

## Hermeneutics and the Theory of action

Paul Recœur, Reader of Davidson and Anscombe

### المهرمينوطيقا ونظرية الفعل: بول ريكور قارئاً لدافيدسون وآنسكومب

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#### Abstract (English):

This research seeks to clarify the role played by the analytical and Anglo-Saxon philosophy in the development of Paul Recœur Hermeneutics by contributing to change his interest in from interpreting texts to trying to interpret and understand human action philosophically, while attempting to develop his own theory, different from that of Davidson and Anescombe on the concept of the act and the possibilities of its interpretation. However, in his research into the phenomenology of the responsible human, Recœur does not claim to try going beyond the readings of the Anglo-Saxon philosophers, but he is very cautiously investing their work in building a theory of action of dimensions with different concepts depending on hermeneutic thinking and linguistic analysis and certainly on the phenomenological interpretation method.

**Keywords:** Paul Recœur; Theory of action; Hermeneutics; Phenomenology; Interpretation.

#### ملخص باللغة العربية

يسعى هذا البحث إلى إيضاح الدور الذي لعبته الفلسفة التحليلية والأنجلوسكسونية في تطوير هرمينوطيقا بول ريكور بالمساهمة في تغيير اهتمامه من تأويل النصوص إلى محاولة تأويل وفهم الفعل البشري فلسفياً، مع محاولة وضع نظرية خاصة به، مختلفة عن نظريات دافيدسون وآنسكومب حول مفهوم العمل وإمكانات تأويله. يجدر الذكر، أن ريكور خلال بحثه في فينومينولوجيا الإنسان المقتدر لا يزعم محاولته تجاوز ما قدمه الفلاسفة الأنجلوسكسونيين من قراءات، ولكنه يعتمد بحذر كبير إلى استثمار أعمالهم في بناء نظرية في الفعل ذي أبعاد مفاهيمية مختلفة تعتمد على التفكير الهرمينوطيقي وعلى التحليل اللساني، وبالتأكيد على منهج التفسير الفينومينولوجي.

كلمات مفتاحية: بول ريكور؛ نظرية الفعل؛ الهرمينوطيقا؛ الفينومينولوجيا؛ التأويل.

## 1-Introduction

The last third part of Paul Recœur's life witnessed a clear change in the objectives of his philosophical project. After being focused on the theoretical meditative philosophy subjects,

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meditation on the human self in its practical dimension became his new project. Although all of Recœur's works resemble the different stages of science development, each episode is related, in the same time, to its predecessor and represents an extension of its aftermath. In fact, his philosophy is characterized by its format and the interconnection of its topics with each different other. Thus, any philosophical question cannot be read in isolation from one issue to the other. His philosophy is a network of concepts that cannot be independent, no matter how much you try. Indeed, Recœur wanted his reflections and interpretations to have vital results. For that reason, he chose the analytical turn, justified and then declared it in the threshold of the self (1990) by saying: "Hermeneutics reveals itself as a philosophy of turn as it seemed to me that the turn by analytical philosophy would be more indispensable by fulfilling promises and results" (Amara, 2017, p. 75).

In this way, Recœur turns his thinking from the Hermeneutics Text to the Hermeneutics Act considering that dealing with the human act in terms of understanding is a continuity to study the text from its interpretive part. He examines that there is a related link between the study of the text and the study of the act, philosophically in Hermeneutics critical model, in a basic way highlighting that: "An action is, like a text, an open effect" That's why Recœur tried hard to move Hermeneutics from the edge of theoretical understanding to the extents of practice and application considering criticism to be the conceptual mind focus meeting with the practical mind.

Therefore, in order to address the human act understanding problem as a capacity to change something in the world, it is necessary to know the reasonable side truth in it, which represents its procedural course, to cite the concept of motives, reasons, will, intent, deliberation, choice, and decision. That's why we wonder: What does "Action" mean? What is the « Actor-Act » relationship? Why did Recœur care about the concepts of incentives and reasons within this kind of Hermeneutics? And what is the use of the interpretation practice as a way of understanding the act purposes? What is Recœur's position concerning the famous philosophical readings such as those of Anscombe and Davidson, who tried to formulate a theory in human action? Finally, what relates the work to the intent?

## 2. Hermeneutics of incentives and reasons

The "Theory of Action" according to Paul Recœur, can only be understood *prima facie* by the theory of language. Thus, Recœur tried to present a different and new understanding by performing an accurate analysis that connects integrally the Theory of Action with the Theory of Language. In fact, he relied on two mechanisms, discussed, in a clear way that makes it easier for each researcher to

understand its circumstances. He also adopted them as rules of Hermeneutics which are the mechanism of indication and the mechanism of deliberation. The first is based on the philosophical reflection and understanding, whereas the second is directly concerned with the language issues. Each prototype question concerning the relationship of act to the actor has to be passed on them first. Reaching the goals of the actor when he does something and sees its results, allows in one way or another to determine the identity pattern to which he belongs according to a realistic and logical identity path which is subject to the same laws that the philosophy of language adheres to when the issue of identity is discussed, which is one of the convergence points between act and language.

As a result of returning to the concept of significance and exactly act significance, Recœur sees that every philosophical indication of what the actor does is limited to describing only what this person is actually doing, without subjecting him to any responsibility that may be drawn from doing so. Indeed, the actor is the real self and no one has the right to understand the significance of his actions through a special moral measure adhered to. The crave significance of the act and its effectiveness is a wide network of acting expressions, such as motivation, deliberation, purpose, result and intent, etc.. In this context, Recœur said: "the 'intersignification' relation is the one that regulates the exclusive meaning of each one of them, so we can say that knowing the use of one means knowing how to use the network in a functioning and correct way; we are facing a coherent language game... In reality, contrary to the experimental imperial concepts established by the humanities from biological to sociology, the function of the entire network is to determine what is 'considered' an act". (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 160) Psychology focuses primarily on what appears to be behaviour and disorders in the patient, which means the action resulting of that self-illness. Therefore, the network of act, is based on its various expressions leading and referring to it in the same context, but in an opposite form that the language and its semantic will formulate the appropriate words with the act done which are hierarchically formed thanks to the questions always asked before doing this act or after finishing it, such as why does he act? How? Who? Why? And so on. Concerning the actor who is doing the action, the question "who" (Who did it? Who is the real actor?) is the responsible for identifying and diagnosing it, because every attempt to answer it whatever the context, is in reality an attempt to understand the human self.

Thus and based on the above analysis, Recœur Hermeneutics appears more clearly, when the semantic dimension of human action is approached on the one hand, and between the act and the text on the other. If there are incentives to clarifying the act value and its intention as well as results,

the latter is more like a text that is open to many interpretations, and therefore knowledge of the incentives leading to the act as a whole, is the knowledge of the act itself. In other words, when reading a text, it will necessarily need a certain understanding, at least if read in a reflective way. Similarly for the act, if combined with incentives following, it is like an open book with different concepts, in a variety of contexts, and perhaps through this idea even a little is determined, the relationship of the theory of text to the theory of act and the Hermeneutics foundations bringing them together. (Ricoeur, *du texte à l'action*, 1986) However, what matters now in this research is to more take into account the concept of the act. In terms of its motivations and reading it through them, it is clear that act and motivation are very similar, contrary to the incentive and reason. For the latter we note that Ricoeur, has shown little interest to it and separate them, although causality is the chief engine of any action: I do this and so, and I do this and that, because I have reason to do it. Yet, the priority at Ricoeur is the incentive when it comes to the Theory of Action, so it does not link the cause to the act, but rather relates the cause to the event and the motivation to act, and there is a kind of conflict here. He says: "first of all, I think that the conflict between the cause and the motivation does not impose itself phenomenological ... It seems, rather, here that the use of desire in the English word 'need' comes to us as a combination and its suitability falls from the moment it withdraws, for logical reasons, the motivation to the argument of action, even if all we want to justify with this act is the originality of how to be necessarily and certainly between motivation and action." (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 172) Then, Ricoeur activates once again the role of language (for example the concept of need) as a main characteristic to understand the act and interpret it as well as to understand the hypotheses that he always receives when opening to new relations, but why the act gets along with motivation, while it is against the cause? It has been pointed out in the preceding that the incentive is closer to achieving a certain understanding of the work than the reason, because the responses that are recorded when asking causal questions are not always logical or rational, but internal entities (the soul and its conditions) often intervene in these answers to deviate from the real intent that made his work possible and real. First and foremost, neither anticipating the actions of others, nor asking about the reason behind it, will lead to capture the actual truth of doing that action or act. All of these are imposed by the barrier of the actor psychological conditions, because if he answers you a good rational reason such as to do this and that, he will fail to 'rationally' respond if you reformulate your question by adding emotional expressions that necessarily lead to a kind of emotion sometimes and sometimes confusion, for

example: why do you like to do this? Will this act meet all your needs? Do you like what you are doing? Etc...Consequently, the human psyche and its conditions interfere in case of contradiction between the action and the act, contrary to the impulse that seems extremely rational, "this phenomenology justification gives the thesis a potential and acceptable characteristic, but the arising question then becomes to know that there is no causal model other than that of Hume going hand in hand with the motivation idea reformulation that has been reduced to a mere idea of 'reason of' that this point can only be discussed at the end of the course which may have led us to combine the idea of motivation within the idea of reason," (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 173) In this way, the discussion at the level of discourse between motivation and reason can be reached to the rule that the act has two opposing fronts through which will be appeared and interpreted. The first is the effect of oneself conditions as well as desires and prejudices. The second is the actual embodiment of this act in reality, in other words, the act has two sides, a psychological side and a physical side, both of which together represent the will of the actor and his intention. The act is then interpreted according to the practical significance of the state in one hand and its linguisticity on the other. The questions "What" and "Why" in terms of discourse, are supposed to be interpreted in a phenomenological way that corresponds to the purpose they are supposed to achieve, which is the direct shift to the "Whom" question. That is, to achieve the real actor of the knowledge process contributing to understand itself and the world as well as the others' realizing its own actions. In this case, the best to be adapted will be the phenomenological Hermeneutics as a relationship basis between the act and his actual actor. The beginning is with the intent concept that Paul Recœur deliberately ranked it the last in his analysis of the theory of action behind the relationships of act-event as well as reason with stimulus. That is to say that the work intent is not the famous intent adapted by the phenomenologists. In other words, to go to something, or return to the same thing because of the own actor's intention that can only be known through the verbal expression of the actor when declaring his intention directly: "The implicit intent cannot be known although the superficial linguistic rules of intent are unclear: nothing distinguishes the future intent (I'll go hiking) from the future estimate (I'll be sick) or from the imperative (you will obey me). Far from the superficial linguistic rules, the main drawback here is the honesty standard in the intent declaration, if we consider "I mean that" the intuition significance non-reducible" (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 176). So, the linguistic analysis of the word "intention" plays an important role in understanding the relationship between intention and act, as Recœur prefers dealing with the word

'intention' within grammatical linguistic rules, rather than addressing it according to the phenomenological or philosophical argument as this argument does not serve the theory of Action based on practical and realistic analysis of the human act. Consequently, utterances such as: What is his intention by doing this? What does he mean? or intended to do, as well as other phrases, already surrounded temporally that are related to the intention and tried to be understood as occurring in the past or happening in the present or also taking place in the future, are such as linguistic incubators of the act content on the one hand, and represent in the same time the real actor image reflection within the linguistic discourse because the goal of this linguistic analysis when the 'linguistic rules' are determined using phrases such as intention, motivation, ability to do would reveal the methodological contexts in which these expressions are described as meaningful connotations. (Ricoeur, *Analyse linguistique et phénoménologie de l'action*, 2015)

### **3. The practical dimension of intent according to Anscombe:**

The 'intention' is considered to be a mediator that links the action and the actor together. If we recognized controversy that each action has a certain purpose, in case proven in human action, because no matter how physical is it, it would have a psychological and mental dimension before. Otherwise, the action of man will be the same as an animal. Again and by this linguistic analysis of intent, the interpretation tends trying to answer the 'What' question, mainly included in the 'Why' question. (What to do? And why doing it?). This is due to the fact that the 'why' question is basically providing analysis with a wide range of unique understandings that the act issue provides. Although this seems to be a positive preference for applying 'why' question, this concern for subtle distinctions is first found in the research dealing with cases where there is no application to ask 'Why'. This caution has occurred in the past with Aristotle in his analysis of the best choice: A state of ignorance, a state of coercion and pressure. Anescombe added: "everything stops under any act description where the actor was not aware of what he was doing (he did not know that he was making a noise while spreading the piece of wood) but the main stir is the absolute conflict between the pretext of act and the reason." (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 178)

Once again, causal analysis fails to answer the basic questions underlying the theory of action. Without intention the actor cannot understand the consequences of his act, but to realize what act to do. Even if the human being used to give reasons for doing something, this is logically acceptable. For example: why did you do that act? The answer will be directly: because of that and that. In fact, this causal justification is a preliminary procedure only to understand the actor, but does not achieve the

desired goal underlying in the act itself. This is due to the fact that the actor is not responding, each time, except under a private internal entity pressure, or an external authority or influencer (whims influence, state authority, submissive religion or aesthetic taste). Thus, the reason is only determined in descriptive terms of act and the notion of causality remains always maze moving within the theory of action. In terms of linking the reason to motivator, the act incentive formally looks like the reason behind the act in the questions 'what is the motive' and 'why'. The answer in this case (conformity) will only need to be interpreted in the past, which is not enough to answer the question 'why to act'. However, when linking motivation to intent, only then you will know when the act has occurred which is often determined to be in the future. In this way, you can know what actually happens and what will happen; a fact which is the essence of act. In other words, the "act" is always defined to be something that will happen or be done. "What about the conflict between act and event, which we had shown in the previous analysis before the conflict between motivation and reason?" Here also, A. Anascombe attitude included so much diversities and showed subtle differences. In the one hand, she highlighted that the intended act is a subject of description clear in the concept of *act* meaning occupied in such a description. So, in this sense the (what) act belongs to the knowledge that can be true or false". (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 179) This is the analytical philosophy which is always focusing on the rigour to describe acts and their purposes. Actually, the rigour of language is in the actions and rules of the speech. That is to say when the actor expresses the incentive or motivation of doing his act, he will use words that will directly lead to understand its meaning. All of this is achieved, if only the knowledge of the act done is accomplished. In other words if the language seeks to present the human act in its semantic and true form that accepts its openness to interpretation and multiple understanding and keep it away from every naïve and superficial understanding, practical knowledge takes the same course and tries to embed any language gap between them. The act requires knowledge of what you do, and also the expression in terms of intent and not in terms of form or image. Thus, the act is intentional rhetorical before being visual physical. Perhaps, this is what Anescombe seeks to prove in her work on intent (the intention in terms of phenomenology means the direction of consciousness towards the thing that I do) (Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, 1990), especially when she analyses, from the phenomenological side, the speech actions in the common language used that must be studied by the Theory of Action, or at least that the Theory of Action is supposed to study. For example, the act at the end achieves a result

which is undoubtedly not necessarily indicating the real actor. Yet, it remains the vat that contains all the kinds of interpretation understanding the nature and purpose of that action.

The actor, in this case, is a being hidden by the veil of motives and motivations. So, Anscombe reanalyzes 'I want' or 'I desire' that she started earlier and takes into account -in an orderly manner- the formula of the actor name (wanting) without ever caring about the expression (I want), and so she can write: "The initial meaning is 'trying to get' and use it as a participle to allow her to delete the actor no matter how she conjugates it. (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 180) However, according to the work hermeneutics depending on phenomenology intent on the one hand and semantic deed on the other, the term (desire) has full credit versus the term need when rereading the verb descriptively, in its interpretation through the practical results of practical knowledge and its implications. The intent and practical knowledge, according to Anscombe, are two sides of one human act in its future dimension, because that's what matters to the real actor as well as the other one watching him and asking questions for understanding. For example, if I did not what I said, it does not mean necessarily that I have made a mistake or even, I have lied, because the statement of intent is not a matter of doing what I said, but that the action is really achieved only according to what I meant. (Anscombe, 2000) Accordingly, the theory of Action determines the sum of action course in which it is seen, read and interpreted, which are the path of motivation, the course of motivation, the course of the event as well as the course of the practical context of the act. Moreover, the fact of knowing the actor and turning it into a mirage that you cannot verify, neither by the brain nor by the reason is due to what the continuous description of the act nature. As a result for it, is the interpretation, which in turn determines the value and intent of this act? Though, why does the actor become such an implied pronoun so influential? The answer lies in the actor himself, in other words, in the human nature of the actor. He is first and foremost a sinning person who, experiences, sometimes internal swings, and does not care about the feasibility of his actions frequently. He can be also delusional again and alluring every now and then. We cannot be directed to the actor, but to all understanding towards the act. For that reason, the self-actor always has a mysterious and negative side in the form of unreality, lies or falsehood, "or simply the hesitation and internal conflicts that Aristotle called virtue and choice (*Nicomachean Ethics*). In that way, the relationship is a means-intent and the logic following it does not end the meaning that we act according to which includes, in addition to that, as I see, the 'act of intending' that has been removed from the first place." (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 183)



In this way, a moral problem closely related to intent arises, which is the problem of telling the truth when expressing the intention behind the action, because the intention involved in this practical form of thinking adopted by analytical philosophy, is a matter of self-interest. Therefore, the actor is not always obliged to sincerely reveal his intention. In fact, the possibility of lying and deceiving others is possible, and therefore the description of the nature of the act, which is one of the main basis of the theory of Action, becomes threatened by the lack of credibility and therefore its ineffectiveness from the beginning. Consequently, every fact based on description, is firstly required proving its sincerity against its lying, and its authenticity against its falsity, but how to prove the sincerity of something that I am not the owner but the other? Really, you can't verify the veracity of a description, or a fact that is self-contained; it is more like the illusion of proving that everything is done in accordance with mutual trust between one self and another only. So, declaring intent is not equal to its linguistic significance. In fact, declaring is accreditation requiring mutual trust of oneself, wanting to attain the truth and always telling truth to the extent that Anscombe herself admits that "only human himself can say what he meant but this statement is considered to be in the level of confession: confession is an expression of the internal testimony that we deliver abroad, either accepted or rejected." What Anscombe calls knowing without seeing belongs, despite what she said, to this record of disclosure and I agree that acknowledging the intended purpose is not the act of a strange eye looking at the middle of this act. (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 184) . So, Paul Ricoeur makes the confession act, that clarifies the purpose of the actor doubtless clear, a principle to criticise Anscombe's intent theory dealing with the problem of act, because, according to him, she did not reach by its analysis, the purpose of which to understand its real nature. Thus, the act should not attain its phenomenological intention because this kind of intent is directed towards the act as well as its manifestations, and somehow neglects the hidden aspects that do not accept the visual viewing that characterizes the self-acting. Recognition and also admission are the best two examples of that. However, Anscombe has tried hard to move from the concept of intent in its descriptive and explanatory dimensions to the concept of intent in its factual and practical dimension, as if the intention corresponds to the same act. For example, the utterance "i meant to do this" suggests to the other's mind, that this act will indeed take place, and also that the deliberation, intention and will preceding it have already been made available, and that the only remaining is its performance. So, the concept is related to what might be "called the 'future motive', under which the description and interpretation of the act are related to what it will ensue later on; in other words, what things' future

cases will take place according to the desire" (alhabri, 2016, p. 58). This is how the intent vanishes as a pre-intention moment to act, towards melting into the act itself. Therefore, even the intent correct prediction that goes along the same path of understanding leading to the future act has been independent of the watch knowledge limitations that Anscombe has referred to, in order to enter under the umbrella of practical knowledge that tries, by various means, to answer the questions of act performance. In short "it does not matter whether the intention is accomplished or the explanation is short and incomplete: Because I wanted to, and that's all. There's simply a removal of what I'm going to call intent. In other words a qualitative momentum into the future where the thing that is going to do, is going to be done by me, the person himself who says he is going to do. That is to say, that the thing inside intent which puts it on the promise path is removed." (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 185) This is how the analytical conceptual intent is culminated in its end by including the term of approval and emphasis by Paul Recœur who considered it the main key to achieve a first-hand understanding of the Act nature and also derestricting the ambiguity surrounding the real actor, in removing any doubt enclosing the reality and credibility of self-acting. It should be noted once again that Recœur has deliberately arranged the question of actions intentionality in his research on the theory of Act in this way by making it to a third level and the opinions behind the concepts of case, reason and motivation, only to draw attention to the fact that the intent in an analytical philosophy and the philosophy of act do not have the same status and importance as in phenomenology. The practical reality of the act discussed by the practical knowledge dissociates itself from each abusive understanding or misinterpretation that the other when explaining, describing or trying to understand an act, can undergo.

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#### 4- Criticism of Davidson's Theory of Action

After all this further analysis in order to formulate a theory of Action on linguistic and practical analytical foundations, Paul Recœur actions return to the concept of the event to link it this time not to the act itself, but to the significance of the act, to mainly concentrate on the event anthropology that has brought human act as a whole under its umbrella. That's why Paul Recœur chooses Donald Davidson's theory with some admiration, as a rule from which he sets up his analysis of the act significance and the anthropology of the event. "The hypothesis starts by a noticeable paradox, already by underlining the 'téléologique' that distinguishes the act from all the other circumstances. However, this descriptive label is soon subject to a causal concept of interpretation in which resides

the critical interference of the theory of action...As much as Anscombe's analyses seem impressionistic, the causal interpretation also serves Davidson's strategy of introducing the act into an unconcealed but declared annotator" (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 186). In this way, Davidson won't take the relationship of the act with the event from the conceptual theorizing treated in the beginning of the research but it will be addressed in anthropological terms, because this context will be taken from the event concept, the cornerstone through which there is no confusion between the act and the anthropology of the event. In the beginning, Ricoeur confirms that Davidson's presentation made the event an undiagnosed entity in a self-acting because the event initially is not, necessarily, a subject to the actor authority. It gives complete independence to any interpretation made under the pretext of knowing the real actor who did or does the act. In this way, Davidson deals with the theory of action in a purely ontological space according to the role of the event and its contribution to its construction. He considers that the act has a certain ontology that allows him to describe it by defining its goals and objectives, and even the total acts of speech that distinguish it from the rest of the acts. Thus, limiting all the differences between the event and the act in intent is necessary (discussing the relationship between the event and act in this way leads to another critical discussion by Davidson about the ontology of unknown events) (Greisch, 2001). So, the event then has an independent entity that is not subject to the ideology of act if the latter does not have the intention, then what happens is the same as what occurs. This is due to the fact that the act of obtaining is originally included in the act of happening and vice versa. What distinguishes them is the act of intent that does not exist in the event which is Davidson's initial view when formulating his theory, and of course added to the strategy adopted in 1963 focusing on the preference to intention use in the accusative case (x intentionally did y) and subject to the gender name ((a has the (intent) to do x in the circumstances of y). However, the intentional expression in which it was merely considered an indicative extension of the status of the event (intentionally). Several reasons justify such a strategy. First, when the intention in the event is treated as a Cognate object or causative object, it could be subject to the job description of what happened" (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 188). The idea that we want to emphasize in this example is that the event in terms of an act subject to the same conditions and serving the same purpose that characterizes the act in terms of having occurred in the past. Then, the time is also important within Davidson's theory of action and analytical philosophy as well, more specifically the past time, because the process of describing the event as a fact in history, is itself a process of describing the act

as an event that has already occurred, which justifies Davidson's use of the meditative strategy that makes the event "intentional", simply because it provides the possibility of reading in his proper time circle, as well as dealing with the act and the event as being actions that have really been done. This is, at least, what the rational interpretation wants to reach. Also, always when talking about rational thinking in any subject, the cause analysis is the most common method. According to that, Davidson refers in his theory to the causal explanation when he tried to rationalize the act. So, its description in his inference surrounding to be 'intentional' does not come out of its interpretative framework based on the argument consideration of the actor; Thus, the realization of a certain reason for the action. From that perspective, Recœur said the following, concerning Davidson's theory: "We can say that someone has his own reason for doing something specific if they first have a favourable attitude or a tendency towards actions of a certain kind, and we mean a tendency to something broader than desire, need, and the preferred a position including all the obligations and all the private and public objectives of the real actor. On the other hand the belief (knowledge, perception, observation, memory) that the actor's act belonging to this category of acts." (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 189) Davidson, therefore, asserts through his dissertation and precisely 'intentionally' that the causal explanation gives the same conclusion as description. That is to say, the practical knowledge that the actor has, gives the act its purpose. So, the description of this act is based on what he understood as intended to understand. In other words, what the actor declares as an argument for his act. So, the intention becomes an argument in itself, and every interpretation resulting from the description process does not come out of the circumference provided by the relationship of argument – intention of the actor. In terms of hermeneutic understanding, the actor presents his argument about the act he has done, he actually provides a causal explanation for it, and involuntarily proves that the act that actually happened is, par excellence, deliberate. Only in this way, the answer slowly comes up to the question 'who', that was reduced as referred to in the first research to 'why' and 'what'? This is due to the fact that the explanation he receives in the declaration of argument by the actor reflects his intention, and then indicates a practical knowledge of what has happened. This kind of knowledge can only be achieved when the purpose of the act is achieved (this rigidity in dealing with the recipe is inherited from analytical philosophy and, in particular, Wittgenstein) (Greisch, 2001). So, Davidson, according to Paul Recœur, equalizes between description and explanation on the one hand and between argument and intent in his theory of action because he considered that every argument mainly includes a necessarily specific causal interpretation. Logically, each act has a good

reason to occur which means that the act as a whole carries an anthropological connotation that gives it the causal interpretation of the argument. "Let's add to that, more sensitively, that we should not confuse a causal theory with a Nouméa theory (specialized in the science of the laws of mind): it is not necessary to know the law in order to be able to confirm a causal relationship. This separation between causal interpretation and developmental interpretation (On the laws of mind) allows the removal of the main obstacle, the causal interpretation of the reasoning" (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 190) It is worth recalling according to this proposition, on two things, that the analytical philosophy did not focus on the practical knowledge underlying the act in the first place, but rather on the visual view of the action first. The second thing is that this analysis based on causality as a rational thinking pattern about the problem of act is not the same as for David Hume since the latter is based on the phenomena interpretation and their prediction according to the inevitability of the result and the reason. However, the causality carried out by both Recœur and Davidson is not out of context, which only tries to rationalize the act through the rationalization of interpretation which means the identification of its intention first and second its causes. So, this is Recœur's hermeneutics, always using some kind trick, either phenomenological or semantic anthropological, or also a linguistic game, because its interpretation opens to the logical uses provided by the thinking paradigm associated with the problem from its origin. This is why Recœur was able to objectively criticise Davidson's theory that he tried to override its causal base when he introduced the motivation concept as an independent subject of Davidson's stated causality, Recœur says: "If lust phenomenology requires a stimulus idea reformulation that takes into account the negative dimension, which seems to be correlated with the action of the actor. So, a parallel reformulation of the reason idea that separates it from the Humien model imposes itself persistently. The language of whim concepts, readiness and emotion, in short, passion concept language requires that the intended character of the Act be separated from the pattern of causal interpretation in line with it, which can only be interpretation." (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 192) It is therefore more obvious that the internal human being influence on the causal model is apparent. It is the one that determines the causal treatment nature in this different analysis in terms of its causality purpose in Hume , but what matters more than Recœur utterance is to give him a psychological dimension (the presence of a strong passion affects the actor when describing his act) to the causality cause as well as act intent at because a causal explanation of the emotion requires a change in the way you see the act and also a variation in the way you read the intent (It's worth remembering that

Anscombe's act on intent has had a lot of impact on Davidson) (Malpas, 2011), This is what hermeneutics, according to Paul Ricoeur, has provided for another concept that delivers such an important task, namely, the interpretation. If someone assumes that the actor is not doing so without having a specific purpose, this would be ironic, because in linguistic use, the word always affects the actor, and its effect is logically preceded by it, but before by the purpose existing before the act itself in the mind of the actor. So, the abolitionist interpretation comes as a condition in interpreting the significance of the act based on it and the integration of the motivation and reason. Thus, the abolitionist interpretation reflects more accurately than the causal interpretation about the image and nature of the act. "In this case we can talk about a rational elicited interpretation based on the advantage of the ordinary discourse that makes it possible. Classifying an act as a deliberate act of intent, is to decide what kind of law should be interpreted which means at the same time 'to rule out' a certain type of interpretation.

In other words, this means (synonym) deciding the law image governing the act, and at the same time excluding that this law should be automatic." (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 193) Only in this way, the normal language is modeled in a descriptive explanatory form in order to reach the intended action according to the actor intention and purpose. In addition, there is a rule that must be interpreted in the midst of this process and which is that within this action, we take into account that the usual speech is mainly based on coming back to the act reason because it identifies whether the act really deserves to take its full descriptive and explanatory image in the theory of action. This phenomenological reading of the act through the idea of describing its intention, presents an important idea, which is that the act experience must be put in the form of a law in which the mind returns to think of the real actor as a conscious self. This is how the ordinary language contribution appears in the act interpretation. For that reason, Paul Ricoeur always maintains in his research concerning the theory of Action, the same analytical method characterizing Davidson and the analytical philosophy. If the analytical philosophy is based on linguistic and inference analysis of the problem of act and actor and Davidson's hypothesis is laid on the intent perception in the case of the accusation, then Paul Ricoeur establishes his theory on both projects, provided that there is no displacement of interpretation or understanding of each theory purposes. Though, there is something that Davidson's thesis did not give it the worthy attention which is the real actor making and formulating the act in the light of the motivation, motive, readiness and deliberation recorded before the act takes place. Consequently, Paul Ricoeur tries to support this fragment when talking

about some kind of mitigation in the intent relationship with the act in time, (the intention because of it, and the intention to.) in the past as well as in the future. Therefore, it is "extenuating its attribution to the real actor in the act formulation - the event and the argument - reason, that the ratio of the act and its arguments to the real actor is not ignored by the author but absent as an independent subject, and remains not clearly indicated... However, Davidson now admits in his introduction (I was wrong), as he did not miss that (the intention that) contains authentic features that are exactly to pursue the future." (Ricoeur, *Onself as Another*, 2005, p. 197)

## 5-Conclusion

At the end of this research, it is possible to sum up the important ideas that Recœur deals with in brief points. First, he has adopted establishing the theory of action by referring to two concepts, the first is the semantic dimension of act based on the characteristic of meditation and the effectiveness of understanding, and the second is the concept of trading on the act, which is closely related to the linguistic discourse of the act. The first is related to the concept of reason and motivation, while the second concept is concerned with the dialectic of understanding and explanation. However and especially in that point, Recœur does not oriented to the same direction of the act, but tries in this procedure to bring the two diverging fields within the philosophical anthropology, namely the field of text theory and the field of the theory of action. Actually, Recœur builds his action theory based on the actor knowledge which means on the basis of answering "who" question. That is, to link the act question to the language question in order to understand the relationship that binds the act to the actor, through that wide network of working expressions, such as motivation, intent, purpose, deliberation, etc. This is due to the fact that his network task is to particularly determine what can be considered as an act. The "who" question calling forth his actor that Recœur tries through it to understand the effective human self that wants to create some change in the world as change in terms of act is somewhat similar to the change in terms of action. Nonetheless, as far as they are associated, they are contradicted, and this conflict is what has led Davidson to wonder about the manner of difference of the act in action from the act in the events as considered to be infrequent as well as the independence of the event from the actor. If the act is an industry, it only means the human intervention in the world as an industry having its own rules and controls, while the event means that the world intervenes in the human being and influences him without making any consideration of his will, desire or purpose. This latter idea is what encouraged Anescombe to activate the intent concept to distinguish between them and also to achieve a phenomenology

understanding of the act issue and its relationship to an actor. Although, Ricoeur believes that Anscombe neglected in her analytical dialogue the concept of a real actor in the field of act and was only busy figuring out how to do the act. That's why she didn't get to understand the anthropological and epistemological relationship that links the act to the event and what does intention mean except only a medium that combines action with the actor in the construction of a linguistic tongue that describes one's ability as a described phenomenon and said words.

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