



## *The U.S. and China's Attitude and Policy to the Iranian Nuclear Question*

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### **Abstract ;**

*Given its geopolitical significance, the Middle East has always been the dominant concern in world politics and foreign policy of major world powers. The region has witnessed foreign powers' intervention for decades. Both American and Chinese relations to the region are long-standing. Policy requirements of the Second World War and the Cold War necessitated superpowers' engagement and involvement in regional affairs, such as the U.S. However, the U.S. restraining influence in the Middle East has paved the way for other foreign powers to increase their engagement and seek a more prominent role. Therefore, China's growing economic presence and involvement in the region has intensified in the last decade. The PRC seeks to recruit regional allies and extend its sphere of influence abroad. After the disclosure of Iran's suspected nuclear programme, the U.S. and China have adopted different approaches and policies to the Iranian nuclear controversy. This work seeks to analyse the U.S. and China's attitudes regarding the nuclear crisis. It examines the nature of the U.S. and China's approaches and policies to the nuclear issue. It also endeavours to provide an understanding of the push factors and objectives of their policies toward Iran.*

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## 1. Introduction

The end of the Second World War marked the U.S. first engagement in Iran. Iran's strategic location along with oil resources were the pull factors behind the American involvement in the Persian Gulf region.<sup>1</sup> The U.S. has been dependent on oil imported from this strategically critical region. The need to maintain the flow of petroleum resources and to preserve Israel's security has been the top priority in the U.S. foreign and defence policy imperatives.<sup>2</sup> Since the U.S. first engagement in the Middle East, Tehran and Washington had enjoyed strong ties and cooperated in many fields. However, the Islamic revolution was a watershed event in their relations that have dramatically deteriorated. The U.S.-Iranian rivalry aggravated as Washington depicted Tehran as a security concern and a sponsor of terrorism that sought to acquire nuclear capabilities while Tehran opposed American interventions and sought to curb its influence in the Middle East.<sup>3</sup>

## 2. The Nuclear Question

Iran's suspected nuclear programme has exacerbated tensions between Iran and America. Washington charges Iran with secretly pursuing a nuclear programme that seeks nuclear weapon capabilities.<sup>4</sup> Although Iranian leaders have repeatedly announced the peaceful nature of their

nuclear enrichment and even most experts assume that Iran is not going to acquire a nuclear weapon soon, the U.S. has pursued several policies to prevent a Nuclear-Armed Iran. However, Iran claims that it has the right to peaceful pursuit of a nuclear energy programme under Article IV of the Non Proliferation Treaty<sup>5</sup> (NPT).<sup>6</sup>

### 2.1 Iran's Motives for Acquiring Nuclear Weapons

Iran's emphasis on developing nuclear weapons is deeply rooted in its defensive motives, including preserving independence and survival of the Revolutionary Regime, preventing any external threat, and withstanding the pressure from foreign powers, mainly the U.S., which is Iran's major adversary. Most importantly, Iranian leaders believe that acquiring a nuclear weapon would enable them to achieve their aspirations and objectives. Given the U.S. conventional military superiority, American military presence in the Middle East region has jeopardised Iran's national security needs. Iran is seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as a means of enhancing its conventional military and deterrent capabilities.<sup>7</sup>

### 2.2. Iran's Nuclear Policy Choices

The future of Iran's nuclear programme is influenced by three critical determinants, such as Iran's external threat perception,

domestic political factors, and technical and material capabilities. Iran is unconcerned with technical and material constraints since it could secure the required resources for its programme. The U.S. and its Western allies will be unable to deny the Iranian regime quest for acquiring a nuclear weapon. The choices of Iranian elites and their critical role in internal politics deeply shape the nuclear decision making process. The decision process over the nuclear issue has been a protracted controversy among Iranian elites. Iran's Nuclear Policymaking Process is heavily dependent on "*external security environment, technical capabilities and resources, and domestic politics.*" These factors are interrelated and their effects on one another are uncertain <sup>8</sup>.

### **3. 3.The U.S. Approach to the Nuclear Issue**

The U.S. has sought to address the Iranian nuclear challenge through several means, including negotiations and diplomacy, imposing economic sanctions, restricting foreign trade and investment in the energy sector, promoting regime change, and increasing Iran's political and economic isolation. Furthermore, Washington has also sought other countries' support for the UN Security Council<sup>9</sup> and its unilateral sanctions to curb Iran's nuclear enrichment activities.<sup>10</sup>

For more than 30 years, the U.S. has imposed sanctions on Iran. Sanctions are intended to increase its political and economic isolation and thus prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities. Sanctions are imposed by the U.N Security Council, the U.S., the European Union<sup>11</sup>

(EU), and others.<sup>12</sup> The U.S. has pursued a policy of trade and financial sanctions against Iran to prevent foreign firms from having economic ties to Iran.<sup>13</sup> Sanctions are planned to exercise influence over Iranian decision-makers, ban imports of materials, resources, assistance, and finances required to Iran's nuclear objectives, and encourage regime change in Iran. Economic sanctions serve as a means for raising the costs of Iran's noncompliance with international demands.<sup>14</sup> However, the U.S. three decades of sanctions against Iran have yielded inconsiderable progress. Under the Reagan<sup>15</sup> administration, the U.S. adopted tougher financial and trade sanctions against Iran that banned arms sales and foreign aids. By 1997, the U.S. restricted all economic activity with the Islamic Republic.

Since 1979, containment has been the main pillar of the U.S. policy.<sup>16</sup> Washington's policy of Dual Containment had been futile and did not reach the intended objective. On the one hand, Tehran restored its political and economic ties with European countries, especially after attempts to improve its records on Human Rights issues. On the other hand, it enhanced its relations with hostile Arab neighbours.<sup>17</sup>

Between 2006 and 2010, the United Nations Security Council had implemented four tougher multilateral sanctions resolutions against Iran: Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929.<sup>18</sup> Several rounds of diplomatic proposals were issued between 2005 and 2013 to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.<sup>19</sup> On 9<sup>th</sup> May 2003, the U.S. Congress

passed an Iran Democracy Act that aimed at supporting opponents of the Iranian government to encourage regime change.<sup>20</sup> In October 2003, under great pressure from the International Atomic Energy Agency<sup>21</sup> (IAEA) and the West, Iran was forced to sign the Additional Protocol (AP) to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that necessitated Iran's cessation of its nuclear programme at Natanz and compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA's) inspectors and commitments. In exchange, the E-3 (France, Germany, and Britain) accepted to resume negotiations with Iran.<sup>22</sup> As Iran refused to adhere to the resolution, the Security Council issued the first UN Security Council resolution on Iran.<sup>23</sup>

In July 2008, the U.S. joined multilateral talks with the UN Security Council's five permanent members China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; plus Germany (P5+1) in Geneva as well as in October 2009. Talks underscored

incentives that could dissuade Iran from going nuclear. More (P5+1) negotiations emphasised on *fuel swaps* and inspections but reached a deadlock. The U.S. and Iran missed several opportunities at direct dialogue due to domestic political constraints, scepticism, and conflict. After the attacks of 11 September, U.S. diplomats and Iranian officials had engaged in direct talks under the United Nations (UN)-sponsored Bonn conference<sup>24</sup> that aimed at creating a new government in Afghanistan and preserve regional stability. Nevertheless, Washington was not concerned with the Iranian willingness to expand cooperation. During the second term of George W. Bush,<sup>25</sup> a report issued by the Iraq Study Group promoted U.S. engagement with Iran. May and July 2007 marked an official direct contact between the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker,<sup>26</sup> and his Iranian counterpart, in Baghdad. Despite the restrictions and the heated debate of these talks, they reduced the risk of military conflict escalation.

**Table 1: Economic Sanctions on Iran**

Sanctions	The United Nations	The United States
<b>Counter– nuclear weapons</b>	Ban the transfer of nuclear, missile, and dual-use items (UNSCR 1737) Prevent provision of financial services that contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive activities (UNSCR 1929) Vigilance in transactions involving Iranian shipping lines (UNSCR 1929)	Sanctions on companies and individuals selling WMD technology (Intelligence Services Act of 1996) Prevents supplier of advanced technology to Iran (Executive Order 13382) Sanctions on foreign individuals and corporations that assist Iran's WMD program (Public Law 106-178) Opposes U.S. nuclear agreements with countries supplying nuclear

		technology to Iran (Public Law 109-293)
<b>Broad-based energy</b>		Restricts international energy investment in Iran (Intelligence Services Act of 1996) Bans sale of refined gasoline, shipping insurance or other services to deliver gasoline, or supplying equipment to Iran or performing construction on its oil refineries (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act of 2010)
<b>Broad-based financial</b>	Restraint in international lending (UNSCR 1747) Vigilance in transactions involving Iranian Central Bank (UNSCR 1803) Vigilance with respect to foreign activities of all Iranian banks (UNSCR 1803)	Bans U.S. trade and investment in Iran (EO 12959) Bans banks from handling any indirect transactions (2006 U.S. Treasury Department restriction) Bans on foreign aid and a vote against international loans (based on Iran's designation as a sponsor of terrorism)
<b>Targeting Revolutionary Guards</b>	Freeze assets of 40 named Iranian persons and entities (UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803) Restraint with respect to travel of 35 named Iranians and the ban on travel of 5 others (UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803) Freeze assets of 41 additional Iranian firms, including 15 linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (UNSCR 1929)	Sanctions Iranian officials who are Human Rights abusers (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act of 2010)

**Source:** Lynn E. Davis, Martini Jeffrey, Alireza Nader, Dalia Dassa Kaye, James T. Quinlivan, and Paul Steinberg. *Iran's Nuclear Future: Critical U.S. Policy Choices*. 2011. P23.

During his campaign, President Obama<sup>27</sup> supported further dialogue with Iran, aspiring substantive and sustained

U.S.-Iranian engagement. In 2008, Iran's Supreme Leader advocated engagement with the United States that would better serve Iranian interests. Early in his

administration, Obama sought to engage with the Iranians without preconditions. In March 2009 multilateral meeting in Afghanistan, in which Iran was invited by Washington, President Obama claimed that his administration sought an enhanced relationship, not regime change. However, his endeavour to approach Iran declined as a result of the Iranian domestic political trends.<sup>28</sup>

Indeed, tighter economic sanctions had influenced the Iranians' way of dealing with the United States and other powers during the negotiations while direct talks and diplomacy prevented direct military conflict. During the talks in Istanbul, the Americans realised that Iranian negotiators became more flexible and willing to resolve the crisis even though no agreement was reached other than to talk again, in Baghdad next month.<sup>29</sup> On 24<sup>th</sup> November 2014, the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and Iran had made three sessions of talks in Geneva, seeking a far-reaching deal.<sup>30</sup>

After years of several multilateral negotiations between Iran and E3/EU + 3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States and the high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), a nuclear deal was signed on 14<sup>th</sup> July 2015.<sup>31</sup> After 18 days of negotiations in Vienna, Iran and six world powers; the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China, had finally reached the intended goal in July 2015.<sup>32</sup> The agreement respects Iran's legitimate right to peaceful nuclear

technology. Under the deal, *"Iran accepts to reduce its uranium enrichment to 3.67% in the next 15 years, to decrease the current number of its uranium enrichment centrifuges by about two-thirds to 6,104 for 10 years, not to build new enrichment facilities; and to assure that its heavy-water reactor will not be used for military purposes."*<sup>33</sup> Iran also promotes further International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards and inspections of its nuclear facilities.<sup>34</sup> In return, the United States and Europe cancelled all economic sanctions imposed on Iran. Furthermore, The U.N. Security Council also removed its sanctions resolutions. However, they maintained an arms embargo on Iran and restrictions on its ballistic missile development. In case Iran endeavoured to breach the deal, it would face sanctions again. Economic sanctions relief was expected to increase Iran's oil production and exports, Rouhani said: *"If this deal is implemented correctly... We can gradually eliminate distrust" with the international community.*<sup>35</sup>

#### ***4. The Sino-Iranian Relations in the Context of History and China's Policy to the nuclear crisis***

It is assumed that there is no historical or long-standing relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Middle East. China's approach to the Middle East is widely determined by its great Muslim population. China's foreign policy towards the Islamic world influences China's Muslims. The Middle East has been a critical area for China's strategic interests. Its historical relations to the region are not long-standing but its

cooperative relations are prosperous, particularly in trade, investment, and energy. Geographical proximity and common religious and cultural values have further strengthened these relations. Relations between both regions trace back to the sixth century. The existence of Arab traders and diplomats dates to (618-907) in the port cities of the southeastern coast, in particular Quanzhou, Changzhou and Guangzhou (Canton) that were known as important commercial centres.<sup>36</sup>

The Sino-Iranian relations and cooperation date back to the 1970s. Several factors have contributed to both nation's rapprochement, including the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s and the Shah's fear of Soviet penetration in Iran and the Gulf. The Sino-Iranian partnership shapes the regional security of East Asia and the Middle East. China has become the second-largest world economy, highlighting the need to secure its energy supply in the light of the U.S. dominance of energy resources in the Middle East. Therefore, China had to cultivate close ties with regional powers, namely Iran to preserve its interests.

Iran has been a priority in China's foreign policy and a critical ally in the Middle East. China's approach to the Iranian nuclear issue is driven by preserving its strategic interests in the region.<sup>37</sup> Two critical factors have formed the basis of the Sino-Iranian relationship, China's economic interest and its growing rivalry with the U.S.<sup>38</sup> Energy supply is the main pillar of the Sino-Iranian partnership that prevents China from approving economic sanctions on Iran's nuclear

programme. For China, economic growth and energy security are the cornerstone of its legitimacy. China's quest for energy security requires the PRC to cultivate and maintain friendly relations with the Middle East Islamic states. Beijing has to pursue its national interests in the region by preventing conflict over Iran's nuclear programme.<sup>39</sup>

During the 1980s, Beijing had provided nuclear assistance to Iran and built a research reactor and a uranium hexafluoride enrichment plant. However, international inspections compelled China to cease its assistance to Iran while some companies had maintained their support and provided Iran with restricted materials.<sup>40</sup> The PRC had assisted Iran's nuclear programme by sending entire factories for producing chemicals, providing support to Iran's chemical weapons programme, and transferring nuclear technology and know-how to Iran's civilian nuclear programmes.<sup>41</sup>

The Chinese leadership has never been concerned with the spread of nuclear or Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD. In 1982, China started to advocate the principles of nuclear non-proliferation. Nevertheless, it maintained its assistance to nuclear programmes in Pakistan, Algeria, and Iran during the 1980s. However, Nuclear weapons tests in May 1998 by India and Pakistan heightened China's concerns over the implications of nuclear proliferation, particularly among China's regional rivals such as Korea, Japan, or Taiwan. Therefore, the PRC adopted a more assertive policy toward the proliferation of chemical and biological

weapons and restrained chemical exports. Since 1992, China adhered to major nonproliferation regimes. In 1997, the U.S. sanctioned two private Chinese companies for exporting chemicals and equipment that could contribute to the development of Iran's chemical weapons programme.<sup>42</sup> In 2014, the U.S. sanctioned a Chinese businessman, Li Fangwei, also known as "Karl Lee,"<sup>43</sup> for providing financial support for Iran.<sup>44</sup>

In 1997, China refrained from assisting Iran's nuclear programme seeking rapprochement with the U.S. and support for its civilian nuclear programme. This stance had deeply affected the Sino-Iranian relations.<sup>45</sup> Although China has assisted Iran's missile systems and nuclear reactors, it has warned against military use of its nuclear programme.<sup>46</sup> In 2012 and 2013, China adopted a harsh stance against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and cut its oil imports from Iran. Furthermore, three Chinese national oil companies- China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) reconsidered their dealings with the Iranian energy sector.<sup>47</sup> The Chinese were concerned with Iran's pursuit of nuclear capabilities despite their strong economic cooperation. Major Chinese firms, such as CNPC, Sinopec, CNOOC, and Zhenrong relinquished their commitments to Iran.<sup>48</sup>

Despite Western countries', particularly the United States, endeavours

to impose increasingly comprehensive and tough sanctions against Iran over its suspected nuclear programme, China has sought to strengthen its energy ties with Iran during the 2000s. Western powers sought, in 2002 and in 2012, to increase Iran's political isolation but China maintained its ties to Tehran and exchanged official visits between leaders of both countries. Economically, the Sino-Iranian cooperation in the energy sector had increased despite Western sanctions. In 2012, China emerged as Iran's major trading partner and a key player in Iran's energy sector. In 2003, after the exposure of Iran's nuclear programme, Washington sought China's cooperation at the IAEA to refer to the Iranian nuclear question to the UNSC but China rejected U.S. demands. Beijing underscored resolving the nuclear issue through negotiations and political discussions. China disapproved the IAEA resolutions against the Iranian nuclear issue.

However, China supported sanctions and resolutions at the IAEA and the UNSC against Iran since 2005, including the resolution of February 4, 2006. Moreover, Beijing along with other permanent members of the UNSC advocated several rounds of sanctions against Iran. Chinese leaders denounced Tehran's nuclear aspirations and sought to dissuade Iran from going nuclear and adhere to International Community requirements. In addition, Beijing restricted its energy ties with Iran.

China's changing attitudes towards Iran is deeply rooted in the U.S. pressure on Beijing regarding the nuclear issue. On



31<sup>st</sup> July, China voted for UNSC Resolution 1696, the first resolution adopted by the Security Council on the Iranian nuclear issue. The resolution stipulated Iran's suspension of its uranium enrichment by August 31, 2006. In case it refused, more economic and political sanctions would be imposed on Iran (UNSC 2006). On November 27, 2009, China voted for the IAEA resolution on "*censuring Iran's nuclear enrichment facility at Qom.*" US officials regarded that vote as "*a direct result*" of Obama's visit. In June 2010, China voted for UNSC Resolution 1929 that authorized the UNSC to impose a fourth round of sanctions against Iran over its suspected nuclear weapons programme.<sup>49</sup>

Iran's suspected nuclear programme has been deemed the major security concern to the U.S. interests in the Middle East. Therefore, Washington has sought to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran by adopting several policies. The main pillar of the U.S. approach to the Iranian nuclear controversy has been international sanctions and diplomatic engagement. The strong cooperative relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran has thwarted the U.S. endeavours and policies to dissuade and influence Tehran. The U.S. has sought to exercise some leverage on China and gain its cooperation on imposing sanctions on Iran so that its policy could be productive.<sup>50</sup> Although sanctions aimed at isolating Iran and halting trade and economic ties between Iran and other countries, China has maintained its investment in Iran's energy sector. Furthermore, Iranian and Chinese banks

have preserved their ties.<sup>51</sup> China took advantage of sanctions on Iran by securing access to its abundant energy resources and being its major economic partner.

The ailing Iranian economy has suffered from the deep impact of the four rounds of UN Security Council, international sanctions, and unilateral U.S. sanctions. China's support has eased Iran's political and economic international isolation. China has increasingly boosted its economic cooperation with Iran after three rounds of UN Security Council sanctions preceding UN Security Council Resolution 1929 as an endeavour to moderate its effect on Iran. Some Chinese foreign policy analysts perceived China's strategy as an attempt to gain leverage on Tehran and to stand for international pressure on Beijing to approve sanctions on Iran. China's assistance has influenced the implementation of the 2011 legislation passed by the U.S. Congress against Iran's Central Bank and lessened the effect of Iran's isolation from the global financial system.<sup>52</sup> After two years of several diplomatic proposals and negotiations between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council--the United States, Britain, China, France and Russia--plus Germany (P5+1) and Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was endorsed to prevent Iran from joining the nuclear club and dismantle its nuclear activities.<sup>53</sup>

## 5. Conclusion:

To understand the policies of the U.S. and China toward the Iranian nuclear controversy, one needs to examine the

historical background of their relationship, geopolitical and strategic interests, and objectives. The U.S. policy choices to the crisis are influenced by its endeavours to secure its regional interests from the political and security threat that emanated from a nuclear-armed Iran. The rivalry and competitive relationship between Tehran and Washington stem from their conflicting interests in the region. Iran's quest for dominance has challenged the U.S. undisputed leadership in the region. Since the revelation of Iran's suspected nuclear programme, the U.S. has pursued several policies to prevent the military dimension of Iran's nuclear programme. Economic sanctions have been the backbone of the American policy. Washington has sought to contain Iran at the economic and political level while preventing foreign commercial and political ties with the Islamic Republic. Sanctions have severely affected the Iranian economy and influenced decision making.

China has also been an active participant and retained a role in this issue. The PRC is deemed Iran's top trading partner and a critical ally. China's economic growth and geostrategic interests have strengthened the Sino-Iranian ties. China seeks to secure vast oil and energy resources vital to its growing economic strength. Therefore, it has provided support for Iran's nuclear programme. Furthermore, relations with China have also alleviated the impact of sanctions. The PRC has advocated diplomacy and negotiations to reach a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue.

As an endeavour to curb Iran's nuclear programme and prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon, the U.S. has exerted influence on China to refrain from supporting Iran. Moreover, the U.S. has sanctioned several companies to halt their dealings with the Islamic Republic. Therefore, the steady pressure forced China to approve many sanctions against Iran at the UNSC and restrain its economic dealings. Nevertheless, the strategic value of the region urged the PRC to keep Iran as a reliable ally and source of energy. Despite the U.S. pressure and influence on the bilateral relationship, China maintains its commitments and obligations toward its critical ally. Indeed, the Iranian and Chinese mutual interests and constructive partnership endure the U.S. influence.

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<sup>5</sup> The Treaty that was opened for signature July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970. It has become the most widely adhered-to arms control agreement in history, with over 170 member states. Summary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 1995. *Arms Control Today*. Volume: 25. Issue: 2. P 22+.

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<sup>9</sup> It was constructed as an organ with primary responsibility for preserving peace. It has 15 members. *Columbia Encyclopedia*, 6th ed. The Columbia University Press. 2018.

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<sup>11</sup> Name given since the ratification of the Treaty of European Union 1993 to the European Community (EC), an economic and political confederation of European nations, and other organizations that are responsible for a common foreign and security policy and for cooperation on justice and home affairs. *Columbia Encyclopedia*, 6th ed. The Columbia University Press. 2018.

<sup>12</sup> Lynn E. Davis., Martini Jeffrey, Alireza Nader, Dalia Dassa Kaye, James T. Quinlivan, and Paul Steinberg. 2011. *Iran's Nuclear Future: Critical U.S. Policy Choices*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, p22.

<sup>13</sup> Robert J. Reardon. Op, Cit. P119.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. pp, 133-134.

<sup>15</sup> The 40th president of the United States (1981–89). *Columbia Encyclopedia*, 6th ed. The Columbia University Press. 2018.

<sup>16</sup> James, Dobbins, Alireza Nader, Dalia Dassa Kaye, and Frederic Wehrey. 2011. *Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2011. P 38.

<sup>17</sup> Elton L. Daniel, 2001. *The History of Iran*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, P254.

<sup>18</sup> Robert J. Reardon. Op. Cit. Pp, 135-137.

<sup>19</sup> Kelsey Davenport. March 2016. *Iran Nuclear Deal Implemented*. *Arms Control Today*. Volume: 46. Issue: 2. P 48+. ©

<sup>20</sup> Stephen M. Walt, Mearsheimer, J. John. 2007. *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, pp, 291-294.

<sup>21</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency, independent intergovernmental organization established in 1957 under the aegis of the United Nations to promote safe, secure, and peaceful uses of atomic energy. *Columbia Encyclopedia*, 6th ed. The Columbia University Press. 2018.

<sup>22</sup> Robert J. Reardon. Op. Cit. P15.

<sup>23</sup> Catherine McArdle, Kelleher, and Judith Reppy, eds. 2011. *Getting to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament*. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, P208.

<sup>24</sup> The initial series of agreements passed on December 5, 2001 and intended to re-create the State of Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonn\\_Agreement\\_\(Afghanistan\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonn_Agreement_(Afghanistan)) On 02/12/2020.

<sup>25</sup> The 43d President of the United States (2001–2009). *Columbia Encyclopedia*, 6th ed. The Columbia University Press. 2018.

<sup>26</sup> Ryan Clark Crocker is a Career Ambassador within the United States Foreign Service and a recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom. He has served as United States Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait, and Lebanon.  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ryan\\_Crocker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ryan_Crocker)  
. On 02/12/2020.

<sup>27</sup> The 44th president of the United States (2009–2017). Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed. The Columbia University Press. 2018.

<sup>28</sup> James, Dobbins, Alireza Nader, Dalia Dassa Kaye, and Frederic Wehrey. Op .Cit. Pp74-77.

<sup>29</sup> Scott, Peterson. 1 May 2012. "Iran Nuclear Talks: Are Sanctions on the Table?" The Christian Science Monitor.

<sup>30</sup> Rachelle, Marshall. January/February 2014. "Kerry Faces Down Israel and Its Lobby to Achieve Agreement with Iran." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs: 8+.

<sup>31</sup> Kelsey Davenport. Op. Cit.

<sup>32</sup> "Top News Advisory for Tuesday, July 14, 2015." The Canadian Press. 14 July 2015.

<sup>33</sup> "EDITORIAL: Framework Deal with Iran Is Milestone to Stop Nuclear Weapons Development." The Daily Yomiuri (Toyko, Japan) 5 Apr. 2015.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> "EDITORIAL: Will Iran Nuclear Deal Be Turning Point in Path toward Middle East Stability?" The Daily Yomiuri (Toyko, Japan) 17 July 2015.

<sup>36</sup> Hannah Carter. 2004. The Middle East's Relations with Asia and Russia. Anoushiravan Ehteshami. Routledge Curzon. New York. Pp 42-43.

<sup>37</sup> Christina Y. Lin. 2010, "China, Iran, and North Korea: A Triangular Strategic Alliance." Middle East Review of International Affairs (Online), vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 50+.

<sup>38</sup> Alireza Nader. Scott Harold. 2012. China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations. Rand. Santa Monica, CA. Pp, 9-15.

<sup>39</sup> Brown, Kerry. March 2010. Best Friends with Beijing. The World Today. Volume: 66. Issue: 3. 4+.

<sup>40</sup> Leavenworth, Stuart. 2014. China, Iran 'Strategic Partners' ; U.S. Seeks Arrest Related to Iran's Nuclear Program. The Charleston Gazette (Charleston, WV). May 7, P 10A.

<sup>41</sup> Daniel L. Byman. Roger. 1999. Cliff. China's Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications. Rand. Santa Monica, CA. P8.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. pp. 35-39.

<sup>43</sup> Principal and commercial manager of LIMMT Economic and Trade Company, Ltd. (LIMMT); supplies goods to entities involved in Iran's ballistic missile program.  
<https://www.iranwatch.org/suppliers/li-fang-wei>. On 02/12/2020.

<sup>44</sup> Leavenworth, Stuart. Op. Cit. P 10.

<sup>45</sup> Alireza Nader. Scott Harold. Op. Cit. P 8.

<sup>46</sup> Leavenworth, Stuart. Op. Cit. P 10.

<sup>47</sup> Wu, Fuzuo. January-March 2015. China's Puzzling Energy Diplomacy toward Iran. Asian Perspective. Volume: 39. Issue: 1. 47+.

<sup>48</sup> Alireza Nader. Scott Harold. Op. Cit. Pp, 9-15.

<sup>49</sup> Wu, Fuzuo. Op. Cit.

<sup>50</sup> Alireza Nader. Op. Cit. P ix.

<sup>51</sup> Lynn E. Davis, Jeffrey Martini, Alireza Nader, Dalia Dassa Kaye, James T. Pp. 14-24

<sup>52</sup> Alireza Nader. Scott Harold. Op. Cit. Pp, 9-15.

<sup>53</sup> Ganaie, Muzaffar Ahmad. April 2018. The Iran Nuclear Deal: Is It Hurting Global Nuclear Order? IUP Journal of International Relations. Volume: 12. Issue: 2. P 7.