

Ethics and transcendence in philosophy of levinas

الإتيقا والتعالّي في فلسفة ليفيناس

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Abstract (English):

Emmanuel Levinas's otherness ethic is based on the distance that separates the ego from the other. This separation is a condition for giving freedom and due respect to other human, and we aim through this article to highlight the value of this ethics in terms of religious dealings.

we deal with the significance of ethics, its relationship to the face, and the relationship between them, to highlight the importance of the face through the patterns of forms of transcendence, asymmetry, and freedom, mean highlighting the importance of this attitude and applying it to some ontological models such as death and trauma, in order to address the responsibility that they entail towards the other and towards humanity by not practicing violence on the other person, In it we always find the ethics requirement that links the self with the other in a transcendent way, derived from the holiness of the face, and seeing the influence of God through the face.

Keywords: the ego; the other; face; responsibility; ethic.

ملخص باللغة العربية

تتأسس اتيقا الغيرية عند ايمانويل ليفيناس على المسافة التي تفصل بين الأنا والآخر، يكون هذا الانفصال شرطا لإعطاء الحرية والاحترام الواجب للإنسان الآخر ونهدف عبر هذا المقال الى ابراز قيمة هذه الاتيقا من حيث هي نفسها معاملات دينية. إذ نتطرق الى ماهية الاتيقا وعلاقتها بالوجه لنبرز بذلك اهمية الوجه من خلال أنماط أشكال التعالّي وعدم التماثل والحرية، قصد إبراز أهمية هذه الاتيقا وتطبيقها على بعض النماذج الانطولوجية على غرار الموت والهشاشة، ثم التطرق الى المسؤولية التي تترتب عنهما تجاه الآخر وتجاه الانسانية كعدم ممارسة العنف على الانسان، الذي نجد فيه دائما المطلب الاتيقي الذي يلزم الذات امام الآخر بشكل ترنسندننتالي ينهل من قداسة الوجه ورؤية أثر الاله من خلال الوجه. كلمات مفتاحية: الأنا؛ الآخر؛ الوجه؛ المسؤولية؛ الإتيقا.

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1 - introduction

Levinas's experience of otherness is a response to the systemic and totality (totalité) philosophy that reduce the other to the simile, where the other becomes subject to the categories of the ego (le moi) and everything that applies to the ego applies to the other (autre) and the definition of man with this proposition is within the total and the absolute (l'absolu), and the other is not taken in his individuality, as a representative This trend is Hegel, who restricted the freedom of the individual human according to Levinas, just as the ontological proposition presented by "Heidegger" and "Sartre" emptied the experience of altruism from his dependence. The concept of (il ya) in Heidegger is considered a gateway to horror and the horror of existence and obscures its truth, so the meaning of the word refers to the verb "there is" (il'ya) There is something, an unknown truth in the light of existence in its general form of existence, and Heidegger's philosophy of altruism is manifested in the death of a single dasein, which is not the death of the other, and in his death there is no relational assertion.

The transcendence (la transcendence) of Emmanuel Levinas can be understood between two basic philosophies, which are Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and "John Paul Sarter's experience of being and nothingness. As for Husserl, the other is reduced within his response to the categories of the ego according to a cognitive process, and the transcendence of the ego that transcends his subjects, including The other, and most of these issues are perceived within the world outside and independent of the ego according to intentional processes, and according to Sartre, he views the other in a hostile position, because the project of destroying the freedom of the ego, the experience of otherness for Sartre lacks transcendentalism and depends on perception and the process of knowledge, while the emancipation and freedom of the ego takes place Out of the other's sight.

Thinking about the other according to the givens of devotion and transcendence according to Levinas depends on transcending every philosophy that tries to reduce the other, or deals with it without trust, for the transcendence lies in the Absolute Other (absolument autre), a tribute to the embodiment of the spirit of difference, respect and humanity. The hospitality and cultivation of the spirit of difference, and the experience of altruism allow the reading of transcendence through several etymological and ontological models: death, love, death, justice, responsibility ... To what

extent can a transcendental philosophy be rooted through Levinas's ontology and otherness of the Other?

2-The ethic of face

The ethic begins when (meeting) with others, and specifically when receiving(as a face), so when looking (at the face), the language of etiquette must be the first that can prevail, and Levinas refuses to have the face given to vision because approaching it will carry higher meanings than what the eye can monitor about something. Not only that which falls outside the eye or is in line with something, but the true vision of the face is what it reveals from behind its appearance, to give it other possibilities, and the utmost importance of the vision is that it makes the face open to others through a special language, a transcendent language that strips me of my selfishness, and leads us to it in a way. Quite different from the experience in the sensual sense of the subject, the face is not just a chin, or a nose or an eye, or just a complexion, the face more than that is an expression, authority and structure of speech.

The resistance and the impossibility of exile to others is the presence of the face, or our face-to-face relationship itself, which makes the act of killing impossible despite our ability to do so, as well as regardless of our will, and the main point that can be hinted at in this relationship is that it is not mutual or similar, meaning as much If the ego is capable, for example, the other is the weak, and if he is the poor and the weak, then the "ego" is the rich and strong. Levinas says: "The others(autrui) as not just ego(le moi), it is for me what I am not, and it is not a psychological feature or body, but rather Because of his self-it, for example, he is the weak, the poor, the widow, and the orphan, while I am rich or capable"(Emmanuel Levinas, 1985, 75).

Here the others who are manifested by these qualities mentioned by Levinas are all concealed in the name of self-righteousness. As for the powers that the ego possesses, they go in response to the call of responsibility without choosing another, so the presence of the face is the abandonment of all the means available to the ego and its investment in human relations. It is sufficient to refer to the transcendent face here. In order to demonstrate the legitimacy of this relationship, the statement that can be made does not limit only my ability, it also touches the power of my ability, and in this an attempt to deny the absolute(absolue) will of any will or attempt that offends others, Levinas says: "altruism" goes beyond the sensible and transcends the absolute and transcendent. If I want it, it will

not be available to me because it is an absolutely other(absolutement autre): "I cannot kill any absolute and independent existence, that which completely exceeds my powers, he is not the only one who opposes it, but who hinders the capacity of the power itself" (Emmanuel Levinas, 1971, p 216) The face of others does not oppose me with power greater than my ability, but transcends the infinite, the latter being more than the experience of death, which Levinas sees as: "... a relationship not with a very great resistance, but with something of the other absolute: resistance that is not resistance - Because it is the ethical resistance (Emmanuel Levinas, 1971, p217). The infinite prepares the face in the form of an eternal resistance that prevents forms of prejudice to the other.

The other • becomes the most important element in forming the identity of the self that is neither satisfied with confining itself to itself, nor for exercising power, nor for looking at itself from the angle of transcendence, for the true essence of the ego begins when it leaves itself to identify with the otherness of the different, separated from it Levinas says: "The ego is not He is the being who always remains himself, but the being whose existence is based on identification by searching for his identity through everything that happens to him. It is the identity par excellence, and the original effect of identification. "(Emmanuel Levinas, 1971, p25), this definition of identity comes as an alternative to the experience that It tries to reduce the other to self or the same (le meme) as is the case in the " Hegelian" phenomenology, or to respond to the ego that is itself in itself and is independent of the other as is the case in the "Husserlian" phenomenology, and also to demonstrate the importance of others to the ego, because the ego always needs contact with the other and communication With them in the neighborhood does not mean congruence, because the distance separating the ego from the other is necessary for the conditional relationship, and what determines the identification with the human being most is his departure from the self and his ego, according to the identity, "I am I, "(a=a) Levinas says: " The identification of the likeness in the ego is not issued as a topological unit: "I am I." The authenticity of identification is not reduced to the image ... "(Emmanuel Levinas, 1971, p 25), so the face is not what appears to me as it leads us to a different experience. We discover it on an ethical basis identical to the freedom of others.

The face turns as much as it turns towards me with its nakedness, the more it rises in terms of its importance for me, and then the face understands its essence from its manifestation behind its outwardness. This is what shows me the face-to-face relationship which is direct and immediate

without an intermediary and the origin relationship with the Other, and which is targeted by Levinas is face to face (face a face) will be without a middle bound and without participation, it is a relationship neither mediation nor participation (Jacques Derrida, 1967, p 134) and the musical meaning that is generated from the face is through the face speaking with silence, and the defender without power, it is the speech that is inevitable, and which necessitates to find opportunities to fulfill this call, the call of the infinity speech: "This face of the other without seeking help, without security, is presented to me in his weakness, his death is the one who orders me" you will never be killed. "There is political authority in the face, which is the one who Orders and I always say it is the word of God " (Emmanuel Levinas, 2016, P 114), Derrida adds about the relationship between the face and God, saying: "As for Levinas, the authenticity of the relationship face to face is not determined (vis-à-vis) two equal and standing persons. What it imposes face to face with man by the severed neck and standing eyes is the orientation towards the elevation of God" (Jacques Derrida, 1967, p. 158). The Infinity (l'infini) is the who speaks behind the silence of the face, and his effect is the speech that I have in front of my near. The relationship with God can only be reached through a separating relationship that makes a distance between the ego and the other.

This distance is what gives the other his freedom, independence and height, and it frees him from the possibility of reducing him to the sayings of the ego or in the "same" (le même), and God manifests itself through the fragility of the face and its vulnerability to violence And the violation in the form of temporary resistance and infinite power that prevents forms of prejudice to human life and urges to respect it.

3: The Face and the Discourse:

Levinas focuses on the reality of the face that makes others transcendent, and which determines the nature of our relationship with him, and this is evidenced through speech, the face is the structure of a discourse, because it is neither apparent nor exposed, and neither its poverty nor its decency, it is the speech that is not devoid of meaning, the truth of the speech carries a linguistic message, this message represents the essence of speech, and when we say the essence, it means is there is no importance to the face without this speech, the other does not speak without a face, that is the conditional sign, it shows the origin of morals and transcendence the sensible as the invisible, and its meaning is not reduced to any saying, and the other He does not say anything because it is presented

as a face that is given as an expression and speech that shows the reality of others. Derrida says: "Face to face" gets rid, then he gets rid of all the sayings, because the face gives us the expression and the speech at the same time, and it is not only gaze, but an original unity of sight and speech From the eyes and from the mouth that speaks, but he also dries his hunger "(Jacques Derrida, (1967, p 148).

The other appears in the face that leads us behind the back of the face: "The face speaks, and its appearance is the first speech, to speak first of all there is the face that comes behind its appearance, and behind its shape, it is an openness of the openness." (Emmanuel Levinas, 1972, P 51) In spite of our saying that the face does not speak a voice, we hear it silence and clearly. Rather, Levinas insists that this silence is what must prevail and dominate, neither by force nor by violence, so he says: Certainly the face and discourse are linked, so the face speaks, as it is the one who makes The discourse possible and who starts it (Emmanuel Levinas, 2017, p 82), and the nature of this discourse is the eternal appeal that carries the form of the original structure of the relationship with others, which starts from the language of discourse, and if the face is on which we build these relationships then, because it speaks and draws the paths of creation, And respect the difference with the other, so the face must be more familiar, and the speech of the face is not an empty or random statement, it is aimed directly to the ego, so when commanding from this other person the ego will be forced to hear the content of this speech, so talking about language and speech is to open spaces for welcoming and guesing the other, in a common place, because I do not have the right to reject the speech Or comment on it, and it must be a speech that brings together the selves.

This speech, which is governed by a comprehensive language, suffices to convey my special features to others, as it conveys to me the features of the other strange. The areas, and the separation here comes so that we do not understand that the discourse or communication between people paves the way for unity, for all that there is a dialogue between the different: "The group of people that exists in language - where the interlocutors remain completely separate - does not constitute sex alone, can be represented by proximity to people." (Emmanuel Levinas, 1971, p 235), and by this he prepares the concerted spaces and floors, he s the one who establishes an experiment of another and strange type. this pure spear does not make the other neither a representation nor a given, because it conveys a comprehensive language as it expresses individuality and selfishness towards the general

and the total, because faith is the transition from the self towards the different and foreign other, and since the ego does not exist in isolation from others, the latter is the condition of what it is, and the ego is not enough to be directed only to others, because it is at the same time exposed to this third's inquiry, Levinas says: "The face that I receive takes me from the phenomenon to being in another meaning: in the speech I am presented to the inquiries of others and the necessity of an answer.(emmanuel levinas, 1971, p 194).

The other absolute is the condition of the outwardness (l'extériorité) of the ego and its contractual grounds, which are in the relationships imposed by language, as it creates a space for communication and understanding, by speech that represents the living meaning of the face, which is its official expression, and Levinas clearly rejects that the meaning of the face's context resembles to the intuition or by the Husserlian phenomenology, it is the opposite of this encounter with externalism or external existence, and not just a given thing or a fixed image. Significance rules over every intuitive given as Levinas says: "Significance is not ideal or an available relationship to rational intuition ... Discourse simply is not just an intuitive expression (Or from thought) rather it is the original relationship with external existence "(Emmanuel Levinas, 1971, p 65). The meaning here is the face of the other, (autrui), and every return to the word is placed beforehand within the face-to-face relationship which is the origin of the accusative language, and since the origin of the language is the encounter with the other, it is Necessarily, to makes his speech superior to mine, as it makes it similar to a person's relationship with God, and thus the approach to God is only if you are morally helper to the other person, and this does not mean that faith presupposes faith. On the contrary, it is faith that presupposes fear as Pause for our existence in the world that makes us open to the other (Olivier Morgin, 1997, p131), then God becomes the Other who comes to thought starting from human relationships.

4-Phenomenology of death

According to Levinas, death is not the event by which man loses his existence, rather it is the event of man himself which is generated from him, it is the consciousness of a person with another, which also indicates the transcendence of the protective relationship, and the other puts me in front of death this question and inquiry, as being alone next to death, death will pour its ontological biological significance, as it does not mean stopping to behave in life, but refers to higher meanings

that can result from the horror of death itself, death here escapes into the convivial experience of others, so the face of this person is always exposed to danger while he is threatened by death.

The first speech of face is the prevention of murder and the concern not to put the life of the other in danger. The first philosophy of Levinas is called responsibility, it is the transition to morality, and the meaning of responsibility here stands on knowing the extent of the relationship of otherness to time and death.

Levinas says: "The relationship with death comes as an interrogation in front of others, in front of his exaggerations, and that is what we are looking for with the difference between death and time" (Emmanuel Levinas 1993, p 30). The importance of time according to Levinas indicates that the existence of man depends on it, in the sense that the existing cannot be imagined. There is no time in it, meaning that without time is necessarily the non-existence of man and his death, and there is no existence of otherness without time, and therefore all the ego's relations with others take place within the limits of time, and with its originality, this experience represents the existence of the relationship between existence and what exists and this relationship with his existence due to the original time of man and the importance of This time is that it provides capabilities for a person to complete his existence and benefits from his experiences "because time is the condition of human existence, and the relationship with others is a relationship with the future, and it is timed and changing, and death is always linked to the future as it is not a present ." Levinas says: "For this reason death is not present at all. It is a clear truth, ignores the old adage directed to dispel the fear of death (if you exist then it does not exist, and if it exists you will not be, the paradox of death is that it erases our relationship with death which is the only relationship with the future, but it insists nonetheless on our relationship With death is a relationship with the future "(Emmanuel Levinas, 2017, p 106), and since it is the future, it is that unknown which raises fear, and the sacred appearance of the face invites the ego not to leave the other alone in front of death.

The fact of death indicates suffering that knows all faces, and death for Levinas is not distinguished only by absence from life, or its obscurity, it is also lost in its wide paths in which there is no hope of return, it has no hope because we have intended it without desire or purpose, but neither We even know where we are from it. Levinas expresses it by saying: "But at the same time death is a journey ... a journey into the unknown, a journey without return, a travel without leaving an address (Miguel

Abensour, Catherine Chalié, 1991 p22), death in this sense is a departure into the unknown or a relationship With the mystery, with the unknown danger threatening us at any moment, these descriptions indicate the horror of death that does not give a person any chance for life, it is the same plundering of the ego, if he is present then the ego is absent, and if the ego is present it means that he is waiting for it, The relationship with others predicts the seriousness of the situation and urges us to seize the last opportunity, and we embody it in the manner of "the responsibility for the other beyond its being, then it is filled with confusion and anxiety in the face of the death of the other, not indifference towards the other. (Ahmed Abdel Halim Ati Muhammad al-Turki, 2007, p.145).

Autism appears as an antithesis to violence, and a means to preserve life, and not to make it in danger.

the proactive responsibility is the prohibition of any violent act that harms the life of the other. The ego is always possessed by fear of others, fear that precedes the self of the ego, this necessitates feeling the extent of the need of others for me, and feeling his humanity Before death, and to be with him always, this is the same event of existence: Levinas says: "Existence seems like the anxiety of existence, as being here, as being in the world, as being in the world, as being with others, as going towards death, that is the event of this existence itself. (Emmanuel Levinas, 1991, p 221). According to the first phrase of the face: "You will never kill" or "You will not commit an act of killing," the "I" is obligated to adhere to these commands, and the death of others concerns me more than it does due to the responsibility entrusted to me, which I bear especially the tyranny and oppression of death, which calls for me to stand in line with my other relative, Levinas says: "The death of the other person accuses me and puts me into question, as if through this death the ego became indifferent complicit, and demanded to take responsibility for the death of the other, and not to let him die alone" (Emmanuel, Levinas, 1991, p 207), Not leaving him alone in front of the mystery of death is the apex of responsibility from which I am forced to approach my nearness more than death is approaching him, and this is what the fragility of his face demands of me, and this is fear for the sake of others and not fear for my sake: "Because the proximity neighborhood other than presented in a book Such as the verb that others are not simply - close to me within a space - or close like the closest of parents, but basically approaching me, I feel (as I am present) that I am responsible for it " (Emmanuel Levinas, 2017, p 93), and this generates the feeling of my own crisis of individualism

towards the responsibility of the other And foreign freedom, and this is what makes the relationship between me and the other stranger a transcendent relationship because I deal with someone who is neither from my environment nor from my language nor from my religion, despite all this I initiate greetings in front of this third person without realizing what I wait as a response from him, because in the end it is free, for he is the absolute other. Levinas says: "The proximity of the relative is a responsibility For the sake of the other, the responsibility for the sake of the other is the impossibility of leaving this person alone in front of death, and this can be touched through the ways of giving and the sensitivity of the final gift of death for the sake of the other"(Emmanuel Levinas, 1991, p 207).

My relative, *mon prochain*, from the indication of the integrity of his face that I am forced to welcome him and receive him, provided that my relationship with others is a relationship of hospitality and my duty is what the people of the house have to do with their guest: "He is the only one with whom we can say yes, and the first yes, welcome is always welcome to others." (jacques Derrida, 1997, p 53). The welcome that is on my part means that I receive the best hospitality on my part, and this reception is a welcome to the idea of the infinity that others carry to me, and the doors must always be open to him .when the door is opened the call will be too to the strange and to higher the idea of infinity, and closing the door is a rejection of hospitality and starting a war and dissonant sensitivity "(jacques Derrida, 1997, p 92), which invites me always to keep on hospitality as I am keeping to reject the act of criminality, which means that the capabilities of my home are open to others, and how necessary they are as the necessity of doors and windows, so the relationship occurs in my house Where I receive him, and nothing will be done outside the house: "I receive the other who comes to my house, and by himself opens my house" (Emmanuel Levinas, 1971, p 185), that is the reception and hospitality tool that I have in my house - I establish - with others, and the treatment that I show to others is interfering In the framework of love of others, and a sense of their need.

Levinas believes that the love of others is awareness of the death of others, my reception of others and my anxiety about the death that awaits me ... "(Emmanuel Levinas, 1993, p 122), and in this relationship that I make with others produces what is negative in death, and the relationship with death is the oldest From experiences of existence, and there is no relationship between death and time that does not come with a question in front of others, in front of his exaggerations, because time

is a kind of mortal existence that quickly fades away, as Heidegger's analysis of existence for the sake of death reveals it, as a new concept of time, because time is like the future Existence for the sake of death, and a future for the sake of the other, Levinas says: "The relationship with death comes as an interrogation next to others, in front of his exaggerations, where we search for the relationship between death and time" (Miguel Abensour, Catherine Chalier, 1991, p 28), and this question comes from Others across the face, through his poor face with which I can do whatever I want, but moral resistance does not stop except that it prevents me from any attempt of violence. "the other considering him non-absolute, is the source of all connotations for me, it is the other, which is the other person" (Rodolphe Călin, 2005, p8). And the other absolute is the infinity (infini) in the language of Levinas, where it is appeared in the face of my neighbor, and the prohibition of murder that we referred to earlier comes as a threat approaching me as a mystery, and the horizons of my freedom start from here from the terms of my freedom towards my friend who I cannot refuse any of his appeals, and before all his face is the one who orders me to not to commit murder, as I read the engraved phrase: "You will never kill"(tu ne tueras point) (Emmanuel Levinas, 2017, p 81). This is the first text of the face call that confers my responsibility to the death of others. Another important task is to prevent murder. I bear my responsibility for the actions of others, which I answer in spite of the ego, intrusion and choice. "(Rodolphe călin, 2002, p 49), death by these experiences reveals what the ego is and its inevitable destiny, as it brings it closer and closer to the infinite. As for the responsibility over others, it does not stop at The limit of responsibility is only upon him, but it goes beyond responsibility even on the responsibility itself, or what it means to be responsible for the obligation of responsibility, which is considered as a compulsory matter, and everyone is heading to the infinite through the non-absolute.

Accordingly, death is not an annihilation as much as it is a question of the relationship with the infinite and with time, so Levinas gives priority to death to the death of others, as the first death, as he says: "I shall be responsible for others by considering him dead, so the death of others here is the first death" (Emmanuel Levinas, 1993, p 54), and the whole like Dasein is incomplete and tends towards nothingness, towards the negation of its reality that is manifested through the experience of death, is more evident in the phenomenological language, because death is a phenomenology that is closer to the definition, which is determined with others, and the future is not, and our relationship

with the future is the same as the relationship with others, By this Levinas revealed the importance of death in determining the relationship with others, by giving the musical basis for time and death, by emptying them of the ontological character. Death turns into annihilation to the moral side, death makes the individual aware of the meaning of the last opportunities that he invests for others, in the form of giving and affirmation, and this future of death turns into the best hoof for the intersubjectivity, temporal, changing relationship, and responsibility comes as concern and concern for the other before it becomes an obligation, In conclusion, we will present the eulogy of "Edmond Gabis" about death, or the death of Levinas: "... the water of transit quenches a thirst for the unknown the unknown is the last crossing, the most destructive, death in this sense conveys the unknown, the face that is born from its erasure that is locked away from not, his forgotten, lost, and preserved features of death, as if death knows the face, all the faces with all their peculiarities or in their confusing insignificance the test of resemblance. " (Edmund Gabes, 2015, p 168). Here, Edmund Gabes lamented the death of man with Levinas, with his memorial repeats Thinking about humanity from the inside horror of death as a temporary sign, which sets all the descriptions of difference and identity, and if death does not exclude these peculiarities, then it knows only the other and knows his face, and death is a suggestion to prevent violence and aggression and avoid prejudice to the human being and his freedom.

5-Conclusion

The Levinas touch in the phenomenological renewal is due to the turn towards the transcendent Other, it began for systemic and ontological philosophies that try to reduce the other within the likeness or within the categories of the ego, or define it within the processes of knowledge in which the self-controls only his subjects, taking this position of religious reference even if he does not authorize it, However, most of his speeches about the other go back to the Jewish mansion and the Christian tradition that generates the transcendent principle, so levinas has made the feature of the first philosophy that deals with this other and puts its share of its eyes towards its ability to be hurt and to be suffer, and the other is the different, foreign and free person who is not subject to the sayings of the system or the ego, Therefore, the responsibility was the duty of the ego before the other, and it is a personal responsibility on the weak other, so death for example is an ontological and anatomical event because it aims at the responsibility not to let the other die alone, to raise a

sense of responsibility to protect the human being and prevent all forms of violence, and the face has its sacred value which is the whole of other identity and the human being identity, because he carries in its manifestation a transcendent sacred discourse indicating the status of the relationship and the authority of the other, and the most important characteristic of faithfulness is the asymmetry that tries to seek Away between the ego and the other in the size of responsibility and interest, as we find it in some philosophies such as Martin Buber (analog responsibility) or in Hegel's systematic philosophy (reducing the other to the ego and the whole), so the other becomes in this way absolute authority and complete freedom that establish a metaphysical distance between the ego and the other and between it and all the attempts of reduction and containment, this is mainly because the face speaks and it is holy and transcendent, and transcendence begins with the afterlife which is the cause of reaching the infinite, transcendence and infinite are two concomitant concepts necessary for every altruistic relationship, and they express the reality of God embodied in the other Absolute. And here the relationship becomes a social life that does not take place except in the context of the intersubjectivity world and the constant question of the other, and all of this takes place after answering the call and listening.

Notes:

- **ethics** : ethics is according to Levinas is not a branch of philosophy, because it is like the first philosophy, and it is directly related to the relationship with others, so Levinas calls the situation of the spontaneity of the ego into question before the presence of others, for it is the comprehensive responsibility over others, and the Levinas ethics is against contemporary ontology that reduces the other and submits it to the categories of existence, For that sense of responsibility and the need of the neighbor to me is the same as fear. As for the difference between it and morale ethics, it is applied, so what is theoretical ethics is concerned with a set of rules and behavior to define truth from falsehood, for the definition of truthfulness see: (Rodolphe calin, François-David Sebbah, (2002), p 23).

The infinite :The infinite according to Levinas represents a strict understanding of the concept of transcendence or externalness that is referred to in the face of others, and the infinite indicates the extent of the importance of the absolute outwardness of the face, which is understood only as etiquette, and Levinas uses the expressions of the infinite, the other absolute, deity, transcendence to

denote other than this being, Or the absolute other, or other than the self, for a single purpose that shows the sacred appearance of the face, as if God is speaking literally in man and abandoning the idea that it can be represented or reduced to the categories of the self, Because we are conscious of it as the discourse of the other who bears us moral responsibility, and not as it was addressed by Descartes as an idea latent in the mind which we will refer to in the body of this analysis, (Rodolphe calin, François-David Sebbah, (2002), p 37).

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