

THE MAGHREB ARAB NEEDS INTEGRATION MORE THAN EVER



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Abstract:

Historically, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was born as a dead initiative. The lasting aspects of its functioning were marginalized from the outset, as a strong union requires strong social, civil, economic and cultural ties, while in 1989 Maghreb leaders focused entirely on political coordination. As a result, national and regional events prevented cooperation and created a new obstacle to the realization of the AMU.

Indeed, although it is the greatest weakness of the AMU, politics has been its main element, ignoring the ideological differences of the regimes, internal conflicts and international allegiances.

key words: Union of the Arab Maghreb, integration, failure and achievements of the (AMU) project

الملخص:

لقد ولد اتحاد المغرب العربي ميتا منذ البداية، حيث همشت عدة جوانب اساسية لقيامه؛ كالروابط الاجتماعية والمدنية والاقتصادية والثقافية الصلبة؛ وتم التركيز على التنسيق السياسي فقط ونتيجة لذلك، عرقلت الأحداث الوطنية والإقليمية مسار التكامل المغربي، فلم يعكس مستوى طموحات شعوب المنطقة، ويعود هذا الاخفاق إلى مجموعة من المعوقات والتحديات التي أدت إلى ضعف الارتباط والتكامل الداخلي أساسها غياب إرادة سياسية حقيقية لدى النخب المغربية الحاكمة في بناء صرح مغربي موحد.

بالإضافة إلى مجموعة من الأسباب أهمها تجاهل الاختلافات الأيديولوجية للأنظمة والصراعات الداخلية والولاءات الدولية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الاتحاد ، المغرب العربي، الاندماج، المشاكل والانجازات .

Introduction:

On 17 February 1989, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia signed the Agreement establishing the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) with the aim of promoting integration and building complementary integrated relations based on a unified vision of the future. After 30 years, the economic and political integration of these countries has not been achieved. Internal and regional differences have blocked the progress of this project and the Maghreb is still absent from the international scene.

The Maghreb needs integration more than ever, as the Maghreb populations have exploded and are ready to do so again if the "paradox" of having to endure high levels of poverty and unemployment despite the availability of natural resources: 3% of the world's oil reserves (Iestrange & Christophe, 2005, p. 154), 4% of the world's natural gas deposits and more than 70% of the world's phosphates" (Elazizi, 2018, p. 15) , The World Bank has estimated that 8 million jobs should be created between 2010 and 2020 in order to meet the future supply of the labor market.

Maghreb economic integration should lead us to: higher growth; a further increase in economies; improved competitiveness; more efficient management of resources; greater diversification of production; lower production and supply costs; greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the European Union; and possible access to world markets.

This study attempts to give answers to the following problematic:

What are the constraints facing the realization of the project of the Arab Maghreb union?

Article structure:

Introduction

- 1- The project of the Maghreb Arab union "birth and evolution"
- 2- The failures of the Maghreb Arab union project
- 3- Achievements and prospects of the Maghreb Arab union project

Conclusions

1. The project of the Maghreb Arab union “birth and evolution”

Following a series of openings of regions led by the Islamic khilafa, the idea of unifying these countries became necessary and obvious. However, after being opened up as 'fath' by the Muslims in the 8th century and by the Ottomans in the 16th century, the peoples of the Maghreb were colonised from the 19th century onwards by the colonial powers, who established new borders (McKeon, 1992, p. 302) . At the beginning of the twentieth century, liberation movements in the Maghreb began to take shape, leading to the creation of national liberation parties, the ideal of a united Maghreb fading in favour of the ideal of independence. and later nationalist. In 1947, the Committee for the Liberation of the Maghreb was created and adopted the famous Cairo Charter, which was the first ideological elaboration of the unitary Maghreb project.

However, Morocco and Tunisia negotiated the acceleration of the decolonization process at the expense of Algeria, claiming that the latter had a different status that gave it less right to independence (it has been colonized long before Tunisia and Morocco). In 1956 (McKeon, 1992, p. 302), after the independence of the two countries, the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) called for the formation of a North African federation. The main objective of this project was to put an end to Algeria's war of independence. The project was interrupted. by the France hijacking of the plane carrying Ahmed Ben Bella, on a secret flight from Rabat to Tunis.) Two years later, in 1958, the nationalist parties of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia took part in the famous Tangiers conference. But once again, the political leaders did not respect their agreements. It should be pointed out that on 1 January of the same year, the EEC was created, as the Maghreb countries felt the future power of this confederation. Since these countries did not realize the dream of the great Maghreb, their frustration is accentuated as well as their fear of being vulnerable to what such a future power would represent.

After its independence in 1962, Algeria was dragged for two years into the "war of the sands" (Torres-Garcia, 2013, p. 328), triggered by the cross-border conflict with Morocco. The following year, in 1964, after a meeting of the economic ministers of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, the Permanent Consultative Committee of the Maghreb was set up, which Libya and Mauritania joined in 1975. But the misunderstandings continued. On the one part, Morocco and Tunisia considered that Algeria, in return for the aid provided during Algeria's war of liberation and the recognition of its borders, would put its energy resources on preferential terms to facilitate its

industrial development. Algeria, for its part, considered that the two countries had not acted accordingly at such an important moment as the time when it was to assist Algeria in its struggle for independence, as agreed in the Maghreb Liberation Committee of 1947. Moreover, the two countries had not respected the 1958 Tangiers Conference by concluding a pact with the colonizing country. For all those reasons, Algeria considered that it had paid the most for its independence during the eight years of the war. That was why it had decided to go it alone and to industrialize fastly while preserving its socialist options.

The misunderstandings and the problems between countries were intensified by the rising of the conflict in Western Sahara and by the economic crisis of the 1970s. In 1973 (Addi., 1995, p. 89) , Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco had completely abandoned any attempt to integrate the Maghreb by negotiating association agreements with the EEC separately. In the same year, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet, El Hamra and the Valley of Gold, better known as the Front POLISARIO, launched its first attack against Spanish troops. The following year, the front clearly established its goal of independence and at the end of the year Mauritania and Morocco claimed the territories of Western Sahara. The conflict over the decolonization of Western Sahara in Spain had begun. In October 1975, Morocco, taking advantage of the serious situation of the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, launched its Green March, signing on 14 November the Madrid Tripartite Agreements, which handed over the administration of Spanish Sahara to Mauritania and Morocco, leaving Spain sovereign. One year later, in 1976, the Polisario Front proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). In 1978, Mauritania renounced its rights, leaving this conflict open until today, between Morocco and the Polisario Front (Addi., 1995, p. 95).

However, the 1980s was the period that made the Maghreb dream possible, with the birth of the entity that is the subject of our study, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). It was the time of the crisis of the post-colonial Maghreb state, of economic stagnation and financial difficulties, of social confrontation, of more divisions but also of reconciliations. The creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council; the enlargement of the EEC to Greece, Portugal and Spain; the signing of the Single European Act ; put pressure on the Maghreb countries in the accelerated search for Maghreb unification. In 1983, Algeria and Tunisia signed the Treaty of Fraternity and Concord, to which Mauritania subsequently acceded. Libya, on the other hand, submitted its candidacy but rejected the proposed conditions (the delimitation of borders imposed by Algeria). Disappointed, Gaddafi allied himself with Morocco by signing the "Arab-African Union"

agreement the following year. But this union was broken in 1986, when King Hassam II of Morocco met Israeli Prime Minister Simon Perez. Libyan-Tunisian relations were also broken when Libya decided to deport 30,000 Tunisians from its territory in 1985. However, the arrival in power in Tunisia of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali in 1987 facilitated the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Libya and Tunisia and to some extent facilitated the revival of Algerian-Moroccan diplomatic relations (Addi., 1995, p. 102).

In this new context of rapprochement, in June 1988, the heads of state of the five Maghreb countries met in what was called the Zeralda Summit (AMU, 2020, p. 44), “an Algerian city «which is the first Maghreb summit since independence. It set up a High Committee that was to coordinate five subcommittees responsible for drafting the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) treaty and its action plan. Finally, six months later, at the second Maghreb summit held in Marrakesh on 17 February 1989, the AMU was born. Within five weeks, all the signatory states had ratified the treaty (AMU, 2020, p. 45) . "To facilitate the creation of the AMU, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic SADR will be put on hold pending a referendum on self-determination to decide its future. The Cairo Charter had been the ideological foundation of the unitary project, the Tangiers Conference its institutional scheme, the Maghreb Standing Consultative Committee its economic expression and AMU its real incarnation.

The Current member States of AMU are Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia (AMU, 2020, p. 46)



Selected regional indicators for AMU

GDP US\$ 425.7 billion US\$

GDP per capita	4518 US\$
Area (sq. km)	5.8 million sq. km
Total population	94.2 million
Total imports	150.9 billion US\$
Total exports	126.8 billion US\$

Objectives of the Arab Maghreb Union

The treaty establishing the AMU set the following targets (Finalsh & Eric, 1994, p. 5):

1. The consolidation of fraternal relations between Member States and their peoples; the achievement of progress in the well-being of their Communities, the defence of rights and the contribution to a peace based on justice and equity.

2- To work progressively towards the establishment among them of the free movement of persons and the free transit of services, goods and capital. With the intention of establishing in the long term a Maghreb economic union among the five Member States, the following steps have been planned:

- The establishment of a free trade area before the end of 1992, with the removal of all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade between member countries.
- The customs union before the end of 1995 to create a unified customs area with the approval of a common external tariff in relation to the rest of the world.
- The common market before the year 2000, with the lifting of restrictions on the movement of production factors of member countries.

3. The adoption of a common policy in all areas, the objectives of which are:

- In the international field: to achieve a good understanding between Member States and to establish solid cooperation between them based on dialogue.

- In the field of defence: to preserve the independence of each of the Member States.
- In the economic field: to ensure the industrial, agricultural, commercial and social development of the Member States and to take all necessary measures to this end, including the establishment of joint projects and the preparation of appropriate general and specific programs.
- In the cultural field: to establish cooperation aimed at developing education at its various levels, safeguarding the spiritual and moral values resulting from the general elections in Islam, preserving the Arab national identity and taking the necessary measures to achieve these objectives, particularly through the exchange of teachers and students by establishing academic and cultural institutions and specialized research institutes common to the Member States.

With regard to the question of security, Member States undertake to avoid forming any political alliance, military or political bloc whose actions could undermine the political independence or territorial integrity of [another Member State] (Treaty, 2020, p. 51).

The Treaty explicitly stipulates the establishment of a security system, in which The main instruments are as follows:

Externally: Article 14 states that "an attack against one Member State shall be considered an attack against all other Members".

Inside: Article 15 prohibits the existence of any activity or organisation on its territory which "undermines the security ... territorial integrity or political system of [Member States]"

2.THE ARAB MAGHREB UNION (AMU) INSTITUTIONS AND OPERATIONS

The Arab Maghreb Union AMU is composed of political, technical-administrative and judicial bodies. It operates with the support of some 40 employees, including some 15 senior officials. By the end of 2002, only two countries had paid their full contributions to the Union: Algeria and Tunisia.

The political bodies consist of (AMU, 2020, p. 49) :

- The Presidency Council (art. 9) is the only body with decision-making power. It is composed of the five Heads of State whose presidency rotates. Its decisions are taken unanimously with little

flexibility. Since its creation, the body has met only six times, most recently in 1994 .

- The Conference of Prime Ministers: Article 7 of the Treaty states that "the Prime Ministers or their equivalents shall meet whenever necessary".
- The Council of Foreign Ministers (Article 8) is responsible for preparing the meetings of the Presidency Council and for examining the work of the Monitoring Committee and the specialized ministerial committees. In addition, it may carry out specific missions by delegation of the Presidential Council, but in no case may it contradict it.
- The Advisory Council (Art. 12), located in Algeria, is composed of thirty members from each country. It limits itself to making recommendations to strengthen the objectives of the Union and is subordinate to the Presidential Council; it is therefore not a parliament. Its members are elected every five years and according to the parliamentary system of each country. Its members are elected every five years and according to the parliamentary system of each country. It can only deliberate validly with 2/3 of the members and by an absolute majority. It is composed of a President, an advisory board and five standing committees

Its technical-administrative bodies are:

1. Monitoring Committee: according to Article 9 of the Treaty, it is composed of one member from each country elected within their respective Council of Ministers or similar body. Its chairmanship rotates, coinciding with that of AMU's supreme body. It is responsible for monitoring the affairs of the Union in coordination, mainly, with the General Secretariat and the specialized ministerial commissions.

2. The specialized ministerial commissions: in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, they are composed of the ministries and people's committees concerned. They are subdivided into sectoral ministerial councils and working committees.

3. The General Secretariat: Located in Morocco since 1999 and governed by Article 11, its permanent Secretary General is the Tunisian Habib Ben En Yahia. Its functions are those of a General Secretariat.

It is permanently located in Nouakchott, Mauritania (Art. 11). It is composed of two judges from each country, appointed for a period of six

years, half of which are renewable every three years. Although it is responsible for defining disputes arising from the interpretation and application of the agreements signed within the framework of AMU, the Presidency Council has the final say, and therefore does not constitute a Court of Justice.

Furthermore, at the second and third sessions of the Presidency Council, it was agreed to create as AMU institutions: a Maghreb University and a Maghreb Academy of Sciences based in Libya (C. E. Jesus, 1989, p. 55), and a Maghreb Bank for Investment and Foreign Trade (BMICE) based in Tunisia, its inauguration took place in December 2015, in Tunis, Tunisia with a net capital of US\$150M to be invested in infrastructure, transportation, telecommunications and electrical power projects and programs (Economic, 2020, p. 22)

Challenges to the development of AMU Activities

Since its constitution, AMU has faced many barriers, which it has not been able to overcome and which have led it to the practical collapse into which it has been plunged to the present day. The refusal of its leaders to cede powers to the Union or to follow its *acquis communautaire* has also contributed to this. It remains to be seen how, just one year after its constitution, internal problems were already arising: the formal transfer of powers from Algeria to Libya was to be completed at a meeting scheduled for 22 and 23 January in Tripoli. The presidential summit was moved twice without setting a date and without informing the public.

Among the various events that have affected the development of AMU, it is worth mentioning:

(a)- The 1988 Lockerbie attack involving two Libyans. Libya was unwilling to make the two suspects available to the Scottish courts. As a sanction, the UN imposed the Libyan arms and aviation embargo in 1992; in 1993, the sanctions were tightened at the request of the United States, which blocked their funds and banned the sale of equipment related to their oil industry. This was not only a blow to the eventual integration of the Maghreb, but also a further destabilization of its internal situation: in December 1992, at an AMU ministerial meeting, all member countries condemned the sanctions imposed on Libya. However, when the UN Security Council tightened the sanctions, Morocco voted against Libya. Finally, in April 1999, Libya placed the two Libyan suspects at the disposal of the Scottish judiciary and in the custody of the Dutch authorities, as the

EU had lifted the sanctions imposed in 1992. The UN definitively withdrew the sanctions in 2003. But at that time, AMU was in a deep sleep.

b-The different positions of member countries regarding the first Gulf War

This time, the discordant note was signed by ALGERIA, which calls for a boycott of the pilgrimage to Mecca and a review of the relations of AMU countries with the nations allied to the coalition, which implies a disqualification of Morocco, which maintains its troops in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates". At the Arab summit in Cairo in August 1990, the five states adopted the most diverse positions possible on the resolution to condemn Iraq: Mauritania expressed reservations, Morocco voted in favour, Algeria abstained, Tunisia did not participate and Libya voted against.

(c) The conflict in Western Sahara

The storm seemed to calm down when both parties (the Polisario Front and Morocco) accepted the UN peace proposal (August 1988) proposing the holding of a referendum on self-determination for the Saharawi people and proceeding with a ceasefire; in April 1991, the UN Security Council approved the establishment of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) (Labella, 2003, p. 79). Officially, a cease-fire was established and a referendum was set for January 1992. However, to date, such a referendum has not taken place due to the different positions that exist regarding the design of the census. In 2005, the last attempt to call the AMU Heads of State Summit failed again. At present, the situation is still unresolved and MINURSO has departed.

d- In 1994, terrorist attacks took place in Marrakech precisely at the atlas Asni Hotel, this event led the Moroccans to take the decision to close the Algerian borders and imposing visa restrictions on Algerians, and Algeria responded by ordering the closure of the land border, which remains in place until today, these decisions harmed the Maghreb Arab project (.yabiladi., 2017)

(e) Algeria's Black Decade between 1992 and 1999.

Since the mid-1980s, Algeria has been in the middle of a major crisis that has caused major social changes. Faced with this situation, the one-party government (FLN) imposed a new constitution, which, for the first time in the country's history, made a multi-party system possible (which did not please Tunisia and Libya). "This new situation allowed the Islamic

Salvation Front (FIS) to win the municipal elections [in 1989] and was on the verge of winning the provincial elections in 1992 (KHETTAB, 2018, p. 26). Following this act, Algeria was plunged into a bloody war against terrorism that lasted until 1999 (Messaoudi, 1994, p. 24) , with the victory of the FLN and the coming to power of President Bouteflika. Although this war-weakened relation between AMU member states, there was a moment in 1999 when it was thought that there might be a rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco when Bouteflika came to power while Hassan II was in power. However, he died the same year and the new Moroccan king, Mohamed VI (.yabiladi., 2017).

3.The Failures of the Arab Maghreb Union

The AMU has been virtually unable to achieve all its objectives, particularly in the economic field. Inter-Maghreb trade accounts for about 3 per cent of the total volume of intraregional trade and, as can be seen, this percentage is very low compared to other sub-regional entities, for example, 60 per cent for the European Union, 22 per cent for the Association of South-East Asian Nations, 10.6 per cent for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and 20 percent among the Mercosur countries in 2009 (Lahcen Achy, 2012, p. 9).

Moreover, BMICE is not operational despite the fact that it was inaugurated in 2015. It should be recalled that the agreement on its constitution was signed in 1993 and ratified in 2002.

To have an idea of the cost of non-Maghreb, the elimination of 50% or 100% of customs duties applicable to agricultural imports from Morocco and Tunisia would imply an increase in trade between the two countries of 20.9% and 47%.

Moreover, e-commerce is having trouble in its development for two fundamental reasons: the total absence of a [common] legal system and limited Internet access, not to mention the cost of the lack of investment in inter-Maghreb infrastructures.

In the socio-cultural field, neither the Maghreb University nor the Academy of Sciences had yet been built. Nor had the homologation of university diplomas been initiated and student mobility had not been established (one of the objectives of the treaty).

Politically, after the blockade of AMU in 1994, each country went its own way. Since 1995, in the spirit of the "Barcelona Process", Morocco, Tunisia

and Algeria have renewed the agreements they had with the EU in 1976 and, in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy, Morocco signed its statute in 2008.

As an advanced member". All these agreements with the EU are governed by the system that still prevails today: the "hub and spokes" system. This system has consisted in designing its policies so that the EU is the "centre" and the others, the third parties with which it agrees, are the "spokes"; which is in some ways in line with the "divide and rule" strategy. This system implies that the "spokes", in this case the AMU countries, are forced to be in competition with each other in order to be more attractive to the centre, the EU, a situation that has contributed to the disintegration of the existing small Maghreb unit. However, sometimes the EU prefers to deal with the Maghreb countries as a cartel, for example at the level of the AMU, especially when it comes to security and immigration issues. However, when it can gain greater advantages, it pushes them to compete with each other by granting concessions by treating them separately".

On the other hand, in addition to their membership of the AMU, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia are members of the 1997 "Pan-Arab Free Trade Area"; and Morocco and Tunisia are the founders of the 2004 "Agadir Agreement" which also establishes a free trade area, (both agreements have failed). In addition, Morocco signed the "free trade agreement" with the United States in 2006 (Abdelkmaliki & , Mustapha , 2007, p. 71) and Mauritania joined the "Community of Sahel-Saharan States" (CEN-SAD) in 2009 ((CEN-SAD), 2020, p. 10)

4.ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AMU

Nevertheless, AMU has achieved the full development of the political, technical-administrative and judicial structures stipulated in the Constitutive Treaty. In terms of conventions, thirty-six Maghreb conventions have been adopted in different sectors. However, only five have been ratified by the Heads of State: two in the field of agriculture, one on land transport of passengers and goods and transit between member countries, and another on the creation of the Maghreb Bank for Investment and Foreign Trade (BMCIE). In addition, two agreements were signed in the international field: a cooperation agreement with UNESCO on 26 May 2009 and, two days later, another with the African Development Bank, for which the latter donated \$50,000 to AMU. (el-maghur, 2011, p. 55)

In the socio-cultural field, it has carried out a food security strategy in North Africa; a Maghreb program to combat desertification and protect the environment; cooperation in the field of health (veterinary and phytosanitary) and the consolidation of basic infrastructure such as the transmaghreb road and the "Ibn Khaldun" fibre optic interconnection telephone.

In addition, the Union of Fairs of the AMU countries was also created on 31/5/2010, the "Union of Maghreb Lawyers" was relaunched on 16/4/2010 and the Union of Maghreb Entrepreneurs (UME) was created on 17/2/2007.

In the international field, AMU has succeeded in integrating itself into the "5+5 Dialogue" or "Western Mediterranean Forum". This dialogue has its origins in the declaration signed in Rome in October 1990. It is composed of the five AMU Member States and the five countries of the Western Mediterranean, Spain, Portugal, France, Italy and Malta.

This forum was the response of the latter five countries to the creation of AMU. Its particularity is its informal character, its homogeneity (due to the geographical approach of its members) and the fact that it is the only forum in the Mediterranean with a western presence that counts Libya as a full member. The Lockerbie attack also "froze" their meetings of foreign ministers, which were only relaunched in 2001 when the EU lifted sanctions against Libya; the first summit of heads of state and government was held in Tunisia in December 2003 and the second in Malta in 2012.

On the other hand, the emptiness left by the blockage of the 5+5 dialogue and the AMU in 1995 was filled by the creation of the "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" or "Barcelona Process", a Spanish initiative based in Barcelona which brought together the 15 EU member countries and 12 Mediterranean countries, with the exception of Libya (which was sanctioned by the Lockerbie affair). Its objective was regional cooperation and integration. After failing to achieve the proposed objectives, the project was relaunched in 2008 at the initiative of Sarkozy with a new name, "Union for the Mediterranean" (UfM)

Today, the UfM is "an intergovernmental organization or cooperation forum based on the common history of this geographical area and on cooperation in concrete development projects to promote regional integration. The work of the UfM is led by a North-South co-presidency, currently held by the EU External Action Service and Jordan .

Conclusion

From the previous three chapters, which correspond to the development of the three objectives stated in the introduction, we can deduce three factors that have notably influenced the development of Maghreb integration initiatives: the relations between their leaders, the situation at the time, and the dictatorship/democracy variable. Until the break-up of the "Arab springs", the unsatisfactory relations between the Maghreb leaders, the poor situation at the time and the absence of the "people" component through democracy obstructed the functioning of AMU. Today, ten years after the beginning of the revolutions, the situation remains the same and even worse with all that is happening in Libya and SAHEL, a situation that hides a plan predefined by the great powers to seize the region and its wealth that is why we need to reinforce the AMU more than ever.

Recommendations:

To make an effective integration process a success it is necessary to proceed to:

- 1- The leaders of the Maghreb union must overcome the disputes of the past and start to work seriously on this project, because without a real political will, the AMU will not be able to achieve its goals.

- 2- Removing tariff barriers that restrict the free movement of goods and limit trade and economic activity between the Maghreb countries.
- 2-, reopening the roads and borders between Algeria and Morocco, and working to reduce the costs of maritime transport between the Maghreb countries.
- 3-, reducing or even removing administrative and technical barriers that block the fluidity of trade exchanges between the Maghreb countries.
- 4-, restoring the credibility of the integration project by putting in place transparent mechanisms to supervise, evaluate and resolve trade disputes between companies based in the Maghreb.
- 5- Improve the investment climate and economic governance.
- 6- Maghreb leaders should continue to promote regional integration as a complement to and not a replacement for multilateral relations within the World Trade Organization and free trade agreements with the rest of the world.

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