

The Russian Eurasian Doctrine and its Geostrategic Dynamics towards Central Asia

العقيدة الأوراسية الروسية وحركياتها الجيوستراتيجية تجاه آسيا الوسطى

Sofiane BOUSSENANE *
University of BLIDA2
bousсенane.sofiane.univ@gmail.com

Date of send:14/11/2023

Date of acceptance:22/04/2024

Date of publication :30/06/2024

Abstract:

This study aims to reveal the geo-strategic dynamics of Russia towards Central Asia Republics, in light of the new Eurasian doctrine driving the ruling elite orientations in this state now. Accordingly, the transformation in pillars of that doctrine to one of the vital spaces in the Eurasian heart can be investigated, as an attempt to restore its regional and global role, while keeping the Euro-Atlantic influence away from this strategically, economically and security key geographic zone.

For the dynamics of that doctrine in Russia's Eurasian space to be explained, the geopolitical approach is employed, which is suitably consistent with the new orientations of Russia, including geo-strategic challenges, mainly the energy security and control of its routes in the Caspian Sea, as one of the geo-economic challenges. Additionally, this approach helps us to explain one of the most significant geo-security challenges of Russian policy towards those republics, to ward off NATO attempts to extend itself to its southern borders, more precisely.

The study concludes, that more importantly, Central Asia is a key to control Russia as a Land Force, a vital geo-strategic actor on the Eurasian Chessboard, under a highly polarized rivalry over those republics, as the atlantic powers are seeking, notably the USA, to prevent the Russian ascension, hinder its capability building, added to containing Russia, starting from its vital spheres, as the Eurasian Russia rejected its marginal status there, rather, it saw itself as a main rival to the west, trying to game geostrategic bets in this vital space of Eurasia.

Keywords:

Russia; Eurasianism; Central Asia; Caspian Sea; Pipelines Wars.

* *Corresponding author*

Introduction

The Russian Federation has outlined its geopolitical doctrine “Eurasianism”, which is related to its strategy towards the Islamic Central Asian region. It includes spatial concepts that guide Russian actions aimed at increasing its presence and influence in the region. This is based on the imposition of an economic, political and security model. The developments and events following the collapse of the former Soviet Union have required Russia to adopt a strategy, that embodies the dimensions of the new Eurasian geopolitical thought. This strategy is represented by the academic circles and the ruling elite in Russia, led by the current president “Vladimir Putin”. It is evident in Russia's foreign policy choices, which are aimed at strengthening its presence through a strategy that is effective in its strategic performance in reality. At the same time, it aims to achieve the desired objectives of strengthening its spatial presence in geographical areas and filling the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially in the Islamic Central Asian region. From the perspective of contemporary Eurasian geopolitics. In addendum the region faces security dilemmas arising from internal and external environmental changes, that have created a new security environment that is at the heart of the Russian Eurasian Security Doctrine's, concerns about countering NATO's expansion towards its southern borders.

1. The research question of the study:

The problem of the study begins with the fact that the interaction of rapid events in the Russian internal environment, and the variables of the regional, and international environment, favoured the emergence of a Eurasian trend on the ruins of the Euro-Atlantic current, whose biased policy towards the Western powers failed to restore Russia's global standing, as the Eurasians imbued with imperial expansionist thought, worked to reshape the approach to Eurasian geopolitics, which is based on drawing the power equation in the Islamic Central Asian region, and its geostrategic interests within the framework of a Russian-Eurasian project in thought and practice, to revive the glory of the ancient Russian Empire.

Accordingly, the research questions are as follows: How did Russia's Eurasian Doctrine manage to influence Central Asia through the geostrategic orientations of the new Russian foreign policy?

Based on this question, we can pose a number of sub-questions:

- 1- What is the significance of Central Asia in the contemporary Eurasian geopolitical approach?
- 2- What are the geo-economic dimensions, and their implications for achieving energy security, and controlling energy sources in the region?
- 3- What are the Russian geo-security arrangements, and their objectives in the Russian strategy towards Central Asia?

2. Study Hypothesis:

According to the research of the study and its sub-questions, the study hypothesis can be raised that: the geo trends of the Russian strategy towards the

Islamic Central Asian region were based on assumptions governed by geo-political, geo-economic and security considerations, in explaining the effectiveness of its influence in the region by focusing on the Eurasian doctrine as a model for its vital fields, and then try to regain its position as an infidel and global power.

3. The study plan:

We have divided the study into three main parts. In the first part, we highlighted the importance of Central Asia in the contemporary Russian Eurasian geopolitical perspective. The second part is devoted to the geo-economic dimensions and their strategic implications for Russian energy security. The third part, deals with Russia's geo-security arrangements and its goals in the region in the light of traditional and non-traditional security dilemmas.

Firstly: The Importance of Central Asia from the New Eurasianism Perspective: Influencing the Eurasian Heartland to Restore Global Status

In the eighteenth century, and particularly from 1813 to 1907, Central Asia was the scene of a strategic competition between Britain and Tsarist Russia, known as the "Great Game". This game began with the British occupation of Afghanistan, with the aim of preventing the Russians from reaching India. In return, Russia sought to use its control of the Central Asian region to counter the British policy of containing its influence there, to continue Russian expansion aimed at reaching the warm waters from Central Asia and the Caucasus¹.

Judging by the spiritual specificity of Russia and its pronounced historical-cultural injustice, as seen by the contemporary Russian geopolitical theorist "ALEXANDER DOUGIN", this country tries to maintain its distinctiveness in the face of the challenges of the West and the traditions of the East, raising the slogan : "neither the East nor the West, but Eurasia", which gives it natural independence and identity, especially since Russia is the geographical axis of history, its geo-strategic interests are inseparable from the countries of Central Asia, which form an important part of this axis known as the heartland. The extension of Russian hegemony over the region is considered the founding, and defining principle of the prospects for the geopolitics of the Russian state, which is firmly rooted in its behaviour based on the expansionist thought of the old imperialism².

As a result of this geopolitical gamble and due to its extremely important geographical and strategic location, Central Asia was considered by Russian policymakers, both in the Tsarist and Soviet eras, as a buffer- zone or a strategic buffer against external threats, since the region was according to the Soviet national security doctrine, located in the southern flank of the former Soviet Union, which had to be protected from any external influences and interference aimed at compromising the sovereignty and security of the Soviets. On this basis, this doctrine determined the options of Soviet decision-makers towards Central Asia, be it through political, economic or military pressure, in order to limit the region's exposure to interference by hostile international forces, and thus preserve Soviet interests, and keep them within the sphere of influence of the central authority in Moscow³.

Historically, Central Asia remained a Soviet zone of influence - geopolitical literature used to refer to it as the "backyard". However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the secession of the five republics from the centre created new challenges as Russian policymakers in the early 1990s found it difficult to deal with the resulting geopolitical vacuum of secession, which led to the decline of the traditional strategic actor in the region, in favour of a highly active international polarisation to dominate and extend its influence over it⁴.

Consequently, the strategic dilemma faced by the Russian Federation in the early stages of its emergence as the successor to the Soviet Union led to conflicting internal perspectives on Russian political orientations and their interactions at the international level.

New intellectual concepts emerged and were adopted by strategic think tanks and decision-makers, placing Russian national security at the top of the agenda in the context of new geopolitical threats. These threats are now posed to the Russian state by the eruption of ethnic and religious conflicts within the independent Central Asian republics. This implies the potential spillover of such conflicts into neighbouring Russian territories, which are already characterised by complex ethnic diversity. Therefore, this spillover may contribute to internal instability in Russia, especially after the formation of new borders, which could create risks and threats and possibly lead to the disintegration of the remaining state in the future⁵.

Building on the previous discussion, the geopolitical situation following the collapse of the Soviet Union has stimulated numerous academic debates and political trends within the Russian Federation regarding the formulation of the concept of Russian influence in the Central Asian region. This concept became evident in the debate that emerged in government circles from 1992 onwards. The first trend, known as the Atlantic or Western-oriented trend, advocated Russia's alignment with the West. On the other hand, the second trend known as Eurasianism or the New Eurasians⁶, opposed Atlanticism and called for Russia to rebuild its relations with its regional environment, especially with the independent republics that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This approach emphasised the need for a stronger external role for Russia, embodying a clear Slavic identity, focusing more on national character, and protecting Russia's interests beyond its borders⁷. Eurasianism argues that Russia's Eurasian orientation is the best option, presenting itself as a renewed imperial behaviour, encompassing geography, ideology, politics, economy, security, culture and history. This option not only offers a less demanding path for Russia to settle on a civilisational identity, but also provides a space where Russians can freely and effectively project the presence of their powerful state, and extensive manoeuvres in the Eurasian vital sphere, including the newly independent republics. Such manoeuvres, allow Russia to occupy a pivotal position in the new international order to participate in its dynamics and to act as a strategic player within its arrangements as a great power⁸.

To regain its dynamic role on the global stage, proponents of Eurasianism have prioritised the geopolitical dimension in Russia's foreign policy. Thus, according to this perspective, Russia's task is to strengthen the centrifugal tendencies towards the centre, and to maintain strategic control over this region

In support of this thesis, "Alexander Dugin", one of the leading representatives of New Eurasianism in Russia and a contemporary geopolitical pioneer, argues that the implementation of Eurasianism thought, and its embodiment in reality as a guiding doctrine of Russian foreign policy will undoubtedly lead to the revival of Russian global influence, and restore the strategic balance with the West, which has been disrupted in favour of the Atlanticist powers led by the United States. Based on this geopolitical vision, "Dugin" advises Russian decision-makers, on the need to adopt the British geopolitical concept of "Mackinder" regarding the geographical axis of history, in which the Russian Federation becomes the heart of the new world, enabling it to control the central landmass of the Eurasian bloc, including the Islamic republics of Central Asia⁹. Thus, according to this perspective Russia's task is to strengthen the centrifugal tendencies towards the centre, and to maintain strategic control over this region, building on a solid foundation derived from the geopolitical traditions of Imperial and Soviet Russia, which always maintained its influence and strategic presence through a flexible, and diverse system of monitoring elements based on a realistic understanding of the Russian leadership, and a clear perception of the concept of the enemy or geopolitical adversary as a key variable in Russia's new geopolitical environment. It is obvious that this adversary is represented by the Atlanticist powers or the West, led by the United States¹⁰.

The geopolitical trend towards Central Asia, which the new Eurasians have incorporated into the expansionist culture of the Russians can be observed. They draw on their historical experience, driven by the dynamics and aspirations of the Russian nation for expansion and civilisational development across the vast territories of Eurasia, including its southern borders. This historical context shows that Russian strategic interests remain intertwined with the countries of this region. The Russians carry a universal message that systematically organises their actions to reconstruct their ancient empire, which encompassed a diverse mix of peoples, cultures and territories. Therefore, the methodical and unlimited expansion to maintain Russian influence in Central Asia is not arbitrary, but an integral part of the historical existence and mentality of the Russians, which carries a civilisational message that is in line with the vast borders of the ancient Russian Empire. The Russians have a universal message that systematically organises their actions to rebuild their ancient empire, which encompassed a diverse mix of peoples, cultures and territories¹¹.

In the same context, one of the Russian geopolitical scholars, "Gomilev Yev" argues, that the Russian people are not limited to the Slavic ethnicity, but is a mixture of races that have given it its distinctiveness. For example, the mixture of Slavic and ethnic Turks justifies the Russian inclination to regain influence over Turkic-populated Islamic Central Asia. The revival of the history of the Tsarist and Soviet

empires in the region must take into account this racial mixture, which shaped the imperial Russian history that determined the direction of Russian foreign policy, the identity and destiny of the state in this vital area¹². This suggests that the Eurasian current has incorporated the concept of identity into its geopolitical thinking as a fundamental variable in this close relationship between nationalist tendencies and Russian expansion in Central Asia throughout the centuries of its imperial history, during which Slavic ethnicities coexisted with various other ethnic groups in the region, be they Turkish, Persian, or others.

Influenced by renewed Eurasian geopolitical thinking, since coming to power “Vladimir Putin”, has focused on rethinking and prioritising his foreign policy towards the Central Asian republics. He has encouraged the growth of Russian national sentiment in response to Western policies and attitudes towards Russia on various issues. This has led the new Russian leadership to work towards restoring Russia's global status, starting from this vital region¹³. Therefore, Putin's rise to power marked a real change in Russia's policy and strategy towards the Islamic Central Asian region, later known as "Putinism" in reference to the new principles adopted by the president in his country's foreign policy. The new Eurasian orientation dominated this approach, as “Putin” made rebuilding relations with the five Islamic republics a top priority. He also focused on redrawing new geopolitical circles relevant to enhancing Russian national security, including an explicit return to the borders of the former Soviet Union, and countering any NATO security arrangements aimed at expanding the West towards Russia's southern borders in Central Asia and the Caucasus¹⁴.

To reinforce this approach, Putin's foreign policy has focused on the need to exert influence in the Asian neighbourhood, which includes the former Soviet space. He recognizes that Russia's global reach spans two continents and that it must therefore act as a Eurasian state in its foreign policy, with the starting point being the exercise of Russian influence in its immediate neighbourhood¹⁵. One of the prominent features that underlined the importance of Central Asia in Putin's policy was his explicit recognition, during a meeting of the Russian Security Council in April 2000, that the region is subject to international competition and that Russia must compete to secure its multidimensional interests there. In line with this vision, “Viktor Kalyuzhny” the President's special envoy for Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, confirmed at the same meeting that Russia had officially adopted a comprehensive decision outlining its foreign policy towards the two regions. This decision emphasises the strategic importance of Central Asia in this policy at all levels, with Russian national security at the forefront¹⁶.

In general, Russian foreign policy towards Central Asia under Putin reflects an understanding of Russian geopolitical thinking that is largely consistent with the previous Soviet approach. Both fall under the strategy of expansion through the vital sphere based on regional dynamics, which means extending influence to the immediate neighbourhood as a Russian attempt to regain its global influence. In the

same context, “Lutz Kleveman” argues, that the geopolitics of the Russian Federation, as well as that of Tsarist and Soviet Russia, are interconnected as Russia is considered the heart of the country due to its strategic geographical location. As such, its fate is tied to its control of its immediate neighbourhood. Despite the post-cold war transformations, Russia has consistently sought to reshape the camp under its leadership from a geopolitical point of view, as it is necessary to assert its presence as a pivotal state in international relations, based on this environment which is part of the Eurasian heartland, and represents a strategic interest that cannot be relinquished¹⁷.

Secondly: the geo-economic dimensions in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea: Energy Security and Economic Integration through the Eurasian Economic Union

1. Energy Security: The Russian Three-Dimensional Strategy

Energy security is an important part of Russia's policy towards Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region. Despite conflicting figures on the region's energy resources, it is clear that the area is rich in attractive oil and gas reserves. These reserves have become the primary target of Russia's strategy to ensure its leading role in the exploitation and exploration of the region's resources. The first step is to control energy exports, especially Kazakh oil which Russia sees as a vital component in the larger Eurasian game, where the struggle for energy dominance among the great powers revolves around the concept of energy security.

To ensure its energy security, the Russian Federation is working towards a three-dimensional strategic equation. The first dimension is the control of energy resources in the Caspian Sea, in particular the reserves of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, together with Russia, Iran and the Islamic Republic of Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus. The aim is to secure the flow of oil and gas at low prices. The second step in Russia's energy security equation for the region is to establish links, and routes for energy sources linking the Caspian Sea and the Central Asian republics through Russian territory, to control the transport of these resources to international markets. Russian leaders are aware that some global powers, particularly the United States oppose Russia's energy supply policy through the Caspian Sea. This has led to intense competition over transport routes, known as the “pipeline war”.

The third dimension of Russia's strategy towards the region involves expanding opportunities for Russian oil and gas companies with both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The aim is to ensure the flow of energy resources to Russia at low prices and to enable Russian giants to enjoy privileges amid international competition among major multinational energy companies for exploration and export monopolies in key oil and gas regions, including the Central Asian republics and the Caspian Sea.

1.1. control of energy sources in the Caspian sea

The Russian economy is heavily dependent on oil and gas exports, which account for 55% of the country's foreign exchange earnings, and 40% of its gross domestic product (GDP). This has placed energy resources at the forefront of Russian

foreign policy. Russia is working to increase oil and gas production and maintain control over its marketing processes to regain its regional and global role. Russia also has the world's largest natural gas reserves and is the world's second largest oil producer¹⁸, it ranks eighth in terms of global oil reserves¹⁹. Russia's cold climate also makes it the world's largest consumer of hydrocarbons. In addition, Russia has a large fleet of oil and gas tankers, making it a world leader in this field. The emergence of Russia as a major economic power, particularly in the energy sector, has had a significant impact on its acceptance into the Group of Seven (G7) major industrialized nations in 2002²⁰.

In the context of Russia's internal reconstruction, the focus on the energy dimension of its foreign policy towards the Central Asian republics became inevitable, especially after Putin assumed the presidency. The region's energy resources were one of the cards the Russian leadership, played to regain its traditional influence in this vital area allowing Russia to become a major player in the global energy market. This period witnessed the emergence of the concept of great powers in the energy sector, and a formal discourse adopted by Russian politicians promoted the idea that Russia had become a great power because of its control over energy sources in the region²¹. Control over the oil and gas of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, has become the subject of geo-economic calculations aimed at securing the necessary energy reserves for Russia's economic development. This is particularly important given that the region accounts for about 6% of global oil reserves and 35% of natural gas reserves. This requires Russian policymakers to find more effective means to secure energy fields in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, and thus to strengthen the Russian economy through an influential energy policy that enhances the regional, and global role of the Russian Federation²².

Based on the information provided, it can be seen that Russia's attempts to control energy sources in the Caspian Sea are not driven solely by internal economic considerations. Russian planning aims to turn this region into a major platform or global centre that controls the distribution of oil and gas, in such a way as to create a permanent energy dependency of the Central Asian republics on the Russian centre. Russia is therefore concerned about the emergence of a new oil and gas region, that will reduce the dependence of many countries, including Europe on Russian energy sources. Therefore, it can be said that Russia's perspective of controlling the energy resources of this region serves other purposes beyond mere economic calculations. It is aimed at meeting a number of challenges facing Russia, including attempts to undermine Western and American plans to isolate, and encircle it regionally and globally, and to keep it out of various regional blocs, and projects in an attempt to marginalize its role as a key state in the Eurasian assembly. Thus, strategic planning circles in Russia have used the energy card in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to become a manifestation of power in its foreign policy.

As a manifestation of this geo-economic gamble, Russia's energy strategy implemented in 2003, focused on the internal and external risks facing the Russian

energy market. Given the market's exposure to geopolitical risks, it attached the utmost importance to protecting its economy from these threats. This led to the development of Russia's National Security Strategy for 2009-2020, which focused on potential energy-related international conflicts near Russia's borders, and those of its allies. This strategy also emphasized the importance of this strategic sector in international politics, pointing out that the decline in global oil and gas reserves would be a decisive factor in increasing international conflicts. In addition, the strategy anticipated significant international competition for energy resources in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea²³.

In 2010, the Russian government adopted the Energy Strategy for 2030, which outlined the geopolitical and economic goals for the Russian energy market, positioning it as one of the world's key centers for hydrocarbons. The strategy also predicted that Russia would become the main source of oil and gas for Central and Western Europe over the next two decades²⁴.

It is clear from the above, that Russia's energy strategy is primarily aimed at strengthening its grip on the energy resources of neighbouring regions. Geo-economic considerations play a significant role in the importance of this neighbourhood, especially in Russia's escalating competition with the West Atlantic powers in the oil and gas sector. Control of these vital resources in the region would reduce the growing dominance of external global powers, led by the United States, in energy investment and production in the Asian part of Russia. It also enhances Russia's opportunities for geo-economic energy superiority in this vital area.

1.2. Controlling energy corridors and transporting energy from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea to global markets

Russian strategic planners understand that those who control energy transport pipelines hold the key to regulating or stopping these resources as a strategic weapon in international politics and power struggles. Thus, these pipelines become a political bargaining chip that can be used to manipulate major energy-producing countries. Furthermore, these routes serve as financial keys, that help to blackmail both producing and consuming nations. By monopolizing the pumping of energy resources through Russian pipelines as it wishes, Russia becomes the sole decision-maker in determining the quantities of oil and gas that can flow to global markets. As one of the largest energy producers, Russia will not hesitate to reduce energy exports when it sees it in its interest to increase production²⁵.

On the other hand, Russia's insistence on maintaining, and activating the transport networks inherited from the Soviet Union to transport oil and gas from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to the outside world stems from a firm conviction to enhance its international standing. It was natural for Russia to invest in its geographical position, because of the opportunities it offered to break out of the international isolation imposed on it after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.

Therefore, Russia's determination to hold on to the transport networks inherited from the Soviet Union and to activate them for the purpose of transporting oil and gas from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to the outside world is driven by a firm conviction to regain its natural position as a pivotal state in the Eurasian region. This is particularly important as Western projects and policies are emerging to link Asia and Europe through a network of transport lines, with the aim of controlling energy resources in the Caspian Sea.

One of the most important projects in this regard is the 1993 European Transport Corridor project, which links independent states to international markets without passing through Russian territory. The route starts from the Black Sea and Ukraine, passes through Georgia and Azerbaijan, crosses the Caspian Sea, reaches Turkmenistan and then extends to the other Central Asian republics. This project provides these countries with realistic alternatives to the Russian transport network for exporting energy to different regions of the world via multiple routes²⁶.

In addition, Russia faces a US-Turkish project known as the "BTC" (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline, which was activated in 2005 following a 1994 deal between the United States and Azerbaijan. The deal allowed Western and American companies to exploit Azerbaijan's oil for 30 years, with a financial value of \$8 billion. The pipeline starts in Baku the capital of Azerbaijan, passes through Tbilisi the capital of Georgia, and reaches the Mediterranean Sea via the Turkish port of Ceyhan. It has the capacity to transport up to one million barrels of Caspian oil per day. Moreover, Kazakh oil will be transported along the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea via Azerbaijan, with a capacity of 16,000 barrels per day²⁷.

This US-Turkish project is a clear challenge to the Russian Federation as a Western-American attempt to isolate it from energy transport projects in the region. Therefore, Russia's main strategic objective is to respond to any Western attempt to establish alternative transport routes by building the "Tengiz-Novorossiysk" pipeline, in addition to a bypass pipeline in Chechnya. This would increase Russia's ability to export oil from Azerbaijan and Central Asia from 400,000 barrels to 2.24 million barrels per day, and all the oil transported through Russian oil pipelines would reach ports on the Black Sea²⁸.

Natural gas exports from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, in particular from Turkmenistan, are transported through the pipeline system of the Russian company "GAZPROM". This system consists of eight lines that act as a network to transport this vital resource from Turkmenistan to the markets of the Caucasus, and Central and Western Europe²⁹. This global giant has been granted a monopoly by the Russian government to transport gas from the region to these markets. This monopoly has left Western companies with no alternative as gas from the region is sold to the same Russian company, at prices that are around \$20 to \$30 per thousand cubic metres below the market price³⁰.

Based on the above, the following are some of the objectives that the Russian Federation seeks to achieve in the energy sector in the region, through its control of international transport routes³¹ :

-The support of the Russian energy industry in the private sector for the development of oil and gas.

-To control the private activities of Western competitors, especially American activities aimed at building alternative pipelines for transporting energy resources from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia through the territories of strategic allies, especially Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

-Achieving maximum financial returns for the development of the Russian oil industry, in addition to gaining control over oil exports from this region.

It is clear from the above, that Russia's goal of reasserting its dominance in the Greater Central Asia region allows it to implement its strategy of controlling Eurasian energy security. This strategy is primarily based on opposing all Atlantic-Western projects, that also aim to control the oil and gas resources of this Eurasian region, which is witnessing a great game of intense Russian-Western international competition for energy transport routes from the region to the global markets. This competition, known in energy geopolitics literature as the "pipeline war", is at the heart of international power politics, and conflicts of economic interests aimed at establishing the power, influence, and global status of competing great powers in vital areas rich in energy resources.

1.3. Strengthening the influence of Russian energy companies and supporting their investment privileges in the region

If the most important dimension of Russia's strategy towards Central Asia is to counter the presence of foreign powers in the region, and to ensure the flow of oil and gas to European and global markets on Russian terms, then the most profound gamble of this strategy is the quest by Russian energy companies to gain significant positions in the fields of exploration, production, refining, distribution, and transportation of oil and gas in the region. Some Russian companies, such as "Gazprom" for natural gas, and "Lukoil" for oil have followed in the footsteps of Western energy companies, that entered Central Asia and the Caspian Sea immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union³².

On this basis, Russia has demanded that its companies have the lion's share of the privileges, granted to other global companies and major financial unions overseeing investment operations, in various energy projects in the region. It is using its dominance of the network of pipelines that transport these resources to global markets to achieve this goal³³.

From a practical perspective, "Gazprom", "Lukoil", "YOKOS", and other Russian companies have begun to compete with many Western companies in the energy investment sector in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. This was made possible by the establishment of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium in 2003, which enabled the transport of the region's oil to the Russian port of "Novorossiysk" on the

Black Sea. This project coincided with a statement by Russian President Putin emphasizing, that the Caspian Sea was a vital area of interest for Russia. As a result, Russian companies have been able to strengthen their role and gain greater privileges in the region. Many Western companies have been replaced by Russian companies, which have been able to secure long-term preferential agreements, particularly in monopolising the export of crude oil, and natural gas from the Central Asian republics and the Caspian Sea region³⁴.

As part of Russia's energy strategy, "Lukoil" the largest and most dynamic oil investment company in Russia, participated in several oil deals in the Caspian Sea. It acquired a 12.5% stake in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium to exploit and develop the "Karabakh" oil fields, whose reserves are estimated at between 68 and 150 billion tonnes. This positioned the company among the major oil companies contributing to the Caspian oil industry, making it the fourth largest oil producer in the world with reserves of two billion tonnes³⁵. It has also secured at least seven oil and gas projects, and three other offshore exploration projects in a part of Kazakhstan bordering the Caspian Sea. It benefits from a 40 per cent share of Kazakhstan's proven oil reserves, which account for 90 per cent of its oil projects, and over 40 per cent of its natural gas³⁶. "Lukoil" has also established a presence in the Republic of Uzbekistan, by signing a contract in 2004 with the "Ozbakanfata Gas" Company, for the exploration and exploitation of the "Kandy-Shady", and "Khanzak" fields for a period of 35 years. The estimated reserves of these fields are 28 billion cubic meters. The company has also invested one billion dollars in the construction of a gas plant in the same republic. In the oil sector, alone "Lukoil" has invested over \$400 million in Uzbekistan, and is expected to invest \$1.5 billion in the future by signing a production-sharing agreement³⁷.

The Russian authorities have also allowed «Gazprom» to monopolize the natural gas market in the Central Asian republics. In 2002, this company signed an agreement with Uzbekistan, in which Russia promised to buy 10 billion cubic meters of gas a year from Uzbekistan until 2012. After that, Gazprom signed in 2004 another agreement, to develop the exploitation of Uzbek gas in the "Ustyurt plateau". At the end of 2005, a memorandum of understanding was signed on Uzbek gas production for a period of 25 years³⁸.

Regarding Gazprom's influence in Turkmenistan, known for its significant global natural gas reserves, the Russian government signed an agreement in 2006, activated in 2007 for the export of gas from Turkmenistan over a period of 25 years. Through this agreement, Gazprom acquired the majority of Turkmenistan's gas, which reached 80 billion cubic meters in 2002³⁹.

Based on the data presented, which show the considerable privileges enjoyed by Russian energy companies, and their involvement in massive projects in the Central Asian republics and the Caspian Sea, it is clear that their policy of maintaining these advantages is primarily linked to the intervention of the Russian state in the energy sector. This is a government strategy aimed at creating the Eurasian Integration Zone,

or the so-called Eurasian Gas Alliance, proposed by Russian President “Putin” in January 2002. This project brings together producers in Central Asia with an integrated system for exporting and transporting energy from the region to international markets through Russian territory⁴⁰.

2. Economic bloc with the Central Asian Republics through the Eurasian Economic Community

The inability of the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC), established in 1994 to integrate effectively with the countries of the region, led to the first step of merging these republics into the Eurasian Cooperation Organization in 2000, which included Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Belarus⁴¹. This is a regional economic organization, that establishes common external customs borders and formulates unified economic policies, customs tariffs, prices and other components of the common market. The founding treaty of this organization emphasizes the need for effective, and close trade and economic cooperation among its members to achieve the objectives related to the customs union and the single economic space⁴². This group also seeks to eliminate restrictions on trade between member states, liberalize exchange rates, unify financial policies, and coordinate overall economic, and customs policies. By achieving these goals within the organization, it is expected that integration in the Central Asian region will become an effective cross-continental link, similar to the European Union⁴³. This is particularly significant given that the Eurasian Economic Union has the potential to influence the global economy, as it controls 20% of the world's gas reserves, 14.6% of the world's oil reserves, 9% of the world's electricity generation capacity, and 9% of the world's coal reserves⁴⁴.

With the accession of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the Eurasian Economic Union in 2006, the organization gained new momentum. For the Russians, this was a significant gain as it brought in a key state in the Central Asian region. Uzbekistan is known for its permanent alliance with the opposite pole of Russia, having previously been a member of the economic grouping, which also included Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Uzbekistan's withdrawal from this group and its integration into the Eurasian Union led by the Russian Federation, has increased opportunities for economic integration in the region. This counteracted an economic blockade led by the United States, as its allies were unable to end Russian presence and influence in Central Asia. The Russian leadership's ability to effectively use this regional organization, which was further strengthened by the inclusion of Uzbekistan as the fourth republic in the region, was aimed at integrating the economies of these republics into the Russian economic system. The Russian leadership's ability to effectively use this organization was further strengthened by the inclusion of Uzbekistan as the fourth republic in the region⁴⁵.

To activate the process of economic integration in Central Asia, the member states of the Eurasian Union have created a number of structures, including the Eurasian Development Bank which was established in 2006 by Russia, and

Kazakhstan with an initial capital of \$5.1 billion, which is exempt from all taxes. It provides concessional loans, and its main tasks, include financing investment projects of the Eurasian Economic Union member states and providing technical assistance for projects with an integration impact. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan from Central Asia, as well as Belarus and Armenia joined the bank between 2009 and 2011, contributing significant capital. Plus, the Eurasian Economic Union Business Council was established in 2008 as a non-profit organization, to engage the business community in the integration process of the union. The Council includes several banks, institutions and companies from the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union.

Add to this, a court was established in 2012, with functions focused on the development, and improvement of the Union's judicial system, and the settlement of international disputes within its free trade area, and customs union. In connection with these structures, the Eurasian Economic Union under the leadership of the Russian Federation, has established a high-tech centre responsible for providing and implementing scientific, technological, and innovative programmes, and projects with high efficiency, as well as using the available expertise of the member states to develop high technologies. Furthermore, infrastructure has been developed and a unified transport area is being created by starting the construction of three international transport corridors reaching Western Europe, and Western China. Additionally, 108 investment projects for the development of transport infrastructure were implemented in 2015 and a network of logistics service centers was created with a total of eight centers, based on a unified information system for customs clearance, which was put into operation in 2012 as part of the implementation of the tripartite program, for the creation of a unified information system for monitoring the movement of goods, between the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union⁴⁶.

Thirdly: Central Asia in Russian security doctrine: Regional security arrangement, the deployment of military bases, and the containment of armed Islamic movements

The Russian Federation views Central Asia as a region that harbours new security threats, due to its geopolitical, and political situation in the post-independence period. This has created an environment of intertwined disturbances involving both internal and external elements. Factors such as social, and economic fragility, lack of development, administrative and financial corruption, poverty, and religious extremism have contributed to the complex ethnic, and racial composition of these republics, often leading to internal instability, and more importantly, the potential for external spillover due to the interlocking nature of Central Asia's geography, particularly with regard to cross-border ethnic, and racial conflicts that have arisen as a result of the geographical nature of the region's territories inhabited by different nationalities, and ethnic groups⁴⁷. As well as, the problem of drug trafficking from Afghanistan to these republics, and the organized crime associated with it cannot be ignored. Moreover, the consequences of border conflicts have had an impact on regional security, including the flow of refugees, and illegal migration

from this region to Russia, further the growing armed activities of Islamic movements calling for jihad, especially after the US war on so-called international terrorism in Afghanistan, which necessitated the establishment of American military bases in the region⁴⁸.

External factors also, play a role in destabilizing regional security in Central Asia, in particular the penetration of certain foreign powers into the region. Russian policymakers view Central Asia as a geographic area that is central to their security doctrine, and essential to their national security, which is based on preventing any expansion or encroachment of Euro-Atlantic powers into Russia's backyard.

Therefore, Russian strategic planning circles have been working on three main objectives in light of the new security environment threats to the region, which are directly related to Russian national security. The first objective begins with collective security arrangements to counter regional risks. The second one is to prevent Atlantic expansion towards its borders. The third objective involves the deployment of military bases in the region and the containment of the activities of armed Islamic movements, which are very active in most of the Central Asian republics.

1. Regional security arrangements to prevent Atlantic expansion towards Russian borders

Russian decision-makers recognize that the lack of a security umbrella for the Central Asian republics will exacerbate the imbalance in their security situation, especially given the imbalance between capabilities, and challenges. Traditional, and non-traditional threats are outpacing the resources available to deal with them, turning these challenges into chronic problems that challenge the region's borders, and allow for external intervention, posing a clear danger to Russia's national security. Therefore, Russia has been keen to reintegrate its security and the security of the Central Asian republics into a unified system within the framework of the Collective Security Organization.

In 1992, Russia signed a collective security agreement in "Tashkent" the capital of Uzbekistan, with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia from the South Caucasus. Article 1 of the treaty prohibits the signatories from entering into military alliances and emphasizes the collective responsibility of these states to jointly protect their common borders. Furthermore, numerous bilateral agreements have been signed between these republics and the Russian Federation within this framework⁴⁹.

As a manifestation of the agreements aimed at strengthening its institutional security relations with the Commonwealth countries, Russia established the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) under the "Kishinev Charter" in 2002. It includes Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan from Central Asia, as well as Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Armenia⁵⁰. By creating this organization, Russia sought to revive the spirit of the previous Collective Security Treaty to regain the military influence it had lost in the region.

At the same summit where the CSTO was established, Russian President “Putin” urged his partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to strengthen this framework and adapt it to security threats. In 2006, the creation of a joint rapid reaction force was agreed upon, along with the principle of collective protection, and collective response to any aggression against member states of the organization, similar to the practices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ⁵¹.

In 2007, the leaders of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) signed a protocol, establishing a mechanism for providing military assistance in the event of potential aggression. This was followed in 2008 by the organization’s military exercises in Armenia, which were supervised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and included the three military levels : strategic, operational and tactical⁵².

It is clear from the above, that Russia has sought to achieve so-called collective security in the region, having realized that these republics are not in a position to sever their military ties with the Russian Federation, which still possesses significant military capabilities that allow it to play a dominant role in the security dynamics of the region.

For reasons related to Russian national security, Russia recognized the need to integrate its security with that of the countries in the region. In 2000, Putin's vision of Russian foreign policy emphasised the importance of strengthening security integration in the region. In general, Russia's geo-security gamble through these military-security arrangements is primarily aimed at bringing the Central Asian republics under its security umbrella. This goal is linked to the Russian national security doctrine towards the region, which was established in 2002, following a presidential decree that explicitly recognised the importance of these republics in the main directions of Russian security, and military policy. The doctrine also focused on various challenges to Russian national security, including the international geopolitical situation with regard to Western powers, especially the United States, seeking to limit Russian influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as NATO's attempts to intervene in vital areas directly related to the security, and sovereignty of the Russian Federation⁵³.

2. Spreading Russian military bases in Central Asia and containing armed Islamic movements

Russia has successfully exploited the internal conflicts in the Central Asian republics. It played a supervisory role in brokering a ceasefire agreement that ended the civil war in Tajikistan since 1999. This allowed Russia to replace the forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with Russian troops, whose main task became to conduct regular patrols to protect Tajikistan's borders, particularly the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border⁵⁴.

In parallel with the events of 11 September 2001, and as part of the Russian-American strategic polarisation aimed at militarising the region, under the pretext of combating international terrorism in neighbouring Afghanistan, the United States was

granted a direct military presence on the territory of the Central Asian republics. This development further convinced Russian policymakers of the need to establish military bases in the region. As a result, the Rapid Deployment Forces were formed in 2001 with a total strength of 1,500 troops, while an armoured infantry division of 10,000 was maintained in central Tajikistan. Plus, 15,000 troops were deployed to secure the border between Tajikistan, and Afghanistan, adding to Russian military garrisons of 800 to 1,500 troops each were established in both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to secure Russia's southern borders⁵⁵.

In 2003, the Russian military base “Kant” in Kyrgyzstan was officially opened. This base serves as the headquarters for the Joint Rapid Deployment Forces of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). It hosts around 500 Russian troops, as well as Russian fighter jets and transport aircraft. The aim of its mission is to provide air support for the operations of the Rapid Reaction Force under the auspices of the CSTO⁵⁶.

Additionally, a bilateral agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan was signed at the end of 2003, allowing Russian military aircraft to land at this military base to track armed Islamic movements in Central Asia. This allowed Russia to support its military presence in the region. The same base also hosts an intensive direct presence of Russian military forces on the ground and in the air. Moreover, two military bases have been established to guide nuclear submarines; and a station has been set up to receive information from Russian military satellites to guide its ballistic missiles. In 2006, Russia deployed modified Sukhoi-27 bombers to this base, capable of flying all day in all weather conditions and attacking targets⁵⁷.

In late 2004, Russia announced the opening of a permanent military “Dushanbe” base in Tajikistan. This is one of the largest Russian military bases outside its national borders and includes several sites, such as the “Eini Air Centre”, and the “OKNO Space Surveillance Centre”, located near the Chinese border. There are also a number of facilities in the “Kulob” region, Russia's extensive military presence in this republic is linked to a reduction in its estimated debt of \$242 million and the deployment of 700 Russian military personnel in the form of three battalions near this base.

As well as, an agreement was signed between Tajikistan and Russia in 2012, guaranteeing Russian forces landing rights until 2024. The Russians use the base to support their ground forces in the fight against terrorism and to improve the mobility of their rapid reaction forces. These factors prompted Russian President “Putin”, to make a speech at the inauguration of the military base, in which he indicated the superiority of Russian military interests in Central Asia over the presence of the American military in the region. He regarded this presence as a contingent matter related to the international war on terrorism while emphasising the permanence of Russian military bases as an effective tool for maintaining Russian influence in Islamic Central Asia⁵⁸.

It is obvious, that Russia's commitment to deploying its military bases in Central Asia and using them to contain the activities of armed Islamic movements in the region, was not isolated from its geostrategic and security vision, which is based on its concerns about the American military presence in these republics. Consequently, Russia expressed its willingness to participate in a Russian-American partnership to combat international terrorism in the region, subject to certain conditions. Russia has defined its objectives for this partnership as follows :⁵⁹

- Recognition by the United States that Central Asia is a sphere of Russian influence.

- A halt to NATO's expansion towards Russia's borders.

- Inclusion of the Russian war in Chechnya in the international war on terrorism.

- To open financial credits from the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.

- Reconsidering the US administration's position on the anti-missile defence initiative, and cancelling the relevant agreements with the Soviet Union.

The most striking observation from these conditions is that Russia's participation in the international war on terrorism alongside the United States is not a sudden change in Russia's position, or a concession indicating Russian-American cooperation instead of their competition in Eurasia. Rather, it is strategic planning based on precise calculations that include two important dimensions : The first dimension is that Russian counter-terrorism efforts are driven by security interests. Russia feels threatened by the growing activities of Islamic jihadist movements near its southern borders in Central Asia, which could lead to terrorist activities inside Russia. The second dimension relates to Russia's objective behind its participation in this war, which is an attempt to force the West to reject armed opposition movements in Russian politics towards the Chechen Republic. Consequently, Russia wants to classify these movements as international terrorist organizations, that must be eradicated to gain international legitimacy for its war in Chechnya. Alternatively, Russia hopes that the United States and Western European countries will refrain from criticising Russian human rights violations in Chechnya, using the pretext of alleged links between Chechen armed groups, and militant Islamic movements in Central Asia that seek to sow chaos and destabilise the region.

Despite the military-security partnership between Russia and the United States in the fight against international terrorism in the region, a lack of trust has prevailed amid the intense polarisation over Central Asia. This has led the Russian Federation to integrate these republics into the "Shanghai Cooperation Organisation" (SCO), since its establishment under Chinese-Russian sponsorship in 2001. The declared aims of the SCO, which coincided with the US war on international terrorism, made it clear that it was a security-oriented organisation. It became a tool in the hands of the Russian Federation to shape the security situation in the region, away from Western and American influences, especially in countering transnational security threats, primarily the militant Islamic organisations active in Central Asia.

This Russian approach was expressed at the 2006 SCO summit in “Bishkek” the capital of Kyrgyzstan. The summit announced a significant shift in the SCO's functions and objectives, focusing on the failure of the United States and NATO to manage security crises in Central Asia. The same statement indicated that the SCO had become parallel to NATO, implying the possibility of its future transformation from a regional organisation with specific objectives, into a military alliance in which Russia plays an active role. Such an alliance would be driven by geo-security calculations far removed from US-Atlantic influence and its military expansion in the heart of the Eurasian region.

Conclusion

Based on our presentation, we can conclude that the Eurasian Doctrine as a geopolitical concept or practice through which the Russian Federation, led by the current ruling elite, has been influenced, and adopted this doctrine has operated in its behaviour towards Central Asia. It has worked to achieve geostrategic goals, aimed at restoring Russia's international status in light of its internal regional and international environment. These objectives can be summarised as follows :

-Geographically, Central Asia is considered part of the Eurasian heartland in Russian Eurasian geopolitical thinking. This allows the Russian Federation, as a land power to be an active player in the great chess game, since global dominance begins with the recapture of vital spaces on the Eurasian continent. This is reflected in the statement of the British geopolitical theorist “Mackinder”: "Whoever rules Eastern Europe will rule the Heartland will rule the World Island, and whoever rules the World Island will rule the world". This thesis is echoed in contemporary Eurasian geopolitical thinking by “Alexander Dugin”, who emphasises that Central Asia is one of the vital spaces within the heartland that Russia needs to reclaim, especially in the face of competition from maritime powers seeking to penetrate the region, primarily the United States. Control of the region is therefore seen in the Eurasian Doctrine as a key to global dominance.

-Central Asia, especially the republics bordering the Caspian Sea is of great importance, which Eurasian Russia is attempting to formulate a multidimensional geo-economic strategy, that falls within the framework of energy security challenges. This strategy revolves around three main elements : the control of energy resources, the domination of the transport routes of these resources through Russian territories, and the management of the dynamic international competition known as the "pipeline war". This is Russia's attempt to use these routes geopolitically in its conflict with the West, to assert its international position and to break the isolation imposed on it in the early 1990s.

Add to this, Russia is using its energy companies as a tool to control and exploit energy resources in the region. This is done to maintain control over energy exports or using energy as a strategic weapon against Western policies that challenge Russian interests in the region, especially in the context of Russia's Eurasianism global orientation.

-The Eurasian perspective has shaped Russian security doctrine and has played a crucial role in Russia's strategy towards Central Asia. Russia considers the region as part of its national security, addressing both traditional and non-traditional security threats. This has forced the Russian Federation to develop regional security arrangements in line with its internal and external environment. The Russians have recognised that the success of these arrangements, whether in countering hard threats or international terrorism, lies at the heart of their integrated geo-security vision. The primary objective of this vision is to contain Western military penetration into the region and prevent NATO expansion towards its southern borders. This has become particularly important following the establishment of American military bases directly in the region, under the pretext of fighting international terrorism in neighbouring Afghanistan. In response, Russia has been forced to deploy similar military bases and bring the Central Asian republics under its security umbrella. It has done so through Russian mechanisms that are independent of any American, or NATO influence. These include their inclusion in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

Margins:

1. Ahmad Rashid Taliban, *Islam, Oil, and the Great Game in Central Asia*, translated by Nidal Baghdadi, Damascus: Dar Al-Ra'i for Studies, Translation, and Publishing, 2001, p. 229.
2. Alexander Dugin, *Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia*, translated by Emad Hatem, Tripoli: Dar Al-Kitab Al-Jadida Al-Mutahida, 1st edition, 2004, pp. 231-233.
3. Andrei Kortunov, *Russia and Central Asia: Evolution of Mutual Perceptions and Interdependence*, Moscow Science Foundation, Rice University, Moscow, April 1998, p. 05.
4. Lazhar Wannasi, *American Strategy in Central Asia and its Regional Implications after September 11, 2001*, Master's Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Batna, 2008-2009, pp. 97-98.
5. Lazhar Wannasi, *Strategic Interactions in Central Asia: A Study of the Relations between the Power Triangle: United States, China, Russia*, Ph.D. Dissertation, specializing in International Relations and Strategic Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Batna, 2013-2014, pp. 211-212.
6. Madin Wajih, *Russia's Federal Policy in Central Asia after the End of the Cold War*, Master's Thesis, Department of Political Science, Damascus University, 2010, pp. 15-16.
7. Virthaza Yarmarth, *Zulmi Khalil Zad, Russia, Strategic Assessment: Translated Studies (05)*, Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1st edition, 1997, p. 108.
8. Diyari Saleh Majid, *International Competition for Oil Pipeline Routes from the Caspian Sea: A Study in Political Geography*, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1st edition, 2010, p. 65.
9. Lazhar Wannasi, *Strategic Interactions in Central Asia: A Study of the Relations between the Power Triangle: United States, China, Russia*, Op.Cit, pp. 217-218.
10. Ali Lirari, *Oil and Security Stakes in Central Asia*, Master's Thesis, Faculty of Political Science, University of Algiers 03, 2008-2009, p. 99.
11. Alexander Dugin, Op.Cit, pp. 232-233.

12. Adel Abbassi, Russian Policy Towards the Independent Islamic Republics: Opportunities and Constraints, Master's Thesis, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Political Science, University of Algiers 03, 2007, pp. 21-22.
13. Talib Hussein Hafiz, New Variables in Russia's Federal Policy towards the Central Asian and Caucasus Regions, Journal of Education College, Volume 23 (02), 2012, p. 439.
14. Lazhar Wannasi, "Strategic Interactions in Central Asia: A Study of the Relations among the Power Triangle: the United States of America, China, Russia," Op.Cit, pp. 209-211.
15. Adel Abbassi, Op.,Cit, pp. 32-33.
16. Diyari Saleh Majid, Op.,Cit, p. 68.
17. Adel Abbassi, Op.,Cit, pp. 25-26.
18. Ibid., p. 152.
19. Khadbaajah 'Arifah Muhammad, "Energy Security and its Strategic Implications," Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 1st edition, 2014, p. 174.
20. Norhan Al-Sheikh, "Russian Energy Policy and Its Impact on Global Strategic Balance," The International Journal of Future and Strategic Studies, 1st edition, 2009, p. 12.
21. Khadbaajah 'Arifah Muhammad, Op.,Cit, pp. 188-189.
22. Harith Qahtan Abdullah, Muthana Fa'iq Mur'i, "The Importance of the Caspian Sea in Russian-Iranian Relations," Al-Farahidi Journal of Humanities, Issue 19, March 2014, p. 279.
23. Khadbaajah 'Arifah Muhammad, Op.,Cit, pp. 198-199.
24. Ibid., p. 199.
25. Hamid Hamad Al-Sa'adoon, "International Competition in the Caucasus Region and the Possibilities of US-Russian Confrontation," Baghdad, 2013, p. 21.
26. Christoph Romer, "Geopolitics of Russia," Paris: Economia, 1999, p. 60.
27. André Pertuzio, "Central Asia: Energy Pole," No. 28, third quarter, 2010, p. 40.
28. Luhayb Abdul Khaliq, "The American Strategy between Two Collapses," Amman: Al-Ahliyya for Publishing and Distribution, 2003, p. 20.
29. Iman Mahmoud Ibrahim, "Regional and International Conflict over the Petroleum of the Caspian Sea Region," Cairo: Dar Al-Ahmadi for Publishing, 1st edition, 2006, p. 174.
30. Norhan Al-Sheikh, Op.,Cit, p. 8.
31. Michael Klare, "The New Geography of Conflict," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, May-June 2001, p. 47.
32. Julia Nanney, "Competition for Oil Reserves in the Caspian Sea," Energy Sources in the Caspian Sea: Reflections on the Arabian Gulf Region, Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1st edition, 2001, p. 158.
33. Harith Qahtan Abdullah, Muthana Fa'iq Mur'i, Op.,Cit, p. 304.
34. Talib Hussein Hafiz, "New Developments in the Federal Russia's Policy towards Central Asia and the Caucasus Regions," Journal of the College of Education, Volume 23 (02), 2012, p. 414.
35. Diyari Saleh Majid, Op.,Cit, p. 74.

36. Craig Oliphant, "Russia's Role and Interests in Central Asia," Briefing Saferworld, October 2013, p. 06.
37. Sebastien Peyrouse, "The Economic Aspect of The Chinese-Central Asia Rapprochement," Silk Road Papers, The Central Asia and Caucasus Institute; SAIS, September 2007, p. 54.
38. Marlène Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, "Central Asia in the Era of Globalization: A Geo-economic Approach," Armond Colin, IRIS, Paris, 2010, p. 267.
39. Olivier Roy, "Contemporary Central Asia," 4th edition, PUF, Paris, 2010, p. 78.
40. Fawzi Darwish, "International Competition for Energy in the Caspian Sea," Gabashi Printing Press: Tanta, 1st edition, 2005, p. 53.
41. Martha Brill Olcott, "Regional Cooperation in Central Asia and the South Caucasus," Washington Carnegie Endowment Peace, 2000, p. 123.
42. S. Gluzianin, "Russia's Return to the Great East," translated by Hashem Hamdi, Dar Al-Huda: Damascus, 1st edition, 2012, p. 196.
43. Irin Simistina, "Trends and Economic Cooperation Between Russia and Central Asian Countries Outlook," Working Paper, No. 05, University of Central Asia, Institute and Administration, Graduate School of Development, 2012, p. 57.
44. Ivan Safrantchouk, "The Policy of the Russian Federation in Strategic Central Asia," Note from the Franco-Russian Observatory, No. 08, November 2014, p. 66.
45. Marlène Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, Op. Cit., p. 19.
46. Ibid., pp. 20-22.
47. Lazhar Wannasi, , Strategic Interactions in Central Asia, Op.Cit, p. 246.
48. Ahmed Sayed Abdel Rahim, "Soft Security in Central Asia: Political and Social Dimensions," Master's Thesis, Institute of Asian Studies and Research, Zagazig University, 2005, p. 190.
49. Mohammed El Sayed Salim, "Global Transformations and International Competition over Central Asia," Center for Asian Studies, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 1989, pp. 321-322.
50. Mohammed El Sayed Salim, "Major Shifts in Foreign Policy," Journal of International Politics, Issue 170, Cairo: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, April 2007, p. 44.
51. Ibid., p. 46.
52. Mohammed El Sayed Salim, "The Reality and Future of Alliances in Asia," Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Journal of International Politics, Issue 183, January 2011, p. 51.
53. Adel Abbasi, op.cit ,pp. 133-135.
54. Lazhar Wannasi, op.cit, p. 234.
55. Idem
56. S. Gluzianin, op.cit, p. 226.
57. Idem
58. Adel Abbasi, op.cit ,p. 145.
59. Nabihah Al-Asfahani, "Dimensions of Russian-American Rapprochement after the September 11 Events," Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Journal of International Politics, Issue 147, January 2002, p. 118.

