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SOUTH CHINA SEA : WHAT AMBITION FOR CHINESE POWER?

بحر الصين الجنوبي: أي طموح بالنسبة للقوة الصينية؟

MER DU SUD DE LA CHINE: QUELLE AMBITION POUR L'ÉLECTRICITÉ CHINOISE?

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Abstract :

This Research Paper aims to identify the China's ambition in south china sea , China intends to be become a major naval power with the control on maritime transport routes. An ambition fueled by China's rising political , economic and military power. This ambition is achievable within a comprehensive strategy followed by Beijing in the South China Sea in order to restor its sovereignty over its islands on the one hand and to develop its naval forces to compete with US hegemony on the other hand, especially in the absence of unanimity among ASEAN countries.

Keywords: south china sea ; china ; ambition ; maritimes routes ; disputes

Résumé:

Ce document de recherche vise à identifier l'ambition de la Chine dans la mer de Chine méridionale. La Chine entend devenir une puissance navale majeure avec le contrôle des itinéraires de transport maritime. Une ambition alimentée par la montée en puissance de la puissance politique, économique et militaire de la Chine. Cette ambition est réalisable dans le cadre d'une stratégie globale suivie par Pékin en mer de Chine méridionale afin de restaurer sa souveraineté sur ses îles et de développer ses forces navales afin de rivaliser avec l'hégémonie américaine, notamment en l'absence de l'unanimité parmi les pays de l'ANASE.

Mots-clés: mer de Chine méridionale; Chine ; ambition ; les voies maritimes; des disputes.

ملخص :

تسعى هذه الورقة البحثية الى تبين طموح الصين في بحر الصين الجنوبي ، تريد الصين ان تصبح قوة بحرية كبرى تهيمن على الطرق والممرات البحرية التجارية. طموح يغذيه تصاعد قوتها السياسية الاقتصادية والعسكرية. حلم قابل للتحقيق ضمن استراتيجية شاملة تتبعها بكين في بحر الصين الجنوبي تتراوح بين استعادة حقوقها في السيادة على جزره بسياسة فرض الامر الواقع امام غياب اجماع دول اسيان حول تحركاتها في هذه المنطقة وتطوير قواتها البحرية لمنافسة الهيمنة الامريكية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: بحر الصين الجنوبي، الصين، طموح، الطرق البحرية، النزاعات

1. INTRODUCTION

Throughout ages, seas were of paramount importance to powerful countries trade. So having a sea front is an advantage for any country. Because if the contents of these Seas of raw materials and fish wealth such as south china sea which has become a hotbed of tension in the international system within the number of countries that are disputing on its island. The South China Sea is a “mediterranean sea”, surrounded by land belonging to different states: the ASEAN states (except Burma), Taiwan and China. Each (except Singapore) claim part of the South China Sea as their territory.¹

In fact, China is the most insisting country on what it calls « its historical right to sovereignty” Over the south china sea and reclaiming a large area in this geostrategic region which is considered the artery of international trade. China’s moves in these islands hide an ambition boosted by the rise of its economic, political and military power. It is challenged not only by neighboring countries but also the non-Asian countries within the strategic interests in the region, the most important is the united states of America which is working to weaken and contain China.

For that, this paper seeks to treat the following problematic :

What does China exactly want to achieve in the south china sea ? Does it have a real hegemonic strategy of leadership in this region ?

2. The strategic importance of south china sea :

The South China Sea region is a semi-enclosed sea – part of the Pacific Ocean, encompassing an area from the Karimata and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan of around 3,500,000 square kilometres (1,400,000 sq mi). The sea carries a great strategic importance; one-third of the world's shipping passes through it carrying over \$3 trillion in trade each year .»² The South China Sea islands are surrounded by countries with significant economic growth: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, all of them are the important importers of raw materials. There are also two important ports on the edge of the southern part: Singapore and Hong Kong.

This sea is surrounded by highly developed countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, all of which are important importers of natural resources . There are two important ports on the edge of the southern part : Singapore and Hong Kong. South China Sea contains two sets of hotly contested island groups, the Spratly and Paracels. The Paracel Islands are contested by China and Vietnam. About half the islands are located within 370 km or 200 nautical miles (n.m.) of Vietnam, whereas all of them are within 370 Km (200 n.m.) of China’s Hainan Island. Various parts of the Spratly Islands are claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Taiwan, Malaysia and China³ Furthermore the strategic site , the south china sea has an another advantage, the significant reserves of raw materials and great fishing

potential. The south china sea accounts for approximately 10 per cent of the annual global fisheries, catch, making it very important to the fishing industries of the surrounding countries...This sea is one of the world's five leading fishing zones. The fishery employs more than 3 million people, contributes heavily to the global fish trade and provides a major source of vital protein to millions of people living in the nations that depend on it »⁴.

In addition to fish the south china sea is rich in both oil and natural gas in wich , « The exploited reserve in oil and natural gas in this area are 5.5 billion tons and 12 trillion m³, respectively. The entire estimated oil reserve in South china sea is at least 23 billion tons, with a maximum up to around 55 billion tons ; meanwhile the natural gas reserve is around 20 trillion m³. In this report⁵ , the author referred the South China Sea as “the second Persian Gulf” for its abundant reserve of natural resources ».⁶

3.China' s strategy toward the south china sea :

In February 2017, China announced the revision of its Maritime Transportation Security Act of 1984. The proposed arrangements allows the Chinese maritime authorities to prevent foreign vessels from entering Chinese “territorial waters” on the grounds of possible interference with the safety of maritime traffic. That declaration, affirms the insistence of china to maintain its claims all islands off the coast. This applies in first place to Taiwan, the “rebel island”, but also to the surrounding islands: the Diaoyu-Senkaku Islands administered by Japan, the Pescadores and Pratas Islands belonging to Taiwan, the Paracel Islands (*Xisha* in Chinese) controlled by Beijing but

claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan, and finally the Spratly Islands (*Nansha* in Chinese), the object of recurrent conflicts. To this day, in this vast archipelago of 410 000km², China occupies nine islands. Malaysia occupies three, the Philippines five, Brunei two. Taiwan, for its part, occupies one small islet ».⁷

This insistence on the restoration of hegemony over sea routes stems from the rise of China's economic, political and military power since the early 1990s. On October 25, 1992, China promulgated a law on the territorial sea and its adjacent area, which includes the second article which enumerates Beijing's claimants in both east and south china sea. This article says :

The territorial sea of the People's Republic of China consists of land-side waters consisting of the continental part of the country and the islands located in Taiwan's coasts and the various islands associated with it, including islands Diayoui, Penghu, Dougha, Parceles, Sprately.

Not only did China vote on the law, but issued a document in October in the same year that talked about the so-called vital area that enables China to access the core energy resources that help it to continue economic growth. This document clearly expresses China's reclaims in the China Sea and the “ its most recent maps claim the sovereignty including maritime traffic rights on 80% of the south china sea, that to say 2.2 of 2.7 million square kilometers and when we know that 70% of Japan's oil imports Passing through this maritime route we understand that the danger goes beyond the interests of the surrounding countries”.⁸

In 2009, China published the White Paper on Defense, which set the future priorities of China's politicians in space and sea. China wants to have all the elements of power,

including naval power, and this is what the White Paper on defense said in 2015. the White Paper on China's Military Strategy released on 26th May 2015, provides the keys to China's objectives in the South China Sea. It establishes that China must become a major naval power and also raises the question of strengthening Chinese logistical means.⁹ Thus china's strategy in south china sea has become linked to a larger goal of making the Middle Empire a major naval force that controls maritime transport routes.

To achieve this goal, China is working first to extend its sovereignty over the China Sea in its southern and eastern parts as Many Chinese conceptualizations of "maritime power" include notions of power and control. China will not become a maritime power until it can deal with the challenges in defense of its maritime sovereignty, rights, and interests, and deal with what it terms the threat of containment from the sea.¹⁰ Therefore, the South China Sea, due to its strategic site has the economic and security importance of the geopolitical future of this country, which seeks to implement the strategy of the "pearl necklace" based on the establishment of advanced centers along the sea routes from the Persian Gulf towards the Strait of Malacca to secure its oil supply and extend its influence."¹¹ For this reason, China insists on what it calls « the historical right » to the islands in the Sea of China in general, since the success of its development experience adopting a new strategic doctrine. «The new strategic doctrine of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is organized around the will to make the South China Sea a Chinese sea and to expand its immediate maritime interests. The Chinese navy justifies itself to its neighbors, necessarily worried, by the

necessity of escorting the commercial vessels essential to the economy of the country; but it is known that the priority of the new Chinese strategy is to become operational beyond the China Sea and the Philippines ».¹²

This strategy is implemented in phases

*The first phase - which is supposed to have ended - in which China has a dominant influence on the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and also the South China Sea.

*The second phase, due to Horizon 2020 2025, aims at ensuring indirect control of the Chinese Navy at least in the Sea of Japan. The Sea of the Philippines and the Sea of Indonesia Where are the Hokkaido, Marian and Palau in the south.

*Third level The long-term aim is to expand China's maritime control to far-off areas such as Guam.

In fact, the initiative launched by China in 2013, called the Road and Belt Initiative, is another point in the trajectory of sea and sea control and make china a major naval power. "The launch of the "One Belt, One Road18" initiative in September 2013 (implying the search for control of the major commercial communication channels) also prompted China to define a logistical model adapted to its new ambitions. One of these objectives is to escape the pre-eminence of the United States Navy. Indeed, they are the only guarantee of freedom of navigation on the main strategic international routes and straits, notably the oil and gas supply route on which the Chinese economy heavily relies on »¹³.

4.China's claims in the south china sea :


China, along with five other countries - Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and

Taiwan - has maintained their right to sovereignty over several islands in the South China Sea, which explains the intensity of the dispute and the continued number of exercises and naval maneuvers in the region. And The most important conflicts in this region are the conflict over the Parsil and Spratly Islands.

“China’s claims concerning its maritime territories in the South China Sea

were delineated in a map published in 1948, more recently referred to as the ‘nine-dash line’ claim.¹⁵ It roughly covers the maritime area extending from China’s mainland toward the Philippines and encompassing Scarborough Shoal, the Paracel Islands, the Pratas and Macclesfield Banks, and the Spratly Islands ». ¹⁴ (see map n 1)

Map n 1 : : Territorial disputes in the south china sea



named Yu Zheng311 (Its cargo ship is 4600 tons) and . Twenty fishing boats and Vietnamese coast guards. The clashes then continue between these two countries , China and the Philippines the most heavily contested countries on the South China Sea, to turn China's policy from massive reclamation to militarisation. Since 2014, the construction of artificial islands on the coral reefs of the Spratly archipelago has intensified, giving new impetus to the Chinese appropriation strategy. Beijing conducted major embankment operations, transforming these reefs into ports and various infrastructure. At the time, China carried out large-scale embankment works on seven of the Spratly islets. The Fiery Cross Reef has a 3,000-metre-long runway on which civilian aircrafts undertook landing-tests in early 2016. Military aircrafts are expected to follow suit »¹⁷. In the same year in may a military clash between China and Vietnam took place when China deployed a deep-sea oil rig in Vietnam's two hundred-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), leading to a seventy-three-day crisis.

In 2016, China deployed surface-to-air missile batteries on Woody Island⁹ and installed radars in at least four of the Spratly Islands (Cuarteron, Gaven, Hughes and Johnson South). It is thus working to strengthen its air and maritime traffic surveillance capabilities in the South China Sea, particularly that from the Strait of Malacca. An unavoidable point of passage in the crossing of South-East Asia by sea, the strait crystallizes regional and international attention, particularly with regard to the residual risk of piracy ».¹⁸

Source :

Marianne Peron- Doise,(2017), « The south china sea : a maritime geography of latent conflictuality, , reaserch paper n 44 paris ecole militaire, ,p 10.

4.1 Dispute over the Spratly Islands

The Spratly Islands consist of thirty-three islands and four hundred islands in an area of 180,000 square kilometers,200 nautical miles south of Hong Kong and 145 nautical miles east of the port of Danbang in Vietnam. These islands were named Henry Spratly, 18th century.

They are important because of their wealth in terms of fisheries and natural resources such as oil and natural gas. In addition to its control over important commercial routes due to its presence on international shipping lines.

Due to this strategic importance, "many countries are fighting over the sovereignty of these islands, such as China (1500 km in the north) and Vietnam (400 km in the west) Taiwan, which since 1947 has been the island of Iti Aba, the largest of these islands or in part, such as Malaysia (320 km in the southeast), the Philippines (280 km in the east) and Brunei ».¹⁵

The fact is that there are several clashes in this area of the South China Sea extending into 2010 when Beijing for the first time identified protecting its sovereignty in the South China Sea as a "core interest" that cannot be compromised.¹⁶ In that year, there were clashes in March between the largest unit of the Chinese fishing patrol

seafloor because of the geostrategic significance of these islands, which are located on a main route in the international maritime transit traffic. Because China found Vietnam in the first half of the last century as the most vulnerable rival, it created a fait accompli by taking over non-populated islands to build platforms to stop aircraft. Beijing is seeking to build a straight line of observation from its island of Henan to Mitshev, to bring Vietnam closer to the Southeast Asian countries in 1995 as China poses a strategic threat to these countries.

5-The position of Southeast Asian countries:

The parties to the conflict and Southeast Asian countries have generally found difficulty in developing a common vision On China's moves in the South China Sea. China is turning to history to justify its right to this region, which makes it a hotbed of tension as it is attributed to the islands as the historical documents confirm that they discovered the islands "Spratly" under the rule of Han (206 BC / 106 AD) and that in 789 it was introduced by the Tang kingdom under the legal cover of a province Qiongzion Named Henan today »²⁰. That is why in recent years, China has been working to strengthen its presence in the China Sea and sought to build a straight line of observation from its island of Henan to Mitshev raising the concerns and fears of its neighbors who are well aware of their belonging to an area that lacks collective security.

This is why the Southeast Asian countries are trying to deal with this conflict by peaceful means and avoid any escalation of these maritime disputes with a very

4-2The dispute over the Parsil Islands;

China and Vietnam are fighting for sovereignty over the Parsil Islands in the South China Sea, which China calls « Sita » and Vietnam « Parsil ». China insists on its right to sovereignty over these islands for its desire to ensure the control of sea lanes, So these islands Can be used as projection bases to secure the maritime artery that allows passage to the Indian ocean.

In fact, the movements of China in these islands have resulted in the concern of Asian neighbors and the silence of Vietnam. For example in In May 2014, China deployed it seventeen nautical miles from the southwestern-most island in the Paracels, whose sovereignty Vietnam also claims. The ferocity of Hanoi's pushback and a chorus of regional criticism prompted Beijing to quietly adjust tactics. HYSY 981 was sent to the Bay of Bengal from February to April 2015..In June, it was again deployed to an area where Chinese and Vietnamese claims overlap, but on the Chinese side of the median line between the two coasts. Hanoi largely remained mute ».¹⁹

Vietnam is, in fact ,the most affected by China's expansion in the South China Sea. "Beijing is reclaiming the largest part of the region, estimated at about 3 million square kilometers located south of Taiwan and the island of Henan between Vietnam and the Philippines and even near the Malaysian and Indonesian coasts. It is a group of pavements and more than 200 small islands, where sovereignty has never been shown and which is also demanded by neighboring countries. Vietnam's damage to China's possession of some islands from Parsell and Spratly directly threatens the safety of its

meetings were followed by several discussions held on the sidelines of the Southeast Asian Community, in which China spoke of an informal system of confidence-building measures in the China Sea in general. "Some what pessimistically, it seems that several ASEAN claimant states are coming to the conclusion that a negotiated settlement of the South China Sea dispute is unlikely. As The Philippines' government indicated in its statement to the Arbitration Tribunal in early 2013»²⁴. On 12 July 2016 the Arbitral Tribunal in the case between the Philippines and China delivered its *Award*, following its earlier 29 October 2015 *Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility*.¹ The Tribunal was constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS),² having been initiated by the Philippines.³ The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague acted as the registry for the case and venue for hearings.⁴ China, for its part, returned the Philippines' notification of its claims, argued that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, and has rejected the Tribunal's *Award* ».²⁵

with the determination of China's right to sovereignty over these islands and In the absence of an internal consensus of the Southeast Asian Community and the great arms race in the region, On 6 August 2017, ASEAN and China agreed on a new framework. They agreed on a three step process to start the negotiations of an actual code - the announcement of the adoption of the framework, convening a new meeting to discuss the modalities for the negotiations of the Code and announcement of the start of a "Code of Conduct" (COC) negotiation by the leaders of ASEAN and China in the upcoming summit in November 2017. But

important economic partner as all disputants have a heavy economic dependency on China, which is ASEAN's largest trading partner, so economic considerations understandably influence the thinking of individual states to varying degrees»²¹. One of these peaceful methods is the adherence of the South-East Asian States to the International Convention on the Law of the Sea. In 2002, the ASEAN countries together with China signed a « Declaration on the Conduct of

Parties in the South China Sea". In it, China and ASEAN promised "co-operation" and "self-restraint", they recognised "the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment" and said they would abide by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and work towards a code of conduct. Nine years later, the two sides agreed to a vague set of guidelines to implement the declaration. In July 2016, China agreed to expedite talks about a code of conduct »²².

Although these countries stressed that the dispute must be resolved by peaceful means, all efforts failed to reach an agreement that defines the rights of all the conflicting countries and sets out formulas for the joint exploitation of the wealth found in these islands, In the absence of internal consensus and due to Chinese pressure, ASEAN failed to issue a communique referring to the situation in the South China Sea twice, in 2012 and 2016. It is well known that an intransigent position towards China is not the best option. This is especially true in the context of a resumed Sino-ASEAN dialogue on the preliminary guidelines for the implementation of the Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea adopted in 2002»²³. These

allowing its naval units to reach the high seas and access the oceanic depths of the Pacific without having to pass through the maritime zones of its neighbours »²⁸.

China is working to develop its naval forces as a priority in its strategic objectives, a goal that is pursued without a fuss to reassure its neighbors and all countries of the world of the peaceful rise of its power. Until now, China's pursuit of pragmatic realism has allowed it to work with its neighbors and the major powers within the existing international system while mostly restraining itself from overtly expressing its expansionist ambitions, attempting to change the status quo, or challenging the American hegemonic influence in Asia. »²⁹

For its part, the United States insists on curbing China's ambition in the South China Sea and forming an Asian axis. When President Obama announced the "Asian Pivot" in 2010, he declared that 60% of U.S. Naval and Air Force assets would be deployed in the Pacific theater »³⁰.

The Asian axis consists of the United States and its allies in the region such as Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, and deters any attempt by China to strengthen its network of bilateral military relations with the countries of the region through joint military exercises, military assistance programs and arms sales.

The United States still maintains large military forces on the Japanese island of Okinawa. As well as alliances with South East Asian countries for the maritime and air presence in the region.

Upheld by the Philippine Supreme Court in 2016, a ten-year U.S.- Philippine security agreement comprises another scenario that has yet to completely manifest itself. This

China said the third step will depend on the stability in the South China Sea, "if there is no major disruption from outside parties».²⁶

6- US position of the South China Sea dispute:

The dispute in the South China Sea does not really raise the interest and concerns of Southeast Asian countries, but many other countries because the majority of external parties with an interest in the region, such as Japan, South Korea and Australia, also support UNCLOS as the legal framework for addressing claims or entitlements to maritime areas.

The United States is one of the most interested countries in the South China Sea because of its strategic interests in the region and its desire to block Chinese's hegemony over the region. "The United States, considered in relative decline, intend to retain their pre-eminence and want at all costs to limit the geopolitical and economic ambitions of China. The new president Donald trump does not intend to lose its place in the Pacific, a region that symbolized America's hegemony during the 20th century. China wants to regain the influence it had in the region in its imperial past »²⁷.

The United States, is aware that china has never been fully satisfied with the post cold war geopolitical settlement that is why china is looking for strategic depth, there remains the undeniable political and military motive. The control of the waters and airspace of the South China Sea would give an interesting strategic depth to China. This area has deep-sea depths and allows for easy access to the Pacific. Through the claim of the archipelagos, China intends firstly to increase its geography, while secondly

regional stability as Germany and the Soviet Union have in the past. The United States views China as the most likely challenger to regional stability. China is the only country capable of challenging US naval power and the bipolar combination of East Asia.” Arguably, the South China Sea drama is an important piece in the new “Great Game” that is being played out between the world’s current superpower (US), perceived by some to be in decline, and the new challenger (China) that wants to take its rightful place as an equal and perhaps even more. The US is faced with the strategic challenge of how to manage China’s global ascendancy peacefully. .., the US is also distracted by other geopolitical crises including an increasingly belligerent Russia as well as the mess in Syria/Iraq »³⁴.

The stability of the South China Sea region is based not only on the countries of the region, but also on the extent to which China and the United States understand that any conflict in the region will be catastrophic and respect for the limits of peaceful coexistence between them.

7. CONCLUSION

The seas and oceans present both challenges and opportunities such as south china sea which has a very strategic importance and where Chinese authorities demonstrate a strong determination to establish their claims . For a long time The contestation of maritime borders in the South China Sea was considered as a regional security issue of concern to China and its South-East Asian neighbours alone, but recently This conflict has taken an international dimension to China's moves in this region and its insistence on Develop its naval forces and

agreement allows the U.S. to rotate air and naval units on a temporary basis in the Philippines and envisions at least a partial re-opening, of Subic Bay and adjacent Clark Field. A U.S. Navy logistics base in Singapore, a former British colony, near the Strait of Malacca completes the U.S. presence ».³¹ This is the superpower that believes that China is militarizing the South China Sea region, Admiral Harris, Commander of Pacific Command (PACOM), testified that “China’s base-building and militarization of the South China Sea, its lack of transparency regarding military modernization efforts and continued malicious cyber activity raise regional tension and greatly hinder US-China cooperation »³²

In return, the United States is working to keep a few of its naval forces in the region. For the United States, the current basing arrangement relative to South China Sea essentially consists of a few well-defined over-the-horizon positions. Thus, U.S. forces operate at the end of lengthy supply lines and flight ranges involving in-air refueling for its land based air superiority fighters operating from Guam or Okinawa (F-15s and F-22s). Moreover, portions of flight lines from Okinawa to the South China Sea flank the Chinese coast with its numerous air bases »³³.

China is therefore suspicious of American intentions, because the strategic depth of the United States and its naval power allows it to control coastal waters and enter the airspace of any country, including China. These capabilities also allow the United States to neutralize the naval capabilities of its competitors, making China insist on challenging the United States and become a major naval power. China poses a threat to

ambition which has become possible to realize due to China's economic, political and military strength. This country which has been challenging US hegemony over the Asian region and imposing a fait accompli, making the United States strengthen its relationship with the countries of the region to contain China as Beyond the South China Sea, the geographic setting favors the U.S. and its allies. Consequently, American options acting singly or in coalition with other nations, most notably Japan and Australia, remain more flexible and able to serve as a long term counterweight to Chinese force projection capabilities into the western Pacific proper ».³⁶

realize its ambition of regaining its hegemony over the South China Sea. It is a border issue that is vital to China, which refuses to compromise and renounce it. Chinese Leaders refuse to give up any area once considered to be part of the political sphere of the Middle Empire .

The Chinese government's position on the South China Sea may very well be driven by the Chinese conception of space. In Oswald Spengler's terms the Chinese conception of space is an "Urtyp", a deeply rooted cultural complex. The whole Sea is claimed as Chinese territory and a clear boundary is drawn far into the South, ignoring the chequered patchwork of claims of the ASEAN states »³⁵, that's why China is striving to become a major naval force controlling these important trade routes . An

⁸ Bernard Dorleans, (1999), « Du gaz dans l'eau.. et de l'eau dans le gaz », **Geopolitique** n: 50, p30.

⁹ Marianne Peron- Doise , Op.Cit, p 4.

¹⁰ Ibid, p iii

¹¹ Andre Vigarie, (1995), « **La chine et la géostratégie des nations** », paris, economica et institut des stratégies comparées, p 336.

¹² Paco Milhiet, (2017), « **China 's ambition in the pacific: Worldwide geopolitical issues** », Paris, institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, p 20.

¹³ Marianne Peron- Doise , Op.Cit, p 4

¹⁴ Edward Morgan, (2017), « **The importance of international law in the resolution of maritime disputes in the south china sea** », Australia the Institute for Regional Security, p 8.

¹⁵ Ye Ming, « Les relations contradictoires entre la chine et le japon: interdependance economique et crispation politiques » www.infoguerre.com

¹⁶ Jihyun Kim, (2015), « Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea : Implications for Security in Asia and Beyond, **Strategic Studies**, p 119.

¹⁷ Marianne Peron- Doise , Op.Cit, p 3.

¹⁸ Ibid p 3.

¹⁹ International Crisis Group, (2016), « Stirring up the South China Sea : Oil in troubled waters **Asia Report**, n°275 | 26 January, p 8.

¹ Hans-Dieter Evers,(2014), **Governing Maritime Space: The South China Sea as a Mediterranean Cultural Area**, Center for Development Research, University of Bonn, **Working Paper**, n : 129,p 1.

² David Criekemans,(2017), **Towards a solution for the increasing tensions in the South China Sea?**, Vereniging voor de Verenigde Naties ; p 3.

³ Martin D Mitchell,(2016) , **The South China Sea: A Geopolitical Analysis**, **Journal of Geography and Geology**, Vol. 8, No. 3, p 15.

⁴ Ibid. p 9

⁵ A paper of two geographical scientists, K. O. Emery from University of South California and Hiroshi Niino from Tokyo University of Fisheries, published a paper named Sediments of the Gulf of Thailand and Adjacent Continental Shelf.

⁶ Xinhui Zhong ,(2013), « **The gaming among china ; the philippines and the US in the south china sea disputes** », TES, Aalborg University, Denmark, , pp 26-27.

⁷ Marianne Peron- Doise, (2017), « The south china sea : a maritime geography of latent conflictuality, **reaserch paper** :n 44 paris école militaire, p 2.

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- ²⁰ Qian wenrong, (1996), « La sécurité de la région Asie- pacifique », **Défense nationale**, p 99.
- ²¹ Agus Rustand, (2016), « **The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to enhance its policies in order to achieve resolution** », Australia, The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, p 10.
- ²² David Crikemans, Op.Cit, p 7
- ²³ Marianne Peron- Doise , Op.Cit, p 8.
- ²⁴ Agus Rustandi Op.Cit, p 8.
- ²⁵ *Clive Schofield* Legal and Geographical Implications of the South China Sea Arbitration, **National Asian Security Studies Program** n 5.1 decembre 2016, p 4.
- ²⁶ David Crikemans, Op.Cit p 7.
- ²⁷ Paco Milhiet, Op.Cit, pp 2-3.
- ²⁸ Marianne Peron- Doise, Op.Cit , p 4.
- ²⁹ Jihyun Kim,Op.Cit, p 115.
- ³⁰ Martin D Mitchell ,Op.Cit, p 20.
- ³¹ Ibid, p 19.
- ³² Ibid, p 7.
- ³³ Martin D Mitchell ,Op.Cit, p 19.
- ³⁴ Marius Grinius, (2016), « **South China Sea and the New Great Game**, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, p 6.
- ³⁵ Hans-Dieter Evers, (2014), « Governing Maritime Space: The South China Sea as a Mediterranean Cultural Area, Center for Development Research, University of Bonn, **Working Paper**, n : 129, p 16.
- ³⁶ Martin D Mitchell ,Op.Cit, p 14.