Turkish border. (Yilmaz, 2014)

The geopolitical implications for the Kurdish autonomous regions in northeastern Syria are rather complex. From a Turkish point of view, the Kurdish groups affiliated with the PKK present in Syria could pose a major security threat to them if they launch attacks on Turkey. Ankara is concerned

about the growing influence of the Turkish Kurdish community and their demand for greater autonomy within Turkey. (Gursel, 2014)

In fact, the peace talks between Turkey and the PKK are a direct result of these concerns, as these talks will determine the fate of these talks and how the Kurds will emerge from the Syrian conflict. Ankara supported jihadist militias in northern Syria, not only to weaken the Assad regime, as Gursel indicates, but also to weaken PKK-affiliated groups and undermine the Kurdish cantons in Syria. (Gursel, 2014)

4. Iran and the Kurds

There are some 3 million Kurds in Iran; they compose about 9% of Iran's total population and between one-fourth and one-third of all Kurds in the Middle East. (Center, 2001) In Iran, transactions between the central government and individuals take place in a very different and fundamental way than in other countries inhabited by Kurdish nationalities; In Iran, the Kurdish nationalism shares with the rest of the country in the cultural, historical, ethnic, and linguistic fields, as well as institutions, and it also shares the myths of the past and the common history. Therefore, neither the Iranian government nor even the Iranians themselves see Kurdish nationalism as a national minority. (Vali, 2014) Despite the natural resources and the vast lands that the Kurdistan region enjoys, the Kurdish people are among the poorest, given the low per capita income. Among the issues that have left a negative impact on the Kurds: poverty and environmental issues, which include malnutrition, clothing, housing, health, and education. The average number of Kurdish family members is between six to seven people. The rate of disguised unemployment and drug smuggling operations has spread, especially in the Kurdish regions adjacent to the borders with other countries. However, the Kurds appreciate the Iranian government to establish factories and workshops within the professional framework; as the people of the region were employed in these facilities. (Vali, 2014, p. 19)

In the modern era, after the establishment of the Iranian state and the demise of the semi-feudal provincial governments, the Kurds in various ways increased their level of cultural, social, and political freedoms, especially in times of weak central government. Some Kurdish armed groups confronted the government, and this phenomenon emerged during World War I and World War II, as well as in the years following the Islamic Revolution in Iran. But in all cases, these groups have been unable to destabilize and change the Iranian government. Evidence indicates the Iranian government attempts to provide social and political conditions for the participation of the Kurds at the national level, to prove the homogeneity of this nationalism with the rest of the Iranian people. (Vali, The Forgotten Years of Kurdish Nationalism in Iran, 2020) During the reign of the former Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, which

lasted for eight years; among the slogans of Khatami were slogans focused on promoting political development, which was a practical means for greater participation by the Iranian people, including the Kurds, and this period witnessed a significant decrease in riots and unrest that led to military confrontations.

Before some Kurdish groups showed a marked decline, and thanks to this, to achieve and meet some Kurdish demands, the Iranian government has appointed a group of Kurds in governmental positions in the country.

This was accompanied by an increase in the percentage of freedoms in writing articles and newspapers in the Kurdish language, in addition to raising the freedom of the press in Kurdish publications and allowing them to establish literary, professional, and social groups by the Iranian state. The advancement of the political and social participation of Kurdish nationalism in policy-making has been of great merit in strengthening the sense of patriotism among the Kurds and strengthening the relationship between them and the state. This also led to an increase in Kurdish loyalty and not asking them to secede from the Iranian state. (David Romano, 2014)

However, this policy did not continue during the era of the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This led to a decrease in the participation of the Kurds in the elections processes and encouraged their demand for independence and separation from the state. During this period, arrests also increased in Kurdish circles, including imams and clerics, but experience has shown that such policies cannot be suitable for any dialogue to solve problems.

The Kurds' participation resumed with the advent of Rouhani, as the percentage of those who voted for him in 2013 in Kurdistan reached 72%, and in 2017 73% voted for Rouhani, and the participation rate in Kurdistan was 59%. (Gurbuz, 2017) If we look at the issue of political participation, through the participation in the election processes, we notice that the Kurdish regions inhabited by the Kurdish nationalism and in which the Sunni community is the majority, registering very little participation. The reason for the increase in the Shiite Kurdish participation in the elections, which includes the presidential elections and the Shura Council elections, as well as the local elections in the provinces and rural areas, is attributed to the sectarian motivation; Whereas, Kurdish nationalism from the Shiite community does not feel a sense of alienation and tension between it and the government as that prevails in the Sunni areas. Iranian studies have monitored the growth of what they considered soft threats based on race and ethnic nationalism in some parts of Iran that came in line with the developments in the Kurdistan region after the occupation of Iraq in 2003, and the threat of Kurdish identity and ethnicity, given the current independence of the new Iraqi Kurdistan, is seen as a major threat to national security Iranian. (David Romano, 2014, pp. 59-60) There is no doubt

that soft threats to the Kurdistan region will gradually increase in conjunction with the desire to achieve a greater Kurdistan, and the Kurdish media have made their focus clear on the Kurdish common goals, which leads to a prediction of the form of demands that the Kurdish regions in Iran will witness in the future.

The relationship between the Kurds of Iran and its government witnessed tensions, attractions, and confrontations in different stages of its history before and after the revolution. The region's move will certainly create more serious challenges in the relationship between Iran and its Kurdish citizens.

5. Kurdistan Iraq and the Kurds

Kurdistan in Iraq, which developed into a quasi-state by the turn of the twenty-first century, is the most developed and politically organized of all of Greater Kurdistan. This region called the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), which is itself a euphemism for the state of Kurdistan, has all the manifestations of an independent state. It has a government independent of Baghdad (the Kurdistan Regional Government) as well as its parliament, for which elections are held separately from the Iraqi general elections. Another crucial component of the autonomous force is the Peshmerga, which has transformed from a guerrilla organization into an effective and well-organized military force.

The Kurdistan region of Iraq has an undeclared capital, Erbil, as well as a national anthem and national day, Newroz, which is different from Iraq. Likewise, the Iraqi Kurds have their flag, which is raised everywhere in Kurdistan and can be seen on the badges of Peshmerga soldiers.

The Iraqi flag is almost non-existent in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, it appears in only a few places, such as Erbil airport. Another symbol of independence is the Kurdish language, which was declared the official language in the region, and is used by the administration, the media, schools, and universities. (Phillips, 2015) The two airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, built in the past few years, have given the region a degree of freedom to communicate independently with the outside world. For an area where there is no access to the sea, this asset is essential for survival. Most of all, the huge quantities of oil and gas found in the Iraqi Kurdistan region are a major factor in its economic and political independence. (Phillips, 2015)

The international oil companies that flocked to Kurdistan in post-Saddam Iraq not only helped develop the oil sector but also became advocates of the Kurds toward their governments. There were 47 companies from 17 countries operating in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, as US oil companies with vested interests in Kurdistan, such as Exxon Mobil, pushed the US administration to support the Kurds. Oil was also a major means of facilitating a rapprochement between Ankara and Erbil. An example is a Turkish-Kurdish

pipeline that was inaugurated in May 2014 and is operating independently of Baghdad. (Phillips, 2015, p. 66)

On another level, Kurdish national consciousness was strongly promoted through the educational system, which flourished during the years of the economic boom (2003-1420). This system is completely separate from the Iraqi regime and curricula. All textbooks are in Kurdish, and unlike the new generation, young Kurds no longer know or use Arabic. Likewise, the narration in these textbooks focuses on Kurdish society, Kurdish society, history, and culture rather than on Iraq and the Arabs. (Rafaat, 2017) Sherko Kirmanj asserts that "the history books of the Kurdistan Regional Government provide a basic political message that the Kurds, as a national group in a world. Nation-states have the right to self-determination and statehood.

Another revolution has occurred in the higher education system where, according to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, there are now no less than 28 universities in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 14 of which are private. (David Romano, 2014, p. 138) These achievements have turned the Iraqi Kurdistan region into a source of pride and inspiration for all Kurds, and a model that must be followed, at least at the popular level. They are all the more impressive when we remember the abyss that was thrown into the Iraqi Kurds by the Ba'ath regime under Saddam Hussein less than three decades ago. (Chyet, 2019, pp. 27-28) So we wonder how that happened. What are the advantages enjoyed by this region compared to others, and what are the challenges ahead? The road to the emergence of a Kurdish state was almost arduous and long, lasting about eighty years. So far not complete yet. The success of the Iraqi Kurdistan region lies in the various geopolitical, social, and economic factors.

First, we must mention Britain's vacillating policies towards the Kurds in the early years of the Iraqi state, when it promised autonomy to the Kurds and then abandoned this promise. Then there was the Local Languages Act, a kind of cultural independence that the Kurds were able to gain at the end of the British Mandate in 1932. Although not fully implemented, it set a precedent that no Iraqi government could ignore. Another unique factor that was not present in other Kurdish regions is political independence, which the Ba'ath government in Iraq granted to the Kurds in 1970.

The Ba'ath took this tactical step less than two years after they took power to win over the Kurds. Goodwill so stability can be controlled in the hands of the government. This fake autonomy was dismantled after five years, but it paved the way for the establishment of true Kurdish autonomy years later. (Bengio, 2017)

The Kurds are concentrated in impregnable mountains, and their high proportion in the total population in Iraq (20-25%) goes a long way toward

explaining their perseverance against the central government's attempts to defeat Kurdistan once and for all. No less important is continuity in the leadership symbolized by Barzani and Talabani. The latter, who began his struggle against the central government in the late days of the Ottoman Empire, continued with it throughout the twentieth century and beyond. Talabani has followed suit since the 1960s. Although these elites suffer from nepotism and corruption, they provide a sense of stability and continuity, especially compared to the new elites emerging in the Arab part of post-Saddam Iraq. Their military prowess has made them a formidable challenge to every regime since the establishment of the modern Iraqi state in 1920. (Bengio, 2017) Wars have played a contradictory role in Kurdish history. On the one hand, they caused disasters on the genocide. On the other hand, they provided opportunities to improve the political position of the Kurds. This is true especially for the Kurds of Iraq.

The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) had a severe impact on the Kurds. The Kurds were accused of supporting Iran in the war, and Saddam's regime launched a crackdown on them. This included the chemical attack on Halabja and the Anfal campaigns at the end of the war, which cost 5,000 and 180,000 Kurds, respectively; As well as the demolition of more than 4,500 villages. The combined effect of this attack was to turn Kurdistan into a desert. The 1991 Gulf War may have ended with similar results, but instead, it turned out to be the beginning of true Kurdish autonomy.

In March 1991, in the aftermath of the war, the Kurds rebelled against the Ba'ath regime. Saddam tried to put down the rebellion by force, but his efforts were revived. The flight of more than a million Kurds towards the Turkish and Iranian borders convinced the international community of the necessity to establish a haven in the Kurdistan region, under the protection of the United States and its allies. Saddam responded by withdrawing his military forces from Kurdistan and halting the salaries of Kurdish officials in the hope that this would accelerate the region's collapse. It did the opposite, as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq gradually established itself as an independent entity. The 2003 Iraq war had more dramatic effects. (Bengio, 2017)

The Kurdish Peshmerga played an important role in overthrowing the Ba'ath regime by supporting the US military's efforts to occupy the northern part of the country at a time when Turkey, a NATO member, refused Americans 'permission to use the Incirlik Air Base for this purpose. This success affected Kurds deeply. In the Iraqi Kurdistan region itself, the dismantling of the Baath regime mitigated the trauma suffered by the Kurdish population under Saddam and greatly supported nation-building and state-building processes. The Kurds also played a major role in the Iraqi central government in Baghdad, giving them a say in the political affairs of the country

as a whole. Another important factor was the new constitution, adopted in 2005, which adopted for the first time in Iraqi history a unique formula for establishing a federal system for Iraq.

In a way, this trend towards self-government legitimized the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

The establishment of independent foreign relations also accelerated significantly in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war. Kurdish missions were opened in countries around the world and missions were opened in Erbil. (Gurses, 2018)

The Kurdistan Regional Government also has a Minister of Foreign Affairs, Falah Mustafa Bakir, who has served in this position since 2006 under the euphemistic title "Head of the Foreign Relations Department".

The most important relationship of the Kurdistan Regional Government is with the United States, which has changed its traditional policy of ignoring the Kurds' policy of engagement and support. The turning point, of course, was the 2003 war, which showed the Kurds to be a reliable and loyal ally of the West. (The US position remained ambiguous.) (Bengio, 2017)Another strong point for the KRG in post-Saddam Iraq is the vitality of the economy, of which oil was the main engine. However, as was the case elsewhere in the world, oil was a problem for several reasons. It strengthened foreign relations, especially with Turkey, but also brought corruption, favoritism, and intense rivalry between the two leading parties in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

The Kurdistan region has placed Iraq in a position to be vulnerable to fluctuations in oil prices and instability in the Middle East. In short, there is no doubt that the Kurdistan region of Iraq has reached a critical mass that may eventually lead to independence. However, its participation in the war against ISIS, in which it has participated since 2014, has brought with it severe economic, political, and military challenges. (Gunes, 2019, p. 101) This war may determine the fate of the Kurdistan region of Iraq: it may become an independent state, or it may return to its previous status as a weak autonomy.

6. The Kurds and the Syrian Conflict

The Kurds were not immune to the popular protests in Syria (March 2011), as the Kurdish movement contributed to raising the morale of the uprisings, supported them politically, and demanded the immediate cessation of all violence and its serious condemnation, and even confirmed the accountability of those responsible, and with the escalation of tension, it developed a vision to solve the crisis, what was known as the "Kurdish Initiative" on April 14, 2011, and demanded to accelerate the pace of reforms in all fields to achieve a gradual and peaceful democratic change that guarantees the abolition of the one-party policy, the recognition of the principle of

political, cultural, and national pluralism, and the pursuit of the principle of dialogue in dealing with All shades of Syrian society During the convening of a comprehensive national conference, its duty to find effective solutions to all issues and files inside Syria, including the Kurdish issue, which is the best option to surround the current crisis. (Zaleweski, 2012)

Fortunately for the Kurds, in of July 2012, and in light of the beginning of the Syrian internal conflict in the south and regions of Central Syria, the Syrian government withdrew most of its security and administrative apparatus from predominantly Kurdish regions, which led to the creation of a buffer zone between Turkey and other parts of Syria and left the Kurdistan Democratic Union Party (PYD) as the de facto regional government. (Chyet, 2019, p. 361)

In any post-Assad settlement, however, Kurdish politics in Syria cannot be understood without looking at the vast shadows of the centers of regional powers: the Kurdistan Regional Government, Massoud Barzani in Iraq, and the Kurdistan Workers Party, both of these two forces are already competing for influence in Syria. On the regional level, Barzani appears to be enjoying more maneuvering based on the PKK and associated groups such as the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and Kurdish military units called the People's Units YPG. They have taken stronger positions, and the rise of the PKK-affiliated Democratic Union Party indicates that the Syrian Kurds may follow The PKK is a suit of Barzani's party. This would threaten Turkey in particular, by consolidating Kurdish lands under the influence of the PKK.

The autonomous Kurdish region in Syria could also become a second base for the PKK in parallel with the well-established bases in the Qandil Mountains in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. (Chyet, 2019)

It is clear that the PYD has strengthened its positions during the Syrian conflict, which confirms the Turkish concern about it, in addition to the fact that about 56% of its fighters are from Turkey and not Syria, but it is not worth exaggerating the popularity of the PYD the Kurds Syrians fighting for the YPG do not necessarily do so because they believe in the policy of the PYD, which provides benefits and jobs in addition to providing electricity and foodstuffs, as they are simply fighting for it to earn a living in this war. Likewise, the YPG's participation in conscription in Syria attests to its limited support among important sectors of the Syrian Kurdish population. (Levy, 2013)Against this background, two competing visions for resolving the Kurdish issue in Syria emerged, headed by Barzani and the PKK.

Given that Barzani considers himself a leader of all Kurds. Not surprisingly, he aspires to be the guarantor for a Kurdish entity in post-Assad Syria, similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government. Barzani has acted as a mediator between the various Syrian Kurdish factions and has also defended the vision of local Kurds who want to establish their unity within the federal

state. Barzani's arrival to the PYD through the Erbil Agreement (World, 2010) was aimed in part at luring the PYD out of the PKK's grip. Barzani is also training Syrian Kurdish fighters in Iraq, hoping to establish a force linked to himself that could compete with the YPG and help secure the independent security of the region just as the Peshmerga forces (armed Kurdish fighters) did in Iraq.

In the future, it is not unlikely that a government would have The Kurdistan region has a large stake in a new independent Kurdish region in Syria. (Levy, 2013)

7. Conclusion

It is clear from the above that the Kurdish issue is a stubborn puzzle in Middle Eastern politics. It is quite clear that when the situation in Syria stabilizes, the Syrian Kurds may preserve their autonomy in northeastern Syria, but this may have a heavy price.

-On the Kurdish side, they are surrounded by unfriendly states and entities such as the Assad regime, and Turkey and Iran are the two regional powers that enjoy a greater presence of the Kurdish population.

-The Kurdish rise in the Middle East is seen as a security threat at the local and regional levels in addition to being a barrier to their ambitions to expand their political influence in the region.

-One of the main challenges facing the current state system in the Middle East has come from the Kurds, and the Kurdish resurgence over the past decade has raised questions about the feasibility of continuing existing states and international borders in the long term.

-While developments in the region have paved the Kurds in a more active and active role politically in Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, the Kurds are located in a region characterized by a perpetual pattern of conflict and throughout the twentieth century, they are dealing with a strong and deep-rooted nationalism. Therefore, the dominant regional powers will likely unite once again in their opposition to Kurdish aspirations and the preservation of the status quo in the region.

-Historically, state policies towards the Kurdish people were based on oppression and denying those rights and this framework still dominates the thinking of policymakers.

-Regional security perceptions limit the ability of Kurdish actors to reap their decades-old political struggle. It also influences the options of international powers in their attempts to shape regional developments.

-The positions of Kurdish entities and entities have been strengthening through the strong ties that they have been able to build with the international forces participating in the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Likewise, individual Kurdish conflicts have become integrated into the current patterns of

conflict and cooperation in the region, and their development has a major impact on the course of conflicts in both Syria and Iraq.

8. Bibliography:

1. Bengio, O. (2017). The Kurdish Question in Volatile Middle East. *Middle Security and Policy Studies* , 17.
2. Center, N. F. (2001). *The Kurds of Iran: A Rugged People in a Rugged Land.* Iran .
3. Chyet, M. L. (2019). *Routledge Handbook on the Kurds.* New York : Routledge .
4. David Romano, M. G. (2014). *Conflict, democratization and the Kurds in the Middle east: turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.* US: Palgrave Macmillan.
5. Gunes, C. (2019). *The Kurds in A New Middle East; the Changing Geopolitics of a Regional Conflict.* UK : Palgrave Macmillan.
6. Gurbuz, M. (2017, June 05). *Emboldened Kurdish Aspirations in Iran: Where are they Headed?* Retrieved 11 26, 2020, from Arab Center : http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/emboldened-kurdish-aspirations-in-iran-where-are-they-headed/
7. Gursel, K. (2014, August 24). *Al-Monitor*. Retrieved 09 28 , 2020, from Davutoglu faces uneasy relationship with Assad: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/turkey-syria-isis-assad-davutoglu.html
8. Gurses, M. (2018). *Anatomy as a Civil War: Sociopolitical Impacts of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey.* USA: University of Michigan Press.
9. Phillips, N. E. (2015). *State-building in Iraq Kurdistan.* Columbia University: Institute for the Study of Human Rights.
10. Rafaat, A. (2017). The 1926 Annexation of Southern Kurdistan to Iraq: the Kurdish Narrative. *American Research Journals of History and Culture* , 03-04.
11. Vali, A. (2014). *Kurds and The State in Iran; The Making of Kurdish identity.* New York: I.B. Tauris.
12. Vali, A. (2020). *The Forgotten Years of Kurdish Nationalism in Iran.* London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
13. Walfgang Taucher, M. V. (2015). *The Kurds: History-Relegion-Laguage-Politics.* Vienna: Austrain Federal Ministry of the Interior.
14. World. (2010, November 07). *Iraq reaches power-sharing deal to form government*. Retrieved 02 24 , 2021, from World :

https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/iraq-reaches-power-sharing-deal-to-form-government-1.488581

15. Yilmaz, A. (2014). The Changing Dynamics of the Kurdish Question. *SWP Comment* , 03.

16. Zaleweski, P. (2012). Turkey, Syria, and the Kurds: there goes the Neighborhood. *Istanbul Policy Cente* , 01.

.