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The Political Participation Choices in view of Semi-authoritarian Regimes: The Case of the Movement of Society for Peace in Algeria.

خيارات المشاركة السياسية في ظل أنظمة شبه سلطوية: حالة حركة مجتمع السلم في الجزائر

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Abstract:

This study aims at investigating the rules that determine the political participation experience of the Movement of Society for Peace in Algeria, during the past decades, and the effect of that on its ideological discourse and organizational structure. We have relied on the analytic-historical method in order to observe the relationship between the state and the Movement of Society for Peace, but through applying “the approach of Brown” in linking the rules that governed the relationship during the precedent decades with the formal policies

Keywords: Movement of Society for Peace, Algerian Political System, Political Participation, Ideological Speech, Elections.

المخلص:

تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى استنتاج القواعد المحددة لتجربة المشاركة السياسية لحركة مجتمع السلم في الجزائر، خلال العقود الماضية، وتأثير ذلك في خطابها الأيديولوجي وبنيتها التنظيمية. معتمدين على المنهج التاريخي-التحليلي وذلك لرصد تطور العلاقة بين الدولة وحركة مجتمع السلم، لكن عبر تطبيق "مقاربة براون" في ربط القواعد التي حكمت العلاقة في العقود الماضية بالسياسات الرسمية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: حركة مجتمع السلم، النظام السياسي الجزائري، المشاركة السياسية، الخطاب الإيديولوجي، الانتخابات

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1.INTRODUCTION

The There are many explanatory approaches that tackle the phenomenon of the political Islam however; it is difficult to find an explanatory entry able to explain this phenomenon. Despite the pressure and repression that the Islamic movements have been subjected to, they could maintain some kind of dynamism, which enabled them to return to the political arena at each time and unexpectedly.

Algeria is one of the countries, in which the semi-authoritarian regime knew different and unequal relationships. The latter passed by multiple phases, which are considered as the controlling cause in various strategies followed by the movement. From the phase of clandestine action, during the totalitarian era and the disorder it witnessed, to the phase of political openness, in which matters took a dangerous turn as the country entered into a wave of violence and terror .the radical Islamic movement got involved, and the rest of the movements put to the test such as the Movement of Society for Peace that tried to calm the power, to participate instead of dominate, and did not hesitate to adjust many of its program clauses and foundation principles as a clear evidence for its adaptation to the semi-authoritarian policies of the Algerian regime.

Hence, this study aimed at investigating the rules that determine the political participation experience of the Movement of Society for Peace in Algeria, during the past decades, and the effect of that in its ideological speech and organizational structure.

From the above, we may raise the following problematic: How did the semi-authoritarian policies affect the strategic choices of HAMAS?, and how did the participation of HAMAS in the political life influence its ideological speech and reform vision?.

Hypotheses the study depends on are represented as the following:

- The semi-authoritarian policies are the essential factor affecting the ideological speech of HAMAS and its strategic choices in change.
- The more Islamist movements involved and adapted to the political process, the more they develop their speech, in line with their new commitments to accepting democracy, pluralism, and alternation of political power, and the more they as well push to the development of the democratic path, with the benefits and rewards it achieves.

In this research, we have relied on the analytic-historical method in order to observe the relationship between the state and the Movement For Society of Peace, through applying “the approach of Brown” in linking the rules that governed the relationship during the precedent decades with the formal policies, and investigating the effect of that on the development of the ideological discourse of the Movement For Society of Peace. So, the method of this study is based on rereading the historical equation between the state and HAMAS by reversing the dependent and independent variables, making the formal semi-authoritarian policies an independent variable, whereas the movement ideological discourse’s development a dependent factor.

2. The theoretical framework: The approach of Nathan Brown (The Political Participation in a "Semi-authoritarian" Elections)

Nathan J. Brown developed a theoretical approach to study the influence of "semi-authoritarian" regimes on Islamist movements in his book 'When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics'. In it, he discussed the effect of limited political participation in "semi-authoritarian" elections on the ideology of political Islam movements, drawing on the contributions of a number of American and Western researchers, such as: Andreas Schedler¹ and Gunes Murat Tezcur², who spoke about studying the influence of the surrounding political environment - political systems - as important inputs in the explanation of the behavior of Islamic Movements, their choices, and their development.³

In his study, Brown discussed the extent of the traditional question accuracy, that researchers and observers of Islamic movements have used to, which is, "Are Islamic movements serious about their commitment to the democratic game, and that they will not turn against them in the future?" It is a question that assumes that there are democratic regimes, but in fact they do not effectively exist, to practically judge Islamic movements depending on their criteria, or to judge their credibility with regard to their political commitments towards accepting the democratic system as a final system, not a transitional system of government! From this perspective, Brown reformulates the question: What is the influence of the "semi-authoritarian policies" that characterize many Arab regimes, in the Islamic movements' ideology and political practice?

Elections take place in democratic systems to rotate and alternate power, and parties take part to win it, while in "semi-authoritarian policies" elections are held and parties are formed, and a degree of public freedoms and political openness is permitted, but without leading to change the existing "rules of the political game". As a result, the alternation of power is

restricted to what the ruling elite permits. In addition, the process of making decision remains governed by considerations that are more complex and deeper than the clear institutional nature that governs the practice of the western democracies! Another important thing in defining the nature of these regimes and their policies is that governments are not the ones who make decisions and Parliaments have limited reins of power. Actual authority, in opposition to what appears in the institutional nature, is united in the hands of one ruler, king or president, and the institutions that act in making critical decisions are not governments, but rather security or military agencies, or even royal institutions, or the elite that are not necessarily, in positions of official decision-making.

According to these determinants, we in front of a political game in which Islamic parties contest elections not to win them, as is the case in democratic systems, but conscious in advance that they are participating in order to lose, or not to achieve a majority, but rather design the electoral process - in fact - to avoid any possibility that gives Islamist movements the opportunity to become in a position of real legal rule, authority and institutional decision-making! The paradox here, as Brown mentions, is that the loss of these movements to the elections becomes a virtue, which they present as a guarantee and an indication of the degree of their commitment to the political game. The slogan that many Islamic movements adopted during the past era "Participation, Not Domination" may clearly summarize it. And if a sudden development or defect happened to the process of designing the election outputs, the results deviated from the traditional equation, and these movements won the elections becoming the leader according to the logic of electoral legitimacy, the result will be a civil war or a complete setback in the democratic process, as happened when the Islamic Salvation Front won the legislative elections in Algeria in 1992⁴.

3.The Semi-authoritarian Policies and the Movement of the society for peace

They are the policies that impose restrictions and limits on the participation of Islamic movements in the political process, represented by designing the outputs of the electoral and political game in a way that does not lead to the circulation of power or radical changes in the process of decisive political decision-making in the country. Before dealing with this element, it was necessary to start with the concept of the Movement of the society of peace

The Movement of Society for Peace appeared in December 1990, but under the name of the Islamic Society Movement, and its first legal framework was under the banner (Guidance and Reform Society), which was established in 1988 | 11 | 12, after moving from the underground work that began in 1963 and strengthened in the 1970s based on its reference to the global Society of the Muslim Brothers, to the phase of public action in the mid-seventies, with an explicit and practical opposition to the regime of Houari Boumediene under the name of the (Unitarian Group), led by Mahfouz Nahnah, who called for Islamic activism but avoiding any clash with the authority, trying to dialogue with it, as well as coordination with all Islamic⁵ forces and actors. The movement pledged to pursue peaceful methods in its political work, and to refrain from joining any activity that would affect peace and security in the country⁶. The movement is considered one of the oldest opposition movements in Algeria.⁷

The movement arose under a semi-authoritarian regime, which is a hybrid system, located in the gray zone, between complete authoritarianism and democracy. It allows to hold periodic elections, without leading to a fundamental change in the composition of the actual power and the real circulation of it, and provides a certain degree of organization and activity of the political opposition, it allows as well partly general freedoms to varying degrees from one country to another. In these systems, governments are not the ones that make the decisions but rather the security or military⁸ services. This system has been

described as a "hereditary system"⁹ by the American sociologist Eisenstadt S.M. who was inspired by the work of Weber before him to refer to those military or civilian elites who rose to power, seized control of the state and public wealth and acted as if they were the owners. These elites, which often used violence to gain power, gave themselves a historical mission represented in building the state and modernizing society economically, politically and culturally, and that was another source from which the elites derive legitimacy in the illusion of the historical mission that was often used as an excuse to seize power by force or to remain in it by the establishment of an authoritarian regime that denies the difference, and behind that, pluralism and the exclusion of the idea of transferring power by peaceful means.¹⁰

This applies to the Algerian case, where the army institution is the backbone of the ruling elites. And, because of its historical strength, ability and legitimacy, it is used to control opponents and control the political scene. Moreover, when resources are available, these elites try to meet the needs of society on the one hand, and achieve the interests of the groups supporting them on the other hand. However, by the mid-1980s, the incomes of the state were reduced due to the drop in oil prices, the increase in the demography, and the legitimacy of the regime began to erode, the clans of power in conflict, the performance of productive institutions decreased and the authority did not absorb international changes.

However, as a result of these internal and international changes, the Algerian regime embarked on political reforms in February 1989, and it was believed that the country entered a crucial stage that would bring about a break with the one-party system and the military phenomenon. Given that these reforms will lead to the democratization of the political system and under the February 1989 constitution, more than sixty political parties were approved. Despite their large and varied number, they can be classified according to their intellectual and ideological backgrounds and the nature of field disputes into

three main currents (national, Islamist, and secular). After the adoption of political pluralism, the first multiparty elections were held (local elections on June 1990, and parliamentary elections on December 1991). These elections confirmed the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front¹¹ which presented itself as an alternative to the faltering system that has nothing but the army as a political resource to keep power from the greed of the Islamists, who won the first pluralist elections¹² but were not able to get the power because of the military institution's blocking their way by canceling the legislative elections, ending their legal presence, arresting their symbols, and putting large numbers of their militants into the camps. The military elite considered these formations of a religious nature in general and the Salvation Front in particular speculated and exploited democratic repercussions¹³ of power. As a result, Algeria entered the path of violence and terror.

When the authority eliminated the Islamic Salvation Front, it sought to support parties that accept the rules of the political game and the logic of the system, i.e, the exercise of opposition against the "formal" authority but never go beyond the red lines, such as the Movement of Society for Peace (the Islamic Trend Movement at the time) that declared its rejection and condemnation of canceling the electoral process, and at the same time called the Islamic Salvation Front to avoid violence, and tried to contribute to reconciliation efforts between the two parties, but the intensity of polarization did not allow this.

After three years of ineffective attempts, Sheikh Mahfouz Nahnah's movement decided to pursue a policy of participation¹⁴, by returning to the electoral process, rebuilding state institutions, getting societal stability for the profit of the homeland and its future generations, and then rebuilding the Islamic project again in light of peaceful struggle and according to available circumstances and reasons. The movement's first step in this way was the participation in the Transitional Council on May 1994 as a basic step to demonstrate the intention to

participate in resolving the crisis, and then to enter after the failure of communications and initiatives in the 1995 presidential elections, which most of the parties boycotted. In the same context, the National Liberation Front continued to dominate the reins of governance (the presidency, parliament, the government), and in the period from 1997-1991 when the legislative elections were held, politics was just an external interface for military regime through councils and bodies appointed directly by the system such as the National Transitional Council (Parliament), or local authority councils in municipalities and states. A period during which violent acts by armed groups were known and a state of siege was marked. Despite the fact that the political parties have not officially blocked their activities, they have witnessed a decrease in their political activity and some returned to the state of clandestineness under the dual influence of the exceptional laws on the one hand, and the deterioration of the security environment.

However, the Movement of Society for Peace has been struggling despite its leader, Mahfouz Nahnah, being deprived of the state presidency in the elections of 1995. Even though the Movement participated in the government since 1996 and entered the first multi-parliamentary elections in 1997 and the local elections (municipality and state) where its chance was lower than its real level, because the elections were falsified, as it won 71 seats in Parliament and about 1100 local elections, of which about 24 municipalities run by the movement. Thanks to this percentage, the number of ministers rose to 07, and the features of political participation in general, and in the executive body in particular, became clear and it became a media sensation because of the fact that the Islamic trend had proven its ability to coexist with the currents that are considered secular, and the birthplace of a participatory democracy at a minimum.

In 1999, the President Liamine Zeroual resigned, and events accelerated to end with the organization of a beforehand

presidential elections, during which Sheikh Mahfouz Nahnah was deprived with an arbitrary administrative decision against him and against the Movement of Society for Peace even if it adapted to the Republic laws in 1996 by abandoning its old name (Movement of Islamic Society) to (Movement of Society of Peace) under the pretext of not using national constants for political purposes. Despite that fact, the administration was arbitrary and prohibited Sheikh Nahnah from participating in the race because of the fear of his ascension to power after the movement of sympathizers with the movement increased between the years 1999-97.

The authority's awareness of the reality of strategic participation that Hamas adopts is what made it decide to dismiss its candidate. As long as Nahnah do not believe in his withdrawal and escape from responsibility, and the elections in his perspective are a legitimate obligation and a realistic necessity, i.e, he will participate in the elections as a candidate for the movement or without its approval. As a result, there is nothing wrong in the interest of the authority, considering that supporting him would give a kind of legitimacy to the elected president and prevent any emergency that might threaten this legitimacy. Besides, the objective of supporting Nahnah, the consensus candidate, is to guarantee the vast number of Islamist votes through which Nahnah occupied the second place for presidency in 1995. This is obviously in the interest of the consensus candidate, especially in light of the great competition of the parties and opposition figures, and their emphasis on realizing the real transfer of power. The elections were conducted in a transparent and fair manner, and the real objective from excluding Nahnah and bringing him to her line may be to guaranteeing that it is not possible to form an Islamic pole against the authority with the candidacy of Talib Al-Ibrahimi and Abdullah Jaballah. Indeed, the course of the elections proved the extent of the mischief of the authority, especially with regard to granting some kind of legitimacy to the winning president, and this is after the withdrawal of the six

candidates from the presidential race in protest against pre-fraud on the eve of the vote being skeptical about the legitimacy of Bouteflika, who has the support of the most important institution in the state, which is the military establishment¹⁵.

In 2002, the parliamentary elections took place, and then the local elections in the same year, and due to the rigging of the electoral process, the Movement of Society for Peace (HAMAS) found itself declining to the fourth rank with 38 deputies, 38 municipalities, and about 1,200 voters, which exposed it to many political auctions and harassment from parties. By the way, the 2007 elections are not very different from their predecessors.

After the death of Nahnah in 2003, Abu Jarrah Sultani succeeded him in the third conference, which witnessed a widening in the disputes between the old militants of the party and the new generation. Disputes exacerbated in the fourth conference in 2008, and almost destroyed the future of the movement. At the 2013's conference, Abd al-Razzaq Maqri - a close associate of Nahnah - settled the conference, heading the movement and moving it from the loyalty camp to the opposition, and this was a change in the party's policy.

In fact, it is natural for these "semi-authoritarian policies" of the Algerian political system to ask us a major question about the goals behind holding periodic elections and integrating the Movement of Society for Peace into the political process, while being careful not to allow results that lead to the loss of effective control over the reins of power. The answer lies in achieving a number of goals or some of them, the most prominent are: the inertia of the Algerian political system, which creates a permanent desire to obtain political legitimacy, and not to keep the opposition in the street, but rather to contain it within a political game that absorbs its resources and capabilities, and places it within the existing political machine. Or, using elections as a test" to measure the size of the opposition, its

political capabilities, and its popularity in the street¹⁶."

The participatory approach that the Movement of Society for Peace has pursued since 1995, has enabled them to maintain their survival and allowed them to provide professional competence to their cadres. However, this political participation also enabled the regime to co-opt these activists and to lose their legitimacy to moderates in the eyes of public opinion, and to impede their ability to attract voters. Consequently, the movement lost its depth and force in Algerian society¹⁷; the movement is dominated by its formation what one of the French researchers Gilles Kippel called (The pious middle classes) that does not risk taking critical and clear positions as a political position, as was the case with the base of the Islamic Salvation Front. The base of the Movement of Society for Peace and its local and national leadership in particular, is highly integrated sociologically; the number of state employees / businessmen in the formal and informal sectors, has increased in recent years, calling for greater political integration, to reach positions of power¹⁸. There is another angle of view that the regime neutralized the main Islamic parties by allowing them to participate in the elections and include them in the ruling coalition, which attracted them with the advantages of power just to realize a decline in their popular support due to making concessions to remain in Parliament. "According to Arimont, Khamisi and Taj al-Din, this strategy was also employed at the level of municipal councils, whereby Islamist parties were allowed to participate in them. "When these councils fail to achieve positive results, young individuals would lose their trust in them; this operation led to underestimate of the Islamist Parties.

The system did not give the Movement of Society for Peace the opportunity to exercise government and open the political space as President Chadli Bendjedid did in 1989, in order to avoid a repeat of the 1990 scenario. Rather, the authority granted privileges and met the personal interests of the

heads of those parties and Islamic political blocs, which made militants in these parties lose confidence in their parties. It is a policy to blow up Islamic and non-Islamic parties from the inside; many political parties have known divisions into small, fragile parties that lack experience and popular base, and are looking for a place for them in the political arena. After that, the authority proceeded to cleanse the political arena from these parties through the elections' law that was issued on August 2016. The law set a 4% threshold for parties to participate in the legislative elections and this is what some parties considered a legal measure that would prevent them from participating in the elections, so they resorted once again to the politics of the bloc, and this is what can be considered that the system was able to distract the political Islam movements from the popular movement and make them take care of their internal problems.¹⁹

4. The Impact of Limited Participation on the Movement of Society for Peace: Intellectual and Organizational Consequences

To what extent does the involvement of the Movement of Society for Peace in the political game affect the ideology of the movement? How did its vision of political participation and its commitment to the democratic game evolve?

4.1 Its position on democracy

The structural and intellectual transformations witnessed by the Movement of Society for Peace in Algeria necessitated the beginning of its establishment of a flexible and positive outlook and attitude towards the system of government, the state, and politics. It constituted an evolution in its positions that acknowledge the political action, in its outlook for many concepts such as democracy, and in political pluralism and rotation of power.

Contemporary democracy, according to the founder of the Hamas Movement, Sheikh Mahfouz Nahnah, is a practical method for taking decisions of public concern, and it is an

approach imposed by the necessities and requirements of modern social life between individuals and groups, and its application requires the establishment of principles and building institutions that enable the conduct of opinions, interests and ideas in a peaceful and organized manner, and this is achieved through restricting democratic practice with a constitution that takes into account the conditions on which the social forces disagree, and upon which the political class builds sufficient consensus.²⁰ So, the democratic process, according to the founder of the movement, begins when peaceful dealing with resolving disputes and conflicts and managing contradictions between the various forces and interests within society prevails, and when an agreement is reached between the influential social forces to ensure a minimum of effective political participation for all citizens without discrimination or exclusion.²¹ Democracy, according to Mahfoud Nahnah's political thought, is as well characterized by two characteristics, the first characteristic is that it is a practical approach and not a doctrine or an ideology, and the second characteristic is that it is a constitutional democracy, i.e, it is bound by a constitution and not absolute. This constitution must meet two basic conditions:

- The constitution expresses the agreement and consent of the active social and political forces
- The texts, provisions and articles of the constitution take into account the major and fundamental principles of democracy.

Except taking account of these two conditions, democratic practice can be constitutionally restricted by the beliefs, values and laws prevailing in society. People, as the source of authority in the democratic system of government, can direct democratic practice.²²

As for the relationship between democracy and Islam, Mahfouz Nahnah says: "we do not look at democracy in our movement in opposition to Islam; rather we look at it in opposition to Shura. Islam asks us to consult and allows us to

deal with democracy. This permissibility is related to the fact that the word democracy is not mentioned neither in Quran nor in the Sunnah and it is one of the words that it is permissible to use...”. As he confirms by saying: ... “I would like to realize that the democracy that we are talking about takes place among human beings in order to curb dictatorship in all its aspects, and to prevent opinion tyranny ...”. Hence, Sheikh Mahfoud Nahnah summarized the relationship of democracy to shura with the term ‘shurocracy’ and gave many elements to justify the mixing of the two terms, whether on the grounds that democracy is an Islamic commodity returned to its people, as Rached Ghannouchi says, or on the fact that wisdom is the quest of the believer who picks it up wherever he finds it.²³

The movement affirms that the essence of democracy is the effective political participation, and the balance of forces upon which democracy is based is primarily a balance between the forces of society and the forces of the state that govern it, and creating this balance requires the agreement of the real forces of change on a common intellectual basis that allows them to overcome their side differences in favor of the public interest.²⁴

In general, the movement tries to present itself as a peaceful, democratic, national movement that prioritizes security, stability, and protection of human rights and the dignity of the citizen over any other partisan goals.

4.2 The Dialectic of the Relationship between the Missionary and the Politician

The Movement of Society for Peace in Algeria is pursuing the experience of organizational unification and complete identification between missionary and politics, in which the political function is amplified at the expense of the missionary and educational position and with the combination of these functions within the same organizational structure, which has negatively affected it in power and in spread, and led to

ambiguity in defining its organizational and intellectual identity: Are they political parties or missionary groups?²⁵

The Hamas movement does not see anything wrong in merging the religious and the political and mixes the missionary work and the mobilization work for electoral purposes, so the people's sense of faith will be excited, and they are followed on the background that the party will draw its rulings from the religious text and will be the guarantor of the protection of sacred things, and the defender of entities and religious institutions, and this trend leads to a monopoly on the part of the associative participant and to speak his name, which affects the paths of competition in the electoral process.

In recent years, however, the movement has tended to distinguish between missionary and political action, and this is what its current president, Abd al-Razzaq Maqri confirmed, saying: "The process of Islamic action, challenges and constraints - as well as experience - dictated the choice of distinguishing between political work and missionary. And we, in the Movement, have tended to this distinction without coercion, and it was the subject of a long research that we presented at the movement's fifth conference in 2013, and we are now calmly walking on it ... It is a response to the Movement of Society for Peace's entry into political practice, not to secular pressures, and that the separation between them is a functional separation and not an intellectual one."²⁶

In general, it can be said that the Movement of Society for Peace, despite its tendency to distinguish between political and religious action, in reality there has not been enough change in the relationship between the missionary and the politician within the movement.

4.3 The dialectic of the relationship between the ideological and the pragmatic

This is another feature of the transformation within the

Movement of Society for Peace by engaging in political action, to transfer its ideas and orientations from general slogans to political procedures and turn to public policy; this necessarily requires rearranging the relationship between the ideological and the pragmatist, i.e between the goals as decided ideologically and by reference, and between what can be attained in terms of interim public policies to reach the strategic goals that are compatible with the ideological and intellectual requirements.²⁷

The Movement of Society for Peace started witnessing a reduction in the ideological frameworks for the benefit of expansion in the practical and pragmatic trend. And it was able to break free from the logic of the call in formulating its electoral program, which presents a realistic, flexible and moderate vision. It introduces itself as a "popular, reformist, and comprehensive political movement that relies on a moderate, peaceful, and transformative approach, that aims at building the individual, family and society and participates in the political process in order to complete the building of the democratic, social and sovereign Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles, through the peaceful transfer of power and by democratic means.

Since its founding in 1991, the movement has dreamed of building an Islamic state by changing the Algerian regime to an Islamic one that applies Islamic law and not man-made laws.²⁸ On the economic level, the movement calls for a return to the Islamic endowment system, and to deal with the Islamic economy in banking transactions. However, it seems that the party today has abandoned the project it had always adhered to, which aims to establishing an Islamic state, arguing that the constitution of the state of Algeria respects the principles of Islam. The first sentence in the preamble to the political program of the party reads: "Algeria is the land of Islam, and a country of the Greater Arab Maghreb, which belongs to the Arab and Islamic world". In view of their pragmatism, the Islamists of the Movement of Society for Peace have shown increasing interest

in governance matters, such as working for political and constitutional reform that establishes for the birth of a strong system of government that represents the sovereignty of the people, defines the mandates, separates powers, guarantees the independence of the judiciary system, establishes freedoms and democracy, criminalizes corruption, and dissuades the falsification of the popular will and the use of political money. Its political program emphasized the civilization of the political system in a way that achieves democracy and the sovereignty of law, entrenches a culture of political, trade union, media and societal pluralism, and considers political and parliamentary opposition as a basic function for building a state of right and law and rooting democracy.

5. CONCLUSION

During the past era - since 1989-, the "semi-authoritarian" policies adopted by the Algerian regime imposed restrictive rules on the outcomes of the parliamentary elections and the ability of the opposition to change. The political process did not allow any kind of transfer of power through the portal of parliament and parliamentary governments.

Despite the limited opportunities and the available political rewards through the "political game", the Movement of Society for Peace has significantly developed its political discourse over the past years towards democracy acceptance, political pluralism, the power alternation, and giving importance to the political and constitutional reform project, that has begun to overwhelm its demands and priorities; which confirms the hypothesis introduced by this study that the more the Islamist movement entered and integrated into the political process, the more its commitment to its outputs and requirements are reinforced and it is transferred from the side of the political scene to its center.

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²⁵ Hamdouche Nacer, Between the Politician and the Missionary: Models and experiences, (consulted on: 8-2-2019), via bit.ly/3mCVNlk

²⁶ Hamdouche Nacer, Op. Cit.

²⁷ Bilal Al-Tlidi, Reviews of Islamists: A Study of the Changes in the Political and knowledge Pattern, Beirut: Development Center for Research and Studies, pp. 215-216.

²⁸ Nadir Masmoudi, Op. cit, P59.