

*Dirassat & Abhath*  
The Arabic Journal of Human  
and Social Sciences



مجلة دراسات وأبحاث  
المجلة العربية في العلوم الإنسانية  
والاجتماعية

EISSN: 2253-0363  
ISSN : 1112-9751

## Reconceptualizing the Perestroikans-Quantitatives Debates in Contemporary Political Science

إعادة قراءة لجدالات التوجه الإصلاحي مقابل التوجه الكمي ضمن علم السياسة المعاصر

---

**Belakhdar Taifour**

Ibn Khaldoun University - Tiaret, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Department of Political Sciences

belakhdar.taifour@univ-tiaret.dz

بلخضر طيفور  
جامعة ابن خلدون - تيارت

---

Corresponding author: Belakhdar Taifour, belakhdar.taifour@univ-tiaret.dz

---

تاريخ القبول: 2021-05-24

تاريخ الاستلام: 2021-01-15

## Abstract:

Development of political science as a contemporary scientific discipline can be viewed through two basic trends, first, the behaviouralism trends (from the 1950s), second, the post-behaviouralism trends (from the 1970s). Through both directions several sub-directions emerged as quantitative, qualitative, and rational choice orientations, Perhaps the enthusiasm for change in the field is nothing but a justification in the name of raising the shares of Scientific methods in order to obtain the necessary academic respect. What gave the field this transformative formula in its methodological and thematic structure were those methodological debates, as they are arguments that accompanied the science on politics studies throughout its stages of development up to the current period in the first quarter of the 21 century which the perestroika trend (from the 2000s) emerged as a trend trying to correct the mistakes committed in political science.

**Keywords:** Perestroïka Mouvement, Political Science, Quantitatives Trends, Methodological Debates

## الملخص:

يمكن النظر إجمالاً إلى تطور علم السياسة من خلال توجهين أساسيين، يتمثل الأول في التوجه السلوكي الذي بدأ مع خمسينات القرن العشرين، ويتمثل الثاني في التوجهات الما بعد سلوكية التي بدأت مع السبعينات ولم تنهي تجلياتها بعد، ومن خلال كلا التوجهين انبثقت عدة توجهات فرعية، فمثلاً توجهات الخيار العقلاني في تسعينات القرن العشرين لم تكن سوى صدى متأخر للتوجهات الكمية للتوجه الأصلي وهو السلوكي، كما أن أنصار التوجهات الكيفية مع بداية الألفية الجديدة ليست سوى مسار تابعي لأنصار المدرسة الما بعد سلوكية، ولعل حماس تغيير الحقل ليس سوى تبريرا لرفع أسهم المعرفة العلمية حتى ينال الإحترام الأكاديمي اللازم. وما أضفى على الحقل تلك الصيغة التحولية في بنيتها المعرفية هي تلك الجدالات التي صاحبت الحقل طوال مراحل تطوره وصولاً إلى الفترة الحالية في الربع الأول من القرن الواحد والعشرون، والتي برز فيها التوجه البريسترويكي الذي يقدم نفسه كتيار يحاول إصلاح أخطاء في علم السياسة خاصة المبالغة في توظيف الأسلوب العلمي الصارم.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** بريسترويكا علم السياسة، التوجهات الكمية، الجدالات المنهجية

## INTRODUCTION

Since a decades, debates are still centered around the structure that political science should have, perhaps the most prominent characteristic of these debates is the issue of opposing dualities, quantitative versus qualitative approaches, normative versus purely scientific, partial theories versus general theories, positivism

applications versus post-positivist trends, the priority of the method versus issues and topics or vice versa, including other aspects of the dualities that constitute the nature of the debate between the paradigms, as some stages of the development of this field have known a period of peaceful coexistence between its paradigms and this is after the researchers are certain that there is no field The control of a single paradigm, for each

cognitive orientation has its supporters, followers, and performers, as it has been impossible to control the cognitive trends of the field as happened in the behavioral stage, perhaps what counts for political science is the ability to change and its ability to change from one cognitive situation to another with ease, it may happen that a knowledge situation prevails for a decade And soon he withdraws in front of a completely different cognitive situation, this happened with the behaviourism that prevailed for two decades, then the post-behaviourism whose cognitive structures were established until the eighties of the twentieth century and then came the stage of the rationalist in the nineties, when the proponents of quantitative methods dominated the field and its journals, until the beginning of the third millennium when the researchers who called themselves “**Theperestroikans**” rose up against the quantitative and rational orientation and demanded to leave the opportunity for the rest of the paradigms to be cognitively and methodically active, until now the debates are still Underway and incessant.

Therefore, we present the following research problematic:

**“How did the perestroika movement counteract the rigorous scientific trends within political science? How were the epistemological debates reflected on the field's methodological structure?”**

To answer this problematic we discuss the following axis:

- I. Perestroika movement in political science: Roots and conditions
- II. Challenging the rigorous forms scientific method
- III. Perestroikans versus quantitative paradigm
- IV. Critical reading

### **I. Perestroika movement in political science: Roots and conditions**

In the early twentieth century before behaviorism, the president of the American Political Science Association called for the necessity of analyzing statistics as a scientific approach to identify political patterns and test results. The same is true for post-behaviorists who believed in their interpersonal discussions that they should focus on presenting research that is related to contemporary questions, but As it was the case of behaviorists with their beginnings, post-behaviorists found themselves forced to keep up with what is new at the level of political issues and problems, and the same thing happened for the supporters of rational choice who found themselves forced to submit to the status quo as a result of the pressures of political scientists, especially in the aspect of methodological approaches, This is on the one hand, and the pressures of political reality with its phenomena and facts on the other hand.

Ideas, approaches, and issues in political science have evolved through the behavioural approach that emerged slowly by being influenced by scientific applications in the rest of the sciences, the proponents of rational choice in many of their important ideas were influenced by economics and research methodology. Post-behavioural and subsequent proponents of the qualitative method have seen the necessity of inserting the language of the normative interpretation of values into research in order not to be lost among the pure applications of numbers to quantitative approaches, although political scientists have produced a wide amount of knowledge, whether regarding the methodological structure. Fragmentation within the field is

considered an obstacle that stands in the way of development. It should be noted that there is an urgent need for a deep re-definition of the roots of political science by emphasizing the human and normative dimension in conjunction with the important vitality of the scientific aspirations. Even in the most accurate sciences, there are tendencies to humanize science, so what is the case with a paradigm that is basically human-centered as a basic unit of analysis. Many have tried to change the character of American political science, but few have succeeded. The revolutionaries in question are those who have sought in a group enterprise to set the agenda for the discipline in conscious rejection of most or all of what has gone before. The discipline has seen five revolutionary movements. (Proclamation and establishment of a new research program, such as structural functionalism or bio-politics, does not qualify, and “paradigm shift” in Kuhn’s [1962] sense is generally not an appropriate frame.).<sup>1</sup>

The changes in political science have reflected the problem of the extent of the cognitive and scientific vitality associated with these transformations. Some researchers may view them as representing a crisis of instability or expressing a lack of clarity within the structure of political science, but an epistemological reading of the developments taking place within the field shows us that these transformations are the core of Scientific progress, as development is the end of controversy within any scientific field, and because science develops through interaction, transformation, renewal and change. As for constancy and rigidity, they are the end of any scientific system or knowledge structure. It is important to realize that these historical milestones and stages are well

used only as general features, because these cognitive developments that the science of politics has undergone also had many aspects and complications in order to properly arrange the types of stages of development, so the emergence of a new stage does not necessarily mean the completion or replacement of the special knowledge structure. In the previous stage, for example, while the traditional school was challenged with behaviorism in the 1950s and 1960s, political scholars continued to use some frameworks of traditionalism. Indeed, many of the introductions to political literature and books in the United States are still due to the perspective of traditional political scholars, however, not all fields and branches of political science Affected by the emergence of a new stage.

Political science is receiving increased critical scrutiny as a discipline these days, and much of that scrutiny is coming from within its own ranks. A growing number of political scientists have signed on to a movement to challenge the dominance of positivistic research, particularly research that assumes political behavior can be predicted according to theories of rationality and that such predictions underwrite cumulative explanations that constitute the growth of political knowledge. The movement to question such thinking is most dramatically represented in the network of scholars that has developed in response to the eponymous Mr. Perestroika letter that raised this challenge in poignant terms when it first circulated over the Internet back in October of 2000.

A loose collection of political scientists, from graduate students to senior scholars, Perestroikans do not always themselves

agree on which features of the dominant approach they want to critique—some focus on the overly abstract nature of much of the research done today, some on the lack of nuance in decontextualized, large sample empirical studies, others on the inhumaneness of thinking about social relations in causal terms, and still others on the ways in which contemporary social science all too often fails to produce the kind of knowledge that can meaningfully inform social life. As a group, the Perestroika movement, however, has championed methodological pluralism, charging that exclusionary practices have made graduate education less hospitable to historical and field research, qualitative case studies, interpretive and critical analysis, and a variety of context-sensitive approaches to the study of politics. The major journals of the field, Perestroikans argue, have become preoccupied with publishing research that conforms to overly restrictive scientific assumptions about what constitutes contributions to knowledge of politics. Perestroika is a healthy development for political science and all other social sciences as well, opening for reconsideration these very questionable assumptions about what constitutes political knowledge in particular and social knowledge in general.<sup>2</sup>

The demands of reforming and correcting the context of political science were not related to a specific scientific branch, but rather the science of politics as a whole, as it also included the field of comparative politics as an important part of political science, so that one of the most important demands of the reformist movement was the need to re-interest in area studies, and this is after the neglect that caused There are supporters of purely quantitative and scientific trends in the study of political

phenomena, on the pretext that area studies do not eliminate the normative and qualitative data in the research, which is a matter that hinders and discourages the scientific quality of political studies.

## II. Challenging the rigorous forms of scientific method

The scientific hegemony with its methods and approaches continues to this day in political science, and it is clear that the positivist hegemony over the science of politics, sometimes defeats itself when it stands unable to explain some political phenomena in certain contexts, because the truth of political science is not often in line with standards They are set by the natural or pure sciences, it is wrong to closely simulate the same methods and the same research methods, because of that there are always opposing voices within political science denouncing those methods that quantitative paradigm tries to impose with the logic of domination.

In 1994, both Shapiro (Ian Shapiro) and Green (Donald Green) launched a strong critical attack on theories of rational choice in their book (Green, Donald and Ian Shapiro. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*, 1994), where they see that whether theories of rational choice think about Devising general laws, or making behavior within the template of causal mechanisms, because in both cases the theory will collapse in the empirical test, and it cannot escape, and in this aspect all of the defenders of this theory or its critics did not attach any importance to the empirical test, because it is to measure the success of any A theory that must have the ability to explain by empirical testing.<sup>3</sup> Their book is ostensibly about applications of rational

choice theory in American politics, but insofar as it addresses “characteristic methodological pathologies,” it can be interpreted to apply to rational choice applications more generally. Their claim is that rational choice theory has not yielded empirically useful results to date, and the reasons why it has not done so are systematic: applications are “theory driven” rather than “problem driven.”

The rational-choice variant drew heavily on game theory, which was rapidly becoming the meat and potatoes of micro economics, thereby integrating two disciplines by turning homo politicus into homo economicus. No longer seeing itself as a corrective to economic determinism, the new ‘positive political economy’ was defined as a field applying the methods of economics to the problems of politics. Historical institutionalists stopped short of this icy embrace, but began to investigate the political economy as a terrain structured by the organization of capital, labor and the state. Over the next twenty years, many young scholars of political science became political economists.<sup>4</sup>

At the beginning of the 21st Century, modern political science, with its combination of theory and method as applied to real world problems is over one hundred years old. Gabriel Almond observes that the ‘essential object of political science...is the creation of knowledge, defined as inferences or generalizations about politics drawn from evidence.’ For political scientists scientific research is designed ... to make inferences based on empirical information about the world’. The editors of the British Journal of Political Science require scholars to submit research with the ‘use of appropriate evidence to

substantiate empirical statements’. Despite its origins in the normative and empirical work of the ancient Greeks, modern political science in the form that meets these definitions showed a burst in development around the turn of the 20th Century. For some, The Perestroikans are thus wrong to either divorce method from substance or to lessen its importance, since as this trend has tried to demonstrate, good method produces good substance. But good method does not necessarily mean numbers, parsimonious and elegant models, and sophisticated statistical analysis. Good method means intellectual honesty about what we are studying and how we are studying it, including meaningful and important research questions, careful theorizing about possible relationships and explanations for observed outcomes, well-thought out research design, fair collection and presentation of evidence, and logical inferences drawn from that evidence. Method is thus intimately linked with our research questions and our answers to those questions. Only by maintaining that link can the profession continue to make a contribution to political knowledge and provide solutions to political problems.<sup>5</sup>

However, this quantitative paradigm excludes many valuable research, for example it is assumed that one case study is unscientific and does not provide any basis for generalization, as it does not build any theory and cannot contribute to the development of political science. Leading journals in a certain period, and on the other hand, the opponents of this epistemological paradigm see that quantitative research is not in the service of objective truth and its theories and methodological methods are often not understood and universally generalized about politics in an arbitrary manner, as a result of this criticism and

counter-criticism, the division has become clear among political scholars about the arguments. The scientific proposition that came and took root in the field with the beginning of the nineties, the language of game theory, formal models and rational choice are external and strange arguments for many political scientists, as they found them to be impenetrable and difficult to achieve, and assumptions, abstractions and simplifications of reality often represent an obstacle and not. Welcome to those who study political behavior and institutions from a qualitative perspective.<sup>6</sup> The argument of those who strongly oppose the application of the strict methodology is that it is impossible to separate between value standards and facts, and the collision of positivist assumptions of science with the reality of the political phenomenon, which ultimately led to the reduction of phenomena and the facts that they express to a mere mechanical calculation, and to arrive at the notion of isolating facts from values and achieving science free from values to the point of dealing with false facts and then pseudo-science. Therefore, modern political scholars have tended to demand that value standards be taken into account.

Perestroika supporter Gregory Kasza expanded on the concerns expressed in the initial letter in "Perestroika: For an Ecumenical Science of Politics" (2001). One can see in Kasza's elaboration of the Perestroika protest six major points illustrative of post-behavioralism:

1- It was claimed that political science had been distorted by the dominance within the field of highly specialized quantitative research approaches; because of this dominance, Kasza asserted, scientists seeking to produce

scholarly works using qualitative approaches were being marginalized.

- 2- Kasza argued that the marginalization of non-quantitative approaches constituted a breach of academic freedom. Political scientists, he contended, were being pressured to mold their substantive interests to fit the contours of rigid methodologies and frameworks; he mentioned an anonymous graduate student who had been warned that she would fail as a political scientist if she did not make her dissertation conform to rational choice strictures.
- 3- In allowing a narrow understanding of science to become dominant within the discipline, political science was undercutting its ability to produce sound scholarship. Indeed, Kasza went so far as to assert that a Perestroika movement could save the discipline from producing subpar scholarship.
- 4- Kasza made the quintessentially post-behavioral call for a political science that was more "relevant" in addressing substantive political concerns.
- 5- Kasza suggested that, in seeking to become as sophisticated a science as possible, political science had actually become something of an adventure in fiction. Kasza charged that scientifically oriented political scientists were, in all too many cases, operationalizing human motives, desires, and choices in such narrow terms (in order to be rigorous) as to render their subjects caricatures too many cases, operationalizing human motives, desires, and choices in such narrow terms (in order to be rigorous) as to render their subjects caricatures.
- 6- Kasza offered an alternative "ecumenical" approach to reduce the dominance of quantitative method on political science.<sup>7</sup>

If we want more phronesis and political science, we need to do three things. First, we

must drop all pretence, however indirect, at emulating the relative success of the natural sciences in producing cumulative and predictive theory, for their approach simply does not work in social and political science. Second, we must address problems that matter to groups in the local, national, and global communities in which we live, and we must do it in ways that matter; we must focus on issues of context, values, and power. Finally, we must effectively and dialogically communicate the results of our research to our fellow citizens and carefully listen to their feedback. If we do this—focus on specific values and interests in the context of particular power relations—we may successfully transform political science into an activity performed in public for social and political publics, sometimes to clarify, sometimes to intervene, sometimes to generate new perspectives, and always to serve as eyes and ears in ongoing efforts to understand the present and deliberate about the future.<sup>8</sup>

### III. Perestroika versus quantitative paradigm

The growing discontent among a minority of political scientists led to the establishment of the Caucus for a New Political Science in 1967. The Caucus includes political scientists of many diverse viewpoints, but it is united by the idea that the discipline should abandon “the myth of a value-free science” and advance a progressive political agenda. While originally founded as an alternative to the APSA, it won recognition as the first organized section of the APSA with the right to sponsor its own panels, collect dues, and to publish its own journal *New Political Science*. Members of the Caucus have authored numerous commentaries on “the tragedy” of political science, “the crisis” in

political science, and “the flight from reality in political science.” In 2000, these discontents again resurfaced in the “perestroika” rebellion, which denounced the APSA as an organization controlled by “East Coast Brahmins,”<sup>9</sup> which promotes a “narrow parochialism and methodological bias toward the quantitative, behavioral, rational choice, statistical, and formal modeling approaches.”<sup>10</sup>

The Perestroika movement started in October 2000 with an e-mail sent by an anonymous “Mr. Perestroika” to a number of political scientists, criticizing trends in the American Political Science Association (APSA) and the association’s flagship journal, the *American Political Science Review*.<sup>11</sup> This is due to the predominance of the technical aspect, the statistical obsession, the employment of third-class economics methods, the dominance of white males in the East Coast, and the research practices that express a few scholars, in addition to the fact that all articles in the *American Journal of Political Science* are from the same methodology, which are statistics or theory. The game - with an essay “symbolic” in political theory, in the absence of a clear political history, international history, political sociology, explanatory methodology, constructivism, area studies, critical theory and last but not least postmodernism.<sup>12</sup> Soon, many political scientists gathered around this movement and received support from some important names in political science. It also opened a serious discussion about the future of political science, especially with the fluctuations in the field in addition to the intransigence of the proponents of the scientific method, something that made Kristen Renwick propose to open the way for all political scientists to present their



aspirations and perceptions about what the field will be like during the first decade of the third millennium.<sup>13</sup> The controversy brought about by this new movement was not about research agendas, but rather about the methodological trends imposed by domination and coercion. The opposite should be the case with openness to all trends.<sup>14</sup>

Gregory Kasza, who has emerged as a spokesperson for the “Perestroika ‘revolt’”, offered several ways to increase the “representativeness of APSA and its journals”. According to Kasza, “To assure the representativeness of the APSA leadership, which is the real issue behind the Perestroika protest, there should be competitive, membership-wide elections to the top posts”. Kasza called for “multiple candidates on the ballot” who would offer “statements of their ideas concerning political science and the Association”. According to Kasza, “in my view, the problem here is not just with results, it is with the organizational procedures that produced those results”. Calls for more “democracy” in APSA (American Political Science Association) seem unimpeachable. Many would agree with Steven Brams’s (2000) call for competitive elections in the organization. One ought to remember, however, that the same calls in the past came from persons with very definite agendas. David Brunori implied that he did not complete the Ph.D. because “political science, at least American politics, was all about numbers”. In fact, “Political science has become nothing more than statistical analysis of volumes of data”. Perhaps Heinz Eulau (1969) was right; there will always be tension between “ancient” and “modern” approaches in political science. Perestroikans wax especially eloquently

when condemning APSR (the journal), which they believe is biased in favor of “technicism”, more specifically “rational choice” and “statistical analysis.”, Although Kasza admits that self-selection may be a factor in the kinds of articles that appear in the APSR Review, he nonetheless argues that APSR and the review process is biased in favor of “hard science”—viz., “rational choice theorists, formal modelers, and those who do exclusively quantitative research”—and against “soft science”—presumably everyone else in political science. Kasza calls for a separate journal—which presumably APSA members would automatically get—that would be book reviews and perhaps review essays, while divorcing receipt of APSR from APSA membership.<sup>15</sup>

Perestroikans reject the attempt to achieve “hegemony” in political science by the “hard sciences.” Kasza offers three reasons for rejecting “the hegemonic project of hard science.” First, “hard science” in political science “threatens academic freedom,” because “hard scientists don’t realize the damage they do to young scholars.” He asserts that “today’s hard scientists have convinced many young people that they must sacrifice their intellectual integrity to enter this profession”. Second, “normal [i.e., hard] science makes for bad science in the study of politics”. Here Perestroikans refers to Donald Green and Ian Shapiro’s (1994) critique of “rational choice.” Third, “hard science” “is increasingly irrelevant to the normative and practical problems of real politics”.

Perestroikans offers seven proposals:

- 1- Must restore political philosophy to a central place in political studies so that

- the ends of political life once again become our common focus.
- 2- Include “qualitative research methods” in graduate schools’ training.
  - 3- Reorganize research around the study of substantive problems, a proposal that has already raised questions.
  - 4- Reverse the decline of policy studies.
  - 5- Revamp our professional associations and journals to emphasize political substance with respect to methods and approaches. we combines this with the assertion that we must facilitate the full participation of women, ethnic minorities, foreign scholars, and the faculty of liberal arts colleges, all of whom have special contributions to make to the ecumenism we hope to foster.
  - 6- Renew our commitment to study the politics of different parts of the world.
  - 7- Promoting interdisciplinary research.<sup>16</sup>

From the vantage point of many Perestroikans, the dominant paradigm in the field operates according to the following hierarchy of assumptions: (1) political science exists to help promote understanding of the truth about politics; (2) political science research contributes to this quest by adding to the accumulation of an expanding base of objective knowledge about politics; (3) the growth of this knowledge base is contingent upon the building of theory that offers explanations of politics; (4) the building of theory is dependent on the development of universal generalizations regarding the behavior of political actors; (5) the development of a growing body of generalizations occurs by testing falsifiable, causal hypotheses that demonstrate their success in making predictions; (6) the accumulation of a growing body of predictions about political behavior comes from the study of variables in samples involving large numbers of cases; and (7)

this growing body of objective, causal knowledge can be put in service of society, particularly by influencing public policy makers and the stewards of the state.<sup>17</sup>

Kasza offered an alternative, “ecumenical” approach. Ecumenism, he explained, would be defined by three elements. First, an ecumenical political science would select problems for analysis and then make decisions about which research approaches would best address the problem, rather than adopting a research approach and defining problems to fit the requirements of the research approach. Second, an ecumenical political science would be explicit in its acceptance of a plurality of methods or approaches. Specialized quantitative methodologies would coexist with qualitative methodologies in an open and expansive political science; for example, graduate programs would reintegrate political philosophy and policy studies into their core areas in a Perestroika-driven discipline. Third, an ecumenical political science would value interdisciplinary study. Kasza urged political scientists to rethink graduate training and, specifically, to institute dual-degree graduate programs. Political science graduate students should be encouraged to earn master’s degrees in alternative and diverse fields, fields encompassing the humanities as well as hard sciences.<sup>18</sup>As happened to the conference for a new political science in 1967, this movement was subjected to some resistance by some political scientists, especially those affiliated under the wing of the American Political Science Association after it accused them of domination and geographic isolation by hinting that most of them are from the east coast of the United States of America, in addition to not Any initiatives are launched

to reassure the proponents of the "scientific method", as did researchers Green and Shapiro who, despite their strong criticism of the theory of rational choice, said that they do not aim to completely cancel that theory in this way easily. Contrary, the structure of that theory must be rethought and overcome methodological problems and employing them in proportion to the political phenomenon.<sup>19</sup>

Such reassurance was not from the literature of the reform movement, which made one of its opponents, Stephen Bennett, does not show any satisfaction with its supporters, The implication ought to be obvious. I ought to be attracted to the Perestroika "revolt." But I am not. Why? Because Perestroikans make it clear that types such as me are not welcome. Not only are we lumped with rational choicers and others with whom we have little, if nothing, in common, we are also stigmatized. Calling us "robots", "statisticians," or "mathematicians" hardly appeals to those of us who are political scientists and employ quantitative methodology. Finally, the Perestroikans often use apocalyptic phraseology. We hear about graduate students pressured into dissertations in which they do not believe. We read about young scholars whose careers are either destroyed or stunted but, of specifics, we hear not. Why? Acts of the kinds of which the Perestroikans accuse their foes are unprofessional, and perhaps legally actionable. Instead of hiding behind anonymity and vague charges, if acts such as those alleged by the Perestroikans have transpired, then come forth, make specific allegations, and if there is proof, let the guilty pay the price for their unprofessional activities. A good politician knows her/his base, and understands how to reach potential

supporters. May define certain kinds of academic movements, but it does not make successful protests.<sup>20</sup>

David Laitin gave his opinion on this movement and what preceded it, he sees the specter of an insurgency haunts political science. Under the leadership of a "Mr. Perestroika," a wide group of political scientists has abandoned the project of a scientific discipline. It would be convenient to write off this quasi-coordinated attack on the scientific turn in the study of society, calling its proponents Luddites. Indeed, their abhorrence of all things mathematical—and their typical but useless conflation of statistical and formal reasoning—reveals a fear of the modern. It would be equally convenient to write off this attack due to lack of any manifesto offering an alternative view of the discipline. Mostly we hear a desire for pluralism rather than a defense of best practices.<sup>21</sup>

Comparativists who do qualitative case studies have no claim to disciplinary recognition by virtue of the fact that examination of a single case is a time-honored procedure in their field. Theoretical work going back to Eckstein sets constraints on what a particular case can show. More recent methodological work, exemplified in the text by King, Keohane, and Verba,<sup>22</sup> gives a road map on how a study of a single country can be transformed into a high-research design, thereby increasing the study's scientific leverage. There can be no argument based on tradition justifying the minimization of leverage. New work in comparative politics must, if it is to gain respect in the wider discipline, adjust methodologically to take into account scientific advances. Pluralism without updating is not science.

This point is doubly important when fields get defined by positions in grand debates and protected by tradition. It would be a warping of the scientific frame if we built into the charter of any department of political science that there had to be an expert in “realism,” or in “South Asia,” or in “democracy,” or in “qualitative methods.” Of course, advertising for jobs by area of specialization is crucial, especially if a department seeks broad disciplinary coverage. But institutionalizing slots for particular specialties is a threat to scientific progress. When any academic field consecrates a debate by giving interlocutors on both sides permanent representation, the result can only be resistance to innovation. A scientific frame would lead us to expect that certain fields will become defunct, certain debates dead, and certain methods antiquated. A pluralism that shelters defunct practitioners cannot be scientifically justified. Flyvbjerg at his most generous is calling for pluralism but giving pride of place to an alternate methodology for the social sciences, going back to Aristotle’s recommendations. But rather than accepting an alternate methodology, this trend asks that we all work inside a scientific frame. Within that frame, we ought to maximize *inter alia* openness of procedures, internal coherence of argument, good measurement of variables, increasing attempts to unravel context, assiduous concern for valid causal inferences, and rewards for replication. Along with formal and statistical analysis, narratively based case studies play a crucial role in filling in this frame but there is nothing to be gained in advertising a program that does not insist on the best approximation to scientists as the data and our abilities will allow.<sup>23</sup>

Laitin's opinion was a response to Flyvbjerg, who in 2001 wrote a book in which he championed this reform movement.<sup>24</sup> Flyvbjerg responded to Leighton, who criticized him for defending the movement, David Laitin is mistaken if he thinks Perestroika is about fear among perestroikans of formal and statistical analysis. Perestroika is about fear of domination and stagnation. And Laitin’s article is good evidence that such fear is well founded when he claims hegemony for his proposed methodology. This type of claim confirms the suspicion of many perestroikans that anti-perestroikans are not interested in an open discussion of political science and its potential but instead in promoting a dogmatic version of the correct interpretation of what political science is, namely, rational choice theory and statistics. Perestroikans appear to have a sound sense that trouble lies ahead when someone suggests “we all” do the same thing in social science. Perhaps this is because as good social scientists they understand that social systems, including social science, thrive on diversity.<sup>25</sup>

David Laitin, in a misguided critique of Bent Flyvbjerg’s book *Making Social Science Matter* for being a surrogate manifesto for Perestroika, misrepresents the book in the extreme, Laitin’s claim that political science may become normal, predictive science in the natural science sense is unfounded; the claim is a dead end that perestroikans try to get beyond, political scientists substitute phrones for episteme and thereby avoid the trap of emulating natural science. By doing so, political scientists may arrive at social science that is strong where natural science is weak: in the reflexive analysis and discussion of values and interests aimed at praxis, which is the

prerequisite for an enlightened political, economic, and cultural development in any society.<sup>26</sup>

Based on the analysis and discussion above, concludes is as follows:

- David Laitin misrepresents my work on phronetic social and political science to a degree where he violates basic scholarly canons of reasonable handling of information and debate.
- When deprived of his false contrast with the phronetic alternative and his claim to hegemony, Laitin's proposed tripartite method and scientific frame is a noncontroversial and noninnovative ad hoc combination of three well-known research techniques: statistics, formal analysis, and narrative.
- Laitin's claim that political science may become normal, predictive science in the natural science sense is unfounded. It presupposes a theory of human judgment that no one, so far, has been able to develop, it is unlikely that such a theory can be developed, because human judgment appears not to be rule based, whereas theory requires rules.
- If political scientists were to follow Laitin's call for emulating natural science and for hegemony for his tripartite method and scientific frame, this would contribute to the type of stagnation in political science that perestroikans try to get beyond.
- Phronetic political scientists substitute phronesis for episteme and thereby avoid the trap of emulating natural science. Instead they arrive at social science that is strong where natural science is weak.<sup>27</sup>

As for Larry Diamond, the Perestroika movement is about defending pluralism in political science. Do not dismiss the potential value of rational choice and game-theoretic perspectives and methods in

comparative politics. Graduate students never discouraged from acquiring formal analytic skills, or from framing their research problems with the tools of game theory or the assumptions of rational choice—if they choose to do so. But, that is the core question for Perestroika: choice, we have been deeply troubled by the reports from graduate students and junior faculty in the discipline. From many departments, they report growing pressure to work with these methods and to embrace these schools. They fear they will be considered second-rate, by their own faculty and by leading departments in the hiring market, if they do not “do” rat choice. Some junior faculty fear revealing their true professional convictions and analytic dispositions. That is one reason why many of the messages in Perestroika cyberspace are (to growing frustration) anonymous. That some of this fear is self-generated anxiety, but we know much of it has a basis in reality. To the extent that the economic approach to political science becomes not one way of testing theories and pursuing knowledge within an intellectual marketplace in which different methods and theoretical perspectives or schools compete, but rather an aspiring orthodoxy, this situation is intolerable. One purpose of Perestroika must be to oppose such methodological hegemony, and to defend the principle that there are multiple ways of advancing understanding about political systems and behavior, multiple kinds of good political science work.<sup>28</sup>

Perestroika in political science has at a minimum provided an opportunity to halt this drift by questioning these assumptions and posing alternatives. At its best, the Perestroikan impulse creates the possibility to question the idea that political science research exists as a unitary enterprise dedicated to the accumulation of an expanding knowledge base of universal, decontextualized generalizations about politics. In its place, Perestroika would put a more pluralistic emphasis on allowing for the blossoming of more contextual,

contingent, and multiple political truths that involve a greater tie between theory and practice and a greater connection between thought and action in specific settings. Perestroika lays open the possibility that political science could actually be a very different sort of discipline, one less obsessed with proving it is a “science” and one more connected to providing delimited, contextualized, even local knowledges that might serve people within specific settings.<sup>29</sup>

Important philosophical justification for this Perestroika-inspired alternative to political science can be found in Stephen Toulmin’s magisterial book *Return to Reason*. Toulmin’s book builds on his life’s work in the philosophy of science, ordinary language philosophy, rhetoric, and the analysis of practical arts. It is written with an erudition rarely seen. Its sweeping panorama places the problem of scientism in the social sciences in a historically rich context. His primary argument is that since Descartes, and especially since Kant, Western philosophical thought has been increasingly enchanted with the dream of realizing universal rationality as the highest form of knowledge and the basis for truth. Yet, Toulmin stresses that it was only relatively recently with the twentieth century that this dream came to be ascendant as the hegemonic ideal for organizing knowledge practices in the academy in general and the social sciences in particular. The dream of universal rationality as the gold standard for objective knowledge of truth became ascendant with the rise of modern science and the growing influence of the argument that science, as best represented by particular natural sciences, was the best route toward achieving universal rationality, objective knowledge, and truth with a capital. In its wake, the modern university was built, and then increasingly compartmentalized into the multiversity, with growing numbers of specialized disciplines, each increasingly preoccupied with perfecting its own methodological prowess as to how to best arrive at truth.

In the field of comparative politics, Todd Landman has vehemently attacked the Perestroika movement, showing where its mistakes lie through scholarly examples, one dominant issue in comparative politics is the relationship between economic development and democracy. Two research strategies to examine this relationship emerged roughly at the same time in the late 1950s and early 1960s and have continued since. Quantitative studies gather indicators on economic development and democracy across large samples of countries and use statistical analysis to test whether there are significant relationships between wealth and democracy. The development in this research area has focused on the size of the sample (its coverage across space and over time), the definitions and measures of democracy (procedural vs. substantive, continuous vs. dichotomous), and the functional form of the relationship (linear, curvilinear, ‘step’ function). In contrast, qualitative studies tend to compare the histories of a smaller sample of countries in order to examine the role of large socio-economic transformations on forms of political rule, such as the contradictions of capitalist development, changing class structures and alliances, the power and autonomy of the state, and transnational constellations of power. What are their findings, why has method been important, and how have the substantive conclusions influenced policy?

The global quantitative studies test the relationship using the best available data and quantitative techniques. Early studies make synchronic ‘snap shot’ analyses of the relationship.<sup>30</sup> On the qualitative side, de Schweintiz and Barrington Moore compared the developmental histories of a small sample of countries to examine the relationship between capitalist development and regime type. After comparing the character of economic development, social classes, political culture, and ‘unique features’ of Britain (democracy), the US (democracy), Germany (unstable

democracy), and Russia (no democracy), de Schweinitz argues that the 'Euro-American route to democracy is closed'. Moore expands his comparison to eight countries. Britain, France, and the United States are instances of liberal democratic outcomes; Germany, Italy, and Japan are instances of fascist outcomes; and Russia and China are instances of communist outcomes. He examines the character of economic development, class development and coalitions, and the role of the state, and concludes that the emergence of liberal democracy was explained by a violent break with the past led by forces from the bourgeoisie. In contrast to these two earlier studies, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens expanded the number of cases on methodological and theoretical grounds. They compare a larger number of countries in Europe and North America than either de Schweinitz or Moore and add countries from Latin America and the Caribbean. They found that a violent break from the past was not a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of liberal democracy and that it is the working class, not the middle class that is seen to be the main agent of democratization.<sup>31</sup>

#### IV. Critical reading

Thus, in both the quantitative and qualitative examples presented here, the methodological advances represented by the latter studies show that precisely the kind of insights into real political problems that Perestroikans calls for can be the direct result of methodological considerations. For quantitative studies, the size of the sample across space and time and the subsequent solutions to analyzing such large and complex data sets provided different answers to the same research question. Moreover, the substantive inferences drawn from the latter studies have already had an influence on the policy advice and implementation. For the qualitative studies, original inferences about revolutionary

breaks from the past and the pre-eminent role of the middle class were displaced by more secure inferences based on a larger sample of countries. The basic methodological lesson for such studies is that inferences become more secure if political scientists raise the number of observations and think more carefully about research design.

Flyvbjerg at his most generous is calling for pluralism but giving pride of place to an alternate methodology for the political science. But rather than accepting an alternate methodology, the studies asks that we all work inside a scientific frame. Within that frame, we ought to maximize inter alia openness of procedures, internal coherence of argument, good measurement of variables, increasing attempts to unravel context, assiduous concern for valid causal inferences, and rewards for replication. Along with formal and statistical analysis, narratively based case studies play a crucial role in filling in this frame; but there is nothing to be gained in advertising a program that does not insist on the best approximation to science as the data and our abilities will allow.<sup>32</sup>

The Perestroikan remain convinced that they will win this epistemological and controversial battle if they are open, responsible, professional and pluralistic in their thinking and discourse, for several reasons. First, the quest to impose a methodological or theoretical orthodoxy is fundamentally anti-intellectual and counter to the true spirit of the academy. In merely exposing the realities and mechanisms of the quest for orthodoxy to the universities and their constituencies among students, alumni, boards of trustees, and the larger society, I think we can heavily discredit this endeavor. But this requires mobilizing evidence, not rumor, hearsay, fear, and prejudice on our own parts. Second, colleges and universities

must ultimately be accountable to their consumers, students. Most undergraduate students do not find the economic way of viewing politics sufficiently illuminating or satisfying, for the same reason that so many of us do not. Most students who major in political science want to understand how government works, when political forces mobilize, why democracies fail or succeed, at a level of empirical richness and explanatory comprehensiveness that heavily reductionist formal models cannot accommodate. And they want to (and for their careers, need to) understand the politics of particular countries and regions in historical depth and analytic breadth. If they are to meet the demands and needs of students, political science departments need excellent area specialists, and comparativists who do not confine themselves to a narrow, economic approach. This is not pandering to the lowest common denominator, it is responding to the real needs of our society.

And third, the external needs go well beyond students. While rational choice and game theory offer powerful insights and tools that may advance understanding of particular problems and processes, or lead us to see old dynamics in newly illuminating ways, they are also limited in their ability to meet the increasingly urgent needs of policymakers and the public at large to understand what is happening in the world: why Pakistan is a failing state, why the Middle East has been unable to democratize, why Africa has been ravaged by civil war, why Latin Americans are rising up against market reforms, why dozens of lower-income countries have been unable to develop despite sizeable infusions of foreign aid over the last several decades. I do not say that rational choice theorists have nothing to offer in answer to these questions, but too often they seem content to address only a narrow academic audience, using frameworks and vocabularies that are bound

to close off broader access. And if these tools do prove useful for some public policy purposes – for example, in developing predictive models for consulting companies and intelligence agencies – they cannot be useful in isolation. They still require real knowledge, in depth, of actual countries and regions, honed through years of field research and mastery of the language, culture, and history of specific countries and regions.<sup>33</sup>

The successes of rational choice theory derive in part from debates with culturalists and structuralists. Even as convergence across the research schools grows, Levi maintains, paradigms remain: “While the paradigm wars . . . have certainly subsided, they have not disappeared entirely. Paradigmatic distinctions remain relevant both to training and to research.” She further notes, “what divides [paradigms] is method in the sense of how to construct theory and organize research findings. Rationalists continue to emphasize methodological individualism and strategic interaction.” While some debates remain, the best comparative work, Levi claims, now uses many sophisticated methods, involving some mix of field work, interviews, surveys, archival work, experiments, and statistics in addition to formal logic. She thus advocates a “multiplicity of methods as well as approaches” that “blurs the lines among approaches” and is “methodologically pluralistic.” As Levi puts it, “not everyone does everything, but everyone seems to do several things.” By urging political scientists to “combine a nuanced understanding of the complexity of a particular (often unique) situation or set of events with a general theoretical understanding,” Levi echoes Katznelson’s big-picture pragmatism. Rational choice theory ensures that research has microfoundations, paying attention to the constraints on and the strategic interactions among the actors whose



aggregated choices produce significant outcomes. A studies sensibility ensures that research respects context, which means that scholars address important empirical and normative concerns. From their different starting points, Katznelson and Levi place rational choice at the very attractive messy center of political science.<sup>34</sup>

In the midst of these debates and discussions that took place in the field of political science, they should not be viewed as a sterile debate. On the contrary, it is a healthy debate that contributes to the development of the field from different points of view, and from multiple cognitive and methodological lines. The competition or even the collision between the cognitive models that occurred in the field is a natural result, and when it comes to arguments about indicative models, the logical premises and common values between the two parties to the dialogue are not sufficient to reach a conclusion in this regard, as is the case in political revolutions, so it is with regard to choice. Between paradigms, where there is no higher standard than the approval of the relevant community, it is the supreme authority that decides the choice, and in order to show how scientific revolutions affect, the study must not be limited to the effect and effectiveness of arguments derived from nature and logic alone, but should also include techniques of convincing argument for It has an effective and influential role within the specialized groups that make up the scientific community.

There are excellent a reasons why revolutions have proved to be so nearly invisible. Both scientists and laymen take much of their image of creative scientific activity from an authoritative source that systematically ! Disguises partly for important functional reasons-the existence and significance of scientific revolutions.

Only when the nature of that authority is recognized and analyzed.<sup>35</sup> If authority alone, and particularly if non-professional authority, were the arbiter of paradigm debates, the outcome of those debates might still be revolution, but it would not be scientific revolution.<sup>36</sup>

Within the power of choice referred to Kuhn and at the heart of political science, Larry Diamond has clearly indicated that there is a danger that many of us know well. Some prominent political scientists, and departments, and even deans who have bought into this misguided logic, are inclined to say, fine: we will teach about these areas, we will have area studies. But it is the “real” political scientists—the ones who are developing general models and formal theory—who we want to be tenured political science faculty. The area specialists, the ones who know the realities of particular countries, can only be real, or really good, political scientists if they also use game theoretic methods and a rational choice approach. Otherwise, they belong in the history department, or the area studies center, or some other research institute, or can be hired as adjunct or untenured (and untenurable) faculty. This hierarchy is ultimately unviable, but we do not want to wait for twenty years until university administrations realize that, and only then begin to find the time and resources to undo the damage that has been done by a long train of monolithic hiring decisions. We have to fight this prejudice openly and vigorously. But to prevail, we have to do so respectfully, pluralistically, with evidence, energy, and a professional spirit. Here are some guidelines for how we should do so:

- 1- We have to recognize that good work in political science cannot be merely descriptive or exclusively country-focused. To really know a country or region well, one must know the relevant

theories of comparative political development or governance, and one must have a concern either to examine those theories in the light of the country experience.

- 2- We should strive to use—or at least understand—multiple methods. To be a literate and “good” empirical political scientist today, one must have some grasp of quantitative methods.
- 3- Those graduate students will be better prepared as political scientists if they gain some exposure through coursework and other research and reading to the tools of game theory and to the ideas and modes of analysis of the rational-choice approach.
- 4- Various theories and methods must be explored, to push out the boundaries of our understanding about that problem, and to do so with methods and concepts appropriate to the challenge.<sup>37</sup>

Methods of theorizing in political science have been a controversial topic, one of the issues that has been discussed strongly about the role of paradigms. Despite widespread agreement that the field currently lacks a single dominant model, scholars are making sharply differing proposals about how to respond to this situation. Some see it as an opportunity to move forward by placing bets on a new rational choice model inspired by economics, while others call for a pluralism competition to avoid hegemony from any one model, such as rational choice theory, while others see an opportunity to completely avoid paradigms and unuseful model conflicts. Allegedly, switching instead to mid-range theory.<sup>38</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Thus, the perestroika paradigm in political science should not make the fatal errors of epistemic criticism, by clinging to the argument that either abandoning a specific approach in terms of substance or

diminishing its importance, because in the end, a good method produces a good scientific knowledge, but a good method does not necessarily mean the irregular numbers, models or sophisticated statistical analysis only. A good method means employing intellectual and scientific honesty about what we study and how we study it, that is, bringing in the scientific spirit in the research, including asking important research questions, and accurate interpretation about the relationships and possible interpretations of the findings reached, research design, collecting and testing evidence, and drawing logical inferences derived from that evidence, thus the research methodology is related to the research questions and the answers to those questions, that only by preserving this link through which the political science can continue to make a contribution to political knowledge and provide solutions to realistic problems of politics.

In fact, when a new paradigm arises that provides a new and good understanding of phenomena in ways that the prevailing paradigm cannot do, then the perestroika must learn the new rules of study involved in this new approach and methods, translation into the old system of studying will not succeed because paradigms are an inexpressible degree. By definition, and indeed inapplicable, each paradigm guide has a specific nature and must always be evaluated according to its own criteria and in its own context, making it impossible to use the evidence to determine whether one is better than the other, knowledge does not grow cumulatively with the construction of a single paradigm over another one, perhaps the best approach for the perestroika would be to encourage the establishment of a scientific trend that sees theory evolving from practices in specific contexts. This type of science does exist but

is not organized or Recognized, it exists where scholars practice it.

Perestroikan political scholars have risen and do not accept the limitation of the normative and value impulse in research, their rejection of all attempts to separate political studies from their cultural and normative dimension, as a result the emergence of these new stages is seen as a counter to the realization of deficiencies in the previous stages, as a cognitive and systematic treatment of what was seen as a deficiency in Schools and previous periods, new stages tend to highlight the differences between what is old and new, in some cases tend to cancel the slightest similarities, each new stage tended to present itself as an opposition and antithesis to its predecessor and the stage that preceded it.

#### **Bibliography List:**

##### **A. Books:**

- 1- DarityA.William, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Philip R. Costanzo, Patrick L. Mason, Paula McClain, Donald M. Nonini, David Scott, Theresa Singleton, (2008), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences., 2<sup>nd</sup>, Thomson Star Logo and Macmillan Reference USA.
- 2- Green Donald, and Ian Shapiro (1994), Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science, Yale University Press, USA.
- 3- Ishiyama John, and Marijke Breuning (2011), 21st century political science: a reference handbook, SAGE Publications, Inc, USA.
- 4- Kuhn Thomas (1996), the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3th, the University of Chicago Press, USA.
- 5- KurianGeorge Thomas, editor in chief: James E. Alt, Simone Chambers, Geoffrey Garrett, Margaret Levi Paula D. McClain, (2011), The Encyclopedia of political science. USA, Prepared with the assistance of the American Political Science Association. CQ (Congressional Quarterly) Press, a division of SAGE, USA.
- 6- Lichbach Mark, and Alan Zuckerman (2009), Comparative politics: rationality, culture, and structure. 2nd, Cambridge University press, New York, USA.
- 7- Munck Gerardo, and Richard Snyder (2007), Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics, the Johns Hopkins University Press, USA.

##### **B. Journal article :** author's name (year), full title of the article, review name, place, volume and number ;

- 1- Dryzek John(November 2006), Revolutions without Enemies: Key Transformations in Political Science. American Political Science Review, USA, Vol.100, No.04.
- 2- Stephen Toulmin(December 2003), Return to politics: Perestroika and Post-paradigmatic Political Science, Political theory, USA, Vol.31, No. 6.
- 3- Petter Hall(fall, 2007), The Dilemmas of Contemporary Social Science, boundary, vol.34, no.03.
- 4- Levi, Margaret(August-September, 2000), The Economic Turn in Comparative Politics. Comparative Political Studies, USA, vol.33.
- 5- Bent Flybjerg,(September, 2004), A Perestroikan Straw Man Answers Back: David Laitin and Phronetic Political Science, Politics & Society, Vol.32, No.03.
- 6- Stephen Bennett Earl (June, 2002), "Perestroika" Lost: Why the Latest "Reform" Movement in Political Science Should Fail, PS: political studies.

7- David Laitin(March 2003), *The Perestroika Challenge to Social Science, Politics and Society*, USA, vol.31, no.01.

8- Munck Gerardo, and Richard Snyder(January, 2007), *Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics: An Analysis of Leading Journals*. *Comparative Political Studies*, USA, Vol.40, No.01.

**C. Seminar article:** author's name (year), full title of the paper, title of seminar, place and date, country ;

1- Rudolph Susanne Hoeber, (31 August 2001). *Perestroika and Its other. Unpunished,* the American Political Science Association annual

meeting, San Francisco, USA. Paper prepared for Panel 7-1, "Perestroika: Undisciplined,

**D. Internet websites:**

1- Todd Landman, *Rebutting 'Perestroika': Method and Substance in Political Science*, at: [www.researchgate.net](http://www.researchgate.net) > profile > Todd\_Landman, (consulted on 15/11/2020).

2- Larry Diamond (August 30, 2002,), *Statement to the Perestroika meeting of the APSA*, [web.stanford.edu](http://web.stanford.edu) > ldiamond > papers > APSA, (consulted on 22/10/2020).

**Citation:**

<sup>9</sup> East Coast Brahmins: The Boston Brahmins or Boston elite are members of Boston's traditional old upper class. They are often associated with Harvard University, Anglicanism, aristocratic clubs.

<sup>10</sup>International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. (William A. Darity, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Philip R. Costanzo, Patrick L. Mason, Paula McClain, Donald M. Nonini, David Scott, Theresa Singleton), 2nd edition. USA, Thomson Star Logo and Macmillan Reference, Printed in the United States of America, 2008, p 314.

<sup>11</sup>Munck, Gerardo and Richard Snyder. *Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics*. USA, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007, p 55.

<sup>12</sup> Rudolph Susanne Hoeber, *Perestroika and Its other*. Paper prepared for Panel 7-1, "Perestroika: Undisciplined, Unpunished," the American Political Science Association annual meeting, August 31, 2001, San Francisco, p 12.

<sup>13</sup> Monroe Renwick Kristen, *Shaking Things Up? Thoughts about the Future of Political Science*, *PS: Political studies*, (June, 2002), p 181.

<sup>14</sup>The Encyclopedia of political science. (George Thomas Kurian, editor in chief: James E. Alt, Simone Chambers, Geoffrey Garrett, Margaret Levi Paula D. McClain), Prepared with the assistance of the American Political Science Association. *CQ (Congressional Quarterly) Press*, USA. 2011, p 1285.

<sup>1</sup> Dryzek John. *Revolutions without Enemies: Key Transformations in Political Science*. *American Political Science Review*, Vol.100, No.04, (November 2006), p 487.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen Toulmin, *Return to politics: Perestroika and Post-paradigmatic Political Science*, *Political theory*, Vol.31, No. 6, (December 2003), p 836.

<sup>3</sup> Donald Green, and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*, Yale University Press, USA,1994, p 32.

<sup>4</sup>Petter Hall, *The Dilemmas of Contemporary Social Science*, *boundary 2*, vol.34, no.03, (fall, 2007), p 10.

<sup>5</sup> Todd Landman, *Rebutting 'Perestroika': Method and Substance in Political Science*, at: [www.researchgate.net](http://www.researchgate.net) > profile > Todd\_Landman, p 01.

<sup>6</sup> Levi Margaret. *The Economic Turn in Comparative Politics*. *Comparative Political Studies*, vol.33, (September, 2000), p 838.

<sup>7</sup>John Ishiyama, and Marijke Breuning. *21st century political science: a reference handbook*. USA, SAGE Publications, Inc, 2011, p 09.

<sup>8</sup> Bent Flyvbjerg, *A Perestroika Straw Man Answers Back: David Laitin and Phronetic Political Science*, *Politics & Society*, Vol.32, No.03, (September, 2004), p 413.

---

<sup>15</sup> Stephen Bennett Earl, “Perestroika” Lost: Why the Latest “Reform” Movement in Political Science Should Fail, *PS: political studies*, (June, 2002), p 177.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, p 178.

<sup>17</sup> Stephen Toulmin, *op. cit*, p 836.

<sup>18</sup> John T. Ishiyama, and Marijke Breuning, *op. cit*, p.p 09-10.

<sup>19</sup> Donald Green, and Ian Shapiro, *op. cit*, p 46.

<sup>20</sup> Stephen Bennett Earl, *op. cit*, p.p 178 – 179.

<sup>21</sup> David Laitin, *The Perestroika Challenge to Social Science, Politics and Society*, vol.31, no.01, (March 2003), p 163.

<sup>22</sup> See- Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

<sup>23</sup> David Laitin, *op. cit*, p 180.

<sup>24</sup> See- (Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

<sup>25</sup> Bent Flyvbjerg, *op. cit*, p 399.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, p 389.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, p.p 411-412.

<sup>28</sup> Larry Diamond, Statement to the Perestroika meeting of the APSA, August 30, 2002, [web.stanford.edu > ldiamond > APSA](http://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond), p.p 01-02.

<sup>29</sup> Stephen Toulmin, *op. cit*, p 837.

<sup>30</sup> Todd Landman, Rebutting 'Perestroika': Method and Substance in Political Science, *op. cit*, p.p 09-10.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, p.p 12-13.

<sup>32</sup> David Laitin, *op. cit*, p.p 180-181.

<sup>33</sup> Larry Diamond, *op. cit*, p.p 02-03.

<sup>34</sup> Mark Lichbach, and Alan Zuckerman, *Comparative politics: rationality, culture, and structure*, 2nd Ed, USA, Cambridge: Cambridge University press, New York, 2009, p.p 04-05.

<sup>35</sup> Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Third Edition, The University of Chicago Press, United States of America, 1996, p 136.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, p 167.

<sup>37</sup> Larry Diamond, *op. cit*, p.p 04-05.

<sup>38</sup> Munck Gerardo and Richard Snyder. Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics: An Analysis of Leading Journals. *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.40, No. 1, (January, 2007), p 06.