



France's relationship with the Sublime Porte and its Maghreb provinces during the 16th century in light of the documents from Muhimat dafteri

¹ BICHI Rahima

¹ Department of History/Faculty of Social and Human Sciences
University of Ghardaia/Algeria
bichi.rahima@univ-ghardaia.dz

Received: 20/ 12/ 23

Accepted: 13/ 01/ 24

Abstract

This article addresses the issue of political, diplomatic, and economic relations of the Ottoman Empire and its Maghreb provinces with European countries during the 16th century AD /. This period the Ottoman influence reach the Maghreb region, establishing external relations, with a particular focus on its relations with France. France adopted a peaceful approach to expand its influence in the region, making these relations of great importance to researchers, as they cast a significant shadow on the modern and contemporary history of the Maghreb region, still echoing in the present time.

This research paper aims to explore and analyze some important documents in order to highlight the nature and aspects of these relations and the controlling factors. The study concluded that the Franco-Ottoman rapprochement was

primarily driven by French interests, as France sought to exploit the privileges of the Sublime Porte to establish its foothold in the Maghreb region.

Keywords: Relations; Sublime Porte; Maghreb provinces; France; Documents from Muhimat Dafteri

Corresponding author, BICHI Rahima
Email: bichi.rahima@univ-ghardaia.dz

1. Introduction:

The Maghreb provinces gained significant importance and influential political status in the western Mediterranean basin during the 16th century. This became especially pronounced after the annexation of Algeria to the Ottoman Empire in 1519, followed by the inclusion of Tripoli in 1551 and Tunis in 1574. The Sublime Porte, considering these regions as strategic, utilized them as a launching point to control the Mediterranean and undermine the activities of Christian naval powers that sought economic gains in the region during this period.

Among these powers, France endeavored to secure the support of the Ottoman Sultans. This support was sought not only for diplomatic representation in the Maghreb provinces but also for the right to receive military assistance in conflicts with Spain. This diplomatic strategy led France to adopt a multifaceted approach, alternating between peaceful negotiations and assertive pressure in its political and economic dealings with the Sublime Porte and its Maghreb provinces. These efforts aimed to realize commercial objectives of France and ensure the safe navigation of its naval vessels.

Based on these premises, this research paper is titled "**The Relationship Between France, the Sublime Porte, and its**



Maghreb Provinces during the 16th Century: Insights from Important Documents and Registers". The paper addresses a crucial issue related to the historical relations between the Ottoman and Maghreb provinces and France, based on valuable information from important archival documents. What is significant in this historical context is the wealth of historical data available in these archival documents.

To illuminate this subject, the problem revolves around the nature of these relationships, their facets, and the controlling factors shaping their character. From this problematic, several sub-questions arise, which can be summarized as follows:

- To what extent did Franco-Ottoman relations influence the Maghreb provinces?
- What factors determined the course of these relations, and what were the resulting outcomes?
- Did the relationship between France, the Sublime Porte, and its Maghreb provinces during the 16th century follow a unidirectional path, or was it more complex than that?

To answer these questions, we relied on the historical-inductive analytical method that aligns with the nature of the subject, conducting a historical and analytical reading of significant archival documents.

Here, we delve into the aspects of the relationship between France, the Sublime Porte, and its Maghreb provinces during the 16th century, based on the following axes:

2. The Franco-Ottoman Rapprochement:

International conditions in Europe that were prevalent at the

beginning of the 16th century, and that France suffered from due to its hostile relations with Spain over the struggle for the crown of the Holy Roman Empire, marked the beginning of French-Ottoman relations. During this period, France sought to attract the Ottoman state, the powerful party in the Christian-Muslim conflict in the Mediterranean, driven by its desire to achieve political and diplomatic gains in the region and to find an ally in its war against the Spanish. How did this rapprochement occur?

King Francois I of France held a strong enmity towards Charles V (the traditional hostility between the Habsburgs and the Bourbons). Following his defeat in the Battle of Pavia Pavia¹, in the year 1525, when King Francis I was captured and forced to sign the surrender treaty, his mother took control of affairs. She believed it was necessary to seek a strong ally for France to assist them against their enemies. It is noteworthy that her son Francis and the French court shared the same opinion. Naturally, they found their desired ally in an external and distant power, represented by the Ottoman Empire, which was engaged in a fierce struggle against the Habsburgs in Vienna, as well as in the Maghreb and Andalusia².

Following the initial mission, a second delegation was dispatched by King Francois I in late 1525, while remaining captive, he sent an ambassador to the Sublime Porte. At this time, he implored Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent to launch an attack against the King of Hungary, an ally of Charles V. This diplomatic move aimed to assuage the grievances of France and reclaim the honor lost in the Battle of Pavia³.

When Sultan Suleiman met the French ambassador, he promised to combat the King of Hungary and expressed his readiness to assist France. However, no formal treaty was concluded between them. Instead, the Sultan contented himself with writing a response to King Francis, and this took place in the



month of Rabi' al-Thani in the year 1525⁴.

As the interest of the Ottoman Empire outweighed all considerations, Ottoman officials attached great importance to it. At the forefront was the Algerian governor, Khayr al-Din bin Ya'qub, who, due to the strategic location of his province facing the Spanish imperial threat, understood well the implications of the Ottoman-French alliance. According to Heyd's account, after Khayr al-Din expelled the Spanish from the fortress of Bejaia in 1529, he too contemplated finding an ally against Charles V. However, he did not disclose his intention to form an alliance until after he left Algiers, summoned by Sultan Suleiman in 1534. On his way to Istanbul, he stopped in France, where he met Francois I, presented valuable gifts, and they agreed to unite their efforts against Spain. Khayr al-Din then attacked Italian ports, inflicting significant losses in 1533, 1534, and 1535⁵.

In the year 1536, Francis I signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Ottoman Empire, known as the negotiations with Jean de La Forêt⁶, The Sublime Porte now deferred to all matters concerning French affairs, respecting its ally's decisions and aligning itself with its demands. In one of the correspondences, it was stated: "Your interpreter and ambassador, Jean Baptiste, arrived carrying your letter and your gift to my exalted threshold... He requested my approval for the settlement of the exiles from Kefza Sagz to the outskirts of Kefa in... or in Ghulata... As your fathers and ancestors have been steadfast and loyal friends to our exalted threshold, becoming friends to our friends and enemies to our enemies, it is imperative that you observe the covenant and the trust as it should

be. This has been reciprocated on our part with manifold considerations, and no allowance has been made for the contrary. Anyone who acts otherwise will be disciplined. Regarding the matter of Sagz, your request has been accepted, and my noble consent has been granted for their arrival in Ghulata and residence there. Upon their arrival, you must always adhere to the terms of the covenant and trust towards the distinguished leaders of our happiness, just as your fathers and ancestors did⁷".

In order to secure French interests and prevent any harm to the Ottoman state and its provinces from French ships, several decrees were issued⁸. western shores of the Mediterranean with France, even if it at the expense of their own interests. One of the decrees stated the following: "... My noble decrees have been sent to the governors of Algiers and Tripoli, directing them not to interfere in the affairs of your country and your province, and your subjects from now on, contrary to the covenant. They have been warned to discipline anyone who does so".⁹

Similarly, France reciprocated with the Ottoman Empire in preserving the integrity of its provinces from external attacks. In one of the correspondences, it was stated: "... When news reached the ears that the King of Spain and the King of Portugal had reached an agreement between them with the intention of causing harm to the province of Algiers, incited by some Arab sheikhs in various parts of western Algeria, the Governor of Marseille informed the Governor of Algiers about this matter and notified him of this incident..."

France did not hesitate to provide assistance to the Muslims of Andalusia who fled from the inquisitions and were unable to escape by sea through the Spanish coasts. They sought refuge by land through French territory after France became an ally with the Ottoman Empire. This was documented in the following



correspondence: "...The Governor of Marseille informed the Governor of Algiers about this matter..., and your ambassador there was informed about the increasing number of refugees in that region¹⁰.

In this context, we can elucidate the mutual interest in the Ottoman-French rapprochement during this period. Each party saw in the other a golden opportunity to mitigate the severity of Spanish attacks that were plaguing both the Ottoman Empire and France. This was especially true given their shared adversary, Emperor Charles V, whose forces inflicted significant losses on Ottoman territories in Europe and the Maghreb. Charles V's forces also imposed substantial losses on the French government in the Battle of Pavia. Therefore, the Ottoman-French rapprochement during this stage was an inevitable necessity driven by the mutual desire of both parties to seek a powerful ally capable of providing military assistance to intimidate the Spanish Empire, a need they found fulfilled in each other.

3. Military Alliance Between the Ottomans and the French in the Light of Common Interests:

The Ottoman-French relations were characterized by pragmatic alignment following the alliance between Ottoman Sultan "Suleiman the Magnificent" and the French King "Francis I." The exigencies of French diplomacy dictated the necessity of gaining the favor of the Ottoman state to confront the Spanish threat embodied by King Charles V. Despite the lack of religious tolerance during this period, this rapprochement acknowledged the partnership between two powers, one of them Christian and the

other one Islamic. This alliance empowered France by seeking support from the Ottoman state to safeguard its interests against the common enemy, the Spanish. Will this alliance prove effective in facing the shared Spanish adversary?

France's objective in forming an alliance with the Ottoman Empire during its critical period was to rely on a strong ally against its common enemy, Charles V. After signing the friendship treaty with the Ottoman Empire, France requested the Ottoman Caliph, through its ambassador "Polin" in Constantinople, to send a fleet. On July 5, 1543, the Ottoman fleet, led by Kheir al-Din Pasha, arrived in the city of Nice. Hassan Agha, the ruler of Algiers, participated in this military effort with around 40 Algerian ships, and cooperation with the French fleet resulted in the recapture of the mentioned city on August 22¹¹.

After completing this mission, Kheir al-Din remained stationed in the port of Toulon, where he spent the winter. The French king ensured an ample supply for his army, delivering to him 800,000 reals and 400 Muslim captives¹².

However, when Hasan Pasha, the son of Kheir al-Din, took charge of the affairs of the Regency of Algiers, the French king, Francis I, sought his assistance against Spain - three years before his death. However, Hasan Pasha ignored and refused this request, considering it an affront to the military strength of Algeria. Additionally, he did not prioritize maintaining friendly relations between the Ottoman state and France. This attitude fueled animosity from the French, who worked towards sidelining him from governing Algeria¹³.

France maintained its friendship with the Ottoman state even after the death of King Francis I. His son, Henry II, continued these relations and allegiance to the Ottoman state to leverage its navy when needed. In the year 1552, Henry II sent his envoy d'Albisse,



to Salah Rais Pasha in Algiers, due to his proximity, requesting him to attack the Spanish coasts. He offered promises to collaborate, while at the same time, Dragut led the Ottoman fleet to block the path of the Duke of Dalba (leader of the Spanish army) in coordination with De La Gard (leader of the French fleet). Thus, Salah Rais responded to the French king's call, raiding the Spanish coasts in early June 1553¹⁴, with forty warships. He successfully besieged the Spanish ships carrying Duke Fernando Alvarez de Toledo¹⁵. Salih Rais successfully landed at Minorca, plundering the countryside under the pretext of relieving pressure on the French king. However, his fleet faced some losses in the Mahón harbor. Despite this setback, he continued towards the Spanish coasts. On his way to Valencia, he seized control of ten Spanish and Portuguese ships¹⁶.

In the year 1558, France sought assistance from the Sublime Porte and the Ottoman rulers in Algeria against the Spanish, who were obstructing the navigation of French ships. The Ottoman fleet invaded the Gulf of Salerno, Naples, and Corsica, then headed towards Marseille, where it joined forces with the French fleet in attacking Minorca¹⁷.

In the year 1580, the French ambassador reported unusual movements along the French-Spanish border and requested military support in case of any war between the two parties. The Sultan promised to provide the necessary support based on the friendly relations between the two sides. He urged them to send messengers to inform him immediately if an enemy appeared. The following is an excerpt from the correspondence: "Additionally, I have been

informed about movements among the subjects on the French-Spanish border. In the event of any hostility arising from this, it is advisable to provide support from this side in accordance with the existing peace, justice, and friendship. In case of the appearance of an enemy from that side and the possibility of seizing the country, you should quickly dispatch your envoys and inform our authorities so that we can offer assistance based on the longstanding friendship between us¹⁸ ."

When the Algerian Pasha Hassan Veneziano led a campaign in the year 1584 against Giovanni Doria, who was pursued by Veneziano to Genoa over a long distance, the French court extended its assistance in this mission. They allowed him to stay in Marseille for a period of eight days¹⁹. This was due to the common enemy they shared, represented by Spain, indicating that the political interest of France and its Ottoman allies took precedence over everything else.

Spain was often troublesome for its neighbour France, an ally of the Ottoman Empire. This prompted the King of France to seek Ottoman assistance in launching a campaign against Spain, with France moving by land and the Ottoman naval fleet by sea. Given the shared interest, especially taking into account Spain's persecution of Muslims in Andalusia, in addition to its occupation of Oran and the Grand Harbor, and repeated attacks on Muslims at sea, Sultan Murad III (1574-1595) seriously considered the French King's proposal and supported it.

King Henry IV of France prepared his army with the hope of receiving necessary assistance from the Ottoman fleet. However, the Ottoman Empire could not lead its fleet due to the death of Sultan Murad III and the ascension of Sultan Mehmed III (1595-1603). The French were determined to invade Spanish territories, and realizing that it could only be achieved with Ottoman



assistance, the French ambassador in Istanbul sent a request to the Ottoman Porte. In this request, he urged the appointment of the Dey of Algiers as the commander of the Algerian and Tunisian fleets to participate in the military campaign. Given the friendly relations between France and the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman Porte issued a decree approving the request and appointed the Dey of Algiers to lead the fleets, coordinate with the French king, and provide the necessary assistance in invading Spanish territories. Additionally, the Dey was instructed to appoint competent individuals to manage the province in his absence and coordinate with the Bey of Tunis²⁰. However, it appears that despite the preparations that were made in this regard, the campaign never materialized.

An observer of the course of Ottoman-French relations, especially regarding the support of the Ottoman navy represented by the Algerian fleet to Henry IV between the years (1593-1598), notes that it was not limited to external enemies only. The support extended to those who opposed Henry IV in his own country, namely the inhabitants of Marseille who wanted to surrender their city to the Spanish²¹.

From the aforementioned, we can conclude that the Ottoman Empire sought to support the French side in its war against the Spanish for reasons primarily rooted in the perception of Spain as a common enemy for both parties, given the ongoing religious conflict between Christianity and Islam. Additionally, Spain had control over several Algerian ports such as Oran and Algiers, and was attempting to regain control over the remaining coasts of Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli. Furthermore, the continued

persecution of Muslims in Andalusia by the Catholic Church, extending its reach to the Maghreb coasts, prompted the Ottoman Porte to adopt an approach of military support for France in order to threaten the Spanish on own territory.

4. Engines of Ottoman-French Relations: Piracy, Maritime Jihad, and Prisoners:

Issues related to piracy, maritime jihad, and prisoners constitute the backbone driving Ottoman-French relations during the 16th century. This period witnessed the Ottoman Maghreb naval dominance over Mediterranean routes and passages. This dominance prompted some European countries, particularly France—one of the key nations in the western Mediterranean basin—to engage in agreements of rapprochement and peace with the Sublime Porte. These agreements aimed to protect their ships and trade in the Mediterranean, considering the Mediterranean context and the obligations of both parties under these treaties.

This development stems from the nature of commercial interests that defined the fate of these nascent relations. The Ottoman state pursued a policy of cautious cooperation with France, evident in a series of decrees issued by the Sublime Porte to the governors of Maghreb provinces. These decrees aimed to deter any aggressive actions by the maritime jihad vessels against French ships, bound by a peace treaty with the Ottomans.

To what extent did the activities of maritime jihad and prisoners taking contribute to shaping the course of Ottoman-French relations?

Despite the agreement between the Ottoman Empire and France, Algerian leaders continued to repeatedly intercept French ships when those did not adhere to the agreed-upon laws. This can be due to the French support to countries, especially Spain and its Italian possessions, that were adversaries to Algeria. The French



also raised their flags on ships belonging to hostile nations to avoid attacks from Ottoman and Maghreb ships in general, and more specifically. Examples of such violations include the seizure of French ships by the leaders of Algeria in 1560. The French consul filed a complaint with Sultan Suleiman the Lawgiver in 1561, demanding their return. However, the French did not remain passive and sent an envoy to Algeria in 1562 to seek compensation for the losses incurred on their ships²².

The incident involving the ship "Sangiogan Bapsteh", a well-known merchant ship at the time, occurred when it was intercepted by the ruler of Jerba. The ship had departed from the city of Marseille carrying traders from the city of Petropavlovsk and Your Horkoter. After and leaving the port of Alexandria with spices and various goods valued at 300,000 gold pieces, the Sublime Porte sent a warning to the rulers of Algiers, Hasan ibn Khayr al-Din, and to the rulers of Tripoli, Dragut Pasha, on (8 July 1565). The order was to return all items and goods taken from the ship without any loss to the French merchants. In case of stubbornness or opposition, they were instructed to enforce their rights and bring the offender to justice. They were reminded that the King of France is committed to friendship with the Sublime Porte, and the minister Mustafa was tasked with following up on this matter²³.

As the resident ambassador of France in Istanbul raised a complaint about the algerian assault on French traders in the province of Storn²⁴, after robbed their belongings and trades, the Sublime Porte (Ottoman government) commanded the Bey of Algiers, Hassan bin Khair al-Din, on (8th September 1565) to

investigate the individuals who caused harm to the French and apprehend them. He was instructed to ensure security and safety so that the French can conduct their business in the province. Additionally, he was forced to return what had been taken from them without any loss, according to the peace treaty between the two states. In case anyone defied this imperial order, he was further instructed to record the defiants' names and send them to the Sublime Porte²⁵.

Following this correspondence, there was a second letter addressed to the Bey of Algiers, Hassan bin Khair al-Din, dated (13th December 1565). It included a complaint from the French king about the enslavement of his subjects. The letter also referred to a document in which prisoners, goods, and items taken by the leaders of Algiers were recorded. The Ottoman authorities commanded the Bey of Algiers to investigate this document, search for the seized goods, recover them from anyone who would be in their possession, and send them back to their owners. He was also ordered to emphasize to the leaders of Algiers the importance of respecting the covenant of security and peace with France and to refrain from any actions contradicting it²⁶.

In the year 1567, King Charles IX of France sent a letter to the Sublime Porte, requesting that the soldiers of Algiers refrain from intervening in the affairs of his country, contrary to the treaty between them. Sultan Selim II responded by reaffirming the close relations with the kings of France. He assured the king that there would be no repetition of Algerian interference in the affairs of his country and pledged to discipline anyone who violated the conditions of the treaty. Sultan Selim II informed King Charles IX that he had issued orders to the Bey of Algiers, Hassan bin Khair al-Din, and the Bey of Tripoli, Ghazi Ali, regarding this matter. In return, Sultan Selim II requested the king to ensure the adherence



of his subjects to the conditions of the treaty and to discipline anyone acting against it²⁷.

After receiving complaints from the French about the raids conducted by Algerian leaders on the French ships, the Sublime Porte did not hesitate to firmly address the Algerian commanders. A notable example can be found in the letters sent by Sultan Selim II to the ruler of Algiers, Ahmed Arab Pasha. In these letters, Sultan Selim II informed him about the excesses committed by Algerian ships against the French, their raids on their country, and the capture of their subjects, all in violation of the treaty. The Sublime Porte emphasized the friendly relations between the Ottoman state and France, urging Ahmed Arab Pasha to warn the soldiers and maritime leaders against attacking French interests, disciplining those responsible, and releasing the French prisoners²⁸.

On the (23 April 1572 AD), the Sublime Porte once again sent a warning to the Pasha of Algiers, Ahmed Arab, regarding the enslavement of French prisoners captured by the leaders of Algiers. It emphasized that if these prisoners were not from the Banadiqa sect or other hostile countries and were not captured in the context of any hostile actions, but rather were taken from the Kingdom of France while peacefully navigating their ships, then it was of duty to release them. The letter instructed Ahmed Arab to inform the French to send their ships to retrieve the captives, providing a written account of the number of individuals who fell into captivity and were subsequently released.²⁹

The hostile activity practiced by the rulers of Algeria against French ships can be interpreted as a refusal to engage with non-

Muslim Christians. Firstly, these seized ships did not adhere to the agreements and treaties between the two countries, prompting them to disregard the orders of the Ottoman Sultan Selim II on multiple occasions. The Sultan himself favored states bound by treaties over the interests of the Algerian regency. However, all of this did not escalate to an open conflict, and it did not hinder the cooperation between the authorities in Algeria and the French government. In 1579 AD, Qouluj Ali Pasha and Qabudan requested supplies for their fleet from Marseille, and in return, they guaranteed favorable treatment for French citizens in Algeria. Hassan Veneziano also received assistance from the people of Marseille during his campaign in 1584, where he stayed with them for eight days³⁰.

In the year 1580 (987 H), French King Henry III complained, through his ambassador, about the Ottomans' failure to honor their agreements and promises. This included failure to release prisoners, return money forcibly taken from French subjects, punish those responsible for killing the French, and discipline those involved in corruption. It seems that the Ottoman side was informed of everything that had taken place. However, the orders issued by Sultan Murad III regarding these matters were not implemented by the ones responsible for the aforementioned actions. The informed them about his refusal to allow any derogation from the agreements and treaties between the two parties, emphasizing that it was customary for the Ottoman government to be a friend to France's friends and an enemy to its enemies³¹.

The French court not only made complaints to the Sublime Porte but also exerted efforts to ensure the punishment of the leaders responsible for causing losses to France. One such leader was Rais Murad Al-Arnaouti, who seized two French ships in 1582. In response, the Ottoman Sultan assigned the new Pasha of Algeria to return the prisoners and spoils. Correspondence indicates that the



Sultan's directive emphasized the necessity of apprehending Murad and sending him bound to the Sublime Porte³², However, it seems that this directive met with resistance, as the French sought, after three more years, the return of the same goods, in addition to other spoils accumulated throughout their activities during this period³³.

The sources recall that until the year 1586, diplomatic efforts persisted in trying to recover the cargo from the two ships seized by Rais Murad Al-Kabir. These efforts aimed not only at the return of the seized goods but also at other items looted by the corsairs during a raid on some French vessels. According to the letter included in the documents published by Ernest Chéron, "their transgressions multiply from day to day without any regard from these pirates for the bonds of friendship or the orders given to them"³⁴.

On (21 January 1591), the Sublime Porte sent a decree requesting that a distinguished French personality, captured by Algerian pirates, is sent to Istanbul The content of the message was as follows: "The province of Brest, to which Count de Petrault-Orgaud belonged, had its son, named Ouatatou, seized when he was traveling on one of the ships to France by the chief and vali, Muhammad, affiliated with the pirates of Algiers. He was captured alongside the ship and taken to Algiers as a captive. Upon learning of this incident, we request the immediate dispatch of this individual, bound and confined, to the Sublime Porte. Despite writing to the maritime governor Hassan regarding this matter to promptly send the captive to Istanbul, we have not received any response from him. Therefore, upon receipt of this order, we

instruct you to adhere to its provisions and work on sending this individual without delay to Istanbul, with no excuses accepted"³⁵.

Based on the preceding information, we can deduce the following:

- Firstly, the excessive interest of the Sublime Porte in this individual and redirecting them to Istanbul instead of releasing them in Algeria, despite the latter being geographically closer to France. This raises questions about whether they intended to deliver the individual personally to the French consul, demonstrating the Sublime Porte's cooperation with France and its ability to consistently find solutions to France's complaints against the rulers of the Maghreb provinces.

- Secondly, the emphasis on sending the individual bound raises two possibilities:

1- The first possibility might involve the fluctuating Ottoman-French relations, with the Sublime Porte retaining control over this individual as a bargaining chip against France. This possibility lacks a definitive answer, and further in-depth research into the intricacies of this case may provide more insight.

2- The second possibility revolves around a lack of trust in the Algerian Diwan, and there's a chance of collusion with the Qaboudan Hasan Veniziano, who was in charge in Algiers. He may have aligned his actions with what he perceived to be in the best interest of Algiers. It's notable that he did not pay attention to the previous correspondences from the Sublime Porte regarding this issue. His lack of concern and his decision to send the French individual to the Sublime Porte suggests that the insistence on sending the individual bound is to ensure their safety until they reach Istanbul and are handed over to France. This seems to be a more plausible explanation for the circumstances of this case.

In the same case, another decree was issued to the Pasha of



Algiers, "Khodr," sent on the (28 June 1591). The decree mentions his non-compliance with orders regarding the case of "Count Petro Orgadetik." The Sublime Porte decided to send high-profile prisoners to the state center and informed the governors of the provinces along the coast, including the Governor of Algiers, of this decision. It occurred that some ship captains did not comply with the decree, keeping such prisoners in their possession to sell them at high prices. When the Sublime Porte found it out, the captains justified their actions by claiming that these individuals had been captured on merchant ships or small frigates, not on larger vessels. According to the previous letter, Rais Dali Mohammed had captured a prince of the dhimmis while on his way to France and intended to keep him instead of sending him to the Sublime Porte due to his prestigious status. This made the Ottoman imperial council angry, prompting it to issue a stern order to the Pasha of Algiers, demanding that the mentioned prisoner is dispatched on a Jakdor-type ship in a prompt and mandatory manner³⁶, The Pasha was warned of reprimand if he showed any negligence in complying with the order³⁷.

Also, the third decree to Pasha "Khodr" of Algiers, dated (1April 1592), addressed the issue of high-profile prisoners. The Sublime Porte decided that such prisoners be sent to Istanbul, refraining from keeping them in provincial centers or selling them to foreign countries directly at sea, regardless of the ships they were aboard. Captains were not permitted to retain them, even if they claimed that these prisoners were captured on ships other than galleys. The Pasha of the Western Algerian provinces was

instructed not to allow corsairs to keep or sell this type of prisoners. Instead, they were to be sent bound to Istanbul. The Sublime Porte requested personal intervention from Pasha Khodr to promptly retrieve and send the captured princes without delay. Another order underlined that corsairs were inspecting foreign ships, including commercial ones traveling between foreign ports, capturing passengers, including princes, whom they sold at low prices on foreign coasts without bringing them to Algiers. The Sublime Porte requested that such prisoners be handed over to the governor of Algiers, who would then send them to Istanbul"³⁸.

The confrontation with the French did not end, and this time the focus was on the ruler of Tunis. The Sublime Porte sent a warning to Ottoman Dey of Tunis on (2 September 1607), accusing him of collusion with the ruler of his province, mistreating French subjects, and those intending to visit Annaba. This was presented by the French ambassador in Istanbul, highlighting the Dey's disobedience to the orders of the Sublime Porte. The decree stated: " Upon receipt of this order, we command you to adhere to the provisions of Sharia, not to slacken or neglect its implementation, and to send all defiant soldiers and sailors to the Sublime Porte in compliance with this imperial decree " ³⁹.

From the above, we can conclude that issues of piracy, maritime jihad, and prisoners in the Maghreb provinces defined the principles and foundations of Franco-Ottoman relations. The escalating activity of Maghreb naval forces against French ships hindered the course of these relations, necessitating direct intervention by the Sublime Porte through imperial decrees to the rulers and leaders of these provinces, emphasizing the imperative of refraining from hostilities against France and the recovery of loot and prisoners in case of an attack. This indicates the Sublime Porte's commitment to the peace treaty with France, despite the



Mediterranean circumstances at the time, compelling Maghreb sailors to surpass this treaty.

5. French Privileges in Ottoman Territories (Coral Hunting and Trade):

The system of foreign privileges in the Ottoman Empire was not exclusive to the 10th century Hijri (16th century); rather, the Ottomans had known it since their inception. The Ottoman state inherited this type of treaties, making it a fundamental condition for trade between the Ottoman Empire and the states bound by peace and trade treaties. During this period, privileges gained particular importance for European countries, including France, which began to seek suitable opportunities to obtain economic and trade privileges in the Maghreb Ottoman provinces. These privileges included coral hunting and the right to Mediterranean trade. This was secured through imperial decrees and treaties concluded by the Ottoman Sultans in the form of concession systems, ensuring that France could conduct its activities in these regions with absolute ease. Did France indeed benefit from these privileges, and did it continue to enjoy them throughout this period?

5. 1. The French sought the privilege of coral hunting in Algeria:

The Algerian and Tunisian coasts were renowned for their coral, which attracted the ambitions of European countries, including France. Exploiting its good relations with the Ottoman Empire, France sought the exclusive privilege of coral hunting. This privilege was granted to the Marseille Company, established in 1561, to hunt coral on the eastern coasts of Algeria, with the approval of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. The company set up

centers between Guelma, Annaba, and El Kala, agreeing to pay 1500 gold ecus to Algeria. However, there is no information available in Ottoman archival documents regarding the French exploitation of coral hunting before the year 1578, the period covered by this historical account. According to the available records, some French merchants submitted a request to the Sublime Porte seeking approval for coral hunting in the area known as Arqariz⁴⁰. The ruler mentioned that the Genoese used this location for coral hunting, and their relationship with the Ottoman state might have deteriorated during that period, prompting them to abandon their coral hunting grounds. The French took advantage of this situation and sought permission from the Sublime Porte to replace the Genoese. The Sublime Porte issued a decree to the Beylerbey of Algeria, who agreed to allow the French to exploit coral in the area. According to the decree, the French were required to pay ten percent of their coral harvest to the state treasury. The Sublime Porte prohibited interference in their affairs and warned the governor of Algeria not to permit the French to build a fortress in the area they were hunting in, as stated in the following document: "... Upon his arrival, prevent anyone from stopping (the French fishermen) from coral hunting in the mentioned location and interfering in their affairs, provided that they pay ten percent of their coral harvest to the treasury. Also, prevent them from building a fortress there or establishing any connection with the area in any form"⁴¹.

5. 2.The Ottoman state demands its provinces not to interfere with French commercial ships and to facilitate their mission:The Ottoman state attached great importance to its relations with France, emphasizing the need for its provinces to consider this. It sent an order to Ramadan Pasha of Tunis after a complaint was made by the French ambassador residing in the



Ottoman state. The complaint stated that the customs of the port of Tunis and its workers were imposing illegal taxes on French commercial ships, as mentioned in the following document: "... The customs and port workers are taking fees for the transport and unloading of goods from French commercial ships. They have also imposed a tax for the right to anchor in the port. These goods, whether owned by merchants or the province, have been subject to damage and loss due to the workers' theft. In order to put an end to these practices, our noble orders were sent to Ramadan Pasha, instructing him to abolish these practices and refrain from demanding payment for the transportation of goods and anchoring fees from commercial ships. He was also directed to stop the workers from causing damage to the merchants and state funds, and to abolish these imposed fees"⁴².

From the above we can conclude that the privileges France obtained from the Sublime Porte in the Maghreb provinces granted it a distinguished position, both legally and practically. The concession for coral fishing yielded immense profits, contributing to its economic advantage. Simultaneously, the privilege of trade and the protection of its merchant ships led to a widespread commercial resurgence. It is worth noting that the French privileges and commercial interests are closely linked to international diplomacy, which defined the course of France's relations with the Sublime Porte and its Maghreb provinces during the period covered by this research.

6. The Ottoman Empire emphasizes the export of grains to France despite the existing friendship between them:

Despite the Ottoman Empire being bound by treaties of peace and friendship with the French government, the Sublime Porte adopted a policy of strictness in selling grains to France. This might be attributed to the requirements of Ottoman diplomatic policy and cautious cooperation at the time. The Ottoman authorities considered grains a cornerstone of their food security, leading them to emphasize the sale and export of grains to European countries, independent of their hostile or peaceful relationship. To ensure strict control over this, the Ottoman Sultans issued a series of royal decrees to the governors of the Maghreb provinces, instructing them to prohibit transactions related to the sale and export of grains to France and to file complaints against any violations in this matter. What are the manifestations of this policy?

6. 1. Food security for the Ottoman state is a red line: The food security has been a concern for every country since ancient times and continues to be so. It was natural for the Ottoman Empire to prioritize it, especially grains due to their central role in nutrition. The Ottoman state emphasized the issue of exporting and selling grains, especially to hostile countries facing economic hardship. In pursuit of this, numerous strict decrees were issued to alert the judges and governors of Ottoman provinces not to sell grains, especially in the Maghreb provinces, given their close geographic proximity to and confrontation with enemy countries. Even if these Maghreb provinces had friendly relations with the Sublime Porte, they were not allowed to sell grains without the Sultan's approval. The term "friendly countries" in that period referred specifically to France, which, despite the strains in its relationship with the Ottoman state, was deprived of this privilege. The decrees emphasized the necessity of selling grains to the Sublime Porte, and this could only be done by sending special ships from Istanbul equipped with sultanic orders for their transportation. The Sublime



Porte insisted on guarding the ships responsible for transporting grains at sea, anticipating piracy and attacks by enemy ships. Castle fighters were appointed to guard these ships. The quantity of loaded grains, the purchase price, and the responsibility of the ships carrying the grains not to sell them elsewhere, or to infidels at sea, but to deliver them and receive a delivery receipt, were all documented. The Sublime Porte ordered the confiscation of foreign ships tasked with purchasing grains, allowing them no leeway regardless of their ownership and detaining their leaders. The matter was presented to the Sublime Porte, which threatened judges with dismissal and punishment if they failed in their duties and were lax through accepting to sell grains from their jurisdictions to ships not coming from Istanbul by sultanic order or selling them secretly to foreign infidels. Moreover, they were warned not to confiscate the ships belonging to foreign states that came to their regions to purchase grains and not to inform the state about these ships⁴³.

The Sublime Porte did not content itself with warning judges against violating the instructions related to the prohibition of supplying foreign infidels with grains. It also requested the ruler of the Mediterranean islands to adhere to this matter as well. It instructed the confiscation of any ship loaded with grains, regardless of its owner, and bringing it to Istanbul. There was also a demand not to protect anyone who breaches the embargo, as stated in this document: "In the event of encountering a ship loaded with grains, do not allow its passage and confiscate it, regardless of its owner, bringing it to my attention. This matter is of particular

concern to me, so adhere to it, and seize, according to my order, ships loaded with grains contrary to my sultanic order at sea, and do not shelter anyone"⁴⁴.

Due to the importance and sensitivity of the matter concerning the food security of the Ottoman state, and its responsibility towards all its inhabitants, the Sublime Porte emphasized this point, as mentioned earlier. The Sublime Porte adopted a stern tone to the extent of threatening officials with the penalty of execution. Another decree was issued to the Admiral of the Ottoman fleet, Hasan bin Khair al-Din Pasha, in the year 1568, regarding the confiscation of ships that violate the ban on transporting grains to foreign infidels. The decree stated that a violation of the ban on selling grains from Ottoman territories to foreign infidels had been recorded. The Sublime Porte reiterated its request to confiscate ships carrying grains without the state's approval, regardless of the profitability of these ships. The Sublime Porte also demanded to be informed of the names of those responsible for violating the ban and the profitability of ships loaded with grains⁴⁵.

Approximately 19 years after the initial decree, in the year 1586, the Sublime Porte reiterated its warning regarding the actions of Frankish merchant ships purchasing grains from districts located on the Ottoman coasts. The Sublime Porte ordered Admiral Kalaj Ali not to be indulgent on the issue of smuggling grains. The decree reported that foreign ships were reported smuggling grains from the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea to foreign countries. The ruling stated that these ships approached the shores under the pretext of their crews needing food, then took the grains. Therefore, a strongly-worded order was issued to the judges in Ottoman ports to prevent ships from transporting grains unless they had an explicit permission to do so⁴⁶.



In the year 1593, the Sublime Porte issued a decree to the judges of the Mediterranean, prompted by reports of foreign infidels being supplied with grains despite the imposed ban. This decree served as a warning to the judges along the Mediterranean coast, holding them responsible for non-compliance with orders on the ban or their inability to deal with it as required. The Sublime Porte considered them accountable for violating the ban and thus deserving to be reprimanded. The Sublime Porte instructed the judges to provide those entrusted with transporting grains to Istanbul with a sultanic order specifying the quantity in their mandate. They were also directed to appoint castle fighters escorts for each ship and send them to Istanbul. It appears that some leaders were presenting forged orders allowing them to procure and transport grains to foreign infidels. Therefore, the Sublime Porte urged the judges to disregard these orders, withdraw them from their holders, and send them to the Sublime Porte. The Sublime Porte tightened its measures in this regard, requesting the execution of any government official attempting to circumvent the order and sell grains to foreign infidels under the pretext of sending them to Istanbul. It also called for the confiscation of ships belonging to those who disobeyed the order, their discipline, and threatened judges with punishment if they showed negligence in enforcing these measures⁴⁷.

6. 2.The French Bastions exceed their limits and engage in prohibited trade: The Bastion Port is considered one of the most important ports in the state of Algeria, both militarily and commercially. It has attracted the attention of many European

countries and served as an economic hub facilitating trade between French and Ottoman merchants. Despite the imposed ban on European countries, especially when it comes to foodstuffs, with grains at the forefront, smuggling was endemic through the Bastion Port. It seems that the French had specific goals for this port, aiming to transform it into a quasi-military base in the absence of supervision. When Khidr Pasha assumed the governorship of Algeria, he sent a report to the Sublime Porte warning of suspicious activities conducted by the French in the Bastion Port. This included dealing in contraband and supplying their country with grains. Khidr Pasha informed the Sublime Porte that the French were constructing towers, shelters, and fortresses, and that enemies were converging on the port. In response, the Sublime Porte issued a decree to Khidr Pasha, requesting an investigation into the matter, disciplining those involved in hostile activities, demolishing the towers, shelters, and fortresses they had erected in violation of agreements, and prohibiting them from constructing new buildings⁴⁸.

From the aforementioned, it is worth noting that the Sublime Porte's policy was stringent in its commercial dealings with France, especially concerning the sale and export of grains. This policy was a response to the Sublime Porte's reliance on grain products, particularly wheat, as a primary food source. This, in turn, represented a food security concern for the Ottoman Sultans. Consequently, they worked to tighten the transactions involving the sale and export of grains, imposing penalties on those who circumvented the regulations and engaged in smuggling.

7. Conclusion:

The research paper concludes with several key points:

- Ottoman-French relations were characterized by political and diplomatic rapprochement, driven by the Mediterranean context in



the western basin of the Mediterranean Sea.

- The Ottoman-Maghreb-French rapprochement arose due to the common enemy represented by the Spanish threat under King Charles V. The Sublime Porte supported France against Spain in wars via material and military assistance. In return, France informed the Sublime Porte about Spain's movements and intentions to control certain Maghrebi ports.
- Issues like piracy, maritime jihad, and prisoners represented significant aspects of the relationship between the Sublime Porte, its Maghrebi provinces, and France during the 16th century.
- The Ottoman Empire achieved a prominent position in the 16th century, playing a key role in maintaining the political balance in Europe. This position allowed France to emerge as a national power with the assistance of the Ottoman fleet, which served as a protector of its western flank against potential attacks, especially from Spain and its allies.
- The Ottoman-French rapprochement provided an opportunity for the Sublime Porte to show religious tolerance towards European Christians in general and the French in particular. This was formalized through the terms of the 1536 Treaty between Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent and King Francis I, granting freedom of religion and worship to the French, in accordance with Islamic principles.
- The Ottoman-French rapprochement was primarily driven by mutual interests. France aimed to adopt a flexible policy towards the Sublime Porte in preparation for its colonial intentions, which eventually manifested in military wars affecting the Maghrebi

provinces in the following centuries.

8. Citations

¹ - Battle of Pavia: which took place between Francois I and Charles V, King Francois I invaded Italy, beginning with the siege of Pavia. However, he was surprised by a German army that inflicted a crushing defeat on him, and he was forced to surrender and was taken as a prisoner to Spain. For more information, see:

- AL-BATRĪQ, 'Abd Al- Hamid , and NAWĀR, 'Abd Al-'Aziz , *al-Tarīh al'ūrūbī al-ḥadīth min 'aṣr al-nnahda'ilā ' awahir al-qarn al-ttamin 'aṣar*

Dār al-fikr al-'arabī, Cairo, 1995 AD, p 70 .

² - GĀṬṬĀS, 'Ā'iṣa, *Al- 'alāqāt al-ḡazā'iriyya al -Faransiyya hilala al-qarn al-ssābi' 'aṣar (1619-1694)*, Master's thesis, modern history specialization, supervised by Moulay Belhamissi, University of Algiers, 1984, p 4.

³ - RĀ'ISĪ, Idris Al-Nāṣir, *al- ' Alāqāt al - 'uṭmāniyya al- 'ūrūbiyya fī al-qarn 16m,*

dār al-huda liṭṭibā'a wa al-nnaṣr, Lebanon, ed. n 1, 2007, p94 .

⁴ - BIK, Muḥammad Farīd, *Tarih al-ddawla al- 'aliyya al- 'uṭmāniyya*, ed. n°2. Without a year of publication, without a place of publication, p 209.

For further information on the subject, the original text (in Ottoman Turkish) of the Sultan's response is available at:

-Ernest, Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le levant*, Extrait de la correspondance de Rome et de Venise ,4t, Paris, (1848-1860), T1, pp118-119.

⁵ - Haedo: Fray, diego de Haedo : « **Histoire des Rois d'Alger** », Trad. par H.D. Grammont, R.A, t24, 1880, p57.

⁶ -Ernest, Charrière , **op. cit**, T2, p912.

⁷ - B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d, ...(Mühimme Defteri)**, Kutu No.7, Gömlek No.365;17 Rebiyülahir 975/21 Ekim 1567,s 142.

⁸ - B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d...**, Kutu No.7, Gömlek No.355; 22 Rebiyülahir 975/26 Ekim 1567,s 138.

-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d...**, Kutu No.18, Gömlek No.288; 23 Şevval 979/9 Mart 1572, s135.

-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d...**, Kutu No.24, Gömlek No.222; Zilhicce 981./ Mart 1574, s 82.



- B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.6, Gömlek No.1361-1362; 9 Zilhicce 972/ 8 Temmuz 1565, s 618.
- B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.5, Gömlek No.215; 12 Safer 973/8 Eylül 1565, s 94.
- B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.5, Gömlek No.656; 20 Cemaziyelevvel 973/13 Aralık 1565, s 259.
- B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.18, Gömlek No.288; 23 Şevval979/9 Mart 1572, s135.
- The Algerian National Archives, Muhimat dafteri12, hukm 1102, p 579 ; 08 Dhu al-Qi'dah 979 AH / 25 December 1571 AD.
- ⁹-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.7, Gömlek No.365; 17 Rebiyülevvel 975/21Ekim 1567, s 142.
- ¹⁰-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.22, Gömlek No.108; 12 Safer 981/13 Temmuz 1565 , ss 51-52.
- ¹¹ -LAKHAL, Al-Sîh, *Naşât wakālat al- Bāstyūn wa 'aṭaruhu 'alā al-ğazā'iriyya al -Faransiyya hilala al-nnişf al-'awal min al-qarn (17m/11h) (1013-1070h/1604-1659m)*, A Master's degree in modern specialization, supervised by Ibrahim Sayoud, (2012-2013)AD, p.34
- ¹² -FKĀYR, 'Abd al-Qādr, *al- ġazw al-'isbānī lil-ssawāhil al-ğazā'iriyya wa 'āṭāruhu (910-1206 AH / 1505-1792 AD)*, Dār hūma liṭṭibā' a wa al-nnaşr wa al-ttawzī', Algeria, 2012 AD, p182 .
- ¹³-Ernest, Charrière , **op.cit**, T1, pp 624-625.
- ¹⁴-Ernest, Charrière , **op.cit**, T1, pp624-625. et T2, p181.
- ¹⁵ -For more information about this joint campaign, please refer to:
- Ernest Charrière : **op.cit**, T2, p261.
- ¹⁶ - Ibid, T2, p204.
- ¹⁷ - FKĀYR, 'Abd al-Qādr, **op.cit**, p 183.
- ¹⁸ - B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.43, Gömlek No.160; 19 Cemaziyelahir 988/1 Ağustos 1580, s 160.
- ¹⁹ - Charrière:**op.cit**, T4, p300.
- ²⁰ - B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.934; 6 Muharrem1004/11 Eylül 1595, s7.

²¹- B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.934; 6 Muharrem1004/11 Eylül 1595, s7.

²²-Charrière: **op.cit**, T2, p664. et p801. / Braudel: **op.cit**, T2, p303.

²³-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.6, Gömlek No.1361-1362; 9 Zilhicce 972/8 Temmuz 1565, s 618.

²⁴ -The province of Skikda is currently a coastal part of the city of Stora.

²⁵-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.5, Gömlek No.215; 12 Safer 973/8 Eylül 1565 , s 94.

²⁶-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.5, Gömlek No.656; 20 Cemaziyelevvel 973/13 Aralık 1565, s 259.

-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.5, Gömlek No.656; 20 Cemaziyelevvel 973/13 Aralık 1565, s 259.

²⁷ -B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.7, Gömlek No.355; 22 Rebiyülahir 975/26 Ekim 1567,s 138.

²⁸ -The Algerian National Archives, Muhimat dafteri12, hukm 1102, p 579 ; 08 Dhu al-Qi'dah 979 AH / 25 December 1571 AD.

-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.18, Gömlek No.288; 23 Şevval 979/9 Mart 1572, s135.

²⁹ - B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.12, Gömlek No.1102; 9 Zilhicce979/23 Nisan1572, s 579.

³⁰- Charrière: **op. cit**, T3, pp799-800.

³¹-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.43, Gömlek No.160; 19 Cemaziyelahir988/1Ağustos1580, s 160.

³² -The Algerian National Archives, Muhimat dafteri 47, hukm 105, p 41 ; 7 Rabi' al-Awwal 990 AH/1 April 1582 AD.

³³- Charrière: **op. cit**, T4, p124.

³⁴ - Charrière: **op. cit**, T4, p124.

³⁵-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.67, Gömlek No.218; 28 Rebiyülahir 999/22 Şubat 1580, s 124.

³⁶ -Jukdor or Jukdeeri: A type of boat that is propelled by oars and was used in the past for transporting commercial goods and in naval battles.

ينظر فاضل بيات: المرجع السابق، ص 286.

³⁷- B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.67, Gömlek No.362; 7 Ramazan 999/28 Haziran 1591, s 137.



³⁸-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.70, Gömlek No.415; Recep 1000/ Nisan 1592, s 219.

³⁹-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.76; 9 Cemaziyelevvel 1016/ 2 Eylül 1607, s 219.

⁴⁰- Barqariz: According to the document, it is located between the provinces of Western Algeria and Tunisia, see:

-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.35, Gömlek No.314; 2 Cemaziyelahir 986/5 Ağustos 1578, s 122.

However, I did not find any indication of this name in the mentioned area, and after extensive research, according to my findings, this area is called: Baja, Tabarka (Mtabarka), El Kala, El Bastion, and The pink Cap.

This brigade was established in 1580 AD, but this designation is not mentioned in the document, Daftar al-Rru'ūs, ḥaṭ Hamāyūnī, N° kubah ḡī 238, s 160; Cumatresi 18 Şevval 988. "according to:

-'UḠLĪ , Ḥalil Saḡilī, 'Ihdāt liwā' ḡadīd fī 'awāhir al-qarn al-ssādis 'aṣar yatarakkab min Balad al'inab wa Bastiyūn wa Matbārqa wa qal'at Bāḡa, fī maḡallat al-'asāla, issue 34-35, Algeria, 1976, pp-163 . 169

The areas previously mentioned were exploited by the French for coral hunting, and according to our analysis, we believe that they were named Barqariz as an abbreviation, where the letter "ba" represents Baja and Bastion, the letter "ra" represents Tabarka (Mtabarka), and the letter "qaf" represents Qalaa. The word "riz" is derived from the pink head, translated in French as "Cap Rose."

⁴¹- B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.35, Gömlek No.314; 2 Cemaziyelahir 986/5 Ağustos 1578, s 122.

⁴²-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.40; 22 Safer 987/20 Nisan 1579, s 40.

/ AL-TAMĪM Ī, 'Abd al- Ḡalīl, *Dirāsat fī al-tārīh al-'uṭmānī almaḡāribī hilāla al-qarn 16 m*, manşūrāt mu'assasat al-Tamīmī lil-baḡt al-'ilmī wa al-ma'lūmāt, , Tunisia, May 2009, p245

⁴³-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.3, Gömlek No.427; 16 Muharrem 967/18 Ekim 1559, s 158.

⁴⁴-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.3, Gömlek No.426; 13 Muharrem 967/15 Kasım 1559, s 157.

⁴⁵-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.7, Gömlek No.1650; 4 Muharrem 976/15 Haziran 1558, s 587.

⁴⁶- B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.62, Gömlek No.150; Muharrem 995/ Aralık 1586, s 68.

⁴⁷-B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No71, Gömlek No.709; 8 Zilkade1001/ Aralık1593, s 380.

⁴⁸- B.O.A, **A.DVNS.MHM.d**,..., Kutu No.73, Gömlek No.1252; 18 Şevval1003/26 Haziran1595, s 574.