

Semantic Change in Tashawit: A Special Focus on Metaphor, Metonymy and Synecdoche

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Abstract:

The present paper addresses semantic change in Tashawit. The focus is specifically laid on the effects of what is known in the literature as the classical quartet or classical/modern trio, namely the mechanisms of metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche, for these are held to be the most basic and most common. The paper aims to show how such mechanisms create additional meanings for a lexical item, that is semantic broadening, or how they alter its established meanings, that is semantic shift, in this Berber variety. It also aims to cast some fresh light on the extent to which the outcomes of semantic change in Tashawit are comparable to those in other Berber varieties, to reflect on areas of convergence and divergence across the Berber language. The paper is made up of two main parts. The first part establishes the theoretical framework of the study, addressing some of the most common typologies of the mechanisms of semantic change, and presenting short accounts of the concepts chosen for investigation. The second part deals with the practical side of the study, and presents the reader with a list of examples of the semantic transfers under consideration across a variety of semantic domains in Tashawit.

Keywords: Classical/Modern Trio, Semantic Broadening, Semantic Change, Semantic Shift, Tashawit.

Introduction

In any language, change in meaning is a norm. It seems safe to state that this sort of language change is more common than most other linguistic changes, namely the phonetic/phonological, the morphological and the syntactic. Semantic change is in no way an indication of language death, like contact-induced lexical change for instance, but is rather an efficient tool for language evolution. Through such change, and a myriad of other mechanisms, language empowers its speakers with new notions to enable them to adapt to incessant extralinguistic innovations. It is such innate and universal language quality that allows a given language to endure and survive through extended ages, albeit in a more or less different form and with more or less different set of words, meanings, and structures. Moreover, semantic change is one of the mechanisms through which language evolves into a number of descendant languages. What often results, as far as semantics is concerned, is a rich net of semantic systems, each of which being unique in its own defining traits, but all being tied to the deep structure of the semantic system of the original language. It is, then, the burden of any

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linguist seeking an in-depth understanding of the semantic system of any language to understand first the mechanisms through which semantic change takes place.

1. Semantic Change: An Overview

Semantic change, in simple terms, refers to ‘change in meaning, understood to be a change in the concepts associated with a word’ (Campbell, 2013, p. 222). Such change takes place through a number of ways about which there seem to be a broad agreement among linguists today. Regardless of the nature of the languages involved, linguists also agree that some of the established mechanisms of semantic change are more common and more important than others. The attention of language scholars, until relatively recently, has most often turned to two basic mechanisms, which are stated here in order of importance, metaphor and metonymy (Nerlich and Clarke 1999; Traugott and Dasher, 2002). It seems that the main, though not the only, reason for such focus, in particular on metaphor, is the impact exerted by the works of scholars in the domains of old and new rhetoric. Another important reason for such focus is that metaphor and, in particular, metonymy, have been understood and used as cover terms for a number of comparable mechanisms, which modern scholars have categorized as being independent.

Metaphoric and metonymic transfers, as pointed out earlier, are so fundamental to semantic extension, but do not account for all sorts of semantic change that are attested in any natural language. A number of other mechanisms have been considered by historical linguists in order to clarify the variety of semantic transfers observed across the different languages (Darmesteter, 1886; Bloomfield, 1933; Ullmann, 1957; Geeraerts 1997; Blank, 1999). To begin with, and before we go further in our account of the different mechanisms of semantic change, it is important to make reference to an important distinction between two broad types of semantic change, namely semantic shift and semantic broadening. Semantic shift, according to Holm (1988), “represents an extension of a word’s meaning with the loss of its earlier meaning (e.g. pineapple no longer means ‘fir cone’ in standard English” (p. 101). Semantic broadening, on the other hand, refers to “such extension without the loss of the original meaning” (Holm 1988, p. 101). Fromkin (2017) stated, in this regard, that “When the meaning of a word becomes broader, it means everything it used to mean and more” (p, 517).

Of the different mechanisms of semantic change mentioned in the literature, we can make reference to substitution, analogy, nomination, regular transfer, permutation, adequation (Stern, 1931), hyperbole, meiosis, degeneration, and elevation (Bloomfield, 1933). More common as a classification of the mechanisms of semantic change is Ullmann’s typology. Despite the criticism levelled at this typology, for example by Geeraerts (1997), Blank (1999) and others, it remains, on admission of its critics, one of the most recognized accounts for mechanisms of semantic change. Contrary to other scholars, Ullmann (1957) distinguishes, along the causes of semantic change, between its nature and its outcomes. Metaphor, metonymy, folk-etymology and ellipsis are included under the nature of semantic change, whereas widening, narrowing, amelioration and pejoration are included under the outcomes.

Some of the linguists who made criticisms of Ullmann’s typology have devised their own typologies. Geeraerts (1997) draws, in his account of lexical change, a line between semasiological mechanisms that “involve the creation of new readings with the range of a lexical item” and onomasiological changes that “involve changes thorough which a concept ... comes to be expressed by a new or another lexical item” (Geeraerts, 1997, p. 94). Semasiological changes, in other words, “provide existing words with new meanings”, while onomasiological changes “couple concepts to words

in a way that is not yet part of the lexical inventory of the language” (p. 94). Of the two categories emphasized above, the former is the one concerned with semantic change per se. Semasiological changes are of two sorts, changes of denotational meaning and changes of non-denotational meaning. Non-denotational semasiological changes include pejorative and ameliorative changes. Semasiological changes of denotational meaning, on the other hand, are classified into analogical or independent changes. Independent semasiological changes of denotational meaning involve four mechanisms, metaphor, metonymy, specialization and generalization (Geeraerts, 1997). These are referred to as the *classical quartet* “because they constitute the core of most classifications, and because they link up most closely with what may be found in the rhetorical tradition” (Geeraerts, 2010, p. 26). Seto (1999) joined specialization and generalization under one mechanism and, accordingly, referred to the *classical trio* of metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche (later, the *modern trio*, see Seto, 2003).

Another typology that is built on a criticism of Ullmann’s typology is the one devised by Blank (1999) who contends that Ullmann’s typology “lacks both a cognitive and empirical background” (p. 66). The classification he devised seems to be less complex, involving eleven mechanisms with no specified subcategories, namely metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, specialization, generalization, cohyponymic transfer, antiphrasis, auto-anatomy, auto-converse, ellipsis, and folk-etymology (Blank, 1999). As can be clearly noticed, specialization and generalization are considered independent of synecdoche as opposed to the previous classification. In this typology, synecdoche is used to refer to semantic change that involve a whole-part relationship and, hence, seem to be regarded as a subtype of metonymy (Blank, 1999).

As it has been pointed out earlier, and on the basis of the brief overview that was provided above, any study of semantic change in any language should primarily, though not exclusively, focus on three major mechanisms, metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche (specialization and generalization), in other words the classical quartet (Geeraerts, 1997) or the classical/modern trio (Seto, 1999, 2003). Accordingly, the focus of the present paper will be on such types and the others will be disregarded.

2. Mechanisms of Semantic Change: The Classical/Modern Trio

The first mechanism of semantic change to be considered in this section is the metaphor. For a long time, the metaphor as a style trope, as an outcome, and later as a mechanism, of semantic change was held to be the most important, not only of the classical/modern trio but of all other concepts (Traugott and Dasher, 2002; Haser, 2003). Consequently, it was the one studied most by specialists in related domains. Central to semantic change as it is, however, there is no single definition for metaphor that all scholars agree on. Yet, we can focus here on the main defining features that distinguish it from other mechanisms of semantic change, metonymy in particular.

The first defining feature for metaphor that specialists seem to take for granted, regardless of their differences in defining it, is that metaphor implies a relationship of semantic similarity (Bloomfield, 1933; Ullmann, 1957; Blank, 1999, etc.). The metaphor is accordingly defined as “semantic change that involves extensions in the meaning of a word that suggest a semantic similarity or connection between the new sense and the original one” (Campbell, 2013, p. 224). The new word is, hence, understood in light of the original one by means of a semantic similarity that bridges between the two. The second main defining features that distinguishes metaphor from other mechanisms, although it is less conventionally established in the literature

compared to the former, is that metaphor involves “a figurative leap across semantic domains” (Campbell and Mixco, 2007, p. 121). This second attribute is emphasized in the definition provided below:

Metaphor is the transfer of properties from one domain to another to create a new referential value: some of a term’s semantic properties are selected (abstracted) and applied to another domain to designate a new entity in virtue of the properties considered shared by the two referents” (Robert, 2008, p. 61-2).

The leap across the semantic domains involved in metaphoric extension within a particular word occurs “when the shift takes place between one particular use (generally a concrete one), considered the primary meaning, and another (generally more abstract), through a process of selecting properties which are transferred from the primary domain to the other” (Robert, 2008, p. 63).

The second most important mechanism of semantic change is metonymy. Considering the extent to which it is common in any language, some scholars even consider metonymy to be more important than metaphor. The two concepts are often discussed in the literature in relation to one another. Many of the studies that addressed one of the two concepts have made contrasts to the other concept, in part because lay readers often confuse one with the other. Metonymy differs from metaphor in a number of ways, important of which seem to be, first, the nature of relationship that bonds the old and new meanings of the word involved in metonymic transfer and, second, the nature of the semantic domains involved. Unlike metaphor, which involves a relationship of semantic similarity between the original sense and the new sense of a word, metonymy is fundamentally based on a relationship of contiguity between concepts. Contiguity, many scholars agree, is the main defining feature of metonymy (Ullmann 1957; Geeraerts, 1997; Kövecses and Radden, 1998; Blank, 1999; Seto, 1999). Some specialists argued that semantic change that is based on metonymic transfer does not occur in the linguistic world, but instead in the real one (Seto, 1999; Campbell 2013). This view seems to be based on Bloomfield’s conceptualization of the concept of contiguity, i.e. in terms of nearness in space and time (Bloomfield, 1933). Based on this understanding of contiguity, Seto (1999) defines metonymy as “a referential transfer phenomenon based on the spacio-temporal contiguity as conceived by the speaker between an entity and another in the (real) world” (p. 91). With regard to the second difference, that is the nature of semantic domains involved, many linguists, though not all, argue that semantic transfer in metonymy, in contrast to metaphor, takes place within one single semantic domain (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Kövecses and Radden, 1998; Traugott and Dasher, 2002). Metonymy is defined, from this perspective, as “a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain” (Kövecses and Radden, 1998, p. 39).

Seto (1999) provides us with one of the most known accounts of metonymy. He stated that metonymy is an *E(ntity)-related transfer*, and seems to argue that if

understood as such, metonymy cannot be confused with other look-alike concepts. According to Seto (1999), an entity is “a bounded thing in the cognitive-linguistic sense of a bounded region” (p. 96). Three main types of entity are highlighted, spatial, temporal and abstract. The spatial is accounted for in terms of “physical entities which have spatial extension”, (e.g. *dog, river*), the temporal covers events that occur within a temporal frame (e.g. *an earthquake, washing*), and the abstract covers entities that are neither spatially nor temporally bounded (e.g. *power, beauty*) (Seto, 1999, p. 97). Based on this framework, Seto (1999) lists a number of metonymic relations that differ according to the type of the entities involved. These include spatial (whole-part, container-contents, and adjacency), temporal (whole event-subevent and preceding-ensuing), and abstract (object-property) (Seto, 1999). Other metonymic relations that also figure in the literature include cause-effect, producer-product, material-object, agent-action, author-work, place-event, place-institution, institution-people, etc.

The third mechanism of semantic change to be covered in this study is synecdoche. It seems most of the authors who addressed this concept in the past considered it a subtype of metonymy, as does many authors today (Le Guern, 1975; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). One speaks of synecdoche, from the standpoint of these authors, if “a term with more comprehensive meaning is used to refer to a less comprehensive meaning or vice versa”, in other words when “a part (or quality) is used to refer to the whole, or the whole is used to refer to part” (Campbell, 2013, p. 226). The view that synecdoche is a class of metonymy, it is important to note, is not shared by all linguists. Today, many authors stress the point that synecdoche is not to be confused with metonymy but, instead, should be regarded as an independent mechanism (Seto, 1999; Burkhardt, 2010; Nerlich, 2010). This is a more appropriate understanding of such notion, these authors argue, because Synecdoche is based on a relationship of semantic inclusion between the meanings involved, and not on a contiguity relationship as with metonymy. From this point of view, synecdoche is defined as “a conceptual transfer phenomenon based on the semantic inclusion between a more comprehensive and a less comprehensive category” (Seto, 1999, p. 92). Seto (1999) points out another basic difference between synecdoche and metonymy; synecdoche is a *category-related* transfer as opposed to metonymy which, as it has been stressed earlier, is an *entity-related* transfer. When addressing category-related transfers, the nature of relations involved are *taxonomical*, which differ from entity-related transfers which fundamentally involve *partonomy* relations (Seto, 1999; Nerlich, 2010). Seto (1999) uses the word ‘taxonomy’ to refer to “the relation between a more comprehensive category and a less comprehensive one” and ‘partonomy’ to “the relation between an entity and its parts” (p. 93). Put differently, “taxonomy is a ‘kind-of’ relation while partonomy is a ‘part-of’ relation” (Seto, 1999, p. 93). Whole-part relations, the advocates of the conceptualization highlighted above argue, should only be considered under metonymy, not synecdoche. Instead, what should be considered under synecdoche is the genus-species relation. In fact, many authors held the genus-species relation to be the only relation that is to be addressed under this particular mechanism. In the present work, synecdoche is treated as an independent mechanism of semantic change and not as a subtype of metonymy.

Two main subtypes of synecdoche are discussed in the literature. The first is the genus for species synecdoche, and is often referred to as specialization, and the second is the species for genus synecdoche, and is referred to as generalization. These opposite mechanisms differ fundamentally in terms of the underlying relationships they involve between the old and new meaning of a word; the former involves a relationship of subordination and the latter a relationship of superordination (Geeraerts, 2010). In the genus for species synecdoche, or specialization, “the range of the application of the new meaning” of a word stands as “a subset of the range of the old meaning”, whereas in the species for genus synecdoche, or generalization, “the new range” of the meaning of a word “includes the old one” (Geeraerts, 2010, p. 26-7). In a similar way, Cruse (2000) stated that we can tell the two mechanisms apart “if we recognize one of the senses” of a word “as more basic than the other” (p. 110). In other words, we can talk of specialization when semantic transfer takes place from a more basic meaning to a less basic, more specialized, one, and of generalization when semantic transfer takes place in the reverse direction. For instance, the meaning of *girl* in English originates from a specialization of the Middle English *gyrle*, meaning ‘child or young person of either sex’, the meaning of *deer* from Old English *deor*, meaning ‘animal’, and that of *meat* from Old and Middle English *mete*, which means ‘food’. Geeraerts (2015) provides us with the fascinating example of the English word *corn* which was used to denote ‘grain’ and, as a result of specialization, is used to today to designate ‘wheat’ in England, ‘oats’ in Scotland, and ‘maize’ in America. With regard to generalization, one can provide the example of *dog* which gained its sense from a generalization of *dogca* which originally denoted ‘dog of a powerful breed’ in Old English. Another example of generalization is the word *salary*, which is traced to Latin *salarium* and which originally meant ‘salt-money, soldier's allowance for the purchase of salt’, etc.

3. Semantic Change in Tashawit

This section is devoted to semantic change in Tashawit, with a focus on metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche. Most of the illustrations provided below are collected from the few texts available for this poorly documented Berber variety, chiefly Huyghe (1906, 1907), and Basset (1961). The examples are presented in the conventional form used in historical linguistics. On the left side of the transfer arrow of each example stands, highlighted in bold, the word concerned with the mechanism of semantic change under focus, along with its original meaning before change, as attested in Tashawit. In order to establish the meaning of each word before change, we provide examples of the Berber varieties where such a meaning, or a close meaning, is attested. In case the meaning in question is obsolete in Tashawit, as a result of semantic shift, the meaning held to be original in proto-Berber, based on its prominence across other Berber varieties or on reconstructions established by Berber historical linguists, is presented. On the right side of the transfer arrow stand(s) the new meaning(s) acquired for the word under consideration after it has undergone semantic change, along with reference to other Berber varieties where similar or related semantic changes are attested.

3.1. Metaphor

As it has been pointed out above, metaphoric transfer is based on a relationship of semantic similarity between the original meaning of a word and the new meaning that it takes after transfer. This similarity can be in one or more features, like form/shape, color, location, function, and the like. Examples of metaphoric transfer are abundant in Tashawit. Some of the examples found in this Berber variety are attested, not only in other Berber varieties, but also in languages that belong to other language families. Some of these examples are provided below.

- 1) **Cha. *titt*** ‘eye’ (Zng. *tud*; W *cett*; Y *tyett*; To. *tit*; Nef. *tit*; Siw. *teṭ*, etc.) > **1) Cha. *titt*** ‘spring’ (cf. Zng. *tud* ‘spring’; W *cett* / Y *tyett* ‘spring’; To/Nef. *tit* ‘spring’; Siw. *teṭ* ‘spring’); **2) Cha. *titt n tfukt*** ‘solar disc / sun’s photosphere’ (cf. Wrg. *titt* ‘solar disc’)¹.

The semantic similarity in the first metaphor (‘eye’ > ‘spring’) in (1) above is based on two main features at least. First, the shape of a water spring could be said to resemble in some way that of the human/animal eye. The second, and most important feature, seems to be in terms of what the two entities in question produce; eyes shed tears, while springs spring water. This metaphor is also attested at least in one other Afroasiatic language, that is Arabic (cf. Ar. ‘*ain* ‘eye’ > ‘spring’). With regard to the second metaphor (‘eye’ > ‘sun’s photosphere’), the semantic similarity seems to be, primarily, in terms of form. The sun’s photosphere has the same shape as the eye or, more accurately, the pupil of the eye; both have the form of a disc, hence the expression ‘solar disc’ in English. The similarity between the sun’s photosphere and the pupil of the eye can probably be recognized better if one reflects on the way it is used in Arabic (cf. Ar. ‘*ain aš-šams*, lit. ‘the eye of the sun’ and *qurṣ aš-šams*, lit. ‘solar disc’).

Other metaphoric uses of *titt* in Tashawit include ‘orifice’ (cf. Tmz/Kab. *tit* ‘orifice’), ‘chain ring’, ‘bud’ (cf. To. *tit n ecek* ‘flower’, W *cett* / Y *tyett* ‘flower’, Ar. ‘*ain* ‘bud’, Eng. *eye* ‘undeveloped bud’), ‘buttonhole’, ‘net mesh’, etc.

- 2) **Cha. *ul*** ‘heart’ (To/Chl/Tmz/Rif/Mzb/Wrg/Kab/Nef. *ul*; W/Y *ewel*; Siw. *uli*, etc.) > **1) Cha. *ul*** ‘the interior part or the middle (of something)’ (cf. Chl. *ul* ‘the heart of a plant’; Mzb. *ul* ‘center’; Wrg. *ul* ‘(vital) center’), **2) Cha. *ul*** ‘the hollow’.

The metaphor ‘heart’ > ‘interior part’ in (2) seems to involve a semantic relationship of location, that is being inside (of a body, thing, etc.). The corresponding words for ‘heart’ in different human languages are used in a similar way (cf. Ar. *qalb* ‘middle, core, center’; Eng. *heart* ‘center’; Fr. *cœur* ‘center’, etc.). The ‘heart’ > ‘the hollow’

¹ The abbreviations adopted for the different Berber varieties that appear in this paper are as follows: Cha. (Tashawit); Chl (Tashelhiyt); Djer. (Djerba); Ghd. (Ghadames); Gour. (Gourara); Izn. (Iznasen); Kab. (Kabyle); Mzb. (Tumzabt); Nef. (Nefoussa); Rif (Tarifit); Sen. (Senhadja de Srair); Siw. (Siwa); Snd. (Sened); Sns. (Beni Snous); Sok. (Sokna); Tmz. (Tamazight of the Atlas); W (Iwelemmden); Wrg (Teggargrent); Y (Tayert); Zenaga (Zenaga). Other languages: Ar. (Arabic); AVA (Algerian Vernacular Arabic); Eng. (English); Fr. (French).

metaphor, instead, seems to be based on similarity in terms of shape, bearing in mind that heart is a cavity or a hollow muscular organ.

- 3) **Cha** *aẓwer* ‘root’ (Chl. *aẓyer*; Kab. *aẓar*; Nef. *azur*; Ghd. *aẓur*, etc.) > **Cha.** *aẓwer* ‘artery, nerve, vein’ (cf. Chl. *aẓur* ‘vein’; Kab. *aẓar* ‘vein’; Nef. *azur* ‘nerve’).

The metaphor in (3) involves two semantic similarities that are quite obvious. With regard to the first feature, arteries, veins and nerves resemble, in their form, the roots of plants (trees and the likes) in an almost ideal way. The second, and apparently the most important feature, is concerned with function; all of the entities involved are transport systems that carry substances of some sort to the larger entities they form parts of. Roots take in water and nutrients into the body of the plant, arteries take blood from the heart to other parts of the body, veins carry blood from organs and tissues towards the heart, and nerves transmit electrical impulses to all the parts of an organism. The metaphor ‘root’ > ‘vein’ is also attested in Arabic (cf. Ar. ‘*irq* ‘root, blood-vessel, vein, artery’).

- 4) **Cha.** *ḍar, ṭar* ‘foot, leg’ (Zng/To/Chl/Rif/Kab. *aḍar*; Tmz/Mzb/Wrg. *ḍar*; Nef/Siw. *ṭar*, etc.) > **1) Cha.** *ḍar, ṭar* ‘leg (of an object, like table, etc.), **2) Cha.** *ḍar, ṭar* ‘door’s axis’.

Like the previous example, the metaphor in (4) involves a similarity in terms of form and function. Legs of objects (like tables, desks, and the like) are made in columnar shapes, as in humans and animals, to carry out, in such objects, one of the main functions that legs fulfill in living creatures, i.e. to serve as weight-bearing structures. Similar semantic extensions are, likewise, attested in other languages (cf. Ar. *saq*; Eng. *leg*; Fr. *piéd*, etc.). The second metaphor in (4) (‘leg’ > ‘door’s axis’) also seems to involve similarities in terms of form and function; the axis of a door has a columnar shape and serves as a supporting structure for the door.

- 5) **Cha.** *imi* ‘mouth’ (To. *emi*; Chl/Tmz/Rif/Mzb/Wrg/Kab/Nef. *imi*; Ghd. *ami*, etc.) > **1) Cha.** *imi* ‘entrance’ (To. *emi* ‘entrance’; Chl/Tmz/Kab. *imi* ‘entrance, threshold’; Rif/Mzb/Nef. *imi* ‘entrance’; Djer. *imi* ‘door’; Ghd. *ami* ‘entrance’), **2) Cha.** *imi* ‘opening, orifice’ (cf. To. *emi* ‘opening, orifice’; Tmz/Mzb/Nef. *imi* ‘opening’; Rif/Wrg/Kab. *imi* ‘opening, orifice’; Ghd. *ami* ‘opening’), **3) Cha.** *imi* ‘mouth (of a river, stream, etc.)’ (cf. To. *emi* ‘mouth of a valley, river’; Rif/Kab. *imi* ‘mouth of a river’).

In a similar way to the previous examples, the first of our meanings in (5), i.e. ‘entrance’, may bear some similarity to the original sense, ‘mouth’, in terms of shape, but the basic similarity has to do with function. The ‘entrance’ to anything, be it a door, a gate or whatever, resembles the ‘mouth’ in the sense that it allows things outside of it to get inside through such entrance, in the same way as food and water enter the bodies of humans/animals. Although the use of ‘mouth’ in such a metaphoric way does not

seem to exist in Classical or Modern Standard Arabic, it is attested with close meanings in some Arabic vernaculars (cf. AVA *fumm lbad* ‘threshold’).

The use of *imi* to denote ‘opening’ or ‘orifice’, our second metaphor in (5), involves a similarity in form. This metaphor is more common outside the Berber language than the previous one (cf. Ar. *fam* ‘opening’; Eng. *mouth* ‘opening’; Fr. *bouche* ‘opening’). The extension of ‘mouth’ to ‘mouth (of a river, stream, etc.)’ is based on a similarity in function. The ‘mouth of a river’, for instance, is the point where a river flows into a larger body of water. Likewise, the ‘mouth’ of a human or an animal is the organ through which food and water enter a larger body. This metaphor is also found in other languages (Ar. *fam an-nahr*; AVA *fumm elwad*; Eng. *mouth*; Fr. *bouche*, etc.).

3.2. Metonymy

Metonymy, in contrast to metaphor, is not based on relationships of similarity but rather on contiguity. Metonymic changes are often categorized in terms of the types of contiguity relations they involve. Hence, we can talk of whole-part metonymy, container-content metonymy, adjacency metonymy, object-property metonymy, cause-effect metonymy, producer-product metonymy, material-object metonymy, and others more. Metonymies are very common in Berber, probably even more frequent than metaphors. Some illustrations for some of the types of metonymy mentioned above are listed below.

- 1) **Cha. *udem*** ‘face’ (To/Chl/Tmz/Rif/Mzb/Wrg/Snd/Kab/Nef. *udem*) > **Cha *udem*** ‘notable, mediator’ (cf. Tmz. *udem* ‘respectable person, influential, notable, personality’).

This example provided in (1) above is an illustration of a part for a whole metonymy. Here, *udem* ‘face’, a body part, is used to refer to a whole person. The metonymic use of ‘face’ to refer to a person is also attested in other languages (cf. Ar. *wajh* ‘prominent personality’; Eng. *face* ‘person’; Fr. *visage* ‘person’, etc.). Below are two other examples of this type of metonymy.

- 2) **Cha. *ixf*** ‘head’ (To. *eyef*; Mzb/Wrg. *iyef*; Mzb/Wrg/Kab. *ixef*; Chl/Tmz/Rif. *ixf*, etc.) > **Cha. *ixf*, pl. *ixfawen*** ‘livestock’ (cf. To. *eyef* ‘goat’; Tmz. *tixfawin* ‘sheep, ewe’; Rif. *ixfawen* ‘sheep’).
- 3) **Cha. *tasetta*** ‘branch, twig’ (To. *tasetta* ‘cut branch of thorny tree’; Chl. *asetta*, *tasettat*; Tmz. *asetta*; Rif. *tasetta*; Kab. *tasetta*, *taciṭa*, etc.) > **Cha. *tasetta*** ‘tree’.

In (2), the word *ixf*, which designates a body part of an animal and, which seems to be considered to be the most noticeable, the ‘head’, is used to refer to the animal as a whole. In a similar way, *tasetta* ‘branch, twig’ in (3) is used to denote a larger entity of which it constitutes a part, i.e. the ‘tree’.

Whole-part relations cover only one category of spatial relations in metonymy. Check the example in (4) for an illustration of the container for content metonymy.

- 4) **Cha. *afrag, afray*** ‘fence’ (W/Y *afarag*; To. *afarağ*; Chl *afrag, ifrig*; Tmz. *afrag, afray, afraj*; Kab. *afrag*, etc.) > **Cha. *afrag, afray*** ‘enclosure, yard’ (cf. Zng/W/Y *afarag* ‘enclosure’; To. *afarağ* ‘enclosure, garden, yard’; Chl *afrag, ifrig* ‘enclosure, sheepfold’; Tmz. *afrag* ‘enclosure, sheepfold’; Kab. *afrag* ‘enclosure, yard bounded by a fence’, etc.).

As it can be noticed, the original meaning for *afrag/afray* is ‘fence’, hence the Berber verb *efreg* ‘to enclose with a fence’, but it is extended here to denote the thing being enclosed within such a fence. It is possible that what triggered this metonymy in the first place is a desire for brevity or economy of expression. Accordingly, to refer to ‘that place surrounded with a fence’ one would say ‘fence’ for short. A related example of container for content metonymy is attested in Classical Arabic (cf. Ar. *ḥā’it* ‘wall, wall of enclosure, etc.’ > ‘garden in general’ or ‘garden surrounded by a wall’).

In metonymies that involve adjacency, the third category of spatial relations, a word that denotes one thing is used to designate another that is adjacent to it. In Tashawit, the illustrations below can be pointed out. In these examples, a word that used to mean a given referent is used to designate a referent adjacent to it.

- 5) **Cha. *tadmert*, pl. *idmaren*** ‘chest’ (To/Chl/Tmz/Rif/Mzb/Kab. *idmaren*; Snd/Ghd. *admer*; Wrg/Nef. *admar*, etc.) > **Cha. *idmaren*** ‘breasts’ (cf. Kab. *idmaren* ‘breast’, Snd/Ghd. *admar* ‘breast, nipple’). Also cf. Ar. *ṣadr* ‘chest, breast’.
- 6) **Cha. *idis*** ‘flank’ (To. *édis*; Mzb/Wrg. *idis*; Kab. *idis*, etc.) > **Cha. *idis*** ‘side’ (cf. To. *édis* ‘side’; Tmz/Mzb/Wrg/Kab. *idis* ‘side’; Ghd. *adis* ‘side’). Also cf. Ar. *janb* ‘flank, side’.
- 7) **Cha. *iri*** ‘neck’ (Mzb/Wrg/Kab. *iri*) > **Cha. *iri*** ‘collar’ (cf. Wrg. *iri* ‘collar’; To. *êri* ‘neck opening’).
- 8) ****timmi*** ‘eyebrow’ (Chl *timiwt*; Tmz. *timiwt, timmi*; Rif/Kab. *timmi*) > **Cha. *timmi*** ‘forehead’ (cf. To. *timme* ‘forehead’, *imme* ‘big forehead’).

Another important subtype of metonymy that needs to be illustrated here is the one concerned with the cause-effect relationship. Below are two examples of this class.

- 9) **Cha. *titt*** ‘eye’ (Zng. *tud*; To/Rif/Gour/Djer/Kab. *titt*; Tmz. *titt*, etc.) > **Cha. *titt*** ‘evil eye’ (cf. Zng. *tud* ‘evil eye’; To. *tehot* ‘evil eye’; Tmz. *titt* ‘evil eye’; Gour/Djer. *titt* ‘evil eye’).

The semantic extension in (9) above is an example of a cause for effect metonymy. Here, instead of using the word denoting an effect of some sort that is believed to be brought about by the gaze of somebody’s *eye*, the word denoting ‘eye’ itself is used to refer to such an evil effect. The metonymic use of ‘eye’ to refer to ‘evil eye’ is also attested in other cultures, in particular oriental ones (cf. Ar. *‘ain* ‘(a strike of an) evil

eye'). In a similar way in (10) below, *anzar* 'rain', the cause, is used to refer to one of its effects, namely 'the water remaining in rocks' after it stops raining.

- 10) **Cha.** *anzar* 'rain' (Chl/Tmz/Rif/Kab/Nef/Ghd. *anzar*; Wrg. *amzar*, etc.) > **Cha.** *anzar* 'water remaining in rocks after rain' (in Tashawit of Ait Frah).

Metonymic extension that involves the reverse relationship, i.e. effect for cause, is also attested in Tashawit. Below is one example of such a type of metonymy.

- 11) **Cha.** *aeaddis* 'belly' (Chl/Tmz. *adis*; Chl/Tmz/Ghd *tadist*; Rif. *aeaddis*, *eaddis*; Mzb. *aeaddis*; Nef. *tiddist*, etc.) > **Cha.** *aeaddis* 'pregnancy' (cf. Tmz. *adis* 'pregnancy, fetus'; Chl/Ghd *tadist* 'pregnant belly'; Wrg. *aeaddis* 'pregnant belly'; Kab. *tadist*, *tidusin* 'pregnant belly, pregnancy, fetus', Nef. *tiddist* 'pregnant belly, pregnancy').

In (11), pregnancy, which is the cause for certain effects and changes in a woman's body during such period, is denoted by resorting to the word used for one of the body parts of the pregnant woman on which such effect can be observed, the belly.

Through metonymy, some objects can be designated by the words used to refer to the materials from which they are made. This is known as the material-object metonymy. In Tashawit, the example below can be pointed out.

- 12) **Cha.** *uzzal* 'iron' (To. *tazuli*; Chl/Tmz/Rif/Mzb/Kab/Sok. *uzzal*; Snd. *uzzel*; Nef. *ezzel*; Ghd. *wezzal*, etc.) > **Cha.** *uzzal* 'blade, razor blade' (cf. To. *tazuli* 'sword, javelin, etc'; Tmz. *uzzal*, *tuzzalt* 'knife', *tuzlin* 'scissors', *uzlan* 'large scissors'). Also cf. Ar. *hadida* 'object or tool made of iron'.

3.3. Synecdoche

Synecdoche is a category-related transfer that involves a relationship of semantic inclusion between a category that is more comprehensive and another that is less comprehensive. When a word that denotes a more comprehensive category is used to refer to a category that is less comprehensive, we talk of a genus for species synecdoche, or specialization. Conversely, when a word that denotes a less comprehensive category is used to refer to a category that is more comprehensive, we talk of a species for genus synecdoche, or generalization. Examples in Tashawit of the former are provided in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 below. The first set of examples produced, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, are instances of semantic broadening, as the original meanings provided for the words in question are still used in Tashawit.

- 1) **Cha.** *argaz*, *aryaz* 'man' (Chl/Wrg/Kab. *argaz*; Tmz/Rif. *argaz*, *aryaz*; Mzb. *arğaz*, etc.) > **Cha.** *argaz*, *aryaz* 'husband' (cf. Tmz/Rif. *argaz*, *aryaz* 'husband'; Mzb. *arğaz* 'husband'; Wrg. *argaz* 'husband', etc.).

- 2) **Cha. *tameṭṭut*** ‘woman’ (To/Ghd. *tameṭ*; W/Y *tamṭeṭ*, *tanṭuṭ*, Tmz. *tameṭṭuṭ*; Nef. *tmaṭṭut*; Rif/Mzb/Wrg/Kab. *tameṭṭut*, etc.) > **Cha. *tameṭṭut*** ‘wife’ (cf. To. *tameṭ* ‘wife’, Tmz. *tameṭṭuṭ* ‘wife’).

The two semantic specializations in (3) and (4) are also attested in other languages (cf. Ar. *rajul* ‘man, husband’/ *imra’a* ‘woman, wife’; Eng. *man* ‘adult male, husband’/ *woman* ‘adult female, wife’; Fr. *homme* ‘man, husband, lover’/ *femme* ‘woman, wife’, etc.).

- 3) **Cha. *laz*** ‘hunger’ (To/Chl/Tmz/Rif/Mzb/Kab/Ghd. *laz*; Mzb/Wrg. *tlazit*, etc.); Rif. *raz* ‘hunger’ > **Cha. *laz*** ‘famine’ (cf. Tmz/Kab. *laz* ‘famine’, Rif. *laz*, *raz* ‘famine’, Wrg. *tlazit* ‘famine’).
- 4) **Cha. *abgas*, *abeggas*** ‘belt’ (To. *taḡbest*; Tmz. *abekkas*; Rif. *abyas*; Mzb. *abecci*; Wrg. *tabeccit*, etc.) > **Cha. *abgas*, *abeggas*** ‘woman’s belt’ (cf. Izn. *abyas* ‘woman’s belt made of fabric or silk’).
- 5) **Cha. *awed*** ‘to arrive, to reach’ (To. *awed*; Tmz/Rif/Mzb/Wrg/Kab. *awed*; Ghd. *awed*; Nef. *awet*, etc.) > **Cha. *awed*** ‘to reach maturity (cereals, vegetables)’ (cf. To. *awed* ‘to reach maturity (cereals, vegetables), to achieve suitable growth (pasture), to reach puberty’; Nef. *awet* ‘to reach maturity’; Kab. *awed* ‘to become/to be mature’; Ghd. *awed* ‘to reach maturity’).

The examples provided in the four examples below are instances of semantic shift because the original meanings seem to have fallen to disuse in Tashawit (The asterisk * is used to indicate that the word involved is not attested with such a meaning in Tashawit, but instead is reconstructed on the basis of comparisons made with other Berber varieties).

- 6) ***Cha. *aḍan*** ‘disease’ (Tmz/Mzb/Wrg/Nef. *aṭṭan*, etc.) > **Cha. *aḍan*** ‘ophthalmia’ (Rif. *aḍan*, *aṭṭan* ‘ophthalmia’).
- 7) ***Cha. *aḍen*** ‘to be ill’ (Chl/Tmz/Mzb/Wrg/Kab. *aḍen*; Nef. *aṭen*; Siw. *uṭn*, etc.) > **Cha. *aḍen*** ‘to have ophthalmia’ (cf. Rif. *aḍen* ‘to have ophthalmia’).
- 8) ***Cha. *aḡeḡḡig*** ‘flower’ (Chl. *ajjig*; Tmz. *alḡig*, *agḡig*, *ayḡig*; Kab. *ajeḡḡig*, etc.) > **Cha. *aḡeḡḡig*** ‘artichoke’s flower’.
- 9) ***Cha. *ajellid* ‘king’** (Chl/Kab. *agellid*; Tmz. *agellid*, *ajellid*; Rif. *ajellid*, *ajeḡḡad*; Mzb/Wrg/Nef. *ajellid*; Ghd. *acellid*, etc.) > **Cha. *ajellid n tizizwa*** ‘queen bee’ (cf. Chl. *agellid n tezzwa* ‘queen bee’; Kab. *agellid n tizizwa* ‘queen bee’).

In Tashawit as in other Berber varieties, and in other languages, instances of semantic generalization seem to be less frequent than semantic specialization (see Nerlich, 2010). Below are some of the examples of semantic generalization that are attested in Tashawit.

- 1) **Cha. *ḡna, ḡni*** ‘to be ill’ (Chl/Tmz/Mzb/Wrg/Kab. *aḡen*; Nef. *aḡen*; Siw. *uḡn*, etc.) > **Cha. *ḡna, ḡni*** ‘to suffer’.
- 2) **Cha. *fuli, falu*** ‘loom thread’ (Rif. *filu, afiru* ‘wool thread’; Izn/Sen. *ifilu* ‘wool thread’) > **Cha. *fuli, falu*** ‘thread’ (cf. Chl. *afulu, ifulu* ‘thread’; Chl/Tmz. *ifili, ifilu* ‘thread’; Rif. *filu, afiru* ‘thread’; Izn/Sen. *ifilu* ‘thread’).
- 3) ****falku*** ‘falcon’ (Beni Salah/Kab. *afalku* ‘falcon’, from Late Latin. *falconem* ‘falcon’) > **Cha. *falku*** ‘bird of prey’ (cf. Kab. *afalku* ‘bird of prey’).
- 4) **Cha. *tallunt*** ‘sieve of skin’ (Tmz. *tallunt* ‘sieve made of small drum with a bottom of skin that is stretched and pierced with small holes’; Wrg. *tallunt* ‘sieve of skin pierced with fine holes’; Ghd. *tallunt* ‘sieve of skin pierced with fine holes’; Kab. *tallunt* ‘sieve made of a skin stretched around a wooden frame and pierced with small holes’) > **Cha. *tallunt*** ‘sieve’ (cf. Chl. *tallunt* ‘sieve’; Tmz. *tallunt* ‘small sieve with a mental bottom’; Snd/Nef. *tallunt* ‘sieve’; Rif. *tagḡunt* ‘sieve’).

Many instances of taxonomical relations do not seem to fit into the two basic categories of synecdoche, i.e. the genus for species synecdoche or the species for genus synecdoche. A number of authors have suggested other classes of taxonomical transfer to cover those hard-to-categorize instances of semantic change. Nysenholc (1981) and, later Nerlich (2010), added the species-for-species class of semantic transfer to the two main types established by many authors. Blank (1999) used the concept of cohyponymic transfer as an independent mechanism of semantic change to cover horizontal shifts in taxonomy, e.g. *mouse* for *rat* (Blank, 1999), Eng. *fir* for Ger. *föhre* ‘pine tree’ (Grzega & Schöner, 2007), etc. Two instances of species-for-species or cohyponymic transfer that are found in Tashawit are given below.

- 1) **Cha. *acḡat, acḡiḡ*** ‘(small) bird’ (To. *égediḡ*; Chl/Tmz/Kab. *agḡiḡ*; Tmz/Rif/Mzb/Wrg. *ajḡiḡ*; Sns. *ajḡeḡ, ajḡeḡ*; Kab. *agḡiḡ*; Snd/Nef. *acḡiḡ*; Ghd. *aḡaḡiḡ*, etc.) > **Cha. *tacḡiḡ*** ‘bat’.
- 2) **Cha. *gider, ijider*** ‘eagle’ (To. *eheder, ejadar* ‘eagle’; Tmz/Kab. *igider* ‘eagle’) > 1) **Cha. *gider, ijider*** ‘vulture’ (cf. Tmz/Kab. *igider* ‘vulture’); 2) **Cha. *gider, ijider*** ‘griffin’.

In the examples provided above, semantic extension seems to be a result of confusion that took place between two species that belong to the same genus.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to present a vivid picture of the importance of semantic change, especially by means of metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche, in broadening the range of different words in Tashawit to adapt to a rich and diverse extralinguistic environment. The paper has revealed that Tashawit is similar to other Berber varieties and other languages in the way it executes the mechanisms of semantic change studied

in order to increase its denotational expressivity to designate the different referents that exist in the settings where it is used. A glance at the instances of semantic changes provided shows how some changes are similar to others attested, not only in other Berber languages but rather, across some other world languages. Some of the tendencies of semantic change that are observed in Tashawit seem to be common to most of the world languages, in particular the fact that semantic generalization is less common compared to semantic specialization. It seems safe to state in this regard that the more two languages are genetically close to one another the more we expect them to have similar instances of semantic change. By the same token, the closer two cultural groups are to one another, the more we expect the languages they speak to share some of the outcomes of semantic change, due to the roles language and culture play in shaping one another and in shaping the way their corresponding speakers/members view the world. Yet, each language is expected to be unique in many aspects of semantic change or, at least, in its outcomes on its semantic system. Some of the examples provided above were shown to be peculiar to Tashawit alone. For a better understanding of semantic change in any language, it is essential to consider the notions involved from the world view of the speakers of such language and their culture, and try not to impose any alien perspective or foreign preconception.

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