

Algeria: a problematic development

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Introduction

In 1955, the meeting of Bandoeng, between African and Asian countries, symbolized the emergence of third world countries on the international scene. The Vietnamese victory over France, the Algerian revolution, the nationalization of the Suez canal, the Cuban revolution, the Vietnamese war against the United States of America; were all important moments in history that allowed so much hopes for the third world. Later, in the beginning of the 1970's, the non-aligned countries' proposition for a new world order seemed to indicate that third world peoples had acquired a level of conscience and maturity such as to allow for future prosperity.

But defeats and disillusion quickly replaced victories and hopes. Civil wars, borders wars, ethnic wars, religious wars and clans wars keep on reminding the world the deep, chronic and structural inequalities that characterize the world in general and the third world in particular. From time to time, the conscience of the world community is brutally awakened by pictures of genocide, boat people desperately trying to escape the horror of their daily life; pictures that express in a dramatic way the incapacity of political regimes to satisfy vital needs of the most deprived social groups. Signs of growing social inequalities and mal development are everywhere: little islands of prosperity in the mid of the most indescribable misery, overpopulated cities, a miserable countryside that young people leave because it does not have anything left to offer, an equipment that is most of the time out of order, a paralyzing bureaucracy, corruption, clientelism, etc. These are some of the characteristics of an unequal, uneven and disarticulated model of development that propulses a minority to the summit of wealth and prosperity, and at the same time, marginalizes the majority of the population. In its 1993 report, the United Nations Development Program notes the following failures [1]:

- Some 60 countries live interior conflicts and about 35 million people are refugees or moved in their own country.
- Approximately 1.3 billion people (almost a third of the global population) live in absolute poverty.
- Only 20% of the 300 million people over the age of sixty have a somewhat guaranteed revenue.
- Some 800 million people still do not have a sufficient alimentation.
- About 17 million people die each year of infectious or bacterial diseases.
- 34000 children still die of malnutrition and disease in their early childhood.
- 35% of the adult population (about 1 billion people) are still illiterate.
- 2/3 of the illiterates are women.

These are some telling data about the situation of the third world. But a fundamental fact, not at all quantifiable, and whose consequences are far more serious for the present and the future of the third world, is the feeling of powerlessness of third world people and their profound belief that they have no solution to the great challenges as the elimination of poverty, ignorance, diseases, etc. This state of mind, a qualitative variable, cannot be included at the present time in the calculation of the human development index. Those who were in charge of the development of the third world have a great responsibility in this state of mind. Third world elites have always blamed the developed countries for all the problems that face them, but they never address the contradictions of their own societies. At the same time, their faith in the developed countries' models of development remains profound. Thus, to address the problems of their countries, they automatically turn to the developed countries for ready made and prepackaged technologies, techniques and processes that they think would be the solution [2]. To gain access to this "solution", third world elites have to deal with a complex world system whose mechanisms they often do not comprehend or do not master. By the time they have made more political concessions and got more indebted, they often realize that "the solution" is obsolete or inadequate because their reality is so different from that for which the solution was prepared. In the mean time, third world problems have become more complex and the legitimacy and credibility of the elite are questioned with more and more violence.

Algeria could not escape the movement that characterized all of the third world. Model for the third world during the 1970's, Algeria is searching today for a model. And the most ironical is that some of the poorest countries on earth, led by the most oppressive and totalitarian political regimes, have become models for an important part of the Algerian people. It is a powerful expression of failure of a development model. What happened during some forty years of independence so that an important part of the population, mostly young people, aspires only to one thing, leaving the country? What led Algeria to such a crisis?

Political scientists, economists, sociologists and other intellectuals, armed with leading theories of the 1960's and 1970's, focused on the natural resources and the political capital that Algeria disposed of as a result of its revolution. This later was supposed to help rally and mobilize third world countries in order to end different mechanisms of transfer of wealth from the third world to developed countries. During all that period, the elites in power knew how to effectively take advantage of the political capital conferred by the Algerian revolution in order to benefit from the natural resources of the country; resources that were supposed to serve the building of a strong and modern State that would insure development. But in the absence of any participation of the people to the conception of a social project, and since the elite did not have any legitimacy, they ended up building their own State and conceiving their own development. Once an influent member of the non-aligned countries, Algeria succeeded in making considerable gains at the level of international exchange using its primary natural resource, oil. A considerable part of oil revenues was used to "buy" the silence of the people and allow the elites in power to pursue their social project without any problem. An enormous bureaucracy

was established in order to manage these revenues. The State that was meant to be strong and modern became a huge bureaucratic machine that modernized the management of oil revenues in the sense that each "citizen" was receiving now "his part" of oil in the form of imported goods, housing, employment, education and free health care [3]. The providence State was born, distributing revenues without any counterpart. And development became a simple mimicry, blind and stupid, of practices that made other countries develop [4]. Thus, workers pretended to go to work without really working, but feeling that employment was an absolute right, they received wages and demanded more. Students pretended to study without really making any effort to get a knowledge and deserve their degrees. The State distributed benefits to production units that did not produce anything and pretended that they did. Everybody pretended, and in appearance, Algeria was developing. Oil revenues concealed everything. The people and the providence-state tacitly accepted a sort of social contract. The State was satisfying the population's basic needs and the people did not interfere with the project of the elite. A seeming political stability was reached, and social peace seemed to reign. Algeria became a "model" of development for the third world.

And the more oil prices went up, the more development took the appearance of reality. Oil revenues becoming important and consumption needs growing, the elite decided in the beginning of the 1980's to import more consumption goods rather than equipment goods. Workers still pretended to work, production units still did not produce but nothing mattered since supermarkets were full of consumption goods. Development was understood this way. And from confusion to confusion, notions of merit, work, competence slowly disappeared and Algerians expected everything from the State without having to make any effort. Once oil prices went down and the State became unable to satisfy all people's demands, the social, economic and political crisis became unavoidable. The Algerian people, seduced by a model of consumption, that of societies where people do not only consume but also produce, but well settled in a culture of inertia, could not accept that there were less goods to distribute. In October 1988, an unprecedented social unrest expressed people's dissatisfaction over the way oil revenues were managed. The elite was accused of embezzling those revenues. In April 2001, riots of a great magnitude swept the Kabyle region and then extended to other regions as well. Rioters were brutally repressed by armed forces. The rejection of an archaic mode of governance was clearly expressed.

Development as a voluntaristic project

Development as a voluntaristic project, is an oriented, organized and managed social change. It bears a project of society. It presupposes a policy, strategies and means to achieve goals. It necessitates then the establishment of a dynamic system made of interacting elements or subsystems. This system lives in a psychosocial environment made of expectations, aspirations, feelings, attitudes and behaviors that result from the promise of a new society. To analyze development

would mean then to analyze, on the basis of the project of society that is the finality of the system, the interactions of different elements that characterize different subsystems of the global society. To shed some light on development actors' strategies means to analyze the driving of the system, that is its management through time. To drive the system is to adapt strategies whose goal is to induce a durable change in individual as well as collective attitudes and behaviors while taking into consideration the field of forces that could influence the direction and meaning of change. To this purpose, the system must listen to any modification within the psychosocial environment in order to adapt itself and avoid any drifting. One of the main characteristics of the system is then its capacity of adaptation, its flexibility. A system can modify its objectives in relation to changes in the environment or transform this latter instead.

Development as a process that bears a project of society is above all a rejection of a traditional conception of society [5]. The way this latter functions would reproduce an ancestral order which has then to be replaced by a new one that bears progress. The intention then of the project of development is a transformation of a reality perceived as traditional and blocking any possibility of progress. From the point of view of the pilots of development, tradition and modernity are often considered as two antinomic systems. The first one is seen as closed, rigid, static and accepting only conformity to ancestral values. The latter on the other hand is seen as open, flexible, dynamic and allowing evolution and change toward a higher order. This qualitative change is perceived as progress. Tradition does not accept any disorder in the system whereas modernity makes of disorder an essential element that allows the system to adapt itself, thus to change and evolve. The capacity of the system to avoid crises depends on how fast it adapts itself. The primary preoccupation of modernity is the mastery of time and space and the rationalization of their use today more than ever by necessity in a perspective of a sustainable development.

The following table summarizes the essential characteristics of tradition and modernity:

Characteristics of tradition and modernity

| | Tradition (ideal type) | Modernity (ideal type) |
|-------------------|--|--|
| Structures | Closed, rigid, isolated | Flexible, interactive, open |
| Functions | Reproduction of traditional social organization's values | Progress, innovation |
| Culture | Religious, mythical | Scientific, positivistic |
| Processes | Not very differentiated, legible | Complex, changing |
| Behaviors | Repetitive, dependent, subjective | Rational, anticipatory, prospective, creative, anguished |
| Actors | Religious, tribal, charismatic personalities | Political, scientific personalities |
| Purpose | To live with constraints of time and space | Greater control over time and space |

For third world countries, development means the transition from a traditional society to a modern one; the changes made becoming visible at the behavioral level. These changes are met by resistances that express the rejection of the project of society carried by the process of development. Feelings of insecurity, loss of meaning, rumors and mobilization against "enemies" accompany these resistances [6]. This means that change must necessarily be managed and guided by a policy and strategies that involve the populations that are concerned by the project of development and which would then appropriate its goals. Pilots of development often ignore resistance to change and confine themselves in an attitude of denigration of those who resist. Moreover, the inadequate management of development is often characterized by an anarchic evolution toward a future that is presented with the best attributes, a mimicry that ignores the specificity of a society, a self-sufficiency of the project and its pilots and a procedural drifting resulting from a process of planning that strips any action of its particularity. Development becomes then a simple vow wrapped up in a self-justifying ideological discourse of elites searching for legitimacy. The disillusion of those "outprojects", the excluded of the system, is then immense. Their anguished interrogation about the meaning of an individual and collective evolution can then lead to all forms of drifting.

Before 1988, the year of the great popular unrest, two different projects of society, the self-management project and the revolutionary one characterized independent Algeria. The former was the main project during the period 1962-1965, and the latter characterized the period 1965-1988.

Expression of a generous and utopian popular drive after independence, the self-management project quickly generated suspicion and concern of the self-proclaimed legitimate central power. In effect, the spontaneous takeover of the economic infrastructure by teams of workers necessarily privileged the micro-social level instead of the global national. Even though it had a weak and unrealistic content because it counted only on the generosity of the populations and very little knowledge of the economic, social and cultural situation at that time, the self-management project intended to change the nature of the relationship between the local, the regional and the national levels, between the State and the citizen. The project meant in fact a radical transformation of social structures, behaviors and representations. Such a project could only get the elite in power worried. They tried from the beginning to control it through state intervention such as the nomination of directors, accountants and other managers in self-managed companies and farms. Already emptied of its meaning, the self-management project is finally replaced by the "revolutionary" project in 1965.

The 1965 change signified the will of the "statists" among the elite in power to control the project of development. It meant the confiscation of local and regional power by the central state thus expressing the beginning of the divorce between State and society, system and social actors. Referring to the voluntaristic tradition, statistes consider that society does not have a consistency of its own and that without the State it would disintegrate [7]. The State must then be omnipresent and intervene all the time. The capacity of action of social actors and society in general is weakened, the revolutionary project inscribing its policy in a larger

territorial and institutional context, that of the nation-state. The revolutionary project privileged a transformation of social relations by the center. Characterized by suspicion vis-à-vis society and the refusal to consider regional and cultural distinctive features perceived as archaisms and obstacles to modernity, the revolutionary project meant to manage social change by decree. Modernity, in the elite's conception, was amputated of an essential dimension, that of interests and individual freedoms. If modernity means the reign of reason that establishes the correspondence between production, science, technology, administration, law and social organization in general, it does not nonetheless mean anything if it does not consider the will of free individuals. Without this later dimension, the reign of reason becomes tyranny and domination of the system over social actors and modernity is thus emptied of its most ambitious content.

The system's domination was such that in the absence of political parties and associations, all structures of consultation and representation had become simple instances of approval of decisions made in state structures. Civil society being reduced to silence, the political system simply meant state system and ultimately state-unique party. During the 1980's, the State became an enormous bureaucracy that managed and distributed oil revenues. The process of development was supposed to induce a dynamic of change and a densification of interactions among different elements of the social system. The opposite effect was in fact observed since in the established system, the political subsystem centralizing absolutely everything, relations between other subsystems were reduced to their simplest expression. The lack of transparency of the system had become such that doubt vis-à-vis the efficiency of the state system became widespread within society. In effect, attitudes of rejection, cynical and uncivil behavior and systematic doubt expressed the questioning of the credibility of the State, its structures and its elites. The inefficiency in the management of wealth and time was perceived as the result of a state structure monopolized by casts that dominated at different hierarchical levels. These casts had their own strategies that did not obey guidelines of a general plan, that of the nation, resulting from a concertation of all social actors concerned by the project of development. Strategies of casts also meant lack of competence of the elite and absence of sanctions. All these elements created a feeling of injustice and provoked attitudes of rejection and cynical behavior that were daily observable in the psychosocial environment at each encounter of the social actor with the system. The violent expression of the rejection of the system in 1988 showed the depth of the crisis in which Algeria has found itself since the mid 1980's. The fall of oil prices showed the limits of a State manager of oil revenues and the weakness of the system. 1988 marks the end of a social project, the revolutionary one, with all the disillusionments that it caused. 1988 means also the beginning of a clash between two projects of society, one based on Islamic values and the other on universal ones. Doubt and incertitude about the future of Algerian society accompany this violent clash.

Some reforms

At the end of the 1970's, questions are already raised relatively to the efficiency of the development project and the strategy that was followed. Three years passed before a new development plan (1980-1984) was adopted after the end of the 1973-1977 plan. The diagnosis was that the process of industrialization did not result in any significant improvement in peoples' lives but had in fact increased Algeria's dependency vis-à-vis developed countries [8]. The 1980's were then a period marked by attempts at making some changes at different levels without however changing fundamentally the nature of the system.

At the internal political level, the beginning of the 1980's was marked by the famous article 120 of the status of the unique political party, the national liberation front (FLN), which made it an obligation for anybody to occupy a position of responsibility in any mass organization or official institution in the country to adhere to the unique party [9]. This clause excluded de facto many competent people from key positions in different institutions. The state-unique party was reinforced. The desire of President Chadli Bendjedid to control entirely the political system translated into a policy of "deboumediensation", Boumediene being the strong man who incarnated the previous regime, of all key institutions within the state apparatus, the army and the unique party. Close collaborators of late president Boumediene were either evicted from their position, retired or convicted after being accused of corruption. This process was seen as a quiet revolution [10]. It was complemented by a revision of the official ideological document of reference, the national charter which was adopted June 27, 1976 and which defined socialism as an irreversible option. The new charter, approved by a vast majority of voters January 16, 1984, reinforces the role of the unique party, Islam becomes the main ideological reference, the contribution of the Berber culture to the Algerian nation is somehow recognized, and the private sector in the economy is encouraged. The socialist option of the regime is not however rejected [11]. These seeming changes were "concessions" to the demands of cultural and religious communities for a participation in the political system. In fact, protests from the Berber community and Islamic groups went on throughout the 1980's, the most significant and most violent expression of the opposition to the political regime in place being the Islamic one.

At the external level, during the 1980's and particularly after the war in Lebanon and the subsequent failure of the front constituted by Algeria, Libya, Syria, South Yemen and the PLO, to influence in any way the events in Lebanon, the Algerian regime expressed its will to revise its foreign policy [12]. Here again, the intention of the regime was to distantiate itself from the previous foreign policy, which was seen as very rigid, aggressive and warlike. Algeria tried to establish an equal relationship with the USSR and the U.S., improve its relationship with France and most of all establish a good relationship with its neighbors. Border treaties were negotiated with all neighboring countries. Most of the treaties were signed and some have not been ratified yet [13].

The changes operated during the 1980's at the political level express the desire of an elite to totally control the political system and to distantiate itself from the policies of the previous elite in power. They do not however express a fundamental change in the political system. No participation of other political and social forces in the political system was allowed. Attitudes and behaviors of the elite in power as well as the processes at work in the system remained unchanged.

The integrative capacity of the system remaining very limited because of the very closed political system and authoritarian regime, and a deep economic crisis, very violent riots exploded October 5th, 1988 in the streets of Algiers first and then gained all major cities in Algeria. For days, people, mainly young ones, went on a rampage destroying everything and especially anything that was state property or represented the State and the unique party. The repression was extremely violent (according to different sources, between 159 and 500 people were killed and hundreds jailed). Long forgotten images of the war of liberation reemerged. Language also. Soldiers patrolled the streets and tanks were everywhere. Algerians were once again getting used to the state of siege, curfew and military commandment. Different clans in power as well as the islamist movement tried to take advantage of the chaotic situation created by the riots. Being aware that some changes had to be made, the political regime proposed a new constitution that was adopted February 1989. Multipartism was legalized and the socialist option was dropped [14]. The first "free" elections of independent Algeria in June 1990, at the local and regional levels gave the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) the majority of votes and thus the control of municipal and wilaya (the region) assemblies. This was considered more as an expression of people's rejection of the unique party rather than a frank success of the Islamic party [15]. Taking advantage of their newly acquired "legitimacy" and the clan struggles within the bloc in power, Islamists went on mobilizing all the dissatisfied people with the political regime in place and occupied the streets, blocked institutions and demanded the immediate organization of anticipated legislative elections at the national level. All the subsequent minor changes operated within key state institutions –the army, the military police, etc.- as well as changes of governments could not make the Islamists change their strategy for power. The first turn of legislative elections of December 1991 gave the Islamic party 188 seats out of the 430 seats of the national assembly. The fear that the second turn would give the Islamic party an absolute majority and lead to a civil war, made the elite in power cancel it. The president was "retired" by the army, which deployed all the means to control the situation especially in major cities. Presidential powers were delegated to a five-member committee presided by a historic figure who was assassinated a few months later [16]. From then on, the spiral of violence has not ended. Islamic armed groups have escalated their violence against all those they perceive as representing or helping by their work the political regime in place or anybody who could portray them as the villains (reporters, intellectuals, artists, etc.). They finally adopted a total war against everybody. The management of the "Islamic phenomenon" by the political regime has alternated from the beginning repression and dialogue without ever succeeding in finding an acceptable solution for all parties. From the 1988 riots on, the entire political system,

the State-unique party first, and then the State and all political parties, has been mobilized around the question of the management of the "Islamic phenomenon". This management in a situation of deep economic crisis has so far been an equation that seems to be impossible to solve. In July 1999, newly elected President Bouteflika initiates a process of national reconciliation approved later on by referendum in September 16, 1999. Assassinations and mass killings still go on.

At the economic level, the 1980's began with the adoption of a five-year plan (1980-1984) based on a critique of the previous economic policy which consisted in massive investments in heavy industry that did not lead to the expected results [17]. In effect, since 1967, the development policy was essentially characterized by the application of G. De Bernis model of industrializing industries; this being done to the detriment of agriculture and consumption industries. According to G. De Bernis, only certain industries allow the propagation of industrialization and thus industrial rationality. These heavy industries are supposed to provide intermediary as well as equipment goods that constitute the material basis of development, contribute to the modernization of agriculture and induce the creation of all kinds of consumption industries. These industries necessitate heavy investments, high competencies, the engagement of the State as an entrepreneur and a planning process. By the end of the 1970's, it became clear that the efforts made in the industrial sector were not leading to any significant result. It was decided, through the 1980-1984 plan, to improve the existing industrial infrastructure, to encourage small and medium size industries, which are supposed to be more efficient and more manageable, and to give more attention to agriculture [18]. Some 70 giant state firms were restructured into some 400 medium size firms. Self-managed farms and cooperatives created during the "agrarian revolution" are regrouped in one sector and organized in the same way with the appointment in each unit of an accountant, an engineer and a person responsible for motor vehicles [19].

Although some changes are initiated during the period 1980-1984, one thing that remained unchanged is certainly the way investments are financed, which is essentially through oil and gas revenues. This fact led the Algerian State to look for ways to better valorize its gas exports. Negotiations with France led to the quasi indexation of gas price on prices of oil. A pipeline transporting gas from the Algerian desert to Italy via Tunisia and Sicily was inaugurated May 18, 1983 [20]. The 1985-1989 plan confirmed the changes initiated by the previous plan as well as the continuous reliance on oil and gas revenues and external credits to finance development projects [21]. But in 1986, Algeria is faced with the fall of oil prices (-50% in six months) and the erosion of the dollar while at the same time the prices of imported goods remained stable [22]. Oil revenues, which amounted to \$12.7 billion in 1985, fell to \$7.65 billion in 1986 [23]. By the end of 1986, the budget of the import program was cut by 20% [24] and foodstuff imports were reduced in 1987 by 40% compared to 1985 [25]. The inconveniences of an entire dependency on oil revenues (98% of exports) were becoming very clear [26]. Though oil revenues were a little higher in 1987 (\$8.45 billion), external debt service reached 55% of total export revenues [27]. In agriculture, new reforms were initiated. The so-called socialist agricultural units (DAS) were reorganized into smaller farms (EAC) which

are attributed to a collective of three persons at least who are under the obligation to produce and maintain the indivision and the agricultural vocation of the land. In industry, a reform is initiated with the ultimate objective of making state owned firms autonomous in their management even though the State remains the sole owner of the capital [28]. But these little changes did not make any difference given the drastic fall of oil prices, the level of external debt service and the structural inability of the public industrial and agricultural sectors to increase production. Economic reforms became unavoidable. Too much State involvement in the economy had resulted in its paralysis. In March 26, 1990, the national assembly adopted the famous "law on money and credit" which made it possible for foreign capital to invest in Algeria. The law was considered as a milestone in the economic reform. It completed an ensemble of laws, which were meant to give public firms autonomy of management, end the State monopoly on foreign trade, make prices of consumer goods obey the logic of the market –as opposed to State administered prices-, privatize agriculture and make it possible for employers to lay off workers [29]. But the reforms, which focused primarily on the legal aspect, did not create a dynamic of change. The crisis got deeper. The rate of unemployment was estimated at 22% in 1989. Foreign debt was evaluated at \$23 billion and its service around ¼ of all export revenues [30]. In 1990, it was estimated that the standard of living of Algerians decreased by 8%, and by mid 1991, the rate of inflation was 43%, there were 1,200 000. Unemployed and foreign debt reached \$25 billion [31]. In 1993, foreign debt reached a new high of \$26 billion. In 1994, the service of this debt would have consumed the totality of oil and gas revenues if the State had not signed an accord with the IMF. The Algerian economy was paralyzed. Public firms were running at their lowest capacities, and the national currency was devaluated by 40.17% in April 1994. The accord with the IMF also allowed Algeria to get some new finances from the World Bank, the European Community and France [32]. In 1995, the IMF granted Algeria a total loan of some \$1.79 billion [33]. Foreign debt was \$32.61 billion but the ratio foreign debt service/export revenues was brought to a "manageable level" –35.5%- compared to what it would have been without the accord with the IMF [34].

If the ambition of the 1970's program of industrialization was to establish the basis of an integrated economy that would not be in the long run dependent on the constraints of the international market, the results were however far from that initial ambition. Structural imbalance, rent economy, mediocre performances, overcosts, wastes, dysfunctions at all levels became the characteristics of the Algerian economy in the beginning of the 1980's.

Once this fact established, measures were taken to remedy this situation. However, the relative financial ease resulting from oil revenues, concealed the importance and urgency of reforms; these later becoming then minor structural changes that did not result in any overall improvement of the situation. The reduction of oil revenues in the mid 1980's striped bare the necessity of a profound reform. The rehabilitation of market mechanisms as instruments of regulation of the economy became unavoidable. The necessary reforms begun with the introduction of the principle of autonomy of administration in public firms especially in the

industrial sector. This industrial restructuring was defined as "...all the measures of reorganization, redeployment and modernization of the national means of production, the objective of which is to increase their efficacy, efficiency and competitiveness, and to integrate them in the international division of labor [35]. The doctrinal document entitled "Algerian economy: stakes and choices in the medium-run (1996-2000)" submitted to the National Economic and Social Council (CNES) in 1996, stresses three facts that justify the necessity of restructuring: weak performances of the national industry, insufficient oil revenues and incapacity of Algerian industrial production to sustain foreign competition [36].

Once the diagnosis made, the objectives of the process of restructuring became clear. From the point of view of the deciders, it was a matter of improving industrial performance, the foreign currency balance in this sector and to increase the share of the private sector and especially that of small and medium size firms. Industrial restructuring had to be undertaken within an ensemble of reforms of the financing system of the economy, the institutional and legal context and the system of mobilization of savings. On the other hand, the restructuring process had to be based on the following strategy:

1. Progressive disengagement of the State from competitive activities in favor of private initiatives.
2. Use of partnership in order to access technology, capital and external expertise.
3. Maintenance, temporarily or durably, of state presence in the following groups of activities:
 - Steel industry, metallurgy, mechanics, electrical and electronics industries, and mining industries.
 - Infrastructure works, hydraulics, cereal and pharmaceutical industries.
 - Petrochemical, chemical and cement industries.

An example: the region of Annaba

If the overall picture of economic reforms seems somewhat rational, its implementation however is a lot more problematic. The case of the region of Annaba with Sider as the main industrial firm illustrates this problematique. The industrial pole of Annaba is the result of a political choice that was facilitated by the presence of such factors as the pre-existing industrial core, that is the port, the airport, the railroad, the electrical energy, etc. The pole is articulated around two main combines, Sider (steel industry) and Asmidal (processing of phosphates). Since the 1960's and particularly the 1970's, a number of other private and public firms have been created. The industrial pole is today made of some twenty nine public firms of different sizes employing more than thirty thousand people, five industrial zones occupying more than 1700 hectares, in addition to the zone of the port, commercial zones and vocational centers that are directly related to industries [37].

In spite of the importance of the industrial tissue of the region of Annaba, the diagnosis reveals that the process of industrialization is not part of a real local or regional planning. The improvisation in the process of development is reflected by the following elements: lack of a space of consultation at the regional level, extreme polarization of space, industrial structure clearly dominated by steel and metallurgy industries, critical financial situation of most industrial firms, loss of high value agricultural lands in favor of industries, weak organization of the private sector and limited water resources leading to conflicts between industries and population.

In the absence then of a regional space of consultation, it is in the last orientation report on the planning of the wilaya of Annaba that we find the industrial restructuring objectives for the region [38]. Industrial restructuring essentially means the achievement of an even development throughout the region by diffusing industrial activities to hinterland. The following objectives are then established:

- Each center of concentration of industrial activities must influence a portion of the territory and offer a level of employment conform to the objectives of planning. The influence area is assimilated to the employment basin.
- High productive potential lands must be protected by the localization of industrial activities primarily on least productive lands.
- Industrial zones must be more efficiently used and occupied and incompatible activities eventually have to be de-localized.
- Small and medium size industries incompatible with residential areas have to be localized within existing or to be promoted commercial zones.
- Small and medium size steel, metallurgy and electrical industries must be encouraged.
- Agricultural and food industries, tourism and services have also to be promoted.

It is easy to notice that industrial restructuring in its regional dimension offers the opportunity to reorganize space for a more even development with a major preoccupation that is the protection of agricultural lands in the future. This main objective translates essentially in a strategy of optimal densification of industrial zones or, in other words, a more rational occupation of these zones. In the strategy of regional space planning then, the industrial sector, thus the industrial firm, remains an essential agent of space structuring. Given the multiple problems that confront the firms of the region during the transition period toward a market economy, how could they influence the region?

At the level of the Algerian industrial firm, the following weaknesses have been diagnosed: dependence vis-à-vis external supplies in inputs and spare parts, under use of installed capacities, technological backwardness, divestment and obsolete products and finally insufficient managerial capacities.

On the basis of this diagnosis, general objectives were set. The firm must refocus on its main trade, externalize secondary activities, re-dimension its activities in accordance with the competition and improve its managerial capacities. In

general, the firm has to increase the efficiency and the productivity of production factors adopting a strategy of subsidiarization and transfer of assets, partnership and training in order to recycle its human resources in different managerial functions.

The problematique of industrial restructuring in its regional dimension can be better understood looking at one of the main industrial actors in Annaba, Sider. The study undertaken by Ern'st and Young Conseil in 1991 and 1993 emphasized the following features [39]

- The proliferation of trades with no direct link to steel industry.
- Insufficient control over the firm's overall performance.
- Extreme complexity of the firm.
- Demobilization and no motivation of the personnel.
- Insufficient training of the personnel.
- Poor condition of obsolete equipment.

Based on this diagnosis, two main objectives were assigned to Sider, improving its overall performance and consolidating its leadership position in production and distribution of steel products. Specific objectives were set for different divisions (production, marketing, finance and human resources). The strategy that is recommended for Sider conforms to the global industrial strategy. Sider must rehabilitate its productive capacities, restructure its activities around independent and specialized entities that are managed as autonomous profit oriented centers but using a group strategy, refocus on its main trade, adapt its human and material resources to market needs and finally develop its managerial capacities through the training and appointment of able managers to positions of responsibility.

This strategy remains dependent on a managerial culture that is seriously lacking at Sider. The deciders particularly insist on the necessity to appoint to management positions "...dynamic men, competent, able to adapt to the context of market economy and to uncertainties, convinced and able to share objectives, real leaders who are able to induce change..."[40]. The reality, however, is other. In fact, the centralized planning system has led to important dysfunctions within Algerian firms resulting in their paralysis to the point where anticipation behaviors were no longer possible; a culture made of routines, sclerosis, inertia and assisted mentalities having progressively spread throughout the society and becoming at the same time a serious obstacle to the modernist project of development. The firm is nevertheless asked to adapt itself to a national and above all international environment characterized by free enterprise or otherwise disappear. The firm must go through a profound cultural change, in other words move from a culture of inertia to a culture that values initiative, innovation and the spirit of enterprise, a culture of project.

Anticipation behaviors stand out today in their great variety as a major fact of our time (...). This influence of the future on our daily adaptations is matched only by the ever-increasing control that we try to develop over space in order to organize and better inhabit it (...). This double concern of a prospective time to control and a potential space to dominate expresses the dominant features of our modernity [41].

To change from a culture of inertia to a culture of anticipation is the real problem of Algerian firms. The following sketch shows the immensity of changes that have to be made in order to achieve a modern management of firms.

Current and desired management in Algerian firms

| | Current management | Desired management |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|
| Structure | Very hierarchical (too many levels) | Decentralized with few hierarchical levels, teams organized around objectives |
| Philosophy | Negative conception of human nature, maintenance of status quo | Positive conception of human nature, strategic and prospective vision |
| Strategy | Co-optation, clientelism, regionalism, clanism | Mobilization and involvement of employees through communication and motivation |
| Style of management | Directive | Very participative |
| Authority and responsibility | Authority centered around a minority of people and lack of responsibility for the rest of employees | Sharing of authority and responsibility |
| Norms | Established by the management and little efforts to make them accepted by employees | Established in common by management and employees for a greater support to the project of the firm |
| Values | Negative: distrust, suspicion, withdrawal of management | Positive: dialogue, cooperation, encouragement of initiative and presence and support of management |
| Organization of tasks | Imprecise | Attribution of mandates and objectives with an autonomy in the definition of tasks |
| Role of the manager | Organizes, directs, controls and sanctions | Defines and diffuses a vision and exercises a follow-up |
| Role of the employee | Performs tasks mechanically | Organizes and performs tasks, group evaluation |
| Training | Training for a given task | Permanent training, training to team work and management |
| Information | Rare and vague, the opacity and lack of transparency are privileged | Transparency, information facilitating the comprehension of situations, diffusion of performance indicators to work teams |
| Interest in work | Demobilized and unconcerned employees about the results and the future of the firm | Valued and mobilized employees for the realization of the project of the firm |

The management of Sider, whose tasks are to pilot these changes, does not seem to have a real managerial culture. Two studies undertaken under our supervision confirm the fact that Sider's management does not have a culture that would encourage the desired change [42]. Certain aspects of this culture seem rather to constitute obstacles to change. At the basis of this culture we find the characteristics of McGregor's x theory. According to this theory, a common person would do anything to avoid work for which she naturally feels a great dislike. This in turn would explain why control and sanctions are necessary in order to make such person to work. Moreover, an average person has little ambition and prefers to be directed rather than have responsibilities. Employees who, at all levels, deplore the

fact that their superiors do not delegate to them any responsibility, power or authority confirm this conception of human nature. This attitude of distrust is accompanied by employees' feeling of powerlessness. This situation is comforted by a complex pyramidal organization where decision-making is very centralized. A classic division of labor dominated by a very technician and Taylorian vision characterizes Sider. There are those who conceive and those who actually perform tasks. The immediate consequence is that at Sider, the personnel think that it is up to experts and often to external experts to define matters of strategy. The result is a management lacking a long-term strategic vision and a spirit of enterprise.

These few features of the management's culture at Sider show that the planned change will not be an easy task. This latter proposing a strategic change, it must necessarily be accompanied by a cultural change. A modern managerial culture would facilitate the sale of the planned change to different partners. As stressed by the Prime Minister, the plan must "...contain a great dose of communication..." [43]. So far, this has not been the case since different social partners have a different lecture of the plan and cannot agree on the appropriate measures to deal with the situation because of the prevailing suspicion. In a resolution dated on May 26, 1997, the firm's union stated that it will not let the management have its way even if it has to use extreme means [44]. The union feels that the firm's problems are the result of bad management, outdated means of production and the deterioration of socio-professional conditions. The managers, on the other hand, consider that the surplus of personnel is the greatest problem of the firm. The Prime Minister had stated that the strategic option of the planned change must be accompanied by a new culture because it could be confronted to the inertia of structures and to the incomprehension of social partners [45].

Deciders have a plan of action; the social system receives it as input, and something happens: peoples' feelings are modified, something changes, but not necessarily as deciders could have forecasted, and mechanisms of adjustment switch on [46].

This is the way change initiates. The firm, considered as the main actor of social change being made of interacting subsystems, must make strategic choices under the pressure of market forces. Changes of actors' attitudes and behaviors in different subsystems of the firm must facilitate strategic change. Cultural change (attitudes and behaviors) must necessarily accompany strategic change. The realization of new strategic objectives depends mainly on the adoption of a new organizational culture, a new vision of labor relations and a new conception of work. This is not an easy task since the new strategic options imposed on the public industrial firm by the market economy are completely different from the strategic options of a centrally planned economy. The strategic change having to be made in a record time, we can easily imagine the resistance and multiple conflicts that would oppose different actors of the system. Managers are called upon to "listen" to evolutions in industry and the social system in general, to imagine and use new forms, structures, methods and techniques of management. Will they know and will they be willing to do so when they are themselves the product of training and habits acquired in a totally different managerial culture? Will management tools be

mastered and used efficiently or will they only be slogans that are appropriated just to be in fashion? In this case, there will not be a real will for change and mimicry will take over. There may be a change someday but it will not be the result of a project where actors, strategies, structures and management tools will function as a whole with clear and precise objectives accepted by all social actors.

According to P. Selznick, as for C. Barnard, culture is nourished by strategy, which it serves in return. This relationship is a serious one. It is a long-term marriage rather than a flirt. Neither strategy nor culture is easily changed; that is why a lot of reflection is needed before an action plan aiming at making them more complementary is adopted [47].

Rapid evolution of technologies and techniques, multiple economic and political stakes, increasing competition, globalization of the economy, impose a marriage of reason between strategy and culture. Nevertheless, this latter cannot take place if social actors' affect is not taken into consideration in the process of maturation of the firm's project. The equation is not a simple one. The positivistic approach, based on a will of scientificity and quantification of variables would look for a relationship of dependence between strategy and culture and would establish a laboratory situation where it would be possible to control the nature of change. This approach, which consists in evacuating everything that is not quantifiable and immediately graspable, in other words everything that is symbolic or affective, has been criticized as a simplistic approach. The human relations school as well as models such as Maslow's have tried to enhance the importance of individuals in organizations. The actor's desires, expectations and needs are given more importance. The actor is not considered anymore as a simple resource or a labor force. A plan of action or project that would not integrate all the dimensions of the organization as a system and actors is doomed to fail. The logic of the system is not necessarily that of the actors. System and actors have power. A process of change is thus a transformation of power relations as a result of more or less difficult negotiations. At the psychological level, the process of change is well described by Manfred Kets De Vries and Danny Miller [48]. Four phases characterize change: shock, skepticism, rejection and awareness.

During the first phase, the individual is paralyzed, panics and manifests feelings of anger at times. At the level of the organization, this translates into confusion, jamming or routinization of activities.

During the phase of skepticism, the individual refuses reality and keeps on looking for what was lost. He is unhappy and feels remorse. The organization is confronted to aggressive behaviors and negative reactions.

During the third phase, that of rejection, the individual examines his conscience with a feeling of despair and rejection of old ways of thinking and acting. At the level of the organization, things seem to be accepted, the situation is redefined and new ways are explored.

Finally, the individual's reconstruction of his representations and the acceptance of the new reality characterize the last phase. The organization starts reorganizing with a new attitude and turns to the future.

This process of change can nevertheless be blocked at anyone of these phases.

A blocked process of change is the impression that we get from the implementation of the policy of restructuring of Sider and of the entire industrial sector at the regional as well as the national level. With the State disengagement from public industrial firms, and from all other sectors, the temptation is great today for local deciders to instrumentalize once again the industrial firm. For the deciders, does not industrial restructuring mean first of all the reorganization of space for a more even development? The fact is that deciders have to do with enormous constraints. At the level of the region of Annaba, these constraints can be summarized in the following way:

- Absence of a real space planning policy.
- Nonexistence of a space of consultation for the region's actors.
- Extreme polarization of the industrial region around the city of Annaba.
- Industrial structure dominated by steel and metallurgy industries.
- Critical situation of the firms in the region leading to the suppression of an important number of jobs.
- Destruction of good agricultural lands by industries.
- Problems of water resources management.

These few indications show that to expect today from industrial firms a major contribution to change in the region could simply call into question the whole process of industrial restructuring and thus to delay changes that have to take place within the firms.

Nevertheless, the region of Annaba possesses important assets that deciders could take into consideration in order to develop the region:

- An important transportation infrastructure.
- An important agricultural potential.
- A considerable potential in tourism.
- A somewhat dynamic private sector.
- New small and medium size firms.
- Competencies in all domains coming out of the university and vocational centers of the region.

This supposes the emergence of a new regional project where the industrial firm would not be the only, nor the main actor of development. The new project would help first the industrial firm to operate internal changes before this latter becomes a partner in the overall social change. Freed from any dependence, the firm could conceive its own project, with its own vision, values, norms and objectives. Once the project shared by most of its employees, the firm could then become an important actor of social change. We could say then that the policy of industrial restructuring has led to a meaningful change; that of liberating the industrial firm from a relationship of control and instrumentation and making it a free actor in the process of development.

A blocked process of change

At the beginning of the 21st century, and two decades after it was clearly recognized that the economic policy of the revolutionary project of the 1960's and 1970's had failed, the Algerian economy still has the same characteristics of the previous period. It is entirely dependent on oil and gas revenues. Oil and gas prices remain the determining factor of the economic policy of the State, the way State budget is elaborated and allocated to different sectors, the volume of the import program, etc. Any fluctuation in these prices is immediately felt at all levels of the social system. The 1988 uprising and its dramatic consequences on the entire society were a direct result of a drastic fall in oil and gas prices. All the reforms have not resulted in any limitation of the weight of oil and gas revenues in the economy. Moreover, there is no indication that the State and the elites in power are willing to seriously consider an alternative to the rent economy that would change the productive structures in a significant way. The rent economy is basically structured around two big ensembles. The first one is made of oil, gas and their derivatives, and the second one is constituted by all other economic activities. This latter produces almost exclusively for the internal market while it depends almost exclusively on foreign providers for its needs in equipment, technology, spare parts, know-how, etc. Thus, this ensemble, which does not generate foreign currency, but needs it to cover its needs for equipment, spare parts, etc., relies on the State, which allocates the revenues made by the first ensemble –oil, gas and derivatives-[49]. Given this structure of the economy and the inability or unwillingness of the State to effect profound changes in order to reduce the reliance on oil and gas revenues, all the economic reforms initiated so far have not resulted in any increase in production and productivity, efficiency and competitiveness. Moreover, since the State opened the sector of oil and gas to foreign investment in 1986 in order for Sonatrach –the state owned oil company- to benefit from the technology, expertise and know-how of its partners, the role of the ensemble oil/gas in the economy has been reinforced. For this sector to play effectively its leading role in the economy, it is estimated that some \$20 billion would have to be invested in it. This would have to be done through foreign loans, thus increasing the level of indebtedness of Algeria. These investments, planned by Sonatrach for the next ten years, concern mainly the extension of oil and gas productive capacities. Algeria seems to have accepted the idea that the only way to induce economic growth is to invest in the sector where it is believed it has an advantage, the sector of oil and gas. Underlying the structural adjustment plan negotiated with the IMF as well as the discussions initiated in 1993 with the European Union about a free trade zone, is this idea of specializing Algeria in one product, energy (oil and gas), which supposedly constitutes a comparative advantage. The Algerian State's policy in this domain seems to confirm this option. This is in fact no different from the economic policy of the 1960's and 1970's that led Algeria to a very deep crisis. Given the shaping of the world according to a new division of labor, and Algeria basing its economic development on factors that

probably no longer offer a comparative advantage, how would Algeria be inserted in the new world economy?

The economic program of the latest government, unveiled in January 2000, is inspired by the main conclusions made by the IMF experts in 1998 regarding the implementation of the structural adjustment plan. The experts identified eight major axes where efforts have to be made:

- A greater public support to the privatization program.
- The modernization of the banking system.
- The establishment of property rights in agriculture and housing.
- The completion of the transfer of housing construction activities to the private sector.
- A revision of the judiciary system concerning bankruptcy and dispute procedures.
- A reform of the labor market.
- A restructuring of the educational system so as to adapt it to economic trends.
- The continuation of the liberalization of trade, services and movements of capital.

This program, which is very vague, with no clear timetable and quantified objectives, remains once again very dependent on oil and gas revenues. This is why the newly formed government introduces two new features: the first one concerns the opening of sectors previously considered as strategic ones as mining, energy and telecommunications to national and foreign investment and partnership. The second, and most important one, is the intention to review with foreign partners and international institutions, the treatment of Algerian foreign debt, politically and economically, in order to achieve a substantial reduction of this debt. The expected hypothetical gains would enable the government to fully implement its program. Once again, the economic program relies heavily, if not totally, on uncertain levels of revenues (oil and gas) and sources of financing (foreign investment and hypothetical reduction in foreign debt). No new path to development is explored and no new possibilities are identified. The solution to the economic crisis seems "more of the same".

This policy of "more of the same" leads once more to the same consequences. In April 18th, 2001, explodes the anger of young Kabyles after the assassination by a gendarme (sort of police officer) of one of theirs in a gendarmerie (headquarters). Constantly refusing submission to any foreign power, the Kabyles have forged for themselves, throughout history, a singular personality that expresses itself through a particular culture and language. Their attachment to a type of "primitive" governance but nevertheless a participative one in the form of a village coordination called *ârch* is very tenacious. The management of the confrontation with the central power, which lasted a few months and resulted in tens of deaths among young Kabyles, was exclusively entrusted to the *ârchs*; the political parties which were supposed to have their roots in the region were superbly ignored. The

new and important element that must be noted here is that the demands of the demonstrators, excepting the particular one concerning the traditional cultural question, expressed preoccupations common to all Algerians and above all, the rejection of the archaic mode of governance that has characterized independent Algeria. In its march 1996-march 1997 report, and before its mission was ended, the mediation of the republic reported citizens' preoccupations and demands which reflect in their entirety their dissatisfaction with this mode of governance of public affairs. The following is a summary of these preoccupations [50]:

- Financial revenues are unequally distributed to regions, cities, villages and neighborhoods.
- Entire neighborhoods or housing ensembles, especially in rural areas, remain unconnected to water networks.
- When the connection exists, the distribution of rare water resources to neighborhoods, villages or cities is unequal.
- In some areas, rare water resources or natural sources of water are simply appropriated by private interests.
- The same claims, but to a lesser degree, are expressed about power distribution.
- The repeated, unplanned and unmotivated increases in water, power and telephone bills have resulted in the rapid degradation of the purchasing power and standard of living of low and middle-income social categories.
- Some rural areas and villages are isolated because of poor road conditions.
- Educational and cultural infrastructures are nonexistent in some rural areas and villages. When they exist, they are in very bad shape, poorly managed, under financed and "lifeless".
- Economic actors, especially public firms, pollute the environment without any regard or consideration for citizens' health.
- Some private interests transgress land laws for the purpose of speculation without any sanction.
- Economically, some areas have become disaster areas because of the high unemployment rate that characterizes them. The situation is getting worse because of many public firms' bankruptcy or restructuring leading to the laying off of entire cohorts of workers.
- Because of poor financial situation or ill management, local administrations are unresponsive to citizens' claims and preoccupations.
- The problem of "social housing" meant for low income categories is probably the one that angers the most citizens who complain that this type of housing is distributed in total opacity, that the number of projects is insignificant compared to their needs and that the delays in the realization of these projects are very important. Citizens have been adopting all kinds of protest actions that have become more and more violent during this last year and often taking the form of uncontrolled riots resulting in heavy damages.

In relation to this problem, citizens often complain about the behavior of those who are in charge of the allocation of social housing. Among other things, they often refer to:

- The lack of courtesy and respect vis-à-vis modest citizens.
- The loss or disappearance of part or all the documents pertaining to citizens' application file.
- The disrespect of criteria of evaluation of the application.
- The nonexistence of committees of evaluation in certain areas.
- The non-consideration of citizens' appeals concerning decisions of allocation.
- The favoritism of certain persons at the expense of others.
- The cancellation of decisions made by previous deciders without any motive.
- The repeated allocation of housing to certain persons, often unqualified for social housing but who take advantage of their position of power or influence in certain institutions.
- The allocation of unachieved housing.
- The allocation of the same apartment to more than one person or family.

For most of the citizens concerned by social housing, people involved with the process of allocation of this type of housing at every level, purposefully adopt such a frustrating behavior in order to make them understand that the only way to get their application processed and then possibly get ranked among the beneficiaries of social housing is to pay them a bribe. In fact, people have come to expect this type of behavior at every encounter with the system.

| القطاع | الجهة | الوصف | التعليق | الملاحظات |
|--------------|----------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| القطاع العام | البلديات | توزيع الوحدات السكنية | عدم مراعاة المعايير المحددة | عدم الشفافية في عملية الاختيار |
| القطاع الخاص | الشركات | توزيع الوحدات السكنية | عدم مراعاة المعايير المحددة | عدم الشفافية في عملية الاختيار |
| القطاع الخاص | الشركات | توزيع الوحدات السكنية | عدم مراعاة المعايير المحددة | عدم الشفافية في عملية الاختيار |
| القطاع الخاص | الشركات | توزيع الوحدات السكنية | عدم مراعاة المعايير المحددة | عدم الشفافية في عملية الاختيار |

Conclusion :

The following theoretical representation of the social system constitutes a framework that can help us picture where Algeria was after independence, where the process of development has led her to and why she got the

The social system

| Subsystems | Functions | Structuring elements | Processes | Actors |
|----------------------------|---|-----------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| Cultural | Maintenance of the dominant cultural system | Values | Influence, control | Civic and institutional, cultural and religious associations, etc. |
| Social organization | Organization and integration for social reproduction | Norms | Institutionalization | Family, school, university, etc. |
| Political | Decision and organization of collective action for the realization of global objectives | Hierarchy, power, authority | Planning, programming | State institutions, parties, representatives, etc. |
| Economic | Mobilization of resources in order for the system to adapt to its environment | Division of tasks | Production, exchange, etc. | Industrial, agricultural, financial organizations, etc. |

The traditional social system of Algeria was close to the following ideal type:

Tradition (ideal type)

| Subsystems | Functions | Structuring elements | Processes | Actors |
|----------------------------|--|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Cultural | Maintenance of a unique cultural model | Fate, destiny, spirituality | Normative | Religious, mystical leaders |
| Social Organization | Reproduction of a mechanical solidarity | Tribalism, clanism | Coercion | Tribe, extended family |
| Political | Maintenance of a sacred order | Monolitism | Domination/ submission | Religious, mystical leaders |
| Economic | Mobilization of human physical resources | Contingency | Division of tasks based on age, sex | Religious, mystical leaders |

The process of development was supposed to be a process of transformation of the social system from a traditional to a modern one that would be close to the following ideal type:

Modernity (ideal type)

| Subsystems | Functions | Structuring elements | Processes | Actors |
|----------------------------|---|--|--|---|
| Cultural | Cultural hegemony of the dominant social class or group | Positivism, universality, objectivity, order | Rationalization, homogenization, uniformization | Cultural associations, artists, intellectuals |
| Social Organization | Reproduction of an organic solidarity | Formal laws and regulations | Social engineering, social planning | Institutions |
| Political | Seek and enforce consensus for a secular order | Democracy (the rule of the majority) | Persuasion and coercion | State, political Parties, associations |
| Economic | Mobilization and transformation of natural resources | Efficiency, productivity, profitability | Standardization, mass, industrialized production | Organizations (Financial, industrial...) |

The way the process of development has been governed has led to the formation of a schizophrenic social system characterized by the existence at each and every level of parallel worlds, those of tradition and modernity.

Today's Algerian social system

| Subsystems | Functions | Structuring elements | Processes | Actors |
|----------------------------|-----------|----------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Cultural | Tradition | Tradition | Tradition | Tradition |
| | Modernity | Modernity | Modernity | Modernity |
| Social organization | Tradition | Tradition | Tradition | Tradition |
| | Modernity | Modernity | Modernity | Modernity |
| Political | Tradition | Tradition | Tradition | Tradition |
| | Modernity | Modernity | Modernity | Modernity |
| Economic | Tradition | Tradition | Tradition | Tradition |
| | Modernity | Modernity | Modernity | Modernity |

1. The cultural sub-system: [51]

The cultural sub-system is made of abstract elements such as values, ideologies, knowledge and symbols. Its main function is the maintenance of the dominant cultural model. It constitutes the source of signification of social actors' actions and interactions and it is this grid of interpretation that has become problematic. The Algerian system of development having failed, the values of modernity which it intended to institutionalize are thus rejected by an important part of society. There is no longer a dominant system of values and the Algerian society is characterized today by a state of anomie which creates a general feeling of

meaninglessness, doubt and incertitude. Two contradictory projects have emerged out of this situation, one defending the values of tradition and the other the values of modernity.

2. The social organization sub-system:

Norms are central structural elements of this sub-system. Its main function is the integration of all actors to society. Social norms control actions and interactions within the system. The social sub-system is closely related to the cultural sub-system, its abstract cultural elements being translated through the process of institutionalization into norms and models of action. The anomie that presently characterizes Algerian society expresses all the difficulty that the society has to translate into norms of action the values of tradition or those of modernity. This situation leads to a psychosocial climate made of doubt and often rejection of the political system that incarnates the development project. The disillusion is great of those who inscribed their education project, professional project or life project in general in this development project.

3. The economic sub-system:

Having to do with activities of production and exchange of goods and services, the function of the economic sub-system is to mobilize material resources so as to allow the system to adapt itself to its environment. It is through economic growth, based on an ever more rational division of tasks and ever more complex technical innovations, that this sub-system assures the adaptation of the social system to an environment in which consumption, performance and competitiveness needs are ever greater. Because of a political management of oil revenues that resulted in behaviors that constituted obstacles to a rational organization of labor, the economic sub-system has not been able to generate the expected growth and thus allow the social system to adapt to an environment ever more demanding.

4. The political sub-system:

The function of the political sub-system is to mobilize human and material means, coordinate and control social actors' actions in order to realize objectives that have a signification to the majority of the social system's actors. This is the system that defines policies, strategies and objectives. This function demands legitimacy and recognized competencies from political actors and the participation of the members of the collectivity so that the majority of the population could adhere to the decisions that are made. The problem is that for too long, the political system has meant the sole unique political party and had not allowed for the participation of any other social force. The result of that is that a deficit of legitimacy has always been the characteristic of the political system that finds itself completely divorced from society at large.

The system of governance that has presided over the process of development is accountable for this situation. The following are but a few features of this system:

- Monopoly of decision by a cast
- Lack of transparency
- Monopoly over the definition of goals and procedures
- Unclear goals and objectives
- Self-sufficiency of the project and its pilots
- Irrelevance of the notion of merit
- Lack of accountability
- Arbitrary behavior
- Absence of sanctions
- Procedural drifting (endless procedural process)
- Denigration and exclusion of those who have a different vision
- Ignorance of resistance to change

The psychosocial environment of the system being made of intolerance, exclusion and violence vis-à-vis all that expresses difference, the social actor is no longer able or willing to make a decision, express an opinion or take position in any given situation. The end result is a blocked process of change and a serious crisis of governability. The problematique of development in Algeria, as well as in other third world countries, is in fact the problematique of governance. This problematique has emerged as a central one at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century with the process of globalization which goal is a unified global market based on the same principles and rules. This movement carries with it an ensemble of values and norms that could call into question the condition of Algerian people. The whole question becomes then " with all its contradictions, does the process of globalization provide an opportunity for Algeria to overcome its crisis and the blocked process of change or will it contribute to the aggravation of the crisis?

Globalization describes the process of emergence of a new world system.

A baffling variety of terms have arisen in the attempt to describe novel forms of life beyond modernity -including the "information society," "consumer society," "post-industrial society," "post-capitalist society," "postmodernism," and postmodernity." Some of the debates about a possible historical transition beyond modernity have concentrated upon institutional dynamics, particularly those which see a shift from industrial production to the production of information as the basis for a new form of political power. Other debates, by contrast, have concentrated on more cultural and aesthetic issues, especially in the realms of art, architecture, and mass culture. These controversies have as a common thread, however, the global expansion of social, economic, and political systems of the developed societies [52].

Globalization is a complex process that is met with a lot of resistance and suspicion. Its objective is to unify principles, rules and values throughout the world [53]. Profit making remains its driving force. Thus, though the postmodern system that is emerging will most probably be very different from existing social systems, it will remain in essence a capitalistic one. The single most important feature of the postmodern world system is its unified global market. The following sketch shows how the postmodern social system would ideally look like [54]:

Postmodernity (ideal type)

| Subsystems | Functions | Structuring elements | Processes | Actors |
|----------------------------|---|--|---|---|
| Cultural | Promote and maintain a multicultural society | Narcissism, impulse, desire, imagination, creativity | Inner, subjective, contemplative. Fragmented, discontinuous, ephemeral | The individual, the self, different "worlds and voices" |
| Social Organization | Reproduce a variety of life styles | Languages | Communication | The learned society |
| Political | Invention and projection of a global cognitive mapping on a social as well as a spatial scale | Pluralism, tolerance | Simulation | The stage society (Alliance politicians/media experts) |
| Economic | Mobilization of intellectual resources | Practical knowledge | Expansion of the market by the integration of all aspects of social and cultural life in the sphere of exchange | The expert society (Translators) |

Transnational processes that are not inherently new but which have become more powerful than ever drive the system. Movements of populations, flows of communication, propagation of ideologies and systems of thought, movements of goods, technologies and capitals have a long history. But what is unique in the present state of the world is the possibilities that new information and communication technologies offer capitalism to transcend national and cultural barriers that have so far stood in the way of the system's rapid expansion. Historically, religions, armies, multinationals as agents that helped expand capitalism, had all been confronted to resistance from territorially based and politically organized communities (tribes, nations). Ultimately, the modern world, understood as an ensemble of principles, rules and values, that the processes of empire building, colonization, multinational expansion had helped shape, has come to be confronted to the very modern nation-states that it created as well as to culturally based minorities that feel marginalized or excluded by the process of modernization. The new information and communication technologies offer capitalism the possibility to transcend national and cultural barriers and to transport the world into a new phase, still market oriented, but qualitatively different in many ways. But, if the emerging postmodern world system, with its powerful means that make transnational processes very efficient in expanding the system, is able to

seriously undermine the traditional role of the nation-states, it still has to deal with conflicts and resistance resulting from inequalities and exclusions. Nation-states are no longer capable of controlling migratory flows as efficiently as they used to. Formal as well as informal economic flows often contradict states' regulation efforts through public economic policies. Sovereignty no longer means state's autonomy and control over a given territory. Religious and cultural flows further undermine citizens' allegiance to their state. This situation has led nation-states in different zones of the world to create regional ensembles, communities of interest, each hoping to be important enough to influence the world economy in the sense that best suits the interests of its members [55]. Regionalization appears then as a first step toward globalization while it constitutes at the same time an attempt for nation-states to salvage what they could from the autonomy of decision and sovereignty they are fast losing under the pressure of transnational flows. If powerful nation-states are able to negotiate a relative autonomy within a given ensemble hoping that the ensemble to which they belong will in turn have an increased autonomy vis-à-vis the rest of the world, most third world nations on the other hand seem completely lost in this process. Thus, two main processes of adaptation to world changes are today observable throughout the world.

The most developed countries are trying, mainly since the beginning of the 1980's, to constitute vast ensembles of sufficient weight in order to be able to develop a somewhat autonomous economic policy. Since 1989, the United States and Canada have been engaged in the constitution of a free exchange North American treaty, NAFTA. Negotiations have since included Mexico. In Western Europe, the European Economic Community has been trying to create an economic and monetary union the objective of which is to give Western Europe the means of an autonomous economic policy. A third pole under Japanese influence in the pacific zone has also been in the making. Nevertheless, a certain degree of autonomy does not mean independence. It is rather interdependence resulting from the liberalization of movements of goods and capitals. Devaluation, taxation, and protectionism in general, are no longer acceptable policies among developed countries. In most developed countries, control of change has been eliminated and capitals circulate according to rates of interest, fiscal policies, possibilities of economic growth, etc. International trade of goods and services has been increasing according to a dynamic that concerns more exchanges within a given regional pole rather than international exchanges in general. Different ensembles have different visions and concerns and that is why different countries prefer to make reciprocal concessions within their own ensemble. The difficulties to agree on an agenda within the GATT at the Uruguay Round (1990) as well as at the WTO Seattle meeting (1999) are but an expression of the developed countries' fear of loss of autonomy and even control over the processes of globalization. President Clinton declared at a media conference right before he left to join the Seattle WTO meeting that about \$9 billion were expected from the electronic commerce during the 1999 holiday season. This is almost the entire revenue from foreign trade of Algeria, an oil producing country with a population of some thirty million people. The message to the world is a powerful one. Who or what could ever stop new information and

communication technologies and the unlimited possibilities they offer from expanding the market to limits never thought of yet? According to Time Magazine:

This year you'll buy about \$15 billion worth of consumer goods online. Businesses will spend an additional \$109 billion buying from one another. And while those numbers are but a small part of the overall retail economy -which clocks in at \$2.7 trillion- e-business is rapidly replacing the traditional kind of almost any purchase you can imagine. By the time the ribbons are off the packages this week, Americans will have spent \$5 billion online for holiday gifts -more than twice as much as last year...In the internet age even buyers and sellers separated by 10,000 miles of fiber-optic cable are closer than those prairie purchasers were to Mr. Sears. They are nanoseconds away, and, as is becoming increasingly apparent, speed kills. It kills old economies, it kills old companies and it kills old rules [56].

While developed countries are busy searching for ways to adapt to the world and to assure to themselves a fair share of the economic growth, third world countries are more than ever entangled in an inextricable web of social, economic, political and cultural problems. The multiplication of transnational flows and the end of the cold war have resulted in the weakening of the modern model of nation-states. In Africa more than anywhere else, populations are busy dismantling this model established during the sixties with the movement of decolonization. The modern nation-state is a political system where judiciary, legislative and executive functions are centralized within a national government. In theory, the system allows for an egalitarian participation of all citizens. A feeling of belonging to a national community constitutes the bridge between society and its government. Nationalism expresses the willingness to defend the interests of the community. This presupposes that the nation is clearly defined, that its interests and values are above anything else, and that its independence must be preserved. The modern nation-state in the third world and especially in Africa has been greatly undermined by the combined effects of transnational flows and the inability of modernizing development projects to deliver on promises of a better life for the majority of people. Modernity as a homogenizing process has failed. The legitimacy of elite controlling judiciary, legislative and executive power is called into question. The bridge between government and society is broken. Differences that were hidden for a long time suddenly reemerge. There are no longer shared values. Ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic and even historic differences are emphasized.

The weakening of the distributive capacity of nation-states aggravates this process. The 1980's were qualified as the lost decade for development. Almost everywhere in the third world, per capita income began to decline from 1980 after having increased from 1960 to 1980 [57]. The weight of foreign debt and ill-managed structural adjustment policies have led to this steady decrease and the subsequent impoverishment of ever growing numbers of people. In ten years, third world debt more than doubled, reaching \$1340 billion in 1992 [58]. The IMF structural adjustment policies have often had a very high social cost. They have led to important cuts in social policies budgets (health, education, etc.). The interruption of investments in all sectors has led to the laying off of numbers of workers who are often obliged to accept any "job" in the informal sector. The reduction of public

expenditures has led to a catastrophic situation in all public institutions, which in turn are no longer capable of providing to the populations the services they are supposed to. To make things even worse, most third world countries were subjected to a structural adjustment plan at a time when prices of raw materials were falling and the dollar was devaluated. Many third world countries depend on raw materials, often a single product, as a source of revenues, and on the dollar as their exchange currency on the international market. The combined effects of foreign debt, structural adjustment policies, fall of prices of raw materials and devaluation of the dollar have had devastating consequences on most third world countries. According to the World Bank, in 1991, of a total population of 5.3 billion people in the world, 1.16 billion were poor. They had yearly revenue of \$370 or less [59]. Their immense majority lives in the third world. The gap between rich and poor countries has increased. It has also increased between the rich and the poor within third world countries. Inequality remains then one of the main characteristics of today's world economy. The 3 billion people of the poorest countries of the world dispose only of 5.4% of the total world revenue. Industrialized countries, which represent only 15% of the world population, control 80% of the world revenue. Sub-Saharan Africa in its entirety disposes of less than 1% of the world revenue [60].

It is no wonder under these circumstances, that modernity as a homogenizing process has failed and that its political expression, the modern nation-state is now widely called into question throughout poor countries. New types of nationalism are born which do not necessarily emphasize a system of identification to a given territory, but rather often refer to a cultural or religious space to which a given community would belong. In other words, if the modern nation-state supposed the existence of a clearly defined territory with legitimate borders, this is not always a prerequisite for new nationalism. New "worlds" are referred to as more meaningful spaces of identification. In this increasing state of anomie resulting from the weakening of the modern nation-state, there is a multiplication of competing systems of identification, each trying to positively link political sovereignty and the identification to a cultural or religious entity. "Old fashioned" nationalist elite whose objective was modernity are obliged to recycle themselves by adopting a cultural or religious stance that would give them a new capacity of mobilization. By so doing, they contribute to the weakening of the modern nation-state while at the same time they give legitimacy to reactive nationalist models that heavily invest in tradition. Very often, we are witnessing the constitution, throughout the third world, of an alliance of "recycled" elite and emerging ones with no clear project of society and whose common denominator is a new brand of populism that invests in tradition as a source of legitimization but has absolutely no concrete solution to the problems of the society at large.

In the Arab world, the collapse of the socialist model, left old nationalist elite with no choice but to call on tradition in an effort to remobilize populations. The example of Iraq, during the Gulf war, with an elite that had for years emphasized the secular dimension of State whose main objective was modernity, now trying to mobilize populations on religious grounds, is a telling one. In Algeria, the rise of Islamism as a vector of identification, made old elite play the card of Arabic as the

sole official language antagonizing at the same time communities that spoke or used other languages. Arab nationalism was everywhere showing signs of weakening while at the same time Islamism was everywhere on the rise. With transnational flows undermining the nation-state whose project, modernity, has failed to translate into a better life for the majority of people, and the fear of these populations of being once again excluded from the postmodern world that is in the making, a considerable portion of the population adhere to an Islamist system of identification. This latter is perceived as the surest rampart to oppose to the western world where, in their minds, originated the "evils" of modernity and where once again is "engineered" a postmodern world that promises to be even more "satanic". Globalization is thus thought of as westernization. Moreover, since the fall of the communist pole, the world is perceived as becoming a unipolar world, and globalization is thus understood as Americanization. This process is portrayed as a "McDonaldization" [61] of the world, that is a standardization of cultures according to American norms and values [62]. The prohibition of satellite dishes by the Islamic regime of Iran and the similar attempt of Islamic groups in Algeria are but expressions of this state of mind. But with all its contradictions and the reaction of opposition to it by all those who feel excluded, the process of globalization is led by very powerful forces that will necessarily call into question the social, economic, political and cultural condition of people in the third world and thus in Algeria.

Globalization is a heavy tendency, taking today the form of the expansion and the primacy of the world market and first of all the world market of capital. The very advanced forms of organization of capital that are multinational firms have marked out and organized this space. Globalization is the major form of the new modernity. Through it is achieved the economic and social modernization, access to new technologies, new ways of producing. It also bears a political modernization. With the new definition of political freedoms and the minimum democracy -pluralism and multipartism, free elections, freedom of information- emerges in fact what could constitute a new international norm of democracy [63].

The mode of governance of the process of development must now be revised. The top-down mode, and its corollary the citizen being taken for a "cultural idiot", are no longer acceptable. The power elite in Algeria continues to resist this necessary change. The latest revision of the penal code seriously limiting the freedom of the press as well as the government proposition of a revision of the law in order to limit lawyers independence are but a clear expression of this resistance. But the rejection of the archaic mode of governance by citizens is also very real. The problematique of development in fact meets that of democracy and more particularly that of a democratic governance.

Notes

1. Human development world report, 1993, p.12.
2. Ivan Illich, *Celebration of awareness*, p.179.
3. See Ivan Illich, *Toward a history of needs as well as Celebration of awareness*, p.166 for a discussion on economic growth, modernization of poverty and the individual's dependency vis-à-vis manufactured goods.
4. See Chinweizu's *decolonizing the economy*.
5. The notion of project and especially the categories of self-management project and revolutionary project that will be used in this text are borrowed from Jean Pierre Boutinet who makes an exceptional analysis of this notion of project in his book *Anthropologie du projet*. However, the way we apply this notion to the Algerian case is personal.
6. See Jean Pierre Boutinet, op. cit., and Alex Mucchielli's *Le projet d'entreprise*.
7. See Christian Mellon and Jean Weydert's editorial of the revue *Projet*, No. 233, p.4.
8. Serge Cordellier, *Le rééquilibrage*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
9. Serge Cordellier, *Vingt ans après*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
10. Daniel Junqua, *Le chadlisme triomphant*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
11. Joëlle Stolz, *Vers l'austérité*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
12. Paul Balta, *Au nom du Maghreb*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
13. Daniel Junqua, *Le chadlisme triomphant*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
14. José Garçon, *Après les émeutes*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
15. José Garçon, *Succès électoral des islamistes*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
16. José Garçon, *Madani emprisonné, Boudiaf assassiné*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
17. Serge Cordellier, *Le rééquilibrage*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
18. Serge Cordellier, *Vingt ans après*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
19. Daniel Junqua, *Le chadlisme triomphant*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
20. Daniel Junqua, *ibid.*
21. Kamel Djaïder, *Une année charnière*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
22. Joëlle Stolz, *Vers l'austérité*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
23. Nicole Grimaud, *Fin de l'économie de rente*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
24. Joëlle Stolz, *Vers l'austérité*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
25. Nicole Grimaud, *Fin de l'économie de rente*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
26. Nicole Grimaud, *ibid.*

27. Nicole Grimaud, *Priorité à la réforme économique*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
28. Nicole Grimaud, *ibid.*
29. José Garçon, *Succès électoral des islamistes*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
30. José Garçon, *ibid.*
31. José Garçon, *Etat de siège*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
32. José Garçon, *Violence au quotidien*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
33. Ali Habib, *Une "guerre sans chiffres"*, in *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, 1997.
34. *L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998*, Algérie, indicateurs économiques, 1997.
35. See the excellent document of the ministry of territorial planning and equipment entitled "**Demain l'Algérie**", p.256.
36. The doctrinal document "**Algerian economy: mid-term stakes and choices, 1996-2000**" was realized in 1996 by a team of thirteen managers representing the ministry of energy, the ministry of planning, the ministry of finance, the ministry of housing, the presidency, Sonatrach (the State oil company) and the national office of statistics. The finance minister and the economic advisor of the presidency supervised the work.
37. See chapter III of part 3 entitled " *esquisse du schéma industriel*" and particularly page 93 of **The orientation report of the planning of the wilaya of Annaba**. The wilaya is an administrative region.
38. See chapter III, part 3 of the same report, pp.93-97.
39. Expertise cited in the document entitled "**Sider, preliminary elements of the internal recovery plan, 1996-1999**" edited October 12th, 1996, pp.2/21 and 3/21.
40. See document cited "**Sider, preliminary elements of the internal recovery plan**", p.9/21.
41. See Jean Pierre Boutinet, *Anthropologie du projet*, p.11.
42. M.A thesis entitled "**Managerial culture in the Algerian public firm. The case of Sider**", defended by Rahal Slimane at the institute of sociology, university of Constantine, Algeria in June 1997.
- M.A thesis entitled "**Meaning and rationality in the Algerian firm. The case of Sider.**", defended by Allouche Jannette at the institute of sociology, university of Annaba, Algeria in July 1998.
43. See the **Prime Minister's note of January, 1995** relative to the public firms' internal recovery plan.
44. See the article in the daily newspaper *El-Watan* of May 31, 1997 "**Controversial recovery**".
45. See the Prime Minister's note cited before.
46. See R. Reitter et autres, **Cultures d'entreprise**, p.13.
47. See R. Reitter, *op. cit.*, p.26.
48. Book cited by R. Reitter et autres in *op. cit.*, p.56.
49. Ahmed Dahmani, *Quel avenir pour les relations Algérie-Europe?*, in the daily newspaper *El-Watan*, December 30, 1999.

50. See **The annual report March 1996-March 1997** of the mediator of the republic, the presidency of the Algerian republic.
51. The definition of different subsystems is borrowed from Jean Claude Lukan, especially from his book "**La systématique sociale**". The way we apply this notion to the Algerian social system is however personal.
52. Anthony Elliot (editor), 1999, p.23
53. Bertrand Badie, Mondialisation, les termes du débat, in **L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998**, 1997.
54. The sketch of an ideal type of postmodernity is drawn on the basis of ideas taken from the thought provoking articles of David Harvey "Postmodernism", Jean-François Lyotard "The postmodern condition", Jean Baudrillard "The precession of simulacra", Frederic Jameson "The cultural logic of late capitalism", Seyla Benhabib "Feminism and the question of postmodernism" and Zygmunt Bauman "Postmodernity, or living with ambivalence". All these articles are in Anthony Elliot's **Blackwell Reader in Contemporary Social Theory**, Part VI, The Modernity/Postmodernity Debate.
55. Denis Clerc, Vers une économie multipolaire, in **L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998**, 1997.
56. Joshua Cooper, Person of the year, Time Magazine, Dec. 27, 1999.
57. Claire Brisset, Croissance des inégalités, au Nord comme au Sud, in **L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998**, 1997.
58. Claire Brisset, *ibid.*
59. Claire Brisset, *ibid.*
60. Claire Brisset, *ibid.*
61. The term "McDonaldization" is borrowed from George Ritzer who defines it as "the process by which the principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world", 1993, p.1.
62. Armand Mattelart, Communication-monde-culture mondiale ou système baroque?, in **L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998**, 1997.
63. Gustave Massiah, La mondialisation, toile de fond des replis identitaires, in **L'Etat du Monde 1981-1998**, 1997. The translation is personal.

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